Modern Germany in relation to the great war

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MODERN GERMANY

1

M O

G E R M ri N X

IN RELATION TO
THE GREAT WAR

BY VARIOUS GERMAN WRITERS
TRANSLATED BY

WILLIAM WALLACE WHITELOCK

A.B.y Johns Hopkint Unhrenity
Ph.D., University of Munich

®

NEW YORK
MITCHELL KENNERLEY

1916

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PRINTED IN AMERICA

CONTENTS

KAOX
IMTKODXrcnON 3

■

BOOK I— GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE WORLD

«BAFTSR

^ I. GEXMANY AND TBZ WOSLD POWEBS, BY PS0VES90S OTTO HIMTZE, OF

THE UNIVESaiTy or BEXUM 9

n. XBB SFUZT of OSXMAN BTVLTUR^ by FB,0FESS<» ERNST TBOSLTSCB,

OF THE UNIVEESiry OF BERLIN 56

^m. GEXHANY'S INTEXNATIONAL economic POSITION, BY PROFESSOR HER-
MANN SCHUMACHER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 89

IV. GERMANY'S COLONIAL POUCY, BY DR. WILESLM SOLF, SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR THE COLONIES I4I

V. THE GERMAN MILITARY SYSTEM, BY PROFESSOR HANS DELBRUCK, OF

IBE UKIVXRSXTY OF BERLIN 169

VI. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF GERMAN INSTITUTIONS, BY PROFESSOR

GUSTAV VON SCBMOLLER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 184

'Vn. THE SPIRIT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY, BY DR. HANS LUTHER,

CITY COUNCILLOR OF BERLIN 2X8

BOOK II— GERMANY'S ALLIES

I. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

A. THE INNER STRUCTURE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MON-

ARCHY, BY PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH TEZNER, OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA 237

B. ATTSTRIA-HUNGARY'S foreign policy, by PROFESSOR OTTO-

CAR WEBER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PRAGUE 246

n. TURKEY, BY PROFESSOR CARL BECKER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 265

BOOK m— OUR ENEMIES' POLICY OF FORCE

^ I. ENGLAND'S POLICY OF FORCE, BY PROFESSOR ERICH MARCKS, OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH 293

rL FRANCE'S POLICY OF FORCE, BY PROFESSOR PAUL DARMSTADTER, OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF GOTTINGEN 318

CONTENTS

CHAPTER pAflK

m. BELGIUM AND THE GSEAT POWESS, BY PROFESSOR KAKL HAICPE, OF

THE UNIVEHSITY OF HEIDELBERG 34O

IV. RUSSIA AND PAN-SLAVISM, BY PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA 381

V. SERBIA'S r6lE, BY PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF THE UNIVER-
SITY OF VIENNA 410

VI. THE GREAT POWERS IN EAST ASIA, BY PROFESSOR OTTO FRANKE, OF

THE COLONIAL INSTITUTE OF HAMBURG 43O

BOOK IV— THE CAUSES AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

I. THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE WORLD WAR, BY PROFESSOR HER-
MANN ONCKEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 443

n. THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR, BY PROFESSOR HERMANN ONCKEN, OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 508

m. BELGIUM'S NEX7TRALITY, BY PROFESSOR WALTER SCHOENBORN, OF THE

X7NIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG 53I

BOOK V— THE SPIRIT OF THE WAR

I. KUL TVR, THE POUCY OF POWER AND MILITARISM, BY PROFESSOR FRIED-
RICH MEINECKE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 559

n. THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, BY PROFESSOR ERNST ZITEL^

MANN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN 584

m. THE MEANING OF THE WAR, BY PROFESSOR OTIO HINTZE, OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 615

MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK 635

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This book is a translation of Deutschland und der IFeltkrieg,
which was pubh'shed in Germany in 191 5. It is a collection
of essays by a number of leaders of thought in modern Ger-
many, and in each case the man is a master of the subject he
is chosen to discuss. The writers are, in nearly every instance,
professors in German and Austrian Universities, many of them
past or present servants of the state in certain capacities in their
university work; the exceptional instances are government officials
who are in charge of the state activities about which they write.

The various chapters, which go to make up the book as a whole,
were completed, for the most part, in March of 1915. At that
time Italy had not seceded from the Triple Alliance, and entered
into the war on the side of the Allies ; and for that reason Italy
has not been included in the discussion of the war, except in
references in footnotes. The effect, therefore, has been that
Italy is treated as a neutral state.

A literal rendering of the title of the book, of course, would
be Germany and the World War, The book, however, is very
much more than a discussion of Germany and the world war. It
is a presentation of the civilization or Kultur of Germany and
Austria-Hungary in our modern civilization ; of Germany's posi-
tion in the world-order, and of what Germany is striving toward
today. It reveals, as does no other book available, the historical,
cultural and social foundations of modern Germany — ^the mind
of Germany at work. It shows us the things Germany is doing
and antidpating, in the fields of science, industry, and social and
state functions, the significant and important things that are
implied in German Kultur, and how this great urge arose out of
the very springs of the life of the Teutonic peoples and was
determined by the necessities of a growing nation in a circum-
scribed territory.

While the title of the book is Germany and the World War,
and while of course the war in most of its varying phases is
dealt with in many of the chapters, it is perhaps well to call
attention to the fact that the war is of secondary importance
to the general purpose of the book, which is to reveal and express
Germany to the world in terms of German civilization and
German social vision.

4 INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The book is an outgrowth of the conclusion reached by die
highest intellects in Germany that Germany and Germany's
aims ought to be interpreted to the world with honesty and
understanding. The leaders of Gennan diought were agreed
that Germany owed it to herself as a duty to interpret herself
to the world, and diey undertook the task in that spirit* This
book, therefore, growing out of such an agreement and determi-
nation, represents the best expression of German thought to-day.

There are certain details to which attention must be called
in which this translation varies from the original German book.

First, the little foreword to the German book, addressed to the
German public, and possessing no value to American readers, has
been omitted, and, in its place, has been substituted this introduc-
tory note endeavoring briefly to indicate the spirit of the book, and
its importance and value to American readers.

Secondly, the chapter in the German edition of the book enti-
tled Krieff und Menschltchkeit Bearbeitet auf Grund amtlichem
Materials ("War and Humanity, Prepared From Oflicial Pa-
pers") has been omitted. It is a record and an interpretation
of official papers which are already sufficiently known to Ameri-
can readers; and in effect a restatement of the attitude of Ger-
many on questions of international law which are thoroughly
discussed in the chapter included herein entitled "The War and
International Law." The value of this book does not lie in
official papers so much as it does in the fact that it is an expression
of the view taken, by German philosophers, of Germany in rela-
tion to our world of to-day.

Thirdly, a great many footnotes in the original book have
been omitted from this American edition. It is a habit of the
very learned, especially of the German philosopher, in his desire
to be comprehensive and even encyclopedic, to use footnotes to
a greater extent than is customary in America, except perhaps in
scientific, legal and technical publications. In some instances
the matter in the footnotes has been incorporated in the text
For the most part, however, all footnotes that give authority for
statements of fact or that give the source of quotations, have been
included. lii cases where the subject of die footnote, or the
publication quoted, is already known in America, the footnotes
have been omitted. The rule has been merely to use footnotes
to give sources of information and authority not readily available
to the American reader, and in many cases explications of the
book or publication cited are given.

In one instance the variation from the original is in new
matter included in this edition. The chapter entided "Gcr-

INTRODUCTORY NOTE s

many's International Economic Position/' by Professor Hermann
Schimiacher, was written, in common with the rest of the book,
at the beginning of 191 5; but at the time this translation was
in preparation there was available much more complete, as well
as later, information in relation to loans and other details of
finance and economics, and this later information has been gath-
ered and incorporated in this chapter under direct authority of
Professor Schumacher.

Another matter to which it is perhaps well that attention
be called is the use of one or two German terms in the trans-
lation. The chief instance of this is in the retention of the Ger-
man word Kultur. This word, in its German significance, in its
indusiveness, expressing as it does the German attitude toward
race development, is essentially untranslatable. It would have
been necessary to use an entire phrase to render its meaning in
English. In its German form, however, the word Kultur has
come to have for Americans something of its true German sig-
nificance.

In certain instances the word Kultur has been used in relation
to the civilization and racial progression of other peoples, such
as those of France, England and Belgium. In these cases the
word has been adopted in the English version because it is used
in the German sense, embracing so many things in these civiliza-
tions, and thus seemed to express the meaning more satisfactorily
than an English equivalent.

Kultur — the true significance of that misinterpreted word, and
all that it means to the German people, is thoroughly revealed
in the second chapter in the book entitled *'The Spirit of Ger-
man Kultur,'* by Professor Ernst Troeltsch.

The word Dreibund is used in this English version to provide
against the possible and quite easy confusion of the Triple Alli-
ance and the Triple Entente.

In these remarks it has been kept in mind that the chief pur-
pose of this book is to interpret Germany, but it is perhaps well
to remember that the book also seeks to interpret Germany's
allies, and especially Austria-Hiuigary, to the world, and, in this
translation, to America.

BOOK I

GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE

WORLD

:RN GERMANY

MODERN GERMANY

CHAPTER I
GERMANY AND THE WORLD POWERS

PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN

Germany's Historical-Political Growth

THE political character of Germany is frequently misunder-
stood in foreign countries, and Germany falsely judged in
consequence. In America, especially, 'there is an inclination to
adopt the English viewpoint, and to measure Germany according
to the standards of a state existing under diametrically opposed
conditions. The statement is scarcely open to challenge that the
spirit and character of a nation depend not alone upon its in-
ternal social structure, but in even greater degree upon the politi-
cal necessities that spring from its geographical position and its
relation to other states and Powers; but, in judging Germany,
this truth has generally been lost sight of.

The bases for a secure national existence are quite other on
the European Continent than in England or America. In the
latter countries the nation pursues its course in relative seclu-
sion, protected by the sea and undisturbed by the immediate
neighborhood of equally powerful states whose enmity may,
under given conditions, become a serious menace; on the Euro-
pean Continent, on the other hand, in a space approximately
equal to the territory of the United States, are crowded to-
gether five Great Powers, besides a dozen smaller states, most
of them saturated with ancient traditions and civilization, all
armed to the teeth, and all filled with an intense longing for
national independence and power, that finds expression in jeal-
ously guarded borders and in uncompromising agricultural and
politico-military competition. The very spirit of international
relations in the different countries is to a great degree influenced
by these difiFering life conditions. Neither Englishmen nor

lo -•»— ,«^ 4ANY

Americans have ever been f orceCi ^ y keep so watchful an eye on
their neighbors or to observe so carefully as we the change of
pressure in the gauge of international politics, caused by military
preparations and diplomatic moves. In the feeling of relative
security, instead of having to protect their borders, they have
been free to devote themselves to the advancement of their wel-
fare, and to make their commercial interests the pivot of their
political activity. The Continental states of Europe, on the other
hand, are filled with a spirit of suspicion and rivalry, that leads
then^ l;o . regard a strong military organization as the absolute
prerequisite to their national safety, and hence to their prosperity
and civilization. Germany in especial is subject to so relentless a
politico-military pressure on her borders that, before all things^
she is forced, through the imperative law of self-preservation, so
to strengthen herself in a military sense as to be able, in case of
necessity, to maintain herself in the face of a world of enemies.

France is free from danger on the Pyrenean border, while to
the west she is protected by the sea. Russia enjoys on the Asiatic
side, as well as toward the north and south, not alone perfect
security, but more or less favorable opportunity for expansion.
Each of these states has but one border to protect. Germany
must protect herself on two borders, east and west, and were it
not for the alliance with Austria-Hungary, she would be imper-
iled on still a third side. This position of our country, in the
centre of Europe, without other natural boundaries than those
furnished by the sea-coast on the north and by the Alps and the
border mountains of Bohemia on the south, is the decisive factor
in our political geography ; nor would it be difficult to trace much
of our peculiar political character to this source: not alone the
monarchic-military basis in the structure of the state and the
framework of our national life, but likewise the indisputable but
often misunderstood and distorted fact that our potential military
strength can be called forth in its entirety only for defense, not
for attack.

Our intellectual life, also, is plainly under the influence of
this central geographical position. Many good points as well as
many weaknesses of our national character result from it: our
open mind for foreign art and foreign ideas; our receptiveness to
the good and beautiful, without regard to its national source;
a cosmopolitan spirit ever ready to hearken to the call of other
nations and whose dream is of a republic of letters ; a frequently
exaggerated recognition of, and admiration for, the characteris-
tics and accomplishments of other peoples ; a facility in the adop-
tion of their customs and manners; an extreme, one might almost

MODERN GERMANY n

say, unworthy, delight in foreign words and things, which mars
the noble simplicity of a truly national style in speech and life.
In the last analysis, this results from the fact that ours is the
central European country and nation, open in all directions to
the outside world, at no point thrown back upon itself through
the existence of natural boundaries, as, for example, is England
in her insular position. The latter country, with its immoder-
ately developed individuality, is not alone incapable of sympa-
thetic and deep study of foreign character, but is all too prompt,
without other than superficial understanding, to criticize and be-
smirch the character of other nations, as at the present moment
that of the Germans, when political and commercial advantage is
to be gained thereby. And here again oUr peculiar geographical
position leads to a manifold echoing of this malevolent censure.
Let us be under no misapprehension : the number of Germany's
friends is small, the number of her enemies, even in neutral
countries, is large. Foreign observers have sought to explain this
widespread and regrettable dislike of us by the fact that in inter-
course with representatives of other nations Germans often exhibit
an exaggerated self-consciousness, accompanied by bad manners,
that betrays the parvenu. As opposed to this view, may be cited
the not uncommon experience that our fellow-countrymen are only
too inclined, when abroad, to adopt the foreign manner of life,
as though it were superior to their own. On the other hand,
we have no desire to deny the fact that the German, ever ab-
sorbed with the essence of things, rather than with the form,
not infrequently neglects to present his own personality in a
favorable manner; as a result, his ofttimes more or less uncon-
ventional exterior makes a less pleasing impression than that
resulting from the polished courtesy of the Frenchman — which,
however, promptly ceases with the stirring of chauvinism — or than
that made by die firm though somewhat tiresome manners of the
Englishman. There may, therefore, be some truth in this re-
proach, although the spitefully exaggerated form in which it is
generally presented renders it as untrue as are other sweeping
judgments of the character of entire nations numbering millions.
But only grudging ill-will can be satisfied with this explanation.
More important is the justification for aversion which the advo-
cates of democratic principles, whose influence is dominant in
the majt>rity of countries, discover in our institutions. They fail
to find their personal ideal of political freedom realized in Ger-
many, especially in Prussia, owing to the fact that with us the
monarchic military authority has not yet surrendered to the civil
or social-democratic majority. This consideration, to be sure,

12 MODERN GERMANY

has in no wise prevented our enemies from sympathizing with
Russian despotism. I would recommend for their perusal cer-
tain passages in Sir Robert Seeley's political lectures. The tend-
ency there is to show that conceptions of political freedom
di£Eer and that the outward form of a government must be
adapted to the vital political requirements of the state. A nation
which, like the German, is surrounded on all sides by the strong-
est military powers, without natural protective boundaries, can-
not have the same institutions as England in her insular security.
The degree of political freedom permissible in the forms of
government must evidently be inversely proportional to the
political and military pressure exerted against die boundaries of
the state. Disregard of this rule entails upon a country the
iate of Poland in the eighteenth century, when that state paid
for undue freedom from political restrictions with its national
existence. We Germans, on the other hand, enjoy an intel-
lectual and personal freedom by no means inferior to that of
Englishmen or Americans, but which, in some re^>ects, is su-
perior. And the fact that our form of government is neither
parliamentary nor republican should awaken in the breasts of
members of those nations who are capable of political judgment
merely the perception that the national requirements under which
we live are different from their own; it should not be a cause
either for dislike or contempt. Tolerance, not only in religious
but also in political life, is a virtue that is generally the result
of a higher capacity for discrimination and the lack of which
gives proof only of vulgar narrow-mindedness and mental limi-
tations.

The fact that we Germans are less favorably criticized in the
press and by public opinion in foreign lands than either the
English or French is in great part to be explained, furthermore,
by the circumstance that we are in a lesser degree the creditors of
other nations than they, and that we have lacked their skill in
purchasing the venal press of the various countries. Even in
regard to Russia, mental and verbal criticism is less severe where
the power of the ruble is felt than where it is absent. Within
the Empire we are in the habit of devoting our money to our
own undertakings, and our education in conceptions of honor
and incorruptibility has been too uncompromising for us to under-
stand, in the manner of Englishmen, Frenchmen and Russians,
the art of influencing public opinion in our favor. Democratic
parliamentarism is in this respect as greatly our superior as is
Russian bureaucracy.

The principal cause, however, of the dislike of Germans, is

MODERN GERMANY 13

generally overlooked. It lies in the simple circumstance that we
live at the centre of Europe and have more neighbors than
any other nation. Propinquity, in vievir of the tension in inter-
national relations, is generally synonymous with rivalry or
enmity. So deep a feeling of distrust, of fear, of covetousness,
of race-antagonism, and of a perhaps even sharper enmity of kin-
dred peoples and races, are bound up in our thousand-year-old
history with this sense of nearness, so many motives of envy, jeal-
ousy, of implacable desire for revenge, that such an excess of
malevolence must, in the end, inevitably pass beyond our neigh-
bors and exert its influence also upon distant peoples. The fact
that Englishmen in this respect are more fortunate is due neither
to their greater amiability nor to their superior manners — ^the
latter, we believe, are open to a good deal of criticism — nor is it
due to their old and established reputation as a European Power,
nor to the respect paid to their political institutions, that have
served as models for so many nations. In great part it results
simply from the aristocratic exclusiveness of their position in
Europe, like that of some dweller in a private manor, whereby
they are removed from the countless frictions and misunderstand-
ings to which Germans, living as it were in the midst of an over-
crowded tenement, are exposed a thousand times daily.

This fact cannot be sufficiently emphasized: Our historico-
political destiny lies in our geographical position. Living at the
centre of the Continent, surrounded by Slav and Romance peo-
ples, as well as by remnants of Germanic races, we find ourselves
forced to maintain an attitude of self-reliance calculated to in-
spire respect, if we wish to escape being trodden down and
crushed in the struggle of nations — as unfortunately was our
fate for so many centuries.

In former times, before the cr3rstallization of eiiective national
consciousness and while the sen^ of religious unity formed a
strong political bond among the undeveloped peoples of Chris-
tian Europe, this central position, together with the lack of
strong natural boundaries, may possibly have operated as a fac-
tor favorable to the spread of the German race and to its influ-
ence in the world. In the south, the gentle approaches to
the Alps lured ever onward across the mountains, in contrast
to their abrupt descent on the Italian side. During the
Middle Ages the German emperors were the standard-bearers
of the idea of a universal Christian Empire, which for centuries
furnished the basis for European civilization. This was the
real imperial epoch of our history. It lies buried in the distant
past; but we may be permitted to recall it, to recall its heroic

V

14 MODERN GERMANY

splendor and its contribution to civilization, when other nations
are disposed to see in Germany the upstart among the European
congeries of states. Our emperors marched at the head of their
German legions toward Rome, whence they directed the des-
tinies of the Christian world, at a time when the tottering An-
glo-Saxon monarchy was about to fall a victim to a handful of
Norman raiders, when the Capetians were but beginning to
conquer for themselves a modest local authority in the Isle de
France J and when Russia still lay shrouded in the obscurity of
pre-historical barbarism. The German nation was at that time
the exponent of the great ideas which controlled the world;
but for its own national future it failed to provide. The neces-
sity of maintaining a firm grasp on Italy, and if possible on
Burgundy, the great struggle between emperor and pope that
resulted therefrom — all these were factors which prevented
Germany from laying a firm national foundation, such as Eng-
land and France were preparing for themselves during this
long period of strife. The princes of the Empire gained an
unduly powerful, semi-independent position, the empire itself
fell to pieces, and with the coming of the Reformation — that
drew its best strength from Germany and found its greatest pro-
tagonist in the person of a German — the political powers in
the Empire were too weak either to smother the movement or to
carry it to complete triumph. The religious dispute split the
nation permanently and completed its political disintegration.
While religious freedom and tolerance gradually, and as the
'fruit of Bitter strife, gained the upper hand, political power was
lost, precisely at the moment when the European system of
states was in process of formation. Two remnants only of the
German people, Austria and Prussia, achieved or maintained
the position of Great Powers. But Austria was too heavily
handicapped with non-German territory and clung too tena-
ciously to an all-embracing Catholicism permanently to retain the
leadership of the German people. The future of Germany de-
pended rather on Prussia, even at a time when the Hohen-
zollern rulers had not yet begun to dream of a universal Ger-
man polity.

But only through unexampled energy and economy of its
military and financial resources was Prussia able, in the midst
of the European states, to raise itself to independence and power.
It was compelled to assume a political structure consonant with
the conditions under which it had arisen, and to adapt itself to
general political conditions and to the resulting requirements.
Hence the origin of so-called Prussian militarism. It is a form

MODERN GERMANY 15

of government which does not seek primarily the comfort and
happiness of the individual, but rather the power and great-
ness of the state, since without the latter, general prosperity can-
not be regarded as secure. This system has made the rela-
tively large standing army the backbone of a central adminis-
tration that takes cognizance of every man and every penny, that
teaches self-denial, order and conscientiousness in civil as well
as military life, and that has accustomed its citizens rather to
fulfill their political duties than to aim at the increase of their
political rights. It safeguarded the intellectual freedom of the
individual at an earlier period than any other European govern-
ment. The "Common Law" of the Prussian state, which came
into being during the period of the promulgation of the Ameri-
can constitution and of the French Revolution, contains the
fundamental guarantee of the most important personal rights,
such as religious freedom, personal liberty and security of prop-
erty against unlawful administrative encroachment. The di£Eer-
ence is that there was no question here of the promulgation of the
universal rights of man — it was simply a codification of limita-
tions which the state had voluntarily imposed upon itself in its
relations with its subjects during the "age of enlightenment."
Public education and enlightenment have been so successfully
advanced under the system of Prussian militarism that to-day
the state is practically without illiterates, and like the other
German states in this respect it leads all- other great countries
of the world, notably France and England, not to speak of
Russia. This system of government, which has by no means
been inimical to the conceptions of true freedom, despite its com-
pulsion to order and the fulfilment of duty, has proved itself
highly adaptable to the transition from enlightened absolutism
to the modern constitutional state, with parliamentary control,
freedom of the press, the right of assemblage and a healthy form
of local self-government. It has developed the fundamental
conception of the equality of citizens before the law; in a
much higher degree than -usually assumed, it has made a reality
of Chancellor Hardenberg's demand of 1807: "Democratic in-
stitutions under a monarchical form of government." But it
opposes a transformation that would place the government iu
the hands of changing majorities and subject the army to corrupt
parliamentary influences — a statement true not alone of Prussia,
but of entire Germany. France may indulge in such experiments ;
our position is too precarious to admit of the attempt.

Since the time of Frederick the Great, the Prxissian name has
enjoyed respect and consideration throughout Germany. Goethe

i6 MODERN GERMANY

speaks approvingly of the "worth, dignity and perseverance of
the Prussians." Since the enthusiastic revolt against Napoleon
in 1813, since the impressive sacrifices and achievements of the
Wars of Liberation from 1813 to 181 5, in the eyes of German
patriots Prussia has stood as the future leader in the struggle
for German unity. Unfortunately, this unity could be achieved
only through separation from the kindred German races of
Austria; but the painful operation that severed the Hapsburg
Dual Monarchy from the German Empire was nevertheless in
the final analysis salutary. It rendered possible a permanent in-
ternational union of the two powers, much closer and freer from
misunderstandings and rivalries than would have been the case
had the old political bond been renewed by means of a loose
and artificial federation. Even without such a formal union>
Germany and Austria-Hungary are united for better or for
worse. Mutually they uphold and support each other in their
positions as great World Powers. But Prussia is, in its relations
to the outside world, an absolute unit with the rest of Germany.

Foreigners find difficulty in grasping the political peculiari-
ties of the German Empire, since this is possible only when seen
against the background of the country's complicated history.
Even such distorted views are encountered as that the other
German states have been conquered by Prussia and forced into
the union. The only force exercised in this connection was that
which existed in the will of the people and in the historico-po-
litical necessity of the moment driving them toward unity.
There is between Prussia and the other federal states no greater
opposition than, for example, between Massachusetts and Vir-
ginia. To speak of "Prussia" and "Germany" in antithesis is
misleading. This mode of expression dates from the period of
the Confederation of the Rhine, when the German states other
than Prussia and Austria which were under the immediate pro-
tection of Napoleon, were pleased to call themselves "the real
Germany." It is rooted in the thoroughly mistaken conception
of a fundamental di£Eerence between Prussia and Saxony or Ba-
varia or Wiirttemberg, in regard to race and civilization. There
are, to be sure, racial differences within the boundaries of Prus-
sia, as within those of the rest of Germany, but they serve to
enrich rather than to impoverish the national life, and retard
in no wise the fusing of all into a unified whole. In the eigh-
teenth century, at the time of Goethe and Nicolai, it may still
have been possible to speak of an antithesis in the intellectual
life and culture of Weimar and Berlin; but since the days of
Humboldt, Fichte and Schleiermacher this antithesis has been

MODERN] (SERMANY 17

eliminated. The various currents of German life have united and
merged to form a fuller and stronger stream. The thought and
culture of the German people is to-day quite the same in Berliit
as in Weimar, Munich, or Heidelberg. The endless variety of
provincial peculiarities are reconciled to form one great whole
through the bond of a common national interest. The industrial
west and the agrarian east, despite their difference in customs
and social structure, long since perceived their mutual interde-
pendence and realized that only in union could they hope to
survive. Great civic republics and centres of trade, like Ham-
burg and Bremen, feel themselves to be integral parts of thb
national civic and economic federation, in the same manner as
the agricultural territories of Bavaria, Hanover and Oldenburg.
The inhabitants of the southern and central mountain districts,
whence our rivers find their way to the sea, look with precisely
the same pride upon the flag at the masthead of our ships of
war and commerce as do the North-Germans of the plains and
sea-coast. Everywhere, together with self-conscious pride in
characteristic local peculiarities, is to be found in the same bos-
oms the realization and conviction that only in a firm and har-
monious union of all the racial stems and provinces are freedom,
prosperity and power to be secured for the German people. The
significance of Prussia for the German Empire lies in the fact
that her firm poh'tical structure, welded upon the anvil of neces-
sity, has furnished the strong backbone for the new national or-
ganism. Prussia's political spirit has become the spirit of the
new German Empire. Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Saxony fight
for the same national possessions with the same patriotic devo-
tion as the men from Brandenburg, Pomerania and East
Prussia.

The unifying of Germany and the formation of the Empire
was not possible by peaceful means. These blessings had to be
gained upon the field of battle against the opposition of power-
ful European states; for, in view of our central geographical po-
sition, a fundamental change in international relationships was
thereby brought about. The new order, therefore, was not to
be achieved merely as the result of a national movement, through
patriotic gatherings and manifestoes — ^what was required to real-
ize it, was a bold and far-sighted policy, under monarchical guid-
ance and with military emphasis. This fundamental considera-
tion gives the key to the whole form of our national existence.
Conditions being thus, Prussia, as the strongest German state,
was called upon to assume and retain the leadership; and the
Prussian government found itself forced in secret to gather mill-

i8 MODERN GERMANY

tary strength for this great task, in the face of the keenest oppo-
sition by the democratic parties. From this fact arose the neces-
sity of emphasizing strongly the monarchic-mih'tary factor in
Prussian life, and of making it secure for the future against par-
liamentary majorities. The leadership of the Empire could be
given into the keeping of no other hands than those which ruled
Prussia. Therefore the Kaiser, invested with the uncurtailed
power of a genuinely ruling Prussian king, stands to-day at the
head of the federated governments of the Empire. The impor-
tance of the Bundesrat, or Federal Council, is frequently under-
estimated abroad, as its activity does not force itself on the
public ; but since the founding of the Empire its federative char-
acter has remained intact. Germany is a federal state, with
strongly marked characteristics and self-consciousness in its indi-
vidual members. The tendency toward unity is perhaps less
strong than in the North American Union. The far-reaching
administrative decentralization in this form of constitution needs
as a counter-balance a strong and uniform direction in the conduct
of its foreign policy, and this must of necessity be placed in the
keeping of the Emperor, acting under the advice of the Imperial
Chancellor.

The Empire is thus provided with a strong monarchic head;
nor is the power of the Emperor or that of the King of Prussia
the impersonal shadowy prerogative of a parliamentary ruler —
it is a real, living, directing force. In the minds of foreigners
the conception of a personal government is generally bound up
with the picture of arbitrary power, lawlessness and despotism.
They are too unfamiliar with our history and the spirit of our
institutions to understand that a free constitution and a strong
monarchic power are by no means irreconcilable. The English
constitution is based upon the fact that the various classes of
society, under the leadership of the aristocracy, succeeded in re-
ducing the royal power to a state of impotence. Conversely* our
constitution has crystallized about the monarchy as a centre,
around which the various classes of society — nobles, burghers
and peasants, and in addition already a considerable percentage
of workingmen — ^have formed themselves in a body, the whole
permeated and held together by the different elements of the
civil service and the officers and the army in general. This in-
ner growth of our organic political life is still in process of de-
velopment, and is now, under the influence of the present great
events, approaching a happy consummation. Our rulers declare
themselves to be such "by the grace of God," but not in the
sense in which Englishmen understand the notorious jure divino

MODERN GERMANY £19

of the Stuart kings. The meaning of this characterization from
the viewpoint of political law is simply that the royal power was
not granted by die people, but that it rests upon ancient, his-
torical right diat has grown and ripened coincident with our
history, thus proceeding from a combination of factors which
piety may be inclined to ascribe to a higher dispensation. Ex-
alted, mystic conceptions, such, for example, as those indulged
in by Frederick William IV, arc of a purely subjective, indi-
vidual nature and without the faintest constitutional significance.
The monarch is not, in our eyes, the representative of God upon
earth, but merely, as Frederick the Great expressed it, the first
servant of the state. And when William II takes pleasure in
acknowledging himself to be the instrument of the Most High,
this is intended in no other sense than might be employed in the
religious conception of any other calling. It intensifies moral
elevation and the sense of responsibility, but does not in any
manner touch constitutional prerogatives.

By the side of the Emperor and the federated governments
stands the Reichstag, a representative body of the German people,
resting upon the broadest democratic basis, with whom the former
powers must agree on such matters as the appropriations for army
and navy and the levy of indirect taxes and customs duties. But
universal, direct, equal suffrage, with secret ballot, which is the
basis of diis parliamentary body, could not with equal justice be
claimed for the Prussian legislature. In the Empire equal suffrage
rights may be regarded as the corresponding equivalent of the
universal duty to bear arms and of the burden of universal in-
direct taxation. In Prussia, on the contrary, where the Land-
tag, or legislature, decides on questions of direct taxation, from
which a large part of the electors are exempt, such equal rights
might, at times, lead tp serious injustice. It must, nevertheless,
be admitted that the present arrangement, which rests upon the
principle of a sufiFrage graduated according to tax liability, has
with the passage of time degenerated in favor of plutocracy and
is in need of a thorough revision. Absolute universal suffrage,
however — ^which, by the way, has not yet been realized even in
England — ^is not practicable in Prussia, for the reason that par-
liamentary friction could not be still further increased without
seriously disturbing the smooth working of our already highly
complicated governmental machine. Government with us is
more difficult than in parliamentary states, or than in such states
as recognize the separation of the various powers, as in America.
Our German governments are forced to resort to compromises
with the various political parties, in order to gain a majority to

^o MODERN GERMANY

support them in the main outlines of their poliqr. Transcen-
dental government (above parties) presupposes a much higher
degree of knowledge, application and skill on the part of respon-
sible circles than government by means of party rule. In Prussia
it is, nevertheless, necessary to have a government that stands
above parties, not alone for the reasons already given, which
spring from our peculiar political position, but owing to the
nature of the parties themselves. The division of the various
factions has been carried much further with us than in England
or America; the divergence of principles is sharper, the spirit of
criticism is much more highly developed than is the actual ad-
ministrative ability. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to
say that the German parliamentary parties represent rather the
various interests of civil society than real political ideas or prin^
ciples. With these social interests, however, are bound up op-
posing views of religion, of cosmic conceptions and of nationality
in so complicated a manner as scarcely to be understood by a
foreigner.

Closer examination of the various sections of the Conserva-
tives and Liberals need not be entered upon here; but some
observations seem appropriate in regard to parties like the Centre
and the Social Democrats, which may be characterized ad
international and which in fact form the complement to the
pronounced nationalistic side of our public life. One may be
permitted to characterize the ideals which they represent as "su-
pemational." These two political parties are a palpable mani-
festation of the ineradicable cosmopolitan idealism that is inher-
ent in German blood. The ideal of the Centre Party is the
unity of the Catholic Church with the Pope as leader. The
ideal of Social Democracy is the brotherhood of the working
classes of all countries, the triumph of labor over capital, of the
cooperative system of organization over that of a master class —
in the last analysis, the metamorphosis of the world into one
great cooperatively governed commonwealth of producers and
consumers. That such ideals, despite doctrinaire exaggerations,
are nevertheless quite reconcilable with stanch national convic-
tions was demonstrated long since by the Centre Party, through
its practical cooperation in parliamentary work ; while the patri-
otic attitude of the Social Democrats at the outbreak of the war
justified the opinion of those who had claimed that members
of this party were from every point of view worthy to be con-
sidered a valuable and indispensable part of the nation. It is the
party of radical opposition in all questions of domestic policy, a
natural phenomenon of reaction called forth by the strongly

MODERN GERMANY M

developed, yet politicaUy necessary, monarchic-military principle
in our form of government. The intensity of opposition is
greater than in any other state, but it is unavoidable; and, al-
though the conduct of government is thereby rendered extremely
difficult, nevertheless in many respects it has proved a benefici^
incentive to the whole body politic. Without the Sodal Demo-
cratic Party, social conscience could scarcely have been awak-
ened as has been the case* The idea of socisd justice has gained
a power in our legislation and administration that permits the
Government to take up the fight on any question of social poli-
tics with a good conscience, while it has, on the other hand, not
been without beneficial influence on the working classes. Our
legislation for the insurance of workingmen, the state-socialistic
spirit of which was at first the subject of foreign derision, is
now generally imitated, even in England, which originally
seemed furthest from such ideas. Our legislation for the pro-
tection of workingmen, for which England may be said to have
furnished the model, has gone further than the original. Eng-
lish labor commissions have been astounded by the general con-
dition and the hig^ standard of living of our workers, which is
immistakably and continually improving. The hopeless doc-
trine of the "iron law of wages" has long since been thrown
onto the scrap heap.

In no other country, taken by and large, is the system of
taxation more just than in Germany. Especially Prussia, with
its progressive income and supplementary property tax, in
this respect towers high over the French Republic We cannot^
of course, avoid social conflicts in the future, but they will
be fought out, we hope, along the lines of common national
interests, even though the international sympathies of the leaders
of labor may not entirely disappear. The workers will
perceive more and more the significance of the state for them
as for others; casting aside prejudice, they will learn to
acknowledge and appreciate more and more die Government's
spirit of justice, and the readiness of self-sacrifice of the pros-
perous classes, who in 19 13 without a murmur assumed the
burden of a defense contribution of a billion marks. And, al-
though our Social Democrats reject militarism on principle,
nevertheless in practice they are excellent soldiers. The stem
discipline of the army has raised the political and unionist or-
ganizations of our workers to an exceedingly high plane.

Less significant than the social and religious divergencies
in our party life are those of a national character, which are
bound up with certain abnormal aspects of our history. Th~

22 MODERN GERMANY

German Empire is a national state of a peculiar kind : its boun-
daries are not identical with those of the German race and of
the German language. At many points they fall considerably
short of these; at others they extend somewhat beyond them.
As early as the sixteenth century certain important outlying
portions seceded from the great German territory, coherent eth-
nologically and linguistically as it existed in the Middle Ages
at the time of the old empire, but as yet without the bond of a
common written language. This secession was due to the fact
that the centrifugal tendencies resulting from international con-
ditions were stronger than the unifying power of the weakened
and disrupted empire. Toward the southwest the Swiss fell
away in order to form, with certain Romance elements, a sepa-
rate state of strongly marked individuality; but numbering as
they do to-day more than two and a half millions, they continue
to use, in addition to their Allemanic dialect, the German lit-
erary language, and have remained in close and iminterrupted
touch with German thought. In the northwest descendants of
the Frisians and Franconians have attained not alone an inde-
pendent political existence, but have developed also an indi-
vidual language, and regard themselves as a separate people. In
addition to the six million and odd inhabitants of the Protestant
Netherlands, under this classification are to be reckoned nearly
four millions of Flemish residents in Belgium. Besides the
above loss through segregation of boundary districts, many mil-
lions of Germans have been lost to the Fatherland by the exten-
sive colonization of former times, and especially through the
prodigious emigration of the last century. They are to be
found in Transylvania and Hungary, in Russia, and above all
in the United States, all of which received during the nineteenth
century an influx reckoned by millions, that brought to them a
valuable Teutonic element in the upbuilding of their national
life.

The formation of the German Empire and the resulting eco-
nomic prosperity has gradually served to check this feverish
movement toward foreign countries. But the political rebirth
of Germany was not accomplished without an extremely serious
and significant loss of Teutonic national territory: the Grermans
of Austria, living in immediate contact with their brothers of
the neighboring land, were excluded from the boundaries of the
Empire. They number to-day approximately ten millions, and
belong to us through language and education. Their sympa-
thies strengrfien the bond that unites us to the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy.

MODERN GERMANY 23

These kindred German elements on foreign territory, how-
ever, have never served as an excuse for a poliqr of "irrcden-
tism'' on our part. Political considerations and also, to an
extent, the emphatic disinclination of these disrupted border
remnants of our nation, have always precluded such plans from
being entertained by serious and responsible politicians in Ger-
many. Our sympathies naturally extend to our fellow-country-
men in other lands, especially to those who, surrounded by
foreign elements, are in danger of losing their national charac-
teristics. We strive to aid them to maintain the German
language, customs and education. This absolutely non-political
cultural design has been pursued for many years by the Associa-
tion for German Ideals in Foreign Countries {Ferein fur das
Deutschtum im Auslande), previously known as the German
School Association, in view of the nature of its chief activities.
The results of such an educational movement have naturally
been favorable to the standing and interests of the German
nation abroad. Valuable influence may in this manner be ex-
erted, especially upon commercial interests, for trade follows
not alone the flag, but the language as well. When on occasion,
however, nationalistic jingoes and hotspurs have overstepped
these boundaries, they have promptly not only met with an
emphatic rebuff in responsible governmental quarters, but in
addition have learned that the great majority of the leaders of
public thought will have nothing to do with such plans.

On the other hand, in the course of history the inclusion into
the German state of certain border territory with foreign ele-
ments has proved unavoidable, as in North Schleswig, in Al-
sace-Lorraine, and especially in Poland and Upper Silesja.
Such elements, however, form together only about seven per cent
of our entire population, which, according to the last census
(1910), numbered approximately sixty-five millions, and which
to-day must have reached nearly the seventy million mark. This
element, therefore, cannot be regarded as exercising any seri-
ously adverse influence on the national character of the German
Empire. An absolute separation of nationalities at the frontiers
is quite impracticable, since Germanic and foreign elements are
in many cases inextricably mixed; and the political necessity for
the inclusion of such elements is dictated by the need of a
boundary, not favorable, perhaps, but tenable from a military
point of view. In Alsace-Lorraine, where approximately two
hundred thousand of the inhabitants speak French, the national
question is complicated by the still continuing protest against
die annexation of the provinces — ^although this step was t^

24 MODERN GERMANY

result not alone of an irresistible nationalistic demand, but was
dictated by military necessity for the protection of our bound-
aries against France. It must never be forgotten that it is
here a question of former Germany territory that was illegally
torn from us at the time of our greatest weakness. Metz and
Strassburg in French control represent sally ports against Ger-
many, whereas under German dominance they are a bulwark
for the protection of our borders. Many observers are of the
opinion that the placing of these territories upon a footing of
approximate equality with other Federal States of the Empire
has proved a detriment rather than an advantage ; but other im-
partial critics declare that the process of amalgamation, con-
strained by its very nature to be slow, is progressing normally.
At all events, we are justified in the hope that the experience
of this war and the resulting elimination of the most embit-
tered nationalistic propagandists may pave the way to perma-
nent improvement and final settlement of the conditions.

The one important national problem of Prussian and German
politics is Poland. As a state Poland could not live, as a nation
it cannot die. At the time of the various divisions national sen-
timent did not yet exist. As regards the dismemberment of the
land, Prussia found herself on the horns of a dilemma. She faced
the alternative either of becoming a partner in it or of surren-
dering the entire booty to Russia, and thereby of permitting this
dangerously strengthened neightx)r to advance her boundaries
close to Berlin. The territory taken by Frederick the Great
had previously been the home of German civilization ; that added
by his successors transformed Prussia temporarily into a half-
Slavic state. In our opinion it is fortunate that the main por-
tion of these Polish provinces did not remain in Prussian pos-
session. It is a fact, however, that the Prussian Government
was desirous of retaining a larger share of these former Polish
possessions than Russia was willing to grant. The motive for
this desire was the need of a more or less satisfactory boundary
in that great plain which possesses but few natural lines of de-
fence. One must admit that the portion finally awarded to
Prussia, and which to-day forms the province of Posen, was for
this reason the very least that could be demanded. Even so,
the boundary, with the deeply encroaching Russian salient be-
tween Silesia and East Prussia, is so unfavorable, from the mili-
tary point of view, as to admit of defence only through great
superiority in numbers or in generalship. Together with this
boundary line, Prussia acquired a Polish population, whose Ger-
manizing, at that period of growing nationalistic tendencies, was

MODERN GERMANY 25

from the start practically out of the question. It numbers to-day,
with the inclusion of other elements, notably those of the more
andent Upper-Silesian stock, four millions of people, who form
a kind of separate community within the German state. The
position of Prussia is different from that of Austria in regard
to the Poles of Galicia. Prussia is and must remain a strongly
centralized and uniform state; it cannot grant to the Poles a
separate political existence, but on the contrary must see to it
that the youth of the country, who of course are subject to the
universal duty of bearing arms, do not constitute a useless for-
eign element in the German army. They must understand the
German language, and the German school and German adminis-
tration are the sole means to this end. It is mainly this necessity
that has constantly brought about fresh conflicts. There is room
for discussion as to the possible extent of concessions to be made
to nationalist feeling, but the problem is how to satisfy in a just
manner the national demands of our Polish citizens, without at
the same time losing sight of Prussian and governmental exigen-
cies. That problem up to the present no one has succeeded in
solving. The present crisis bears with especial weight upon this
sensitive point in our national and political life. The Polish
question, in view of the changes which the war has rendered
possible, must in the future be earnestly and sympathetically con-
sidered. As a factor in the outbreak of hostilities it was of no
moment, and in the struggle itself our Polish-speaking citizens
have done their full duty.

The German nation, despite its long history, is nevertheless
not an ancient race. In point of age it lies midway between
France and Russia, as do likewise Austria-Hungary and Great
Britain, although these two countries may be said to approach
the French rather than the Russian extreme. France, with an in-
crease of population of but 1.8 per thousand, shows unmistakable
signs of degenerative age; Russia, with an increase of 21 per
thousand, those of effervescent youth; while Germany, whose
increase is 13.6 per thousand, represents what may be described
as the prime of life. Perhaps we have already passed the highest
point of our increase in population — ^until 19 10 it stood at 14.5
per thousand, recently it has fallen slightly — but in any event
we stand well above the United Kingdom, which shows only
an increase of 8.7, about the same as that of Austria-Hungary*
Our increase, therefore, is about 900,000 yearly ; and only a far-
seeing and unrelaxing economic policy can solve the problem of
feeding this ever-rising population on a fixed territory. That
we have been successful is proved by the fact that emigration has

y

a6 MODERN GERMANY

steadily decreased since the eighties, until in 191 3 but 25,800
persons left the country — ^that is to say, less than accretions
through immigration. The constantly increasing capacity to sup-
port our growing population has been gained not alone through
mechanical and industrial advance, but also through the progress
of agriculture. German economic life is characterized by the
union of agriculture and manufacturing industry, not by their
opposition. But it lies in the nature of things that the results of
progress and industry are more perceptible in the manufacturing
field. In this, German energy, mature yet still youthful, mani-
fests itself very clearly. France has long since passed the
zenith of her industrial development ; she is the typical capitalistic
nation, retired from business, as it were, and living on her
savings. Russia is, in this respect also, still in youthful im-
maturity. England in recent years has seemed likewise on the
point of passing into the class represented by France. We arc
in the ascending scale; commercially also we are about to become
a World Power.

II .,

i

Character of Germany*s World Policy Contrasted with the

Imperialism of Her Enemies

At the time of the founding of the German Empire, Europe
was still the political world beyond which the eyes of its states-
men scarcely strayed. The new state became a member of the
European system, assuming the position among the Great Powers
which Prussia had hitherto held. With the resurrection of the
imperial dignity no thought was given to a revival of the old
ideas of the earlier imperialism. On the contrary, the new Em-
pire was created in conscious opposition to this ideal of the Mid-
dle Ages. The German people and its leaders had not failed
to profit by the history of a thousand years. They were fully
aware that a policy aiming at world dominion easily carries the
nation which represents it into paths of degeneration and deform-
ity, economically as well as politically. The German Empire
aimed to be nothing but an equal among the other Great Powers
of the world. The paramount prestige which it temporarily en-
joyed among the European states was only the natural effect of
the deep moral and political impression made by its remarkable
achievements and successes, and especially by the impressive per-
sonality of its great statesman. But an actual dominance, threat-

MODERN GERMANY 2/

ening the interests of other states, was not the corollary of this
prestige.

The European system has been based, from its inception, upon
the principle that the component states recognize each other's
entire independence, and that a certain number of these powers —
previously five, since the advent of Italy, six — preserve among
themselves a species of balance, so that no one of them can exer-
cise exclusive or excessive power.

This system of Great Powers, enjoying equal rights and mu-
tually respecting each other, this international commonwealth
upon which rests the European civilization of the last four hun-
dred years, is a new phenomenon in the history of mankind which
developed only during the period from the sixteenth to the nine-
teenth century. Neither the history of ancient times nor that of
the great Oriental states knows this principle of equality and of
mutual recognition in an international community of powers. It
came into existence as a result of the community of religious and
cultural interests among the states of the Christian Occident,
following the shipwreck of the imperial and papal dreams of
universal power. But this idea did not develop spontaneously
and in peaceful harmony; it was born rather of the struggles of
rivalling interests in the uninterrupted continuance of which remi-
niscences of the imperialistic idea of the Middle Ages played a
considerable part. The clashing of the tendency towards a uni-
versal monarchy with the conception of the autonomy of the na-
tions is what has called into being the European idea of the bal-
ance of power. This has proved, it is true, an uncertain bal-
ance, but the many disturbances which it has suffered have at no
time led to a permanent dominance of any one single state. This
relationship of the Powers was previously confined to the Conti-
nent of Europe. The colonial world, as well as commercial and
maritime interests, were excluded from its purview. In this field
England, the outlying member of the European system, had in
the course of the eighteenth century gained an almost exclusive
ascendency. But this condition, which had resulted concomitant
with the great development of states since the sixteenth century,
though considered unwelcome was not keenly or universally
felt to be a disturbance or menace to the balance of power, so
long as the maritime interests of the Great Powers remained too
unimportant seriously to influence the general political situation.
Not until recently did a change take place in this respect.

England's conception of the European balance of power was
to the effect that it should be the means of increasing and main-
taining her maritime ascendency. It meant that the Continental

2b8 modern GERMANY

Powers should destroy each other by constant warfare, in order
that England might have a free hand at sea and in the colonies.
Throughout the centuries of modern history it has been the
relentless principle of British policy to fight the strongest Power
of the Continent by means of the others.

The mutual rivalry of the Continental states at all times
furnished England with a convenient handle for such a policy.
Moreover, this political maxim of hers helped to prevent the
Continent from ever finding peace and to perpetuate and in-
tensify the di£ferences of the various Powers. In this connec-
tion, however, it cannot be denied that at the time of Louis
XIV and Napoleon I, Europe's balance of power and her free-
dom were seriously threatened, or even almost destroyed, and
that it was due to the assistance of England that they were
maintained and restored. Especially in the person of Napoleon
was there a decided recrudescence of the old imperial conception,
of the dream of universal monarchy. Not alone the political
exigencies resulting from the struggle with England endowed
his plans with an all-«mbracing scope looking to the subjection
of the entire European Continent; but bound up with these per-
sonal aims we find ambitions which were an inheritance from the
past of France and Europe in general, and which through the
personal lust for power of the Corsican assumed gigantic propor-
tions. But the moment which, through the cooperation of the rest
of Europe with England, saw the thwarting of this mighty
attempt to found a Continental despotism, brought with it the
consummation of England's undisputed sway over the seas, com-
merce and colonies. The European balance of power was, and
remained, for England primarily a means to this end ; it became
more and more a deceptive catch-word intended to mislead
public opinion by the fetich of European freedom and to conceal
the fact that it was the discord of the Continental Powers that
smoothed England's way to world-dominion.

The European system is to-day an obsolete notion. The
surface of the earth, through the vast increase in international
intercourse, has assumed a unified aspect from the economic and
political standpoint. A new system of World Powers is coming
into being. All the Great Powers to-day have interests across
the seas much the same as England, with whom they have come
into more or less keen competition, unless content to shape dieir
course according to the latter's dictates. To the six Eujropean
Great Powers have been added the United States and Japan*
In the same manner as the medieval states, those of to-day are
beginning to group themselves and to delimit the spheres of

MODERN GERMANY ^9

their influence and interests. As in the period of mercantilism,
an important role is again being played by the commercial seclu-
sion of the various states and by the endeavor to gain for them-
selves greater and self-sufficing trade territory. Not without
justice has this been spoken of as the New Mercantilism. The
spirit of commercial competition and political rivalry has arisen
anew, with a strength long unknown. A struggle identical
with that which, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
resulted in the creation of the European Great Powers, is to-day
being waged to determine the World Powers in the future system
of states. In this connection the fact of England's command
of the seas stands forth with new significance. In former
times England, through her maritime interests and colonial
possessions, reached far beyond the confines of the European
system of states of which she formed in a measure an
extraneous part; her existence was dual: she was at the same
time a European and a World Power. Now, to the full
extent of her possessions and interests, she has become an integral
part of the new and greater system of states, and in this new
setting the successful maintenance of her claim to the sole ruler-
ship of the seas would mean nothing less than world-domination.
Sir Walter Raleigh's saying: "Who rules the seas, rules the
world," has gained a new significance to-day. The ocean, which
in this age of extended steamship traffic, of cables and wireless
telegraphy, forms one vast unit, has in truth become to-day, as
Fricdrich List foresaw, "the highway of international inter-
course." To seek to control this element is as though one were
to say to the inhabitants of a city: "In your houses you may
do as you will, but when you step into the street you must act
according to my rules and interests."

Here is the great problem of the future: Will the principle
of the equality of the various states govern the new world system
as it did the old European system ; or will a single Power, namely
England, finally succeed in founding upon the basis of her
predominance at sea a world dominion that will seriously limit
the independence of the other Powers, that may prevent them
under certain circumstances from pursuing their vital interests,
and that will grant them only so much space and freedom of
movement as seems consonant with her own interest and
convenience ?

In the answer to this question all the Powers are interested^
but none so vitally as Germany.

With the new era of imperialism Germany finds herself
placed in an extremely difficult position. No sooner bad we

30 MODERN GERMANY

succeeded in gaining for ourselves a normal national existence^
such as France and England had enjoyed for centuries, than
the foundations upon which it rested, namely the European state
system, with its old inherited standards and relationships, changed
and expanded into the system of world states. In this latter
system a continuous rise in the scale of national and international
life again threatens our painfully won commercial and political
position. We are surrounded by states, many of which have
grown to gigantic stature, while we, confined at the centre of
the civilized and overcrowded Continent, were cut off from free
access to the seas by the barricade of the British Isles. We
were, therefore, unable to gain, or even to aspire to, such expan-
sion of our territory as would have corresponded to the example
of other nations or to our increase in population. This we could
have done only by exposing ourselves to the dangers of a world
war, in which, presumably, the surrounding Powers, unhampered
in their expansion, would have leagued themselves against us.
Such is, approximately, the situation to-day; and not alone our
enemies, the English, but even the Americans, influenced by
them, have disseminated the view that in the last analysis it
was the impulse of the German people toward expansion that
brought about the war. As disproof of this legend, the fact
must be emphasi2^d that for many years the German Emperor
and his advisers have systematically and unswervingly pursued
the policy of avoiding all attempts at an expansion which could
have been bought only at the price of a world war. Conditions
were unfavorable to us owing to the fact that the most valuable
colonial territory was already in firm possession at the time when
we appeared upon the scene. Germany's advent was too long
delayed for her to profit in the division of the world as her
interests demanded. That was not oi)r fault, but our destiny.
Even after 1871, for more than ten years Germany's interior
as well as exterior condition was not such as to permit her to
undertake far-reaching plans of expansion, without serious danger
to herself and with the prospect of success. The contemptuous
charge which English writers now bring against Bismarck that,
in the blind passion of war against the opposing Clericals and
Social-Democrats, he missed the favorable moment to found
a great colonial empire for Germany, betrays entire misappre-
hension of the difficulties of our foreign policy at that time.
Not until the formation of the Dretbund, and the signing of
the treaty of 1884 ^i^h Russia, was Bismarck free to take up
the question of a colonial policy. And if he undertook this
only with the greatest caution, with the guiding principle of

MODERN GERMANY 31

allowing the flag to follow commerce, so to speak, his policy
was based upon the clear perception of Germany's peculiar
position in the world, which has not changed materially since
then and which may be summed up in two sentences. First,
we lack the natural basis for the up-building and control of a
great colonial empire, such as France and Russia possess, thanks
to the propinquity of the territory which they are colonizing,
or such as England enjoys through her maritime position and
her long mastery of the seas; second, colonial and foreign
complications in which the interests of the various Powers are
involved, react with especial force and in a dangerous manner
on Germany, in view of her central position, which subjects her
to a concentric pressure from the other states and thereby
threatens her very existence. This circumstance has not ceased
to be of importance to-day, when through the increase of our
transoceanic interests, we find ourselves face to face with the
necessity of changing from a European Power into a World
Power. It is this difficult position of Germany at home that im-
parts to her foreign policy a peculiar character, frequently misun-
derstood and falsely judged, not alone in other countries, but even
among ourselves. It becomes thereby, in a degree, experimental,
uncertain, and calls for extreme caution. There is no other
course than to determine by experiment what gains are possible
without precipitating armed conflict. The unchanging principle
w^hich has guided German policy has been the avoidance of a
world war for the sake of colonial expansion; it has sought,
instead, to advance the interest of the nation by peaceful means.

This fact has impressed upon Germany's world policy its
^>ecial character, which is strikingly different from the imperial-
ism of England, France, Russia and the other Powers.

French imperialism resulted rather from the desire to recover
through great and successful colonial enterprises the prestige
lost in the war of 1870 than from the natural impulse toward
expansion of a healthy, sturdy racq. It created a great colonial
•empire in Southwestern Asia, in Madagascar, in Senegambia,
and especially in Northwest Africa in conjunction with Algeria,
ivithout being driven thereto through increase of population or
by the needs of export. The aim of this policy was political
rather than commercial, an important consideration in the expan-
sion and development of the northwest African territory being
the hope of finding in the Moorish soldiers a substitute for the
numerically insufficient recruits at home.

Russian imperialism is of a healthier and sturdier nature. But
in her case it is even more apparent that aims of political power^

3a MODERN GERMANY

not commercial considerations, are the dominant factor. The
question is here not of founding a distant colonial empire, but of
advancing the country's boundaries in all directions. It is
Russia's destiny, one may say, to be forced to seek expansion
to the proportions of a continent, thereby becoming a menace
to all its neighbors. Vital interests urge this vast continental
power in every direction toward the sea, Peter the Great
opened a window on the Baltic for the ancient Muscovite em-
pire; Catherine II succeeded in reaching the coasts of the Black
Sea. But these confined, inland seas fail to satisfy the greater
commercial and political needs of the present. For a long time
Russia's chief aim has been the straits upon which stands Con-
stantinople, and which by the treaty of 1841 are closed to her
ships of war, as to those of all other nations. She regards the
Dardanelles as the key to her house, and would fain transform
the Black Sea into a Russian Mediterranean, in order to bring
the coasts of Asia Minor and Europe under her mediate or
immediate authority. This political desire for expansion has
a religious background, which renders it holy in the eyes of the
orthodox Russian nation: namely, the expulsion of the Mo-
hammedans from the Cathedral of St. Sophia. But bound up
with this is an extremely important commercial consideration.
Two-thirds of Russia's grain export, which represents billions
of rubles and which is of the most vital importance in the preser-
vation of her domestic economic welfare, must pass through the
Dardanelles; therefore the closure of this passageway, a thing
which may happen in every Balkan war, has the most serious
results for her domestic and foreign trade. Hence Russia's
claim for the political control of these straits. This considera-
tion determines her attitude toward the Eastern question.

Free access to the Mediterranean would, however, not per-
manently satisfy Russia ; she would seek also to open a way past
Gibraltar and through the Suez Canal, in order to be enabled to
dispatch her fleet to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Toward the
north, likewise, she feels the need of gaining a free passage frcrni
the Baltic into the ocean. Since the control of the Danish straits
would be difficult to acquire and retain, Russia has of late
years turned her eyes toward Sweden and Norway, which, owing^
to the Gulf Stream, possess ports free from ice diroughout the
year. Her strategic railways in Finland — one near the coast,
the other somewhat inland— could easily transport troops and
munitions in either direction. The possession of Narwik would
be of great value to Russia. Her fleets would then be able to
cooperate in the Atlantic, from south and north. But this is

MODERN GERMANY 33

only one side of Russia's efforts at expansion. More important,
perhaps, even than the European field is the Asiatic. The entire
history of Russia consists of a gradual extension into the vast
territory of forests, moors and steppes beyond the Ural Moun-
tains and the Caspian Sea. This is at one and the same time
a process of agricultural and military settlement, very different
from the colonizing of the West-European maritime nations.
The Russians are fond of emphasizing the fact that their advance
into Asia brings them into contact with peoples who neither in
customs nor feelings are foreign to the simple Russian peasants
and Cossacks, as they are to the West-European colonists and
pioneers of civilization; they say that they are able to under-
stand the soul of the Orient and are therefore its natural leaders.
The only limit to this advance is the sea; but the ocean itself
holds an invitation to further expansion. A gateway to the
sea was gained in Siberia and in the Province of Amur. But the
harbor of Vladivostok, which is closed to shipping part of the
year, could not satisfy the desire for an open port on the Pacific
Ocean ; therefore Port Arthur was seized — and then lost. The
war with Japan temporarily checked the advance in this direc-
tion and produced a fundamental change in the situation. Like-
wise the movement toward India and along the Persian Gulf,
as a result of these events, has come to a temporary standstill.
Russian imperialism has again turned toward Europe. Never-
theless, its Asiatic aspect is sure to assume prominence anew;
its aim is to bring under the rule of the "White Czar" the
entire European-Asiatic territory that has not yet assumed the
established form of a modern state and to whose Oriental
inhabitants this yoke may not appear oppressive.

The maritime imperialism of England is not less far-reaching
than that of Russia. The world domination that she has built
up and that she still seeks to extend and strengthen, rests upon
the basis of her mastery of the seas. An English historian has
characterized his country as "Oceana" ; another calls it a "world-
wide Venice," in which colonies are city districts and oceans are
canals. In a double ring the colonies are grouped around the
motherland. From the constitutional point of view, an inner
ring may be said to be formed by the great dominions with
representative government, which are autonomous states within
the boundaries of the Empire. The endeavor which the Imperial
Federation League has sought to realize is to weld them into
a commercial and military union under common direction; but
this ambition seems likely to encounter insurmountable obstacles.
The remaining colonies, with the Indian Empire, constitute the

34 MODERN GERMANY

outer ring. It is the duty of certain of them to render secure
for England the great ocean lanes, upon which depend both
her commerce and her safety. From Gibraltar stretches such a
chain of stations, by way of Malta, Cyprus, Egypt and the Sues
Canal, thence from Aden and Koweit to the confines of India,
and then through the Straits' Settlements to Singapore and East
Asia. Egypt plays a special role in the scheme of the British
Empire: it is the point at which England's African and Indian
interests unite. Cecil Rhodes' gigantic conception of giving a
firm central support to British influence in Africa by means of
a Cape-to-Cairo railroad fits into this scheme, as does also the
recently exposed desire of England to bring the Persian and
Arabian coasts under her control and to turn the Indian Ocean,
together with the Persian Gulf, into a British lake, guarded by
her possessions in East Africa, Southern Asia and Australia.

Such is the imperialism of our enemies. How modest in
comparison seems that which Germany has striven for and
achieved! There is not only a difference of degree, but like-
wise of kind. That which we call "world policy" is something
quite different from the imperialism of the other Powers, despite
a certain superficial similarity. It has not been our chief aim,
in the manner of these states, to build up a great colonial empire
by which to increase our power among the nations of the world ;
rather has our endeavor been, in keeping with our peculiar
geographical and political position, before all things to secure and
advance our industrial and export interests. As Bismarck de-
sired, our colonial undertakings have been the organic result
of our commercial needs. The main incentive has been furnished
by the increase in our population and the necessity of providing
them with food. One may endeavor to provide for a growing
population in two ways: either through the acquisition of new^
territory into which it can overflow, or through an increase in
industrial activity, which brings a greater volume of food into
the country in exchange for exports and which renders it possible
for the nation to increase within its limited territory. We were
forced to choose the second way, since the first seemed to us
impracticable. It led us, however, to the goal which we had
set ourselves: emigration has ceased, and our people are content
and prosperous. Though not underestimating our colonial pos-
sessions, we cannot say that they form an empire of political
importance like those of France, Russia or England. The terri-
tory which they offer our people is neither suitable nor sufficient
for purposes of settlement; they provide but a fraction of our
need in tropical food products and in raw material for manu-

MODERN GERMANY 35

facturcs; nor do they furnish a market worth mentioning for
our exports. The hopes which are entertained as to the possi-
bility of future development do not materially alter this opinion.
Despite this fact, we have made no e£fort to secure by force
great or more valuable colonies. The misfortune of a
world war has always seemed greater to us than the possible
resulting gain. We were content to have obtained a footing
at different points throughout the world and to possess a training-
school for colonial administration. Our main object has always
been the establishment of the principle of the open door in the
great conunercial districts of East Asia, South America and
Morocco. In these places we desired to be able to trade under
the same conditions as the French and English, in order to
advance our export interests. In this connection we have con-
sistently championed the independence and integrity of the exotic
countries, whenever their measure of civilization seemed to hold
out a promise of well regulated and secure relations. We opposed
in general the proposition that it is necessary to control such
countries politically in order to enjoy advantageous commercial
intercourse with them. According to English imperialism,
"peaceful penetration" of a country means nothing less than the
preliminary step to its political subjugation. Hence the readi-
ness in Anglo-American circles to interpret our relation to
Turkey as in the nature of England's to Egypt, or of France's
to Morocco. At the time of the granting of the concession to
Germany for the building of the Bagdad railway, in 1903, Sir
Harry Johnston, an English colonial expert, conceived the fan-
tastic plan of encouraging Germany in the founding of a great
eastern empire, embracing the districts traversed by the railway,
namely Austria-Hungary, the Balkan states and Turkey. They
were all to be brought under German suzerainty. The basis for
this plan was the expectation that Germany's ambition and desire
ior expansion would in this manner be diverted into channels
innocuous to England. Doubtless, also, there existed the gener-
ous intention of arousing distrust among Germany's threatened
friends and of involving her in deadly conflict with Russia.

This scheme, which at the time was most severely criticized
even by the Pan-Germanists and rejected as a "gift of the
Greeks," still haunts the brains of Englishmen and Americans,
and has given birth to such grotesque imaginings as Usher's book
on "Pan-Germanism." It is self-evident that neither the German
Bank nor the Minister for Foreign Affairs ever indulged in such
fantastic dreams. Our interests in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia
were limited to gaining for ourselves at these points an important

36 MODERN GERMANY

market, capable of great development, and a source from whidi
raw material might be obtained for our manufactures— there
was no question of German colonization or of political domina-
tion. The Bagdad railway was a purely commercial undertaking,
and if it possessed any political significance it was solely that
Turkey might by its construction be strengthened along com-
mercial and military lines and placed in a position to be better
able to resist possible imperialistic encroachment by Russia or
England. It was not fear of Germany's imperialistic plans that
inspired England's relentless opposition to this undertaking;
rather was it her disinclination to see Turkey strengthened, and
in addition the dread lest this shorter rail route to the Persian
Gulf might prove a successful competitor with the waterway
through the Suez Canal. To this was added the general appre-
hension of seeing England's absolute and exclusive preeminence
challenged on these coasts, which serve as a connecting link
between India and Egypt. Germany's readiness to make conces-
sions in this affair is a matter of general knowledge. We met
England's desires in regard to the last section of the road, from
Bagdad to Koweit, and agreed to place it under international
control. Further, we agreed with Russia to take steps for
connecting the Bagdad railway with the branch planned for
Persia.

Germany's foreign or world policy is thus seen to be quite
different from that of England, Russia or France. It was
not given to us to create a great colonial empire comparable
to those of our enemies ; but neither has that been our endeavor,
since the conditions to such an end were from the start too un-
favorable, owing to our geographical and political position and
to the previous distribution of colonial territory. We have in
the main contented ourselves with striving to advance our vital
interests in the economic sphere by trying to secure "a place in
the sun" with the other World Powers, in order to increase and
maintain the export trade necessary to provide the nation's
food supply. An unfriendly observer might perhaps say that
the grapes were too sour. And why should we not admit having
made a virtue of necessity in proceeding along moderate lines
in our foreign policy? Did we not wish voluntarily to be ex-
cluded from the list of World Powers, there was no other course
for us on the occasion of the last act in the division of the world
but to raise our voice and now and again to demand our por^
tion. But in doing this we have on principle avoided war with
other Colonial Powers, and even the most unfriendly judge

MODERN GERMANY 37

must admit that the preservation of peace has been the golden
thread in our world policy.

Si vis pacem, para helium. He who desires <peace must prepare
for war. The German government has made this approved
saying its guiding principle. The caution with which it avoided
dangerous disputes went hand in hand with the thorough-going
preparation for the eventuality of an unavoidable conflict, which
it did not wish for, but faced without fear. A policy of peace
without preparation is a sign of weakness and impotence*
Thorough preparation creates quiet self-confidence and that de*
gree of respect in the eyes of the world requisite for sober self*
restraint in the interest of peace, without the danger of exposing
the state to the loss of its dignity and power. Our aim has been
so to strengthen ourselves in a military way that any possible
desire of our enemies to attack us might thereby be held in
check. In this attempt we could not limit ourselves to our
army; it was necessary for us to possess a fleet in keeping with
our position, our maritime interests and our place as a World
Power. Unobstructed access to the sea is for us, as for every
World Power, an absolute necessity. The way to the ocean lies
througji the English Channel, unless our ships are to follow
the long and costly course around the Shetland Islands, which
is by no means devoid of danger during the stormy months of
winter. The English, and even the French fleet, in certain
circumstances, might block this course for us. In the Baltic
Sea we are threatened by the third great navy, that of Russia.
In distant lands and seas the German merchant and sailor, the
settler and missionary need the protection of German cruisers*
In the present condition of the world only that state which
possesses a strong high-seas' fleet can maintain its position in
the foremost rank. Our Emperor was the first to perceive this
simple truth and to draw the logical conclusion from it. In
Admiral Tirpitz he found the discriminating aid who has created
a Grerman fleet capable of inspiring respect. In the naval
program of 1900 our aim is plainly stated. Our fleet was to
be sufiiciently strong to cause even the greatest naval Power
to hesitate to attack us or to attempt injury to our vital interests,
since the probable loss which it would sustain in case of war
would threaten its own superiority. It was the least with which
we could be content; the present state of affairs furnishes the
proof of this. The defensive aim of our naval preparations
could not have been more clearly expressed. In our threatened
position we could not feel even measurably safe unless able on
land and water to offer adequate resistance to the political and

38 MODERN GERMANY

military pressure exerted by our enemies against our borders.
In order to secure peace we had to make them respect us. In
this sense we have always regarded the high cost of our military
preparedness in the light of an insurance premium against the
danger of war. This preparedness and the prudent circumspec-
tion of our policy has resulted in the preservation of peace during
forty-three years.

This circumspect and restrained foreign policy, content to
renounce great and brilliant successes for the sake of preserving
peace, and limiting itself to the minimum of development of
German influence in foreign lands consonant with the nation's
welfare, has encountered much public opposition. Especially
has the Pan-German Society, since its founding in 1890, with
varying emphasis but unceasingly, opposed the Foreign OfSce.
It complained that this policy showed a lack of boldness, of
"the will to power," of decisive success. The Imperial Chan-
cellor von Billow on one occasion reproached this doubtlessly
patriotic group of political critics with acting rather under the
influence of a warm heart than of a clear head, and with allowing
themselves, freed from any shackles of responsibility, to be car-
ried away on the wings of their fancy. To decide whether a
political move was wise or the reverse is always an extremely
difficult matter for an uninitiated observer. Such a one lacks,
at any given moment, the ability to take in at a glance the entire
political chess-board and hence fails to grasp the general situa-
tion, especially as the facts known to the public are always
capable of divergent interpretation and explanation. Notably
in criticising Germany's world policy are the dangers frequently
lost sight of which every single step is apt to entail upon our
European position, that lays us open to joint pressure from
without. Had we acted according to the desires of the Pan-
Germanists, peace could scarcely have been preserved so long.
Nor should we have felt, as to-day, so strongly and unanimously
that we have drawn the sword in justifiable self-defence, that
we have been attacked by our enemies and are forced to fight for
our existence.

As a general proposition, it is undoubtedly laudable to accustom
the public, with disregard of domestic party questions, to inde-
pendent discussion of the great problems of our foreign policy
from a broad national basis. For we Germans have hitherto
been only too prone in the press and in the forum to thresh out
party questions, leaving the responsibility for the power and
greatness of the Fatherland in the experienced hands of the
Government. Our history under Bismarck's guidance showed us

MODERN GERMANY 39

the frequent folly of the criticism of the great problems of states^
manship by uninitiated publicists and parliamentarians, who were
slaves to party doctrines. On the other hand, the successes
of his policy accustomed us in international questions to trust
blindly in the guidance of the Government. The successors of
the great chancellor have not enjoyed the confidence of the
public to the same degree. It is easy to understand their sensi-
tiveness under the spirit of criticism that awoke among un-
initiated and irresponsible fault-finders. No one desires to see
in public discussions a cessation of interest in international ques-
tions; but with the growth of political training and under-
standing, there comes a corresponding discretion in the expression
of opinion and in the award of praise and blame. The difficul-
ties of a country's foreign policy increase in direct proportion
with the possibilities for embarrassing complications and with the
resulting need for the exercise of prudence. It is less difficult
for an Englishman or American, even for a Frenchman or
Russian, to discuss the problems of his country's foreign policy
than for a German, since ours is the most difficult international
position. The politicians of the Pan-German Society cannot be
said in such discussions to have displayed on the whole a percep-
tion of the attainable or to have been sufficiently careful to
avoid fantastic excesses; but in other national patriotic circles,
also, displeasure over the apparent failures of the Government
and the decrease of German influence in the world has expressed
itself in noisy emphasis of the "will to power," at times even
with threats and rattlings of the sword.

In die famous book of General von Bernhardi the necessity of
a "war of prevention" is urged with a frankness that does credit
rather to the soldier than to the statesman. Torn from their con-
nection and more or less distorted, his statements are quoted in
numberless pamphlets and newspaper articles, especially in those
from English and American sources. Such books as Bernhardi's
are made use of by our enemies to convince neutral countries that
Germany not only desired the war but wantonly brought it about
in order to escape from an untenable position. It is impossible to
over-emphasize the fact that such writings are in no sense the ex-
pression of our official policy and that they had nothing to do with
the outbreak of the war. They are, on the contrary, in direct
contrast with the peaceful and restrained policy of the Emperor
and his government. Whoever knows Kaiser Wilhelm II
realizes that he uttered the absolute truth in solemnly declaring
that be was forced by his enemies to draw the sword. The
history of bis reign of twenty-five years gives proof of hi&

7f

40 MODERN GERMANY

steadfast desire to preserve peace as long as it was compatible
with the honor of the German name and the interests of the
Empire. This is an indisputable fact, which rises to confute our
enemies in their attempt to throw the responsibility for the
war upon us. They have sought to avoid this difficulty by
inventing and spreading the fiction that the peace-loving Emperor
was forced into the war by a military clique. The English in-
ventors of this fable, in their absolute and characteristic ignor-
ance of German conditions, must have confused Berlin and
Fetrograd. But the fertile political imagination of the English
is not satisfied with a single version. The author of one of the
Oxford pamphlets thinks himself better informed. It was not
the work of the military clique of Potsdam (whose existence
seemed a trifle too misty), but that of the "Pan-German League.
An anonymous writer, under the cloak of "Daniel Frymann,
had offered the suggestion in a pamphlet, "If I were the Kaiser,"
that Germany would do well, if her foreign office could not
be better managed, to introduce parliamentary rule like that
of England and France. From this suggestion promptly and
with easy facility, the English writer draws the conclusion
that the Pan-German League had threatened the Emperor with
dethronement and thereby forced him to renounce his peace
desires. And the same author claims to have discovered still
another reason for Germany's eagerness for war, and this the
strangest of all. The country, he declares, was on the verge
of a great economic collapse, owing to the lack of markets for
its accumulated and unsalable wares, and it began the war in
order to relieve its desperate plight. These arguments are pure
inventions, absolutely without foundation, and give evidence of
such childlike ignorance of conditions in Germany that they
serve only to amuse us, despite the seriousness of the subject
and of the present moment. The motive for such inventions is
a wicked desire to libel us and the author betrays unmistakably
his attitude of mind when at one point he represents as highly
plausible, in view of the Archduke's friendliness for the Slavs,
the assumption that the murders at Serajevo were planned in
Berlin rather than in Belgrade I How desperate must be our
enemies* case if they must needs have recourse to such weapons.
But even in apparently unbiassed American writings — ^which
iire, however, really governed by English ideas — ^we encounter
the widespread and evidently generally accepted explanation
that Germany found herself forced into the war by reason of her
restricted position and the paralyzing pressure exerted by Eng-
land and her allies upon the country's commercial and political

MODERN GERMANY 41

freedom of movement. Whatever may have been the imme-
diate occasion for hostilities, Germany, it is claimed, was the
actual aggressor, in the effort to escape from her untenable
position and to improve her position in the world through the
defeat of England and France. The genesis of this explanation
is quite evident. Germany's constricted position and the pres-
sure exerted for many years by England and her allies upon
the country's vital activities are well-known facts; nor will any
one be convinced by the English attempts at denying the invidi-
ousness of Great Britain's policy towards Germany when it is
so apparent as in the Morocco question. Support for the above-
mentioned explanation may have been found in the fact that
writings such as General Bemhardi's seemed to expound the
same ideas.

Yet, such a construction is absolutely false. The weak point
is the assumption of Germany's untenable and desperate posi-
tion. A political extremist who measures his demands by the
unprecedented successes of Bismarck's times and who entertains
the naive belief that things can continue indefinitely in
the same manner, may, perhaps, regard as unfavorable the
political position of the German Empire, in view of the
lack of similar successes and achievements in this vastly more
difficult period of "world politics." But he who limits his
demands to a normal and sensible standard must admit that
we have by no means fared badly considering our extremely
difficult position. It is impossible to deny that we had entered
upon a period of remarkable economic advance. The problem of
adequately employing and feeding our growing population within
the boundaries of the Empire itself, since we possess no colonies
fit for settlers, much less a great colonial empire, had been solved
for a long time to come. Agriculture and industry had been
brought into harmony, and so close an approach made to Aris-
totle's ideal of "autarchy," or national self-sufficiency, that
its complete realization in the future scarcely seems unlikely.
We had taken measures for the welfare of our workers as no
other country in the world has done ; the national wealth showed
most satisfactory improvement. And yet, in addition to all this^
we did not omit to complete our military preparations on land
and sea. The balance of our debit and credit which was taken
in 191 3, on the occasion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the Kaiser's reign, showed satisfactory progress
in all departments. Despite the jealousy and ill-will of our
neighbors we had become richer and stronger from year to
year.

42 MODERN GERMANY

Our development into a World Power by the side of our
more favorably situated neighbors had continued slowly but
steadily. It was our hope through industry to maintain the
"place in the sun" which we had won with such difficulty. We
hoped likewise that increasing strength would inevitably bring
with it freedom of commercial activity. Our position was far
irom untenable; least of all could we look forward to its im-
provement through a world war on the result of which would
depend the very existence of our race and its position in the
world. None of the Great Powers in a general war would have
as much to lose as we, even with Austria- Hungary as our ally.
The situation was unmistakable — ^war was to be thought of for us
only in the event of compulsion. With anxiety we saw this
compulsion ripening in the growing enmity of the Powers which
opposed us. Therein alone lay our danger, and despite the
moderation and caution of years, we were not able to avoid it.
As an obstacle in the path of England's and Russia's imperialistic
ambition our strength as a World Power had to be crushed.
Although naturally opposed to each other, these two Powers,
through the great changes in international relations and through
their mutual understanding with France, our old irreconcilable
enemy, had been gradually brought to form the fatal alliance,
which from the start was aimed at us. Finally, following the
bloody tragedy at Serajevo, the critical moment arrived when,
after frequent increase and relief of the tension and after repeated
strengthening of military preparations, Russia, the strongest
military power among the allies, hurled the fire-brand from its
hand and precipitated the world conflagration.

Ill

Germany's Foreign Relations Since 187 1

France had never unreservedly accepted the conditions of
the Peace of Frankfort. Her statesmen and patriots had re-
mained true to Gambetta's watchword: Never to abandon the
thought of revenge, even though they did not speak of it. The
recovery of Alsace-Lorraine appeared to them as a kind of
national duty; and even during the period before the disputes
with England in colonial matters had been adjusted, their eyes
remained fixed threateningly on Germany. After 1871 Bis-
marck was never without the fear of the forming of a coalition
against the Empire, the natural centre of which was France.

MODERN GERMANY 43

In order to weaken pressure from this direction, he left no stone
unturned to promote the consolidation of ^e Republic, which
he assumed would be less militaristic than a restored Bourbon
monarchy. For the same reason, he welcomed and embraced
the opportunity to divert the ambition and energy of the country^
which had shown such astounding powers of recovery, into
colonial undertakings on a great scale. But the Republic adopted
the militarism of the empire, and developed it to a higher degree
than would have been possible to a monarchical government.
Further, colonial imperialism by no means forced the hopes of
revenge permanently into the background; on the contrary, in
the end it served to vitalize them anew. The deep hatred for
the conqueror of 1870, which smouldered in the hearts of most
Frenchmen, kept alive the legend nourished by the country's
conscienceless jingoes that Germany was constantly on the point
of attacking France. We can state with absolute sincerity that
this has never been the case since 1871, not even in 1875, despite
diplomatic gossip to that eiBFect. Especially in recent years has
Germany's strongest desire been to enter into an understanding
with France on the basis of neighborly confidence and security
from hostilities, which would have enabled her with a free and
undisturbed mind to promote the development of her commercial
interests in the world. The courteous attentions and attempts
at rapprochement of our "Peace Emperor" seemed excessive to
the national pride of many Germans. He succeeded thereby in
elevating the tone of international intercourse, but failed to change
French sentiment. Blood revenge, which has been eliminated in
personal relations in civilized countries, seems to be irrepressible in
the relations of states to each other. France thus became the
country in which Europe's hatred against Germany was nursed.
New hatred displaced the old. In order to strengthen herself
against Germany, France finally abandoned her colonial rivalry
with England. The humiliation in the Fashoda Affair ( 1 898-99 )»
resulting in the renunciation of all claim to the territory of the
sources of the Nile and therewith the abandonment of her
former Egyptian ambitions, paved the way for the later under-
standing with the mistress of the seas. The real pivot, however,
on which the policy of France turned was the alliance with
Russia. It was an old political conception of the days of Napoleon
and Alexander I, that had never quite been lost sight of but
which, since the eighties, had become the chief support of the
hope for revenge. So greatly had the patriotic imagination of
French speculators and money-savers been excited and blinded
by this idea that in the course of twenty years they invested

44 MODERN GERMANY

at least seventeen billion francs in Russian bonds. Without
this sum, Russia's recent development of her agriculture, manu-
factures and railways would have been quite impossible.

During the critical years from 1863-70 Russia served as the
protector of Prussia's rear. The traditional union of the two
ruling houses was further strengthened by the personal con-
fidence which Bismarck enjoyed at the court of Alexander II
and which the jealous intrigues of Gortschakow failed to under-
mine. Prussia's attitude toward the Polish insurrection of 1863
had shown Russia that it possessed a trustworthy friend in the
former state. But in Russia they seemed unable to forget the
role which Nicholas I had once played in Germany, and believed
themselves justified in claiming Germany's aid in Russia's policy
of expansion and desire for power, the recognition and satis-
faction of which would gradually have brought Germany into
a position of dependence, in fact, of servitude. Austria's atti-
tude during the Crimean War and the ancient rivalry of the two
states regarding influence in the Balkans, which had been intensi-
fied by Austria's elimination from Germany and Italy, had made
Russia more determined in her hostile feeling toward the Hap&-
burg monarchy. The result of this since 1876 had been a
gradual troubling of Germany's relations with Russia. Bis-
marck was firm in the conviction that a strong Austro-
Hungarian state was a vital necessity for Germany, in the face
of the growing Russian power. From his "Memoires" we
know that in 1876 he opposed the Russian plan of a war of
extermination against Austria, and that the Russian government
thereupon came to an understanding with Austria, with the
result that the storm-centre shifted from the Carpathians to the
Balkans. Again at the Congress of Berlin Bismarck's attitude
was not such as his Russian friends believed they had a right
to expect. Bismarck likens Russia to an exacting woman who
expects her suitor to divine and execute her unexpressed wishes.
What Russia expected was that Germany should throw the full
weight of her authority into the scale, in order to obtain for
her nei^bor a predominance in the Balkan Peninsula. But
this would have increased Russia's power in a very dangerous
manner, while at the same time it would have rendered Ger-
many's relations to the other Powers extremely unpleasant. As
is well known, Bismarck contented himself with the role of
the honest broker, and it was with his indulgence that, owing
to England's protest, the peace treaty of San Stefano was not
carried out but was revised in favor of Turkey. As in the
Crimean War, Russia had once more been checked in her vie-

MODERN GERMANY 45

torious march toward G>nstantinople. Her opposition to Eng-
land, about which international politics turned in the nineteenth
century, as they had turned about the enmity of France and
England in the eighteenth, had been dangerously increased. This
found expression in Russia's advance into Asia toward the bor-
ders of India. At the same time the friendship between Russia
and Germany had suffered a severe strain, which, it is true, was
temporarily concealed but which did not admit of real cure. In
view of France's irreconcilable attitude, Bismarck realized the
necessity, as a safeguard against the resentment of Russia, of
a union with the state which the Czar has just threatened with
annihilation.

In 1879 the alliance was entered into with Austria-Hungary,
whereby each of the contracting parties pledged itself to come
to the aid of the other in the case of an unexpected attack
by Russia, which they hoped to avoid. Nothing was further
frcMn Bismarck's desire than thereby to render the break with
Russia complete. On the contrary, he took great pains to
bring about a renewal of friendly relations with that Power, so
as to preclude the danger of an armed conflict. And following
Italy's entrance into the German-Austrian alliance in 1882, as
a result of her resentment at France's occupation of Tunis, he
succeeded in realizing the treaty with Russia, in which the latter
country promised, in the event of war between Germany and
any other Power, to maintain an attitude of benevolent neu-
trality. Russia's motive for entering into this agreement was her
desire to gain protection against England on the Continent.
Bismarck had won through the friendly understanding with
Russia the opportunity for freedom of action in the Balkans.
Conditions at that time still justified his guiding prindple that
the Balkan question did not concern Germany and that it was
not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier. Bismarck's
chief gain, however, was that through the agreement he held
Russia back from responding to the friendly advances of the
French Republic. He had succeeded in isolating England and
France, while drawing the three eastern empires more closely
together. Upon this basis, also, rested the possibility of Ger-
many's assuming an active part in international politics and
of entering upon a course of colonial acquisition, at first in Africa.
The Berlin Congo Congress of 1884 is an event which demon-
strates the new aspect of affairs.

The march of events in Bulgaria from the year 1885 on soon
brought Russia again into sharp opposition with Austria, and
diis reacted also upon her relations with the Gemjan Empire.

46 MODERN GERMANY

The suspicion that Germany was attempting to play a part in
the Balkan question was fostered and strengthened by forged
letters which reached the Czar from French sources. Even
without this, Alexander III, who had had no personal experience
of dynastic relations with the Prussian rulers and who had been
guided into other channels by his Danish wife, was easily inclined
to distrust Germany and much more susceptible to Russian na-
tionalistic and Pan-Slavic influences than his predecessor. Bis-
marck, however, was able, in the course of a personal interview
in 1887, to demonstrate that the documents in question had
been forged and thereby remove a pregnant source of distrust
from the Russian side. The crisis of 1887 ^^ safely passed,
but the state of mind which had rendered it possible remained
as a continuing danger. It was a characteristic sign of the
times that at this moment the high tide of the Boulanger move-
ment coincided with the Russian anti-German press campaign.
From both camps came the demand for an alliance of the two
countries against Germany, and in Russian nationalistic and Pan-
Slavic circles the saying began to be heard that the road to
Constantinople led by way of Berlin and that the settlement of
differences in the Eastern question was to be sought on the
Rhine and the Oder.

Yet Russia's main interest lay in her expansion in Central
and East Asia. The consequent danger of a conflict with Eng-
land caused the Russian government, despite the growing un-
friendliness toward Germany of nationalistically influenced pub-
lic opinion, to consider the renewal of the agreement with this
country for three years valuable enough to prefer it to an un-
derstanding with France. Kaiser Wilhelm II likewise has
taken all possible pains to cultivate and maintain the tradi-
tional relations with Russia which his grandfather urged upon
him on his death-bed. Bismarck's retirement, however, intro-
duced a change in the political program in as much as his suc-
cessor, Caprivi, did not attribute the same importance to the
formal signing of a treaty as the originator of the Russo-German
Treaty had done. The machinery seemed to him too compli-
cated; he feared, above all, to arouse Austria's distrust in case
the secret agreement should become known. It was thus chiefly
out of consideration for the Austrian alliance that the renewal
of the Russian convention in 1890 was abandoned. It was
thought that friendly relations with Russia might be maintained
and cultivated even without such a formal basis, which, further-
more, had had no value as a counterbalance against the anti-
German sentiment of the public.

MODERN GERMANY 47

It is a question of opinion whether this view did not under-
estimate the importance of the treaty. At all events, there now
became manifest in Russia an increasing desire to welcome
French advances, in order not to face England and the Dreibund
quite isolated. The naval visits to Kronstadt and Toulon
followed. The Franco-Russian treaty, that Bismarck had con-
sistently striven to prevent, became a reality, though this dual
alliance did not yet assume precisely the aspect of a threat
to Germany. It appeared, like the Dreibund, to be of a de-
fensive character, and could be regarded as a means for preserving
the European balance of power. It was directed against England
as well as against the Continental Powers.

England betrayed the fact that in France and Russia she
recognized her probable future antagonists, not alone on the
occasion of the vast increase of her naval armament in 1888, which
was based upon the ''two-power standard" and which ushered
in a new epoch in modern naval history, but likewise during
the period of the succeeding ten years. She welcomed, therefore,
the lapsing of the close alliance between Germany and Russia,
a development which she had striven in all ways to bring about;
she now sought to bring Gfermany's policy into line with British
interests. Harmonious cooperation of the greatest naval power
and the greatest military power for the preservation of peace
was proclaimed as the program of the future. The so-called
Zanzibar Treaty was entered into, whereby Grermany surrendered
important coast possessions and territorial claims in East Africa,
in exchange for Heligoland, whose future maritime importance
no Englishman at that time suspected (1890).

England's idea in arranging her relations with Germany in
this manner was to bind the latter country's hands in colonial
matters. Relations, therefore, became increasingly strained as
Germany in 1894 {^^ conjunction with France) successfully
opposed a violation of the Congo Act by England, and later in
connection with the events in South Africa from the time of
the Jameson Raid to the annexation of the Boer Republics.
The long accumulated displeasure at German competition, the
jealousy caused by the thriving of our manufactures and trade,
the hatred of the successful rival, found at this time astoundingly
strong and undisguised expression in the English press ; especially
noteworthy was this in an article in the Saturday Review,
which with a warped but ominous variation of Cato's warning,
uttered the watchword: Germaniam esse delendam!

This indiscreet revelation of England's true feelings was an
important factor in causing the German people to give friendly

48 MODERN GERMANY

and intelligent support to the first great naval programme of 1898.
At this time, however, England still regarded Russia, not Ger-
many, as her most dangerous enemy. The agreement of 1899
had laid the basis for a future understanding with France. But
Russia, with its designs on the Persian Gulf, with its ambition
to become the dominant Power in East Asia and in the Pacific
Ocean, aroused the most serious apprehension in England.
Especially was this so during the Boer War, which for years
taxed the country's powers. Hence the endeavor of the British
government to gain Germany, which had preserved absolute
neutrality during this war, as an ally against Russia. It was
at this time that Chamberlain uttered the rally cry for a Teu-
tonic union, comprising England, America and Germany (1899).
Germany, however, was far removed from unfriendly intentions
against Russia, with which, as a matter of fact, it had just
reestablished better relations. An alliance with England, under
the conditions then existing, would have implied an abandonment
of the development of the navy and of an independent position
in world politics. An additional factor was the unwillingness
of the parliamentary government of England to bind the country
by definite treaties for definite eventualities. So these negotia-
tions came to naught. The year 1900 witnessed the unanimous
action against China of the World Powers, including the United
States and Japan. But the Imperial Chancellor, von Billow,
did not allow himself to be swept by England beyond the provi-
sions of the Yangtse agreement into opposition against Russia
in the Manchurian question. This attitude of the German
government finally convinced England that in no event would
Germany permit herself to be used against Russia. The British
government now took a most unusual step by forming, in 1902,
an alliance with Japan, aimed primarily against Russia. This
treaty from its inception bore the germs of war, which broke out
in 1904 and which resulted in freeing England for a long period
from the fear of Russia's growing power. Japan had under-
taken the role intended for Germany. The unfortunate out-
come of this war, however, and the resulting revolution pre-
pared Russia for becoming an ally of England just as the humilia-
tion of Fashoda had done in the case of France.

The period when Germany finally freed herself from the
enticements of English diplomacy coincides, approximately, with
the time when the results of the two naval programmes of 1898
and 1900 began to be evident in the beginnings of a powerful
sea fleet. Since that time the policy of England, protected by
Japan against Russia, took a decidedly anti-German turn. King

MODERN GERMANY 49

Edward VII, who had ascended the throne shortly before, was the
originator of the ''encircling policy" against Germany, which
began with the entente cordiale with France in 1904 and was
extended by Russia's admission to the group in 1907. The
full development of this policy followed a few years later
through the agreements arranged by Sir Edward Grey with
the two governments in question and which transformed the
entente into an actual war alliance against Germany. The
development and manifestations of this "encircling policy," the
attempts at decreasing the political tension, the effects of the last
Balkan Wars, the outbreak of the present great world war —
all these will be treated in later chapters of this book, and are
therefore not discussed here. It will be proper at this place only
to add a few general remarks on the nature of the relations
between the Powers in question and the aspects of the conflict
of interests. This will be done in order to indicate the guiding
principles of Germany's policy in the years immediately preceding
the catastrophe. The question mainly concerns Russia and
England.

In the direct relations between Germany and Russia no
points of serious friction existed; the aim of Germany's policy,
especially since 1894, ^^ unmistakably been to renew the
former pleasant relations between the two neighboring states.
In her attitude toward Russia during the bitter experience of
the Japanese War and the resulting internal disturbances Ger-
many was as friendly as is possible for a neutral power to be.
Witness the generous utterance of Kaiser Wilhelm: "Russian
sorrow is German sorrow." Russian publicists have recently
brought the emphatic accusation against Germany that the latter
country took advantage of Russia's necessity in 1904 to obtain
more favorable conditions in the commercial treaty renewed at
that time than were consonant with Russia's real interest. It is
a fact that these conditions were more favorable for us than those
of the treaty of 1894. But at that time Germany had found
herself in an extremely unfavorable position, which Russia had
utilized to the full ; and it was only right and proper that when
this condition had changed, Germany should take thought for
her own commercial interests to the best of her ability. But
no unfriendly pressure of any kind was exercised by her. The
complaints of the injustice done Russia by these treaties have,
moreover, been gready and deliberately exaggerated by Russian
writers. This was done in order to prepare sentiment effectively
for the negotiations for a renewal of the treaty in 191 7. In
this the pressure which the "encircling policy" had for years

so MODERN GERMANY

exerted upon Germany from all sides was to be used for the
promotion of the commercial ambitions of the Russian govern-
ment and Russian society. But the conflict of commercial inter-
ests existing at this time was, despite the threatening speedi
indulged in by Russian writers, not of a nature to carry with
it the danger of war. Doubtless, a mutual attitude of fairness
and restraint in the negotiations would have smoothed out
any existing difliculties. German designs on Russian territory
did not exist ; nor can it properly be assumed that before the war
Russia had cast covetous eyes on the East Prussian provinces.
The conflict of political interests was limited, in the main, to
the Balkan question and to the relation of Germany to Austria.
Nor did the differences seem insurmountable if Russia and
Austria but held to the convention of Miirzsteg of 1903, which
had declared the principle of the status quo for the Balkan
Peninsula — that is to say, if Russia would temporarily restrain
her desire for expansion and limit herself to a policy of internal
commercial, social and political reforms, in order to strengthen
her position, which nobody was threatening. But as a conse-
quence of the Franco-Russian alliance, shipwreck overtook the
efforts of the German government to bring about a closer under-
standing after the Japanese War, and thereby to lay a founda-
tion for an understanding of the three empires, at which Bismarck
had aimed as the best guarantee for permanent peace.

After the Algeciras Conference (1906) the French alliance
exercised greater powers of attraction, and eventually brought
Russia together with France into the agreement with England
( 1907 ) . The German government having been unable to prevent
this agreement, naturally drew from that fact the conclusion that
it would be wise to maintain its close relations with Austria. This
all the more because the union of Russia and England, the two
former opponents in Oriental affairs, had emphasized and sharp-
ened anew the differences between Russia and Austria, which
had been only temporarily adjusted by the agreement of
Miirzsteg. Russia, bound in East Asia by Japan, in Persia by
England, turned anew with a changed front toward the Near
East. And it appears that England, without explicitly with-
drawing her opposition to the complete exclusion of Turkey
from Europe and to Russian occupation of Constantinople and
the Straits, nevertheless understood the art of awaking hopes
and expectations in the breasts of Russian statesmen which ren-
dered them useful tools for English designs against Germany.
Had Russia limited herself to the demand that under certain
restrictions passage through the Dardanelles be granted to her

V

MODERN GERMANY 51

ships of war, it is probable that neither Turkey nor Austria
would have offered serious opposition. But Russia's desire
went much further. She planned to extend her rule over Con-
stantinople, the Straits, the Balkan countries, the Black Sea
and Asia Minor, and to these plans the German-Austrian com-
bination formed a serious obstacle. Repeated attempts were
made at various times, by Russia in Berlin, by the English in
Vienna, to bring about in one way or another a rupture of the
close alliance of the two Central European Powers. All these
efforts failed. It would be less in place to-day than ever to
speculate whether Germany stands in greater need of Austria,
or Austria of Germany, to maintain their position as World
Powers — the important fact is that, in the European constellation
of states as then existing, the two Powers were mutually inter-
dependent and that the realization of this community of interests
has manifested itself far beyond the actual terms of their written
treaty.

The effects of the Russian-British understanding in the Balkan
question became more apparent after the meeting of Reval
(1908), beginning with an increased agitation of the Greater
Servian movement, which was directly aimed against the Aus-
trian occupation of Bosnia, and indirectly against the integrity
of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in general. The resulting
tension became still more intense through the Young Turk
Revolution, which gave a dangerous impetus to the nationalistic
aims of the Balkan nations and of the Ottoman Empire, and
increased the delicacy of Austria's position in Bosnia. Austria's
decision to annex Bosnia was the result of this situation (Oct. 5,
1908). Formally, it was a breach of the provisions of the Berlin
Treaty, but it was dictated by an imperative, vital interest of
the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, this act made no real change
in conditions in the Balkan Peninsula, and all fears of more
ambitious designs on Austria's part were rendered idle by the
fact that at the same time Novi Bazar, in which Austria had
treaty rights, was given back to Turkey. Nevertheless, as the
result of England's activity, a storm of protest was heard on
all sides against this one-sided action of Austria; and for Ger-
many the fateful question arose: What position was she to take
in the matter? Treaty obligations did not enter into considera-
tion, only the political situation ; but as this was conceived by the
German government there was no course but to support Austria
unreservedly and emphatically in this act so unmistakably dic-
tated by vital interests. Cold practical considerations were the
determining factor in this decision, not the romantic sentiment

52 MODERN GERMANY

of "nibelungen" fidelity. The Imperial Chancellor, Bulow^
recalled at that time (March 9, 1909) in the Reidistag, .Bis-
marck's words : "A state like Austria-Hungary, when abandoned
by its ally, will become alienated and inclined to grasp the hand
of the enemy of its faithless friend/' (Speech of February 6,
1888.) To be sure, as a member of the entente, Austria would
gradually have sunk from her former position of power; but
Germany likewise would have found herself in a future inter-
national crisis in a position of dangerous isolation.

The immediate and decisive support which Austria received
from Germany was an important factor in quieting the attacks
of the Powers against the Dual Monarchy and in preserving
peace, but, under cover, the clash of interests continued. The
Greater Serbian agitation, encouraged by Russia, continued
despite the agreement of 1909, and was still further strengthened
by the final outcome of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. The
danger which this involved for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy
became more and more manifest; it was, therefore, a matter of
course that Germany should continue to stand firmly and de-
cisively on Austria's side in the resulting conflicts.

Naturally, Turkey was threatened even more by Russia's plans
of expansion; but this consideration played no part in the out-
break of the present war, not becoming a factor until later
on. The German instructors in the Turkish army were just
as little an indication of a control of Turkey by Germany as
the English instructors in the navy were an indication of such
a control on the part of England. The only difference is that
the German military commission, with the earnestness and zeal
characteristic of German officers, took a real and active interest
in the strengthening and military education of the Moslems.
Our commercial interests in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia
justify to-day without doubt a keener participation in Balkan
affairs than at the time of Bismarck, but they were not a decisive
factor in the outbreak of the war. We as little desired to make
the Mesopotamian affair a cause for war as the Moroccan. With
the moderation and restraint which characterize our international
policy, we had come to an understanding with England and
Russia on the question of the Bagdad Railway. The construc-
tion put upon these facts by an American author is as ridiculous
as it is arbitrary and unfounded. He argues thus: "Following
Bulgaria's understanding with Austria^ only the conquest of
Serbia was needed to bring about the realization of the Levantine
Empire of the Pan-Germanists — Whence the Austro-Serbian con-
flict and the war." It is astounding that such figments of the

MODERN GERMANY 53

imagination can find a place in serious American magazines. Ger-
many's policy in regard to Russia may be thus summarized : We
are determined to oppose every effort by Russia and her agents
aimed at the destruction or degradation of Austria, even at the
risk of war. It is permissible in this connection to recall another
remark of Bismarck: "The preservation of the Austro-
Hungarian monarchy, as a strong, independent Power, is for Ger-
many a requisite of the European balance of power, for the
accomplishment of which, if necessary, the peace of the country
may be sacrificed with good conscience."

The German Empire is an obstacle in the path of the British
efforts to attain world-rule in the same manner as Austria is
an obstacle in the path of Russian Pan-Slavism. For almost
twenty years the successful competition of German industry in
the commerce of the world has aroused the jealousy, the envy
and the hatred of British business men and of the government
which they control. To be sure, the competition in no wise
endangered the growth of England's export trade and appro-
priated for Germany only a part of the riches created by the
increase in international commerce; but German export trade
was increasing more rapidly than England's and this rapid up-
ward tendency, which marked the entire economic activity of
the German people, was considered a source of danger to the
preservation of England's commercial supremacy.

An additional consideration was the growth of our fleet to
the size of a respectable sea power; in actual number of ships,
it is true, it was scarcely half that of the British fleet, but by its
absolute size it nevertheless awakened respect. It was due to
this fact that the British Admiralty drew together in home waters
the chief units of its fighting forces, which had hitherto been scat-
tered over the Seven Seas, and even left the protection of the
Mediterranean in great part in the hands of the allied French
fleet. There was no suspicion that our naval preparations were
of an aggressive character; sensible English people have never
expected an attack of the German fleet on England; but Eng-
land did not intend to permit any strong sea power whatsoever
to exist which, in certain contingencies, she might have to take
into account. Her aim was to maintain undiminished the im-
mense advantage she possessed over every other fleet in the
world. Politicians who gave thought to the conditions necessary
to maintaining England's naval supremacy were alarmed by
the tendency to growth shown not alone by the German fleet
but likewise by the trade and commerce of this Continental
rival. For the greater the absolute strength of the German

54 MODERN GERMANY

fleet, the more difScult it became for England to maintain
permanently the proportion of superiority over her rival which
she then still possessed. What would the result be if Germany
should raise the number of her dreadnoughts to sixty? How
would England then be in a position to maintain twice that
number? Whence would come the men and money for this
purpose? From the article of Archibald Hurd in the Fort--
nightly Review of October, 191 2, or the report of the British
Admiralty on Canada for the same year, the conclusion is easily
reached that these apprehensions were calculated to lead to a'
decision to check the further development of the German sea-
power by a preventive war. Even the modest basis of our world
policy and of our defensive maritime preparations seemed intoler-
able to Englishmen, because, with intuitive correctness, they
realized that Germany's economic strength and naval power
might one day, without war, through gradual, uninterrupted
development, challenge England's world supremacy. That, in
fact, was the aim of Germany's policy; we desired to develop
slowly in peaceful competition with England, until one day
the older World Power would recognize Germany as possessing
'.equal rights in determining the politics of the world. This
^development England sought to preclude by the war, following
the failure of her efforts to induce Germany to limit her naval
armament without corresponding political concessions and to
accept a position incompatible with political independence.

The aim of these endeavors was, of course, to perpetuate the
great superiority which England at that time possessed in naval
strength and to place this superiority upon a basis of interna-
tional law. The principle of British rule, it was intended,
should in this manner gain treaty recognition for all time. Ger-
many was to be forced, although she had to reckon not only
with the English but also with the French and Russian fleets,
to limit her naval strength to suit the interests and convenience
of the nation which rules the seas. In order that England might
be absolutely safeguarded in her naval supremacy, and relieved
from undue exertions in maintaining her superiority, Germany
was expected to renounce the policy of providing as generously
for her own safety at sea as political considerations required and
her internal strength justified. The method underlying this
naive request would, if applied to Continental conditions, justify
Germany in demanding of France and Russia a limitation of their
military strength to a point where it would seem innocuous to
Germany. What would England say to such a request ? There
is in that country evidently quite another standard for the rela-

MODERN GERMANY 55

tions of the G)ntinental Powers among themselves and for their
relation to England. England is far from granting to the Con-
tinental Powers a position of equality in international questions.
France and Russia may submit to such a relationship, if they
consider it compatible with their dignity and independence.
Germany demands a position of equality with England, and re-
fuses to recognize in principle and for all time her dominance of
the seas. This was the principal cause which drove England
into the war against Germany.

CHAPTER II
THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN KULTUR

PROFESSOR ERNST TROELTSCH, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

BERLIN

THE Homeric heroes, according to legend, were wont to go
into battle hurling imprecations at their foes, and it would
seem that fighters always have experienced the desire to stigmatize
their opponents as morally inferior. A change came with the
knights of the Middle Ages, when the consciousness of repre-
senting a privileged class and the desire to illustrate Christian
mansuetude, even in battle, gave birth to practices exhibiting
a certain esteem and courtesy. The rules of warfare and the code
of honor of that time have remained operative in the maxims
of our modern armies, and above all in the standards of the mod-
ern officer; but the great mobilized masses of to-day, and espe-
cially the nations themselves, counting millions of souls, once
more experience the emotions of Homeric heroes and accompany
the battle of their armies with primitive and violent race-
hatred.

This seems to be a psychological law and applies, with tem-
peramental differences, to all the belligerents. But that which
we are experiencing to-day is something that transcends the
sphere of emotions. It is a new weapon which is wielded by
the modern press. It is in the nature of a crusade against
Germany, of a "Kulturkrieg" which takes advantage of existing
predispositions or adverse sentiments in order to create and
propagate to the greatest possible extent a decided and uncon-
querable antipathy. This vituperative literature strives to justify
the war as the carrying out, so to speak, of a verdict of interna-
tional proscription. ^

This Kultur war is primarily the work of England, in whose

* Sec the London Times^ December 22, 19 14, statement of Professor Sayce: "The
Germans are still what they were fifteen centuries ago, the barbarians who
raided our ancestors and^ destroyed the civilization of the Roman Empire. For
a thousand years the blight of German conquest hung over Western Europe,
until at last the conquerors perished in internecine conflict or were absorbed
into the older populations, ana the Dark Ages came to an end.

"We must trust that they will not return with a new avalanche of Teutonic
barbarism, but that the Germans may resume their old vocation as the intel-
lectual 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for Western Europe. Germany
has no ancient culture to fall back upon, and what that means may be best
understood from the contrast between Glerman savagery in the present war
and the chivalry of the dvilixed Japanese in their war with Russia.

56

MODERN GERMANY 57

political intrigues against Germany it has long been clearly
perceptible. The inciting of the whole world against Germany
and the attempt to starve her out would appear indefensible
unless it were shown that the destruction of Germany is really in
the interest of humanity and that the moral inferiority of the
Germans demands it. A colossal campaign of suggestion is there-
fore undertaken in order to justify and uphold this manner of
warfare. Expressions of just appreciation, once so general, are
now suppressed^ and from Capetown to Edinburgh, from Rome
to Bordeaux, the censorship does its brutal work.

From a purely political standpoint such a policy is cleverly
calculated. The unscrupulous determination to make use of
every weapon, combined with the art of rendering this policy
morally popular, are old traits of Britain's political skill, and
the idea is as clever as is its execution. The latter may be
divided into two closely connected and yet different processes.
The first of these consists in influencing the daily press and
incidental literature, in which the most grotesque and crude
statements find a place, and the reader is made to shudder by
tales of Huns, barbarians, child-murderers and cannibals. The
hoi polloi demand such coarse pabulum, which is rendered more
palatable by pictures and films, made to order in case of neces-
sity. The other phase of the undertaking is left to scholars and
celebrated authors, who in more dignified language and with
scientific evidence, exhaustively picture the inferior or at any
rate the dangerous qualities of the German mind, at least in
its regrettable modern development. These products of their
pens are distributed in countless copies, and furnish the catch-
words and theories which are the weapons of the daily press
when they feel that, in connection with tales of horror, they
must offer their readers something more positive. In this en-
deavor English publicists are, of course, generously supported by
their French colleagues — indeed, the latter frequently provide
their brethren across the Channel with the most telling points
and most damaging charges, either revived or manufactured on
the spur of the moment. Russian writers naturally lack such
far-reaching influence.^

^ See Germany and Europe^ by J. W. Allen, London, 19 14. "The existence in
Europe of a great state specialized for military purposes and directed by people
dominated b^ such views — this is the immediate cause of the war'* (p. 56). . . .
"These deficiencies account for the old stupidity which marks almost all Ger-
man work. The German mind is at once powerful and dull" (p. 46). Mr.
Allen instances, as proof of their mentality, the works of Treitschke, Nietzsche
and Bemhardi, and the pan-German publicists; but he knows, and indeed ex-
pressly statesy that these writers do not agree, and do not dominate German
thouffht. He remarks further that the great groups, such as the Catholics,
the Social Democrats and the Liberals, do not countenance the publications of
the small pan-German group; but he adls on them to bear witness to German

58

MODERN GERMANY

The fonner of these two phases of the Kultur war must be
regarded from the psychologic, or rather, from the psychopatho-
logic standpoint, and falls under the chapter of "Truth and
Falsehood." The other, respectable portion of the anti-German
literary output is of a different nature. In this group we find
discussions of German character written from varied stand-
points— some more conservative, some more radical — but all
tending to present the war under the aspect of a Kultur war
and to disguise the physical struggle as a moral and spiritual one.
Despite this, however, they present earnest and exhaustive
studies of things German. Analysis frequently takes the place
of polemics. For it is here a question of the spirit of German
Kultur, which is presented either directly as the cause of the
war, or as something inimical that must be fought, but which,
by force of its inherent weight, often compels to purely scientific

mentality and Kultur. Sometimes, however, he retracts his statements: "Thia
mental condition seems to have amounted to what may roughly be described
as a will to war, and may be regarded as the real cause of the war. But
this mental state was no^ of course, a simple thing, all of a piece. It might
even be argued that it did not really exist at all" (p. 30); and later he saysL

peace including the condition' that Free Trade be established throughout Europe
and that everywhere — except in the British, Empire — the various nationalities
are to be permitted to determine their own political future.

See also Germany and England, by the late Professor J. A. Cramb, Lon-
don, 1014. It is an honest, chivalrous and thoughtful work, but it is of course
one-sided, and in one important point it is strangely in error. His book was
written before the war, but it has had a large circulation. Professor Cramb

S leads for the establishment of conscription; and he describes the threatening
lerman danger. It is not German inhumanitv that he considers the danger;
it is the ^reat political and intellectual development of the modern German
£mi}ire, driven by fate towards the hope of world-dominion, and thus into
an inevitable struggle with England — an England determined to maintain her
universal power. He bases his arguments cUefly on the works of Treitschke,
and interprets England politics in the light of Treitschke's idea& The final
motive of Germany as well as of En(|[land, according to Professor Cramb, is
not material, but spiritual^ world-dominion; it is Germany's purpose to destroy
Christianity, and to set m its place a German religion of worldly ideals, of
the^ power of will, of heroism, the ideal of which is Napoleon, the prophet of
which is Nietzsche. He holds that modern German development means the
annihilation of exotic Christianity and creation of a new national religion
which derives from Odin and the old Teutonic heroes; that the Germans, with
their ideas of world-dominion, are experimenting at the same time with a
new universal religion: "Corsica, in a word, has conquered Galilee*' (p. 133).
The English spirit, on the contrary, holds similar ideajs of heroism, a religion
of freedom, with reverence as well as fearlessness in its attitude toward the
Riddle of the Universe. Because of these differences, Professor Cramb fore-
sees an inevitable struggle between these rivals: "And one can imagine the
ancient mighty deity otall the Teutonic kindred, looking serenely down upon
that conflict, upon his favorite children, the English and the Germans, locked
in a death-struggle, smiling upon the heroism of the children of Odin, the
War-Godl" (p. 152^.

See also The Jvar and Democracy, by R. W. Seton-Watson, J. Dover Wilson,
Alfred Zimmem and Arthur Greenwood, London, 19 14: Germany and the Ger-
man Emperor, by G. H. Perris, London, 1914 (Fourtn Edition); and Britain's
Case against Germany, by Ramsay Muir, Manchester, 19 14. The last publica-
tion discusses the variation between the old Germany and the new Prussian
Germany, and upholds England's claim for world-dominion because she stands
for the maintenance of the present world order, which the German principle
of force aims to destroy.

N

MODERN GERMANY 59

or historico-philosophical discussion. Much misunderstanding
and caricature are mixed with all this, as is also much that
shows distinct bias. But in the main we meet here the
scientific method, which was developed by Germans precisely
for such purposes and which is now turned by our enemies
against us. Alongside of this is our own war literature, which
is already of considerable volume. It shows us as we see our-
selves. It is on the whole drawn with German honesty, and
may be studied with proiit by friend and foe, though of course
the picture is only a rapid sketch of what is seen by the flash-
light illumination of the war. But this is all that can be ex-
pected, as on both sides the cultural contrasts of Europe are
revealed by such momentary flashes, now that the hazy concep-
tion of the "respectable European" has practically been elimi-
nated by the conflict.

Let us endeavor, then, as calmly as may be in the face of
the perils surroimding us, and with reference to the war literature
that has come into existence, to characterize these great con-
trasts and the position occupied by German civilization within
this framework. We may then draw our conclusions without
having to descend into the degrading arena of war polemics,
with its increasingly disgusting abuse.

So-called European Kultur, or, more properly expressed, the
Kultur of the white Christian races, is not, as a matter of
fact, so uniform as appearances would indicate, or as each
fraction assumes it to be when it naively identifies its own
particular Kultur with that of Europe. Likewise, the view
that modem science had produced a uniform type of Kultur,
consonant to the demands of reason, is as erroneous as is the
view that Christianity implies and guarantees a homogeneous
Kultur. The dispute is by no means a product of this war.
England and France have long carried on the Kultur war by
means of the press, lectures and festivals. England, in addi-
tion, has done tJiis through Christian missions in order to prepare
against the day of political reckoning, or merely to emphasize
the existence of a moral contrast.

The various civilized states differ even in the material bases
of their existence. The two Americas are independent, unas-
sailable colonial states, self-sufficing commercially, destined in
the future to undergo the social developments through which
Europe has already passed. The British Isles are the centre of
a world empire comparable only to the old Roman Empire; as
in the latter, the citizens of the home state have grown into a
proud master caste, versed in all the arts of ruling the most

6o MODERN GERMANY

heterogeneous territories and nations. The states of the Euro-
pean Continent are military states, whose populations continue
to outgrow their natural boundaries and who consequently come
into serious conflict with each other, not only on the Continent
itself, but also beyond its borders, over the division of the colonial
territory which they require. These conflicts are of ancient
date, and in the course of more than a thousand years the out-
come has varied, so that to-day the purely political causes of
disagreement are complicated by questions of honor and national
traditions. Finally, the Russian Empire belongs to the type of
bureaucratic predatory states which, like ancient Assyria, have
no natural boundaries, and devote their excess of vitality to
territorial conquests, instead of to inner development.

These multifarious conditions cause great differences among
the various states as regards their Kultur, But there are, in
addition, differences of feeling, of thought, of the entire character
resulting from the racial individuality of the various na-
tionalities. They spring in part from the peculiar historical
development of the chief individual groups, but are not to be
explained entirely in this manner. There is in each case a
peculiar mixture of elemental tendencies and historical destiny,
of social-political and moral-intellectual development, acting and
reacting upon each other, yet each with its own individual cause
of being. It is clear from this that one can comprehend no single
one of these types of Kultur without considering it in its
entirety, as resulting from the intermingling of its various ele-
ments and tendencies; especially must it be studied under the
mutually interdependent phases of its external and internal life,
of its material and spiritual properties, of the historical fortune
it has met with and its inner qualities of character. The result
is, therefore, that one must not seek the Kultur of a nation only
in its science and art, its religion and morality, its culture and
schooling, as the English, with their penchant for simplifying
everything, are especially prone to do; rather must it be sought
in the manifestations of the nation's life as a whole, in the more
or less uniform national spirit created and revealed by the
mutual interplay of these manifestations. It is, therefore, quite
futile to quote statistics of renowned poets, scholars, artists, in-
ventions and machines, as unfriendly second-rate newspapers are
so fond of doing, taking as their standard only the accidental
celebrity of the press or the encyclopaedia. This is one of the
childish things which will automatically disappear with the war.
The system of treating certain authors selected at random as
typical of the German spirit is equally futile. We need do

MODERN GERMANY 6i

no more than mention the ridiculous trinity Treitschke-Nietzsche- /
Bemhardi, which to many controversialists is holier than the
Christian trinity, but which in the better class of writings even
among our enemies is recognized and condemned as an arbitrary
and stupid selection.^

Nothing is to be gained by such crude methods. The real
question is to grasp, in the broadest manner possible, the mani-
fold and paradoxical manifestations of the life of a nation and,
viewing them from a single or from as few central standpoints
as possible, to fathom and understand them as a uniform whole.
These central points, as our modern historical and historico-
philosophical teaching shows, are primarily to be found in the
politicd and social development of a nation, which determines
its spirit, if not exclusively, at least in the main. ^

We can understand England if we keep in mind her insular
character, her national union under the Tudors, her absolutely
unique position as regards the church, her Puritan Revolution
and the contemporary turning to trade and manufacture, her
fortunate position during the great European conflicts, which en-
abled her to appropriate a fifth of the globe and transformed
her into an extra-European Power, dependent only upon herself.
From this point of vantage one grasps the significance of the
middle class, which is the pillar of English trade, with its com-
bination of strong law-abiding religiousness and keen business

^ See Germany and Europe, by J. W. Allen, p. 4 et seq. He refutes the state-
ments of the authors of The War and Democracy (p. 350 et seq.) that the
philosophic of force is common to all nations: "What is true and what is more
aeriousy is that men like Hamacl^ Eucken and Wilamowitz. who should re-
midiate all intellectual kinship with Machiavelli and Nietzscne— men who are
leaders of European thought — -publicly support and encourage the policy and
standpoint of a Government which, according to British ideas, has actea with
criminal wickedness."

* It is perhaps well to pause here to say that the term Kuttur is not only
peculiar to German scientific language, but particularly to German thought and ^
leelinff. It is ceaselessly mocked at by the second-rate press as "KtUtur with
a K. It conforms to German History and manner of thought, in which tbs
unity of the nation has been broujght about by a spiritual development that has
become one with her politico-social being. At the same time, Kultur harks
back to Lutherism and the national church, in which the state and highest
intellectual interest have become completely one. The Anglo-Saxon c^mo-
cratic lanffua^e s{>eaks only of civilization, by which is meant the natural
right of the individual, and through it the control of the state, the freedom
of religion and the church, the recognition of the private character of personal
belief and conviction, and the influence of public opinion on government and
private life. See The War and Democracy, Cnap. IX, p. ^^8 et seq. In France,
too, the ideas of state, society, philosophy and aestheticism are closely con-
nected. But they do not call this Kultur as the Germans do, but civilutation.
progrks, humaniti, in order to express the logically necessary and rational
character; implied in the German Kultur, however, there is something roman-
tically, individualistically irrational, the idea of self -education and the improve- «
ment of the individual and the nation. For an English view of German Kultur,
see Viscount Haldane's address, "Germany and Great Britain," delivered at
Oxford at the time of the Agadir crisis; and note that he says the mutual study
of the national mind of the two countries is indispensable, and note also that
he calls attention to the fact that education {Bildung)^ which is general ia
Germany, in England leads to the establishment of class distinctions.

62 MODERN GERMANY

sense, its leanings toward the Free Church and toward an indi-
vidualism that resents governmental tutelage and that expresses
itself through control of the government, through individual
independence, and above all through public opinion. Again, from
this point of view, may be understood the development of that
class of pioneers and conquerors who seized, organized and ex-
ploited the colonies and who called into being that firm, masterful
Englishman who regards the world as belonging to him, and looks
upon himself and his customs and habits as the only possible ones
an3rwhere. The national armies and universal duty to bear arms,
as seen on the Continent, are inconceivable in such a colonial em-
pire. Its activity is divided between business and voluntary
military and pioneer service, that shifts from point to point
throughout the world. Above this middle class stands a
monarchy and aristocracy, who are treated with conservative re-
spect by the English democracy, owing to the latter's character,
which chiefly aims at independence; nevertheless, owing to the
pronounced conunercial and industrial interests of monarchy and
aristocracy, they do not form a social type as different from the
rest of the population as that of the Prussian landed aristocracy.
Further, above this middle class is a social stratum of cultivated
individuals, who, by virtue of their w^th and the opportunities
thus offered to them, may be said to belong to the noblest and
most cultured specimens of intellectualism.

But this class is much smaller than the corresponding class in
Germany, and much less the result of universal popular education.
That, on the other hand, beneath the "Hebrew Philistine middle
classes," as Matthew Arnold calls them, there exists a substratum
of the most abject poverty and helpless misery, has been shown
plainly enough by English sociological work, the Salvation Army,
and the most recent British social legislation. These were the
conditions from which arose what Cramb, with natural emphasis
on all that is great and striking in them, characterizes as the
general tendencies of English imperialism during the last cen-
tury and a half : "To give all men within its bounds an English
mind; to give all who come within its sway the power to look
at the things of man's life, at the past, at the future, from the
standpoint of an Englishman; to diffuse within its bounds that
high tolerance in religion which has marked this empire from its
foundation ; that reverence yet boldness before the mysteriousness
of life and death characteristic of our great poets and our great
thinkers; that love of free institutions, that pursuit of an ever-
higher justice and a larger freedom which, rightly or wrongly,
we associate with the temper and character of our race wher-

MODERN GERMANY 63

ever it is dominant and secure."^ The Conservative is recog-
nizable in these words; nevertheless, in his ideal he includtt lib-
eral English civilization as a world principle. The differences
are, in fact, not very great from a world-political point of view:
some Englishmen regard world dominion as the execution of a
bold, imperialistic conception of power, others as safeguarding the
moral world system of freedom against chaos. England's world
dominance is to some the promotion of the masculine spirit of
rule ; to others it appears a right and duty imposed by God ; but
to both it seems a matter of course.

The foundations of French Kultur were laid much further
in the past. It is the prototype of national culture in Europe,
gradually evolved through the consolidating influences of kings,
court, administration, Gallicanism, and centralization of intellect
in Paris. Thoroughly aristocratic, it was determined in the
paths of its modern spiritual development by the acceptance of
the Renaissance and the Counter Reformation. The aristocratic
culture of this classic period was then passed on to the middle
classes, which secularized and rationalized it, separated it from
church and monarch, and placed it upon the foundation of a
purely scientific conception of state and society. Basing their
claims on this theory of the state, the middle classes took the
power into their own hands and set up a rule of the people which
they declared to be demanded by reason, human progress, freedom
and social equity. This is the ideal of the bourgeois republic,
erected upon the foundation of clear and relentless science, con-
stantly calculating anew, in ingenious constitutional concepts, the
proper share of the will of the individual in the power of the
state, conceiving itself as the expression of reason (otherwise
expressed, of individual rationalism), and hence as the principle
of humanity, progress and anti-clericalism. The new republic
connects itself to the glorious old political aspirations of the
French military state by means of its propaganda for democracy,
science and humanity, at one moment with the material weapons
that liberate nations, at another with the magic of an elegant and
lucid literature of suggestion. The intellectual element, however,
of this democratic humanity consists au fond even to-day in the old
aristocratic ideal of the esprit classique, in the cult of form and
lucidity, in elegant ease and mathematical keenness, in the alterna-
tion of scepticism and dogmatism — all of this inspired by that
specifically French quality of imagination and feeling, the charm
of which is felt in every line of French literature. By this means

^ Germany and England, Cramb, p. iZ9 ^ MQ*

64 MODERN GERMANY

French genius has succeeded in presenting itself to that portion
of the world which is not under the sway of English civilization,
as the standard of humanity, democracy and progress, producing
at the same time the impression of a firm, established, but never-
theless impressionable and artistic protean power. Yet the
French peasantry and small capitalists continue to be ruled by
the bourgeoisie, although under democratic forms, much in the
same manner as at the time of the ancient regime and the Na-
poleonic prefects.

Freedom and equality are postulates of individual reason, on
which society is built up, rational and lucid. But this indi-
vidual reason is really only the spirit and taste of the old
aristocracy, leveled to the plane of the bourgeoisie. The
French Republic is a democracy in the form of its constitution
and parliament, a democracy of high-sounding phrases, but it is
not a real democracy of feeling, spirit and Kultur. The efiForts
of Socialism to create such a democracy are always wrecked by
the omnipotence of the bourgeoisie, or else they end in violent
temperamental outbreaks. He who has no share in the bour-
geois mentality does not count, and is thrust back into the arms
of clericalism, the enemy of all culture. The breach with the
national religion and the national past, and the resulting adop-
tion of science as the creator of the new, progressive and uni-
versally valid order of society, is the most characteristic trait of
the French mind, which, through all these breaks with the past,
has maintained only the artistic spirit of the Renaissance. That
enables France to act as leader to all nations which have experi-
enced or desire a similar breach and it creates a feeling of affinity
with all Romance peoples who are equally under the influence
of the Renaissance. The world-wide influence of suggestion of
the French is to be understood in this manner; truly, it is one
of the most important results of European development. It can,
however, scarcely be ascribed to hate or prejudice, if we Ger-
mans believe that we recognize, not the strength of progress, but
the aging of a great civilization, in this disturbed spirit, that has
broken with the national religion and that is therefore so en-
tirely rationalistic. This is likewise the opinion of many French-
men, in view of the fact that all attempts at innovation and re-
juvenation merely lead back into clericalism. Whoever recalls
the brilliant essays of Melchior de Vogue in the Revue des deux
Mondes of former years is reminded of strange, haunting au-
tumn moods ; whoever has read the social novels, le Mannequin
d' Osier or I'Anneau d'Amethiste, by the modern Voltaire, now

MODERN GERMANY 65

so ferocious,^ knows that the inevitable, logical consequence of
such pure rationalism — ^namely, scepticism — is already manifest-
ing itself in France in a high degree. For the moment, to be
sure, a violent nationalism and the religion of revenge for the
Franco-Prussian War has arisen as a "new idealism" to check
this tendency, and has decked itself with all the splendor of the
French claims to culture inherited from the eighteenth century.
But in the long run this is likely to prove a futile and unpro-
ductive idea.

In respect to oiu* third great enemy, there can be up to the
present no question of a pronounced contrast of kindred civiliza-
tions. It is true that the highly gifted masses of Russia hold
within themselves possibilities and probabilities of an important
new and essentially Russian Kultur. Were such a civilization
really to materialize, it would undoubtedly be the most religious
in Europe, and would result in an entirely new type, which
would combine the specific orthodox religiousness with the pe-
culiarities of an agricultural people still free from West-
European capitalism and rationalism. Every one familiar with
Dostoyevsky, Soloviev, and Tolstoi will look forward to such
future possibilities with great expectation — if, indeed, we may re-
gard them as possibilities. But the unorthodox West-Slavic ele-
ments, which are under European cultural influences, would not
be a factor, since they lack all prerequisites for participation in
the manifestations of a specifically Russian spirit. Pan-Slavism is
not a Kultur conception but a political weapon and a means of
agitation. But that with which we are concerned at present is
precisely not Russian Kultur in any spiritual sense. It is rather
Czarism, with its traditional policy of force and conquest, which is
meant to divert attention from the inner questions of Russian
civilization to external politics. When Russian liberals and
revolutionists seek to gain profit for Russian liberalism through
an alliance with the Western Powers, and at the same time to
indulge their hatred against reactionary Prussia, formerly the
ally of Nicholas I, this has nothing to do with the conception of
independent Russian Kultur; nor, on the other hand, has it any-
thing to do with such a conception when the feelings of the ortho-
dox mass are aroused against the impious Catholic and Protestant
West and directed toward the conquest of Constantinople. The
inclusion of Russia in this Kultur war against the German spirit
is, therefore, meaningless, hypocritical bombast, which is not
without its difficulties for the liberals in England and France.

^This refers to Anatole France and his anti-German attitude since the war.—
Tkanslator's note.

66 MODERN GERMANY

The cooperation of Russia is of purely military and political
importance. From the point of view of Kultur, the victory of
autocratic Russia, vtrith her Peter and Paul prison, her system
of Siberian exile, her pogroms and her pseudo-constitutionalism,
would mean nothing else than the advancement of the most vio-
lent and senseless reaction. There is no need, therefore, to con-
sider what Russian civilization will be in the future.

The pictures that we have before us, in contrast with our own,
are those of the English and French civilizations, whose influ-
ence, in each case, extends far beyond the boundaries of the coun-
try in question. The English spirit is dominant in North Amer-
ica, despite that country's manifold peculiarities; while the
French spirit controls anti-clerical Italy and the Romance coun-
tries in general. Only by utterly disregarding the deep-lying
differences in the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin conceptions of
democracy and of the strong esthetic and temperamental differ-
ences between the Anglo-Saxon and Romance peoples, can one
conceive of Western civilization as identical with the democratic
ideal of freedom, progress and humanity; only then can one,
with a wealth of illuminating demagogic rhetoric and with all
the ardor of the sincere doctrinaire, contrast it with the German
class-state and the German philosophy of force. Connected with
this, as a rule, is the doctrine of nationalities, looking to the
emancipation of all those groups that consider themselves to be
separate nationalities, and that would fain set themselves up as
independent democratic states, by means of a plebiscite and under
international guarantee. It is easy to picture the horoscope
which, from this standpoint, the opponents of Germany and Aus-
tria cast for those countries: disintegration into small democra-
cies, with a minimum of military equipment, under the control
of the liberal Great Powers. England herself would, of course,
remain unchanged by the operation of this principle, since, as we
are constantly assured, she consists only of willingly incorporated
nationalities and is now, or is in process of becoming, a model
commonwealth of democratic, self-governing units, similar to
that of North America. This democratic rhetoric furnishes the
main basis of the attacks against Germany. Judged by this stand-
ard, German-Prussian imperialism is indeed a thing to be con-
demned in the interest of humanity and the future of the human
race. Nor is there anywhere the least hesitancy shown in so
doing. Material is thereby furnished for the press campaign,
while at the same time the moral ideal is proclaimed with which
the most heterogeneous elements make a war of extermination
against Germany seem justifiable to themselves and others, in

MODERN GERMANY 67

order to avoid admitting that the whole situation is merely
the exploitation of the Russian desire for war for the benefit of
France's dream of revenge and England's longing for commercial
world supremacy.

The real nature and tendency of German Kultur is not to be
learned from such international rhetorical phrases or from super-
ficial moralizing, but only from an analysis of Germany's devel-
opment and of the German spirit.

The decisive factor in this connection is to be found in the fact
that the German Empire is a very recently created state, with
complex and insecure boundaries, situated in the middle of Eur-
ope, and unwelcome to all the previous Great Powers, for whom
this politically free space in their midst formed the natural bat-
tlefield and the natural source of territorial compensation. One
needs only to recall the dismay which so humane a statesman as
Gladstone experienced at the disturbance of the then existing
political balance through the birth of the German Empire, and
simultaneously through the formation of the Italian Kingdom,
the latter event being rendered possible only by the former.
This disturbance, and its continual augmentation by the eco-
nomic and political growth of Central Europe, is the true reason
for all the dislike and antagonism. In the youthfulness of this
late-comer and trouble-brewer in the European system of states
is to be found, moreover, the reason for its lack of finish, its
sanguine vitality, its passionate self-consciousness, and the mass
of still unsolved administrative problems. In the minds of out-
siders this may be a ground for criticism, in our own it indicates
merely the striving for an ever-growing unity and increasing sta-
bility of the Empire, as well as the hope of a prosperous and
great future. These are hopes that befit a vigorous adolescence,
but which, under the relentless pressure of reality, will doubtless
adjust themselves to the outside world. They indicate no more
and no less than does the boundless optimism of the Americans —
namely, the vitality and self-confidence of a youthful state.

But the decisive factor in determining the spirit of Grerman
Kultur is the manner in which the German state was founded
and the peculiar compound of plastic forces which moulded the
nation. The Thirty Years' War left in its train chaos, religious
disimion, poverty and a motley of small states. Austria, whose
attention was concentrated on the Orient, could not undertake
the reconstruction of the German Empire — ^her interests, in fact,
lay in the perpetuation of the prevailing state of chaos. The
memories of a former German Empire had faded, and seemed
like those of a foreign world. But the vitality of the nation was

68 MODERN GERMANY

not extinct: it crystallized gradually around the new military
power, the Prussia of Frederick the Great, which, through a
series of well-known events extending over two hundred years,
finally became the backbone of a new, if narrower, empire. That
this was the only road open for reuniting the nation into a state
every diild in Germany knows to-day. The prerequisite for the
development of Prussia into the German Empire was the devel-
opment of a spiritually united and homogeneous German nation,
which justified its demand for a firm state-edifice. This has been
the work of German literature, poetry, philosophy and science, that
since the eighteenth century have disseminated a new spirit of
unity throughout Germany, torn as it was by religious differences
and sunk into philistinism. The result was Wilhelm von Hum-
boldt's great school and university reform, which has been copied
in all the German states and which has enabled the spirit of
German Kultur to become the unifying principle and the bind-
ing force. The great educated middle class adopted the cause
of Liberalism, which took upon itself in the remarkably peace-
ful Revolution of 1848 the establishment of German union.
In this effort it was forced to turn to Prussia to obtain the
necessary military support, though at that time in vain. In the
year 1870 Liberalism in all non-Austrian states finally suc-
ceeded, with the aid of Prussia, in the formation of the Empire;
to-day, in spite of all frictions, it has become incorporated in
the politico-military edifice. Since the recuperation of Ger-
man economic life and the founding of the Customs Union a
new creative factor has been added. This is the combined in-
dustrial activity of the whole nation; as a result of the founda-
tion of the Empire, this industrial development began to bring
forth all the latent energies of the people, and in the entre^
preneur and working classes produced a third important element
of the body-politic. Not without friction has this element hith-
erto adjusted itself to the other two; nevertheless, it is bound
to them by innumerable ties, resting as it does mainly upon the
basis of discipline and order and upon the achievements of me-
chanical art and science, of school and education. It was this
third factor that made possible the tremendous growth in popu-
lation, which since 1870 has increased by twenty-four million,
the feeding of whom is the chief problem of the Empire to-day.
In the interplay, friction and adjustment of these three forces
is represented the German Empire of to-day. Here, and not in
the alleged antithesis between un-German, power-seeking Prus-
sia and the other, idealistic but politically weak states, lie the
problems and contending factors of the new Empire; in Prussia

MODERN GERMANY 69

herself these are not less real than in the other parts of die
Empire. The only difficulties that arise from Prussianism to-
day are those resulting from the peculiar social structure of the
class of great land-owners in Prussia, and especially from their
intimate relationship with the Prussian administration. The
military organization, the energy and system of this administra-
tion, its spirit of discipline and responsibility have been willingly
adopted by the whole country, which competes with the Prus-
sians along these lines. For the nation is convinced that no in-
dependent German civilization is possible without the protec-
tion of a great powerful state, and that the sustenance of our
millions is not feasible without a firmly united Empire, capable
of a strong commercial and economic policy.

Finally, one must not forget the great substratum of the
peasantry and lower middle class, from which large groups with
clearly realized aims are continually making their way upward.
In these classes are stored the nerve power, the natural instincts,
the elementary spiritual forces, which readi self-realization only
with the level of self-conscious culture. The tremendous im-
portance of this fount of national strength and the close con-
nection of essential characteristics of the nation with this popular
stratum and its peculiarities of mind and sentiment, so difficult
of explanation, is made instantly clear at a time of war, like
the present, when its importance becomes decisive.

Like all great nations, Germany is rich in contrasts and com-
plexities; as compared to its two great opponents, it is much
further from a state of final development. In times of peace,
therefore, it presents an aspect capable of widely divergent inter-
pretations ; but it is the result of great fateful moments like the
present to bring about what otherwise years could not accom-
plish— not alone the union of the different parts and grcyups,
which in face of the deadly danger naturally think only of the
preservation of the state — but above all the revelation of the
hidden or obscured unity of spirit. Inward coherence reveals
itself and spiritual unity flashes forth.^

^The theory of the Prussianization of Germany it not accepted hj the
authors of The War and Democracy, They reco^iize that Germany waa, at
the outbreak of the war, and is still, an inner spiritual whole. Thus, on page
X20, it is said that the German war literature ahowa: "First, a great con-
solidation of the German national unity, and secondly, a tendency ... to hark
back ... to the wars of Liberation. ... No one can read recent articles bv
the leaders of German thought without feeling that the Germans are still,
tMefore all things, and incurably, the people of poets and philosophers, and that,
by a tragic irony| it is the best ana most characteristic qualities of the race
which are sustaimng, and will continue to sustain it, in toe conflict in which
its dreams have involved it." Also (p. 230): "Here we have to learn from
Germany, for German statesmen, stran^ly enough, have taken an immense
trouble to make their policy a democratic one. The whole German nation is
behind them, because for years and years they have taught the nation through the

\/

70 MODERN GERMANY

The picture as it presents itself may be sketched in the fol-
lowing outlines:

The Germans are preeminently a monarchic people. To this
they are bound not alone by ancient inherited sentiments of
fealty, loyalty and trust (which to-day manifest themselves
chiefly in relation to the person of the Kaiser as the upholder
and symbol of German unity), but even more by national neces-
sity. Only under monarchical leadership can the work of unity
and development of a nation encompassed by danger be accom-
plished. That has always been the case and is still so to-day.
All European nations have achieved their unity by means of
monarchy. The exceptional case of the United States proves
nothing to the contrary, since in this instance the question was
one of development without the presence of neighboring states.
The French Republic is only a translation into republican
form of that which the Bourbon and Napoleonic monarchies
had created, and it has often enough suffered from friction
between the Army, desirous of monarchic leadership, and th*
elements of democracy. Unity and coherence and a cor-
porate military force demand a consistent and independent
leadership which cannot be shaken; and this can be attained
only in a monarchy, to whatever degree dependent upon the
popular will and the free support of the people. Moreover,
united Germany shows the most pronounced diversity in
her social structure, embracing all classes from the old Prussian
landed nobility down to the factory worker and peasant. It is
in a period of transition from an agrarian to an industrial state,
and is in need, therefore, in an especial degree, of a leadership
unfettered by social distinctions, which has nothing to gain for
itself and which in its own interest must be as just to all as
lies within its power. No parliamentary majority can fulfil
these demands. Great as may be the advantages of a parlia-
mentary form of government for the discovery and training of
political talent, as well as for the political education of a people
in general, it is a menace to the unity of the military and politi-
cal leadership of a youthful state. Hence the desire for parlia-
mentary rule is not widespread in Germany, quite apart from
the legal and historical difficulties of such a form of government
in a confederation of states.

No plutocracy, no committee of "intellectuals," no syndicate

schoolflL the universities, the press, their own reading of history and their
own idea of what true civilization is. . . . The real strenslh and danger of
Germany is not what her statesmen and soldiers do^ but what Germans them-
selves believe. We are fighting not an army but a false idea." It is 9uite
true that the unity of spirit in Germany is the work of the nation itself within
the last twenty years. The outbreak of the war did not create, it revealed it.

MODERN GERMANY 71

of workmen's unions could provide us with what we need.
That can be given only by a monarchy, and for that reason —
ivhether through sentiment or understanding — ^we are monardii-
cally inclined. And it accords with a strong monarchy, such
as we require, that its hand should be felt everywhere, both in
great and little things. Personal freedom and human dignity
do not suffer thereby in the least. While public servants are
placed in a safer and more independent position, owing to the
rights guaranteed to them by the laws, than in democracies, the
average citizen experiences absolutely no repression through the
monarchy. It is, of course, natural that a monarchic ruler, with
his plenitude of power, should exercise great influence; but this
is the case with every form of government, even with parlia-
mentary majorities. We, at any rate, consider ourselves in
many respects freer and more independent than the citizens of
the great democracies.

Closely connected with this is the military character of the
German state and people. It is rooted in the old Teutonic
warlike character which no esthetic cult, no puritanism and no
commercial philosophy has succeeded in breaking, and which is
a matter of course to our peasants. Even more, however, is it
due to our geographical and political position, which can be
secured against our neighbors only by superior strength. For
this reason the last century has been conducive in the highest
degree to the development of this military character. It has
injected the conception of honor and the esprit de corps of the
officers of Frederick the Great into Scharnhorst*s Army of the
Nation, and has so intimately united the Prussian ability for
organization and rule with the ethical idealism of German edu-
cation that they have thoroughly coalesced. The result of this
is the remarkable efficiency of the professional officer and of the
popular army. In the last analysis, national unity rests upon the
army in the same manner as does the monarchy. All the ideal
forces of education, science and technical training have been
absorbed into the organism of the army; conversely, the mili-
tary system furnishes the model and the requisite strength for
the remarkable organization which prevails throughout the Ger-
man nation and in which initiative of the individual and disci-
pline of the whole are successfully united. All this, is imposed
upon us by fate, which has placed us in the centre of Europe; ^
of this necessity we have made a virtue, which, despite unde-
niable difficulties and frictions, has stamped the whole na-
tional character with masculine clearness and lucidity. But the
most important consequence of this universal bearing of arms is

7a MODERN GERMANY

«

the fact that an effective war can be waged only with die real
^nd enthusiastic approval of the people; it must thus always be
a war of defence. There can be no thought of world domina-
tion with a popular army nor with a fleet which, based on
conscription, can be used only for the protection of the country
and of its trade and industry. The bitterness against German
militarism — ^the hardships of which we alone have to bear — is
really based only on the fact that the German army is so difficult
to defeat, and that those who would like to dislodge Germany
from her place, or prevent her from rising into prominence, find
themselves forced to imitate this institution, which is psychologi-
cally much less adapted to many other nations.^

The school organization parallels that of the army, the public
school corresponds to the popular army. The latter as well as
the former was called into being during the first great rise of
the coming German state in opposition to Napoleon. When
Fichte, while the country was groaning under the Napoleonic
yoke, considered the ways and means of resurrecting the Ger-
man state, he advised the infusion of German culture into the
mass of the people, through the creation of national primary
schools along the lines laid down by Pestalozzi, which were
to educate the chifdren, according to well-established methods,
to mental independence, moral self-control and intellectual self-
development. This program was actually adopted by the dif-
ferent German states, and developed during the last century
into a comprehensive school system of elementary, secondary and
university education. This has become the real formative fac-
tor of the German spirit. There is in this school system a

^ See Germany and^ the German Emperor^ by G. H. Perns, London, 19x4. A
characteristic expre^on of the average English opinion. The question, How
<can such a superior nation come under the sway of a military despotism, and
virility, originality, liberty, and individualism be so completely lost? is answered
by an analysis ox the whole of German history. After the Reformation, Ger-
many was so drained of all vital energy that she could express herself only in
romantic verses and abstruse metaphysics. Thus completely weakened, she
succumbed to Bismarck's despotism. At the same time the modern economic
revolution, while it deprived her of the remainder of her originality, on the
other hand certainly supplied the necessary means for unity. It is Germany's
tragedy, therefore, to have reached no sane democratic and progressive unity,
but to be disintegrated a^in bv Prussian brutality and its consequences. The
contrasting picture of Eni^lana is interesting and instructive: "If England
l>ecame the mother of Parhaments» the exponent of evolution in political and
social life, as well as in science and philosophy, it is ultimately not because
-of any innate superiority of the British nature, but because her insular posi-
tion has, since 1745, protected her from internal warfare, and for a much
longer period has set her full in the current of modern forces, so that feudalism
-and clericalism withered earljr, and no speculation could get far away from
the bracing winds of practical interest" (p. 115).

See War and Democracy. The German outlook on life is called a "confused
and patchwork philosophy'^ (p. 108), and it is explained by attempting to show
that it originated in her long and debilitating political misery. Prussianized
<jeniiany, it declares, is sick, and, because it is undemocratic, it furnishes a
<case of morbid nationality-development.

MODERN GERMANY 73

Democratic and State-Socialistic element such as Fichte in-
tended. On the other hand, it is closely connected with the
achievements of the army and of German industry and techni-
cal science, which have become famous throughout the world for
the quality of their results and for their scientifically enlight-
ened methods.

This system also naturally involves certain dangers — conven-
tionalizing to type, a pedagogic spirit and, as it were, a casting
of minds in the administrative mould. Our system is most un-
popular with the English, who prefer a vastly looser school or-
ganization which makes for firmness of character and good fellow-
ship rather than for education and general intellectual develop-
ment. But the dangers referred to are neutralized by careful
individualizing, by fostering the Kantian spirit of independence
and self-government, and by the teaching of ancient classics for
purposes of moral character-building. This is particularly the case
in a great number of secondary schools, whereas the dangers are
met in the universities by the spirit of free and pure science, that
serves no utilitarian purposes. The English, on the other hand,
prefer material utility and routine to our university education,
leaving free, pure science to private scholars or holders of fel-
lowships. Their secondary schools reflect class and social dis-
tinctions much more than ours, while their free national schools
are under a complicated administration of the church, the gov-
ernment or the local bodies. It is extremely difficult to determine
the greater or lesser advantage of the two systems. They corre-
spond to the general character of each nation, and considering
our character and our tasks, we have every reason to be thank-
ful for our system. We are certain that our present accom-
plishments and successes would not have been possible but for it,
and we are confident of being able to overcome all its dangers
by our almost excessive spirit of individualism, originality and
personal freedom. A spontaneous movement to this end has
already begun to manifest itself among our present-day youth.^

The touch of State Socialism which the army and the school
are thus shown to exhibit is even more pronounced and compre-
hensive in the general system of German administration. This
system is the outgrowth of the patriarchal state of the seven-
teenth century, and also of the enlightened ''police state," which^

^ See Universities and National Life, by Viscount Haldane, London, 19121
(Second Edition), the chapter cm "German Organization," p. 77 et aeq., wmch
discusKS the German school system in relation to England.

See also The IVar and Democracy, pp. 356-363, on the End[isb dislike of the
German educational system : "We have hardly yet beeun in Xngland to realize
the possibilities of educational development along the lines of the British idealr
both at regards young people and adults" (p. 361).

74 MODERN GERMANY

by Its thorough-going work, rescued the German people
from the economic desolation left in the wake of the Thirty
Years* War and the Napoleonic conflicts. But this administra-
tive system has passed through new phases and has acquired
new characteristics since the great period of Stein; it has de-
veloped from a patriarchal bureaucracy into a rational and far-
seeing guardian of all the interests of the State and the people.
It has joined hands with the great system of self-government in
the cities and districts, with the various forms of insurance, and
finally with the supervising and advisory parliaments, thus de-
veloping an enormous activity the effects of which are seen in
the prosperity and security of present-day Germany. Unfet-
tered work and free competition of industry and agriculture
would never have accomplished this unaided, as they have failed
to accomplish it, as a matter of fact, in England and America.
In this connection, we must above all refer to the great work
of social insurance, which is gradually being copied by the whole
world, and also to the housing, land and labor legislation of our
cities — in which there are no ill-famed slums and which, with
the general increase of population, are o(i the high road to a
marvellous prosperity. Nor must we forget the rational land
policy, the encouragements to prosperity, and the protection of
homesteads in the country. It is true that these things have
their dark side. Criticism is heard of the predominance and
number of the official class, of bureaucratic "enforcement of
felicity," exaggerated respect for position and title, the habit of
depending upon the police for help and a certain tendency to
groveling subordination. Englishmen, who in this respect pre-
fer freedom from state intervention, are generally averse to this
form of administration and are accustomed to speak contemptu-
ously of the character which it has imparted to the Germans.
But these are dangers which we ourselves strive to counteract
within the system, not in opposition to it. ,He who knows our
administration from its inner working, not merely from the
outside, and especially he who has made a study of the great
system of municipal self-government, with its bold experiments
in far-reaching social legislation, will have no fears of bureau-
cratic ossification as a final result. He will, on the contrary,
see in it the growth of an established vigorous State-Socialism,
which is the inevitable development of modern society, and
which even England has been compelled to inaugurate in her
latest legislation. Our own love of freedom and the character
of our great administrators guarantee that flexibility and life

MODERN GERMANY 75

will be preserved in the system, which has stood the test so
brilliantly in the present war and which has yet many great
problems to solve in the future.

Only on the foundations here described was the development
of German economic life possible; it synchronized in its growth
with the development of our political unity and strength. The
Germans, to be sure, are by nature an extremely diligent people,
trained to careful and conscientious toil since the dajrs of the
boroughs of the late Middle Ages, and inured to hard work and
thrift by the misery and poverty of the period of petty states.
They are still to-day more industrious than the English, who
are accustomed to growing rich with less labor and who con-
sider this as their proper privilege. But only since die birth of
the new state have the Germans successfully entered the cur-
rent of the modern economic movement and raised themselves
to the plane of their present extraordinary economic achieve-
ments, under careful state guidance and with the spur of capi-
talism and mechanical art. This primarily has increased the
population, and this increase was again an incitement to more
extensive labor. The result has been gradually to change us
from a purely continental and preponderantly agrarian state
into an empire in which industry and agriculture are combined
and whose interests extend far beyond the seas. Great inter-
nal difficulties are inherent in this dual tendency, but at the
same time there are great advantages of an economic and psy-
chological nature, as we are realizing most keenly at the present
moment. German agriculture feeds the nation in time of war,
the German peasantry furnishes the best soldiers, and the large
land-holder, accustomed to command, supplies the officer corps
with the major part of its members. We are not a nation of
rentiers, like the French, not a rural military and bureaucratic
state bent on conquest, like the Russians, not a purely industrial-
and commercial nation, like the English, whose fleet is the bul-
wark of their luxury and who provide for their younger sons
by giving them posts in the colonies. We are still a nation
working at high tension, that must employ all its arts of or-
ganization, of order and calculation, as well as its whole political
strength and unity to feed its increasing millions. To this very
fact the war was chiefly due, since our industry and increase in
population gave birth to our maritime policy, resulting in clashes
with England, the exclusive ruler of the seas. To these circum-
stances, far more than to German ideas and theories, are we also
indebted for our great unpopularity. Our middle-class popula-
tion, in pursuit of a livelihood, is forced out into the world to

76 MODERN GERMANY

take places abroad as clerks, barbers, mechanics, teachers, superin-
tendents and foremen, and they are naturally regarded as unwel-
come competitors. A still more important factor is that our
industry is compelled to concentrate itself chiefly on finished high-
class products, not necessities, and that these products are not
welcomed like those of dealers in raw stuffs and partly made-up
goods, but must often struggle for a market against native finished
goods. In addition, our business methods are frequently unwel-
come to the established mercantile intercourse of older commercial
countries. This is the result, to be sure, not of German character,
but of Germany's commercial position ; but it is easy to generalize
from such a basis and to stir up sentiment against the German
spirit, as is being systematically done at present.

All the things here mentioned — ^monarchy, army, school, ad-
ministration and economy — rest upon an extraordinary instinct
for order, combined with stern discipline and an earnest sense
^ of duty. With this we penetrate more into the inner being of
the German. Whence comes this trait, whether from natural
endowment or from historical training, it is difficult to say.
Nor does it matter. It is enough that things are as they are.
It is in this sense that our ruler designates himself as the ''First
servant of the State," and that the great German thinker ex-
claims: "Duty, thou sublime word!" — the same thinker whose
chief merit it is to have established philosophy on clear and classi-
fied logical principles. Order and duty, solidarity and discipline
are the watchwords of our officialdom, of associations and cor-
porations, of large and small business concerns, of our labor
unions, and of the great social insurance undertakings. Method
and system are the principles of scientific work and the technical
arts, of education and social legislation. Even free artistic tem-
perament and imagination do not move only in the sphere of in-
spiration and mood, but seek, precisely in the case of our greatest
men, to take their place in the general psychic development, in the
cosmic conception and in the scheme of moral achievement. No
examples need be mentioned, for this is the characteristic
trait of the German which strikes strangers first of all.
Many regard it with unfriendly eyes. Englishmen are fond
of designating it as pedantic and doctrinaire. A Russian
newspaper says: "The German has but one aim throughout
his whole life. To be German, therefore, is identical with in-
finite boredom." An Italian recently expressed the opinion that
in Germany method is so highly developed that it renders genius
superfluous. It is difficult to argue about a matter in which the
decision rests on purely subjective standards, and in regard to

MODERN GERMANY 77

whidi it is true that, in our case, as in others, virtues have their
drawbacks. At all events, there is no plethora of geniuses in
other countries, and we may well be satisfied with so universal
and widespread a substitute.

But the dangers in this connection are after all not so great.
For as one-sided development inevitably calls forth counter-
balancing qualities in the human soul, so this sense of order
finds its balance in extremely gentle and tender traits of heart
and mind, in family instinct and love of home — the most beau-
tiful expression of which is the German Christmas festival. It
is further counteracted by the tender depth and primitive sin-
cerity of feeling as expressed in our folk-songs, and by the stem
sense of justice and self-assertive tenacity as shown in the ethics
of our peasantry. Under the surface of the metropolitan jour-
nalistic writings this is the genuine German character, which
finds its way through a hundred channels, even into the highest
classes, and which is now manifesting itself on all sides in our
national army and touching our hearts with song* and comrade-
ship. Naturally, these elemental popular traits are as a rule
completely lost upon the foreigner; just as we, in the case of
other nations, can only divine these undercurrents by means of
their anecdotal literature. At all events this is the point of
contact with the Englishman, who is otherwise so different from
us in spirit, but who feels also the need of a similar counter-
balance to his commercial and utilitarian sense. But we limit
this world of sentiment less to home and family ; we let it extend
into every phase of life and cosmic conception; it finds expres-
sion in our art and poetry, our social attitude and our judgment
of our fellowmen. This fact is revealed by those poets whom
one may characterize not as our greatest, but as the most essen-
tially German: Jean Paul, Adalbert Stifter, Wilhelm Raabe,
Willibald Alexis, Fritz Reuter, and above all Jeremias Gott-
helf, who is not characteristic of Switzerland alone.

Comparing them with Dickens and George Eliot, or 2k>la,
we gain at least a dim conception of the difference in national
spirit. But even where German poetry and character-delinea-
tion rise to the heights of universal humanity and spiritual great-
ness, we still meet this basic element, operating on the whole
man with the force of a certain childlike heartfelt directness, as
demonstrated by Goethe, Bach or Beethoven. Nay, this differ-
ence extends even into the field of religion. Luther, who domi-
nates German Protestantism, is distinguished by his childlike,
popular traits and primitive strength of feeling from the sober,
logically precise, and morally correct Calvin, whose spirit still

78 MODERN GERMANY

lives in Calvinism and non-conformity, although much external-
ized, formalized and deteriorated along utilitarian lines. The
keen observer would herein likewise discover the chief difference
between German and French or Italian Catholicism.

But as a matter of fact this entire antithesis in thd sense of
order and sentiment does not exist to sudi a pronounced degree
as is apparently the case when viewed from without. For these
two tendencies have a common source from which they flow and
in which their inner unity is to be sought — ^namely, the German
metaphysical and religious spirit. Our sense of order is not
founded on its usefulness for material and social ends, but ema-
nates, together with the sense of duty, from an ideal concep-
tion of the spirit which is the rule and law of human life and of
the universe. Nor is this feeling identical with a sentimentality
that clothes, covers and seeks to compensate the asperities of
life. It is rather the child of an elemental cosmic conception
which realizes that this feeling is basic in the universe. The
German is by nature a metaphysician who ponders and strives,
^' from the spiritual inwardness of the universe, to grasp the inner
meaning of the world and of things, of man and destiny. It
will always be idle to explain the origin and development of this
predominant, though by no means universal, characteristic. It
remains the final German life secret, much discussed among
the Germans themselves, the cause of sacrifice and suffering, the
motive power of wonderful achievements — the problem of an
ever-new compromise with practical life and its realistic demands.
It is seen above all in the significance of religious life, as
revealed by German history. The life of the burghers of the
late Middle Ages was the first complete realization of Chris-
tianity within the limits possible for an active people. From
this class came the Reformation and the division of the Church,
which has decided the fate of modem Europe, disrupted the
unified German state, and lastingly bound up the general life
of the single states with their religious organizations. At the
period of national spiritual renascence of the eighteenth century,
the great problem of life was the reconciliation of the modern
spirit with Christianity, the creation of a scientific, critical theol-
ogy, the adaptation of the Christian idea to a religiously deep-
ened conception of humanity. This problem has remained until
to-day the chief point of German interest. But at the same
time the old traditional churches have displayed vital activity,
and they are regarded by many intellectual as the natural
means of maintaining a moral idealism among the people. This
has resulted,, it is true, in very confused conditions. To remove

MODERN GERMANY 79

this confusion, whether in the manner of French anti-clerical
legislation or in that of the Anglo-Saxon freedom of conscience
and disestablishment of the churches, encounters difficulties, not
alone in historical, political and legal conditions, but likewise in
the depths of the German spirit itself, to which the Puritanic
separation of politico-social institutions and purely individual
culture is foreign. We regard state and spirit as belonging to-
gether, and an old inherited instinct makes us avoid a separa-
tion in the interest of both, despite the difficulties created by
the modern spiritual cleavage. We suffer the confusion of this
situation rather than resign ourselves to the Anglo-Saxon divi-
sion of politico-social civilization and private individual spiritual
training. In such a separation, experience teaches, the latter
suffers grievously. The whole system in England presumes the
general domination of an inviolable orthodoxy, while on the
other hand the French bourgeoisie has made anti-clerical enlight-
enment a state question. This point shows with particular clear-
ness the fundamental dissimilarities of the nations.

A similar metaphysical tendency, though naturally less closely
connected with the state, holds sway in German art. For that
very reason, its real centre is music, since in it is voiced, in a
manner most appealing to us, all that is unutterable and inex-
pressible in the German character, simplicity and heroism,
mirth and melancholy, faith and doubt, empirical knowledge
and intuition. From Bach, Gluck and Handel down to the
present day there is an unbroken series of the sublimest crea-
tions. Through its music the essence of the German spirit is
usually most easily revealed to foreigners, as is shown in Romain
Rolland's great novel, "Jean Christophe," to choose but one
illustration. It is true that this metaphysically inspired, impul-
sive and stirring art, is in sharp contrast with the artistic con-
ception of the Latin races, with their sense of clearness, form,
grace and transparency, which is an inheritance from the Re-
naissance. Herein the great national contrasts are clearly
revealed, contrasts which simply cannot be overcome and eradi-
cated, and in the expression of which each people must live out
its own life. For this reason German music cannot be torn
from its organic connection with the entire national life, from
national religious faith and war-like heroism, from national self-
consciousness and the hopes bound up therewith. How closely
all these things are connected may be seen in the "Meister-
singer," that most German creation of a master who in other
respects may be said to be modern rather than purely German.
Precisely for this reason, the protest of RoUand against German

8o MODERN GERMANY

Kultur and the severance of modern realistic Germany from
old idealistic Germany proceeds from a false basis. For our
enemies such a separation may doubtless be highly desirable, for
us it lies neither in the realm of the desirable nor of the pos-
sible.

It is much more diiEcult to apply the same line of thought to
German plastic art. For in this field, in Germany as elsewhere,
influences are many and varied. Moreover, our situation is
here very complicated. The great German tradition of the
Middle Ages was interrupted, and in the period of desolation
it was foreign art and literature that helped us find ourselves
again. Especially in the plastic arts are the various influences
highly involved; it is impossible, not alone owing to the limita-
tions of space, to draw here one clearly defined line of specifi-
cally German development. But that which is not possible
from the point of view of the history of art, may, nevertheless,
be indicated from the point of view of the history of civiliza-
tion. Despite the German's yearning for the sunny south, the
northern Gothic germ is in his blood, while the French have
completely broken with the great France of the Middle Ages
and turned sympathetically toward the Renaissance and the
Counter-Reformation. The German's thought is always
chiefly occupied with substance, expression, movement, not with
line, form, symmetry and delicacy. This explains fundamental
dissimilarities between the Germans and the Latin races, for
the latter of whom, moreover, art stands in much closer con-
nection with the immediate forms and instincts of life.
This finds ample expression in the present Kultur war, and
in the minds of many forms the basis for the charges
of barbarism, just as the classical Frenchman saw only the
untamed drunkard even in Shakespeare, the poet of the
Renaissance, and as the Italian regarded, and probably still re-
gards, northern Gothic art as barbaric art. This has been the
source of a mass of international criticism, scattered throughout
the world as commonplaces on the wings of elegant French
journalism and eagerly accepted, especially by Anglo-Saxons,
whose Puritanism and commercialism have deprived them of a
definite artistic tradition. Further discussion on this point is
without object. We Germans find the great symbols of our
mode of artistic conception in Diirer, Holbein, Griinwald and
Rembrandt; and we let the real artistic creative power of the
present follow its own path, knowing that it cannot be fettered
by theories and that it is certain to return to those old symbols.

It is easier to characterize German philosophy in a uniform

MODERN GERMANY 8i

manner. It has, to be sure, naturally shared in all the move-
ments of European thought ; but in the main it is precisely this
philosophy which is the expression and the cradle of the meta-
physical German spirit, and its central position in German spir-
itual life is of the greatest importance. The reader is already
familiar with the main outlines, and a few words must suffice
for this great subject.

German philosophy was created by Leibnitz and Kant. Their
spirit has acted on classical German literature and poetry, and
in conjunction with these it laid the foimdation of German
idealism, which once more to-day, after many fluctuations, domi-
nates German philosophy and has done more inwardly to form
and strengthen the youth of Germany than anything else within ^
the last twenty years. If in truth it is the task of modem
philosophy, as distinguished from the ancient and medieval, to
seize hold upon and philosophically digest and apply modern
natural science and its all-permeating mechanical concept of
nature, German idealism up to the present may be said to have
set itself the task of combining with the mechanical concept of
nature, the full appreciation of the moral, religious and artistic
spirit, and the assertion of freedom with the mechanical princi-
ple. In this effort, German idealism has hitherto undertaken
its most abstract and elemental investigations, but never more
ardently than at the present moment. By this means German
philosophy has remained in closer touch with the religious life
of the people than has the French scientific dogma of atheism.
On the other hand, it has penetrated much deeper into the
general spirit of religion than can be the case with the essentially
practical and conventional religion of England and her not less
practical and utilitarian philosophy.

German philosophy is free, autonomous idealism. There can,
in truth, be no question here of that so-called philosophy of
force, nor of nationalism or chauvinism. The only question is
that of the fundamental relation of nature and spirit, and within
the bounds of spirit the question of the individual to the body
politic. It is chiefly the spirit of Kant and Fichte which has
inspired these investigations up to the present day. Their spirit,
only calmer, more realistic and cosmopolitan, permeates the
national uprising of 1914, as it permeated that of 1813. For-
eigners, it is true, are inclined to criticize this philosophy as
abstruse metaphysics, or as semi-theology, and many contemptu-
ous references to it are to be found in the literature of the war.
But those who judge thus are in no case the leaders of thought.
They are the average anti-clericals and the equally average Eng-

82 MODERN GERMANY

lish utilitarians and '^matter-of-fact'' men. The leaders of
thought, even in those countries, have turned their efforts to-day
towards a similar idealism, and are in many cases indebted (as
for example, Bergson and Boutroux) to German philosophy.
The basic difference is that in Germany philosophical idealism
possesses a much stronger national tradition and has a much
wider influence in educated circles, but in the main the European
leaders of thought converge in a truly remarkable manner.
There was no need of going to war for the sake of our divergent
philosophies.^

Such a concentration on the spiritual elements of culture as a
whole, which unmistakably characterizes the historical develop-
ment of Germany since the Reformation, indicates a pronounced
talent for scientific work in general. Thus, together with the
increasing realistic tasks of the nation, we observe an increas-
ing development of its powers in the field of empiric science.
No mention is needed of what the nation has achieved in the
line of natural science and mechanical art. It has in all branches
fully attained to the science of the older and more advanced
nations, and perhaps in some lines even surpassed them. But for
purposes of our discussion, this is unimportant. English scien-
tists, who in their war fury will at best but credit their German
colleagues with the discovery of the spectrum analysis as an inde-
pendent piece of research, may receive their answer from the
German scientists, if these should think it worth their while.

On the other hand, a word in regard to German historical
science may not be out of place. At its inception it was strongly
inspired by philosophy, and embraces, in thoroughly cosmopolitan
fashion, the development of languages, art, religion, politics, as
well as the economics of the whole world open to our knowl-
edge. In this effort it was emphatically supported by the in-
vestigations of travelers and geographers. But among other

^ See German Philosophy and ths Present Crisis, by G. Dawes Hicks,
Hibbert Journal, October, 1914, Vol. XIII, No. x. In this sober-minded article
the writer claims that this entire system of philosophy has been superseded
'by "Bismarckism." It is perhaps sufficient, in reply to this, to say that,
despite our gratitude to the founder of the Empire, there has developed in
Germany a reaction against "Bismarcldsm" as a system. The maxims and the
deeds of a statesman who was called upon to overcome almost superhuman
difficulties cannot be regarded as an ethical system for eternity. It is a
strange fact that foreigners do not recognize German idealism — ^which ,they
are always so ready to call "political immaturity" — when it treats political
and social problems according to German history and not according to those
French and English traditions which they accept almost as natural rights.
It is impossible, of course, under our state and educational system, for German
social pnilosophy to be what the English and French democratic systems de-
mand; which proves that our social philosophy is idealistic For further testi-
mony on this point, sec The War and Democracy^ referred to in footnote,
p. 69. German philosophy and the "potato-bread spirit," of which Mr. Lloyd-
George speaks, of course, have as much in common as have English philosophy
and miners' striken

MODERN GERMANY 83

numerous problems with which the science of the newly created
and growing state found itself face to face was the particular
problem of the state. Hegel, continuing the thought of an-
tiquity as represented by Plato and Aristotle, had already recog-
nized this as a quite peculiar problem, absolutely distinct and
different from those of merely private morals and of social
science. In Ranke's cosmopolitan investigations it was stated
in its purely historical sense as the distinction between the in-
carnation of political power and all other historical creations.
The historical school of jurisprudence has effectually supported
these apperceptions. Herein, it is true, German historical
science, as emphatically as Plato had done in his day, opposed
the democratic fiction that the state is an institution created by
the individuals for their own security and happiness. This
antithesis naturally became intensified in the days of the fierce
struggles for national unity, during which the great historical
investigators, von Sybel and von Treitschke, seemed to be
developing into political publicists rather than historians. But
anyone versed in such matters is aware that these political
thinkers in no way intended to deny the existence of political
ethics, but merely to distinguish them from the rules of private
morality.

It is precisely this distinction which English democrats,
whether of Christian or anti-Christian stripe, fail to recognize.
They measure all foreign states by their private moral rules,
but leave the politically so advantageous immoralities of English
politics to the responsibility of the Government. We are in
this respect more honest, and penetrate further below the sur-
face. The saying that "might makes right" has never been
the motto of German thinkers, despite the fact that for them
the conception of right and morality was more difficult and in-
volved than for those who, in the manner of Puritanism, pro-
claim a universal democratic natural right, which they reconcile
with their own political aspirations by declaring their own state
to be the guarantor and controller of natural rights throughout
the world.

German historical science, however, has by no means re-
mained at the standpoint of the seventies. Without abandoning
its conception of the nature of the state, it has again extended
its view to include the entire cosmopolitan horizon, and has
elevated purely political interests to the historico-cultural plane.
It is, however, not possible at this point to enter further into
this subject. It suffices to mention Mommsen, von Wilamowitz

V

84 MODERN GERMANY

and Eduard Meyer, or to recall the names of Hamack, Dilthey
and SchmoUer.

To all this must be added German literature and poetry, as
the most important revelation of the German spirit. It may
seem surprising that they should be mentioned last in this con-
nection. But that is due precisely to the universal function which
they exercise among us. German life and feeling in the eight-
eenth century had been forced back into a literary existence, and
the entire vital energy and force of the nation was compressed
into its literature. Literature, therefore, was the centre of all
philosophical, scientific and cultural interests, and drew within
its sphere social and finally state problems as well. Not with-
out significance is it that Goethe, the typical representative of
this literature, found the solution of his problem in universal,
but at the same time thoroughly individual, self-culture. This de-
termined the character of modern German literature. It ab-
sorbed into itself the essence of German life, and in this way
operated like a philosophy. It formed, deepened and transfig-
ured the life of the nation in all fields of activity. In this con-
nection the classical and romantic schools were, in truth, not in
such marked opposition; they were united in the ideal of self-
culture, differing only in the means to be employed for its
achievement. Indeed, in carrying out this thought and in im-
planting it in the soul of the people, the romantic school was
perhaps more efficacious even than Goethe.

In the course of the nineteenth century, German literature.
It is true, fell from the heights attained (of which further dis-
cussion is superfluous), but with fresh energy, it is now recov-
ering from this decline. The literary revolution of the eighties
prepared the way for a deep inner change and revival, which,
at present, we feel within us only as a shadowy desire and im-
pulse, but which is surely an indication of vitality and unex-
hausted power. This is, therefore, the place for a word about
Nietzsche, whose name has been so misused in this Kultur war.

Nietzsche is rather a poet than a thinker. German philosophy
is concerned with him but slightly, German politics not at all.
He preached against the triteness, shallowness and self-compla-
cency of German culture of the eighties, deepened vastly the
conception of personality, strengthened the longing for sincere
living and originality, and thereby blazed the way for a new
romantic movement; in its development this movement has
become much more German than would have accorded with
Nietzsche's Latin and Slavic sympathies. Even before the war,
the morbid, irritable and egoistic quality of his teaching

MODERN GERMANY 8S

was in process of elimination, and doubtless in the spiritual de-
ration resulting from the war it will be permanently overcome.
But only trivial Pharisees and narrow-minded sectarians can
deny the incentive to new aims and inner searchings that owe
their origin to him.

How deeply this spiritual and scientific interest is rooted in
Germany is ^own by the remarkably bxoad classes which are
permeated by it. All officials, teachers and preachers have
enjo3red thb education. The centres of scientific work are
remarkably numerous and well equipped. In this respect Ger-
many is perhaps unique. But even more important is the fact
that an army of publishers, associations, institutions and enter-
prises uninterruptedly provides the people with this intellectual
pabulum. Music and philosophy, science and education are con-
tinually popularized. A kind of democratization of all educa-
tion is under way which strives to render the very best and
deepest universally accessible. He who is familiar with the
S3^tematic activity of the Kunstwart and of the Durerhund
with their remarkably cheap dissemination of genuine art and
serious thought, knows with what earnestness this work is
carried on. A Dutch socialistic paper was not wrong in declar-
ing recently that this was one of Germany's greatest services in
the field of culture.

This brings us to the last, most important and most disputed
subject: the German conception of freedom. It combines the
metaphysical religious spirit, which we have Just characterized,,
with the political needs of Uie youthful Empire — ^as described in
the opening passages of this chapter — in a peculiar, and it must
be admitted, often paradoxical manner. Hence, as all contro*
versialists correctly divine, and some express with striking clarity*
this conception is different from the French and from the Anglo-
Saxon.

The French idea of freedom rests upon the conception of the
equality of all citizens in their contributions to the carrying out
of the common will. Theoretical constitutional maxims which
safeguard the egaliti and liberie, and occasionally incite the im-
agination and the passions of the people, are of supreme im-
portance, although in practice they fail to exclude the dominance
of plutocrats and lawyers. Of fraternite it is perhaps best not
to speak at all; it is and remains, in the words of Count Cham-
fort, somewhat like the fraternite of Cain and Abel.

The English idea of freedom, on the contrary, is a compound
of Puritanic ideas and of conceptions dating from the times of
the old Saxon Estates. It represents personal responsibility and

86 MODERN GERMANY

y self-government of the individual; his independence of the
state, based on a natural right; the creation of the state by
the individual. Without attaching great importance to consti-
tutional theories it exercises practical control over the powers
of the state; it guarantees freedom of religious opinion, liberty
in matters of conviction, and independence of spiritual culture
from state interference. It is the realization of the universally
recognized dominating position of the English citizen, who
imposes upon inferior races the ndes of life suitable to them,
while reserving his own rules for his individual determination.
The Englishman acts from his own free utilitarian convictions
and in reliance on his personal inviolability. It is his creed that
this freedom coincides with the welfare of the state, which he
proves either in Puritanical fashion, by means of Providence,
or rationalistically, by means of evolution — ^in any case, which-
ever way he looks at it, he considers it a matter of course.
For this reason he links the state and government to public
opinion, which is the product of these free and clever egoistic
units, and he sees therein the guarantee of reason, morals and
freedom.

Upon either of these two bases, great and mighty developments
of political and social life are undoubtedly possible and have ac-
tually been realized. But the German idea of freedom is funda-
mentally different. Rising gradually from long centuries of
inferiority and servitude, the German first experienced freedom
in German education and the spiritual content of individuality.
These ideals were permeated from the start and for all time
by the old German longing for independence and defiant self-
assertion, though these were for a long time denied political
realization. German freedom came into being, according to
Kant's conception of it, as the freedom of spontaneous recogni-
tion of duty and ri^t, and in the romantic conception of an
infinite wealth of culture, individual, but in all cases mutually
complementary. Up to the present it has, in the main, retained
this character. In conjunction with this, the old tendency
toward particularism has persevered, manifesting itself in pro-
vincial, dialectic and dynastic peculiarities, and in the proverbial
German love of dispute and discord. But this latter quality is
to-day greatly moderated in its disruptive effects. It has been
sublimated into individualism and distinctiveness, and has defi-
nitely subordinated itself to the strong feeling of political soli-
darity, which will no longer brook foreign domination and is
determined to regulate its own life from within, in the true
German spirit and manner. By these means we have sought in-

MODERN GERMANY 87

wardly and morally to overcome the worst obstacle to German
freedom ; namely, the separation of classes and castes dating from
the period anterior to 1848. That is even in our day the most
difficult and peculiar task of German freedom. C From this point,
truly, it was and still remains a long way to actual political
freedom. The English model of Parliament and the systemi
of self-government have helped us greatly along this path ; likewise
a great influx of French Democratic thought has permeated Ger-
man party life and is still generative to-day. Our energies are
directed, and must for a long time be devoted to the utilization
and adaptation of these incentives in forms suitable to our nation.
Nothing demonstrates more clearly than this that we are still a
young and unfinished state. Our policy regarding the various
nationalities embodied in the German Empire has also much to
learn along these lines.D

The democratization inevitably resulting from the popular
army, the public school and the emancipation of the working
classes, will continue to develop in Germany and will find means
to adjust itself to military and political exigencies. That is a
result in Germany, as everywhere else, of the condition in which
modem nations find themselves; our freedom will always be dif-
ferent, however, from that of the Western nations. Parliaments
are necessary, but in our eyes they are not the essence of fre^
dom. The ri^t of sufiFrage and the cooperation of the people
in the duties of government educate to political maturity; but
not even this is the freedom which we mean. QGerman freedom
will never be purely political; it will always be bound up with
the idealistic thought of duty and with the romantic thought of
individuality. Even as a political conception it will bear the
mark of its essentially intellectual and cultural origin, in the
same manner as the Englishman's conception bears the mark- of
Puritanism and the Frenchman's that of revolution.^ Above all,
we desire to gain and develop this freedom ourselves and not
to receive it as a gift from foreigners — least of all as the result
of defeat, as the literature of our enemies so often consolingly
holds out to us in prospect. Here lie our definite tasks for the
future. The freedom of the nation must grow and develop to
completion in a victorious Germany, and this freedom will be
German freedom, not French, not English, and above all, not
Russian freedom.

If, now, from this point of vantage we gather together all
the traits described into the entity which they represent in life, we
shall, in the main, have correctly formulated the spirit of German
civilization as contrasted with that of the civilization of our

M MODERN GERMANY

enemies — ^allowing, of course, for errors. Nor do our enemies,
for their part, picture it very differently, save that they accen-
tuate other points than we and with an unfriendlier emphasis.
It would be childish to try to distinguish between these distinctive
factors by a dogmatic pronouncement. The great national
civilizations all have their advantages and their drawbacks, and
there is room enough in the world for all. Let us draw atten-
tion to one result only of the German conception of freedom.
It has not the nationalistic impulse of French liberty to force
itself on all mankind as the scientifically sole possible form ; nor
like that of England, the pretended moral impulse to regard
all civilization as dependent upon the supremacy of English in-
stitutions.

German freedom does not strive for world dominance, neither
material nor intellectual. It stands for the freedom of the
various national entities who may not destroy each other s possi-
bilities of development nor allow them to become conventional-
ized in the name of any law, no matter of what nature. In
this sense we believe that we are the people who are striving
for the true and genuine progress of mankind, which does violence
to none and brings freedom to all.

The longer the war of weapons continues, the more unrelent-
ing this Kultur war has become and the greater the skill of our
enemies in transforming by lies or imagination violent national
egoism into humanitarian principles. In this the Machiavellism
of the Italians has excelled all previous performances. We, for
our part, know that for us this war is not primarily a question
of principles and ideas, but rather one of life and death, and
that the war of diplomacy and cultural enmity has been threat-
ening us ever since we have enjoyed an existence in a political
sense. We arc, in the first place, fighting for our life. But
this political life of ours as a Great Power carries with it an
aspiration that fills us with unshakable confidence — the belief
that the various nationalities must be released from England's
dominance in the political and moral ordering of the world and
her tyrannical control of the seas.

CHAPTER III

GERMANY'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC

POSITION

PROFESSOR HERMANN SCHUMACHER, OF THE UNIVERSITY

OF BONN

AS was more explicitly shown in the preceding chapter, Ger-
many lies at the centre of the most densely settled part
of the globe, and is surrounded by a greater number of popu-
lous, powerful, and ambitious neighbors than any other country.
On all sides, especially on the eastern and western frontiers,
the way lies open for peoples strange in race, civilization and
speech to enter the country with the products of their hands
and brains. Germany has thus been designed by nature as the
highway, and at the same time the gathering-place of Europe.
Great cultural advantages undoubtedly result from this situa-
tion. Germany has never been able to live for herself, in jeal-
ous exclusiveness. Outside stimuli have at all times acted upon
her life. No other nation has developed a like interest and
understanding for foreign modes of life, and none has so great
cause to appreciate foreign achievements along lines of civiliza-
tion. Upon this basis, aided by German strength and thorough-
ness, there has grown up a many-sided and rich life of the
spirit. Germany has become the glorious land of poets and
thinkers.

But as a result of her geographical position, she also became
the battle-ground for the settlement of all the disputes of Europe.
For not alone to travelers, with foreign wares and foreign
thoughts, but likewise to warriors, with weapons of death and
firebrands in their hands, were her unprotected fields open. Upon
these have been settled the greater part of European wars. Time
and again has the nation experienced terrible visitations, been
robbed of the fruits of its industry, and set back for generations
in the development of its powers. Whereas England, her
coasts safe from foreign foes, was enabled to lay aside her
gains and savings in undisturbed security; and France, despite
the many wars waged (mainly beyond her own borders)
by her glory-seeking kings, found it possible to preserve the
continuity of her commercial development, the wealth and cap-
ital of the German nation were repeatedly destroyed. These dis-
asters were felt the more keenly in view of the fact that our

89

90 MODERN GERMANY

limited territory was not richly endowed by nature. With its
sand dunes and hilly stretches, it is inferior in natural fertility,
not only to France and England and Northern Italy, but like-
wise to Hungary and Southern Russia. It possesses no rich
meadows, like those of the broad coastal regions of Western
Europe. It brings forth neither cotton nor silk, nor rice nor
com, and wheat only sparingly. It hides no gold within its
bosom, and but little silver and copper.

Three great and vital tasks are thus presented for solution
to the German nation. Culturally, we must develop the ad-
vantages of our position at the heart of Europe, by cultivating
every opportunity for peaceful intercourse, by the adjustment of
intellectual interests, and by the encouragement, without na-
tional stultification, of understanding for all that is noble and
capable of development in foreign life ; politically, we must offset
the disadvantages of our situation by developing our strength
and holding ourselves ready to repel from our borders even a
numerically superior enemy; commercially, we must overcome
the handicaps of our position and of our past, by multiplying the
productive factor of our labor as compared to the factors of
soil and capital. These are the three great tasks which fate
has laid upon the German people before all other peoples. They
have not chosen them deliberately, the tasks have been imposed
upon them. So long as the nation continues, so long will it be
forced to strive for their accomplishment. The more nearly it
succeeds, the better will it serve, not alone itself, but likewise
humanity in general, whose welfare, as Germany believes, can
be advanced only upon a basis of a multiplicity of equal and joy-
ously laboring nations, but which must wither under any crush-
ing world supremacy.

For the performance of the political task it is not sufficient
to resort to energetic measures in the moment of danger. This
' may be done by nations for whom nature has provided a more
or less satisfactory protection, like the United States, which occu-
pies almost an entire continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific
Ocean and has at no point an equally powerful neighbor; or
like England, who, thanks to her insular position, has remained
untouched by the international disturbances of the Continent.
The danger of invasion has in recent years filled England's im-
agination; in Germany, however, it has, at all times, through
frequent recurrence, been a terrible reality. In the face of
this constant danger of invasion, that permanent protection which
nature has refused us must be artificially provided through or-
ganization, in contrast to England and the United States. This is

MODERN GERMANY gt

the stern lesson which history, supported by geography, at every
turn impresses upon us, with an emphasis that it employs toward
no other people.

To follow this teaching has not been easy for the German
people, for originally its individuality ran counter to the political
requirements of its position and history. Since the times of
Caesar and Tacitus, much has been written by strangers regard-
ing the individual German's love of liberty, and we have often
been described by natives and foreigners as a nation rich in
striking individualities. Individualism is deep-rooted in the Ger-
man soul. The antithesis between the natural inclinations of the
individual and the vital demands of the whole nation was for
a long time our undoing. It was gradually overcome only
through two forces. At first a strong governing will, as exem-
plified in the Prussian Kings, was able to hold it in check only
by imperious authority; it required the conscious determination
of the people, developed in the relentless but indispensable school
of bitter experience, finally to overcome it. These two forces
were welded together through Bismarck's creative power, and
the present war has convincingly shown their irresistible strength.
The lasting protection which, to our undoing, we had lacked
during our previous disunion, was given to us by the Prussian
Kings in times of greatest stress when they imposed the universal
duty of bearing arms. This they did, not in arbitrary despotism,
but with a proper care of their people and as the strong and
wise providers for our political needs.

In doing this they have unconsciously greatly helped also
to prepare the way for the solution of the third or economic
problem. For since the days of Scharnhorst, we have been ac-
customed to regard the duty of military service, not alone as a
measure of protection, the necessity of which has now for all
time been impressed upon each one of us, but at the same time
as an indispensable form of training. Clear-sighted observers from
all civilized lands have in recent years come to a realization of
this fact. Military service, as the school of physical development,
takes its place by the side of the public school, which provides
the elements of mental culture for each individual ; it has hitherto
been a matter of regret to us that every single individual did
not come under the beneficent influence of military discipline as
well as under that of the public school. Compulsory education
and the requirement of military service are the two solid pillars
upon which rests the proud edifice of Germany's defensive power
and her economic strength. That which we were forced to learn
in bitter days in the army, in order to save ourselves from de-

92 MODERN GERMANY

struction, has later borne rich fruit in the field of our eoonomic
life, at the start almost to our astonishment. The same
qualities which render our soldiers unconquerable in war are re-
sponsible for the superiority which the army of our workmen
80 often show in peace. They are the qualities which alone
render every great organization efficient: the highest possible
development of the individual combined with the most efficient
cooperation of all.

Individual power demands mental, physical and moral develop-
ment. Mental efficiency is secured by our school system, which
is more highly developed than elsewhere and which finds its broad
homogeneous basis in our 61,557 public schools, and its many-
sided completion in the war academy, twenty-two universities,
eleven technical high-schools, six commercial high-schools, four
agricultural, forestry and veterinary high-schools, three high-
schools of mining, sixteen for plastic art and eleven for music
Physical training, as stated, is gained by means of military service,
which develops self-command and adaptability, punctuality, order
and cleanliness. To these in recent years has been added a new
and unique educational element in our system of workmen's in-
surance with its 22,838 offices, 114 trade associations and 31 in-
surance offices. This system has not alone provided expert med-
ical attendance in all cases of greater or lesser need for every
working-man's family, and thereby greatly assisted in the pres-
ervation and improvement of public health ; it has developed far
beyond this into a general social-political and social-hygienic
training of the entire people, in the same manner as it has
turned its attention from mere relief of poverty to its prevention.
Thus in later life are developed the seeds of a healthy and
economically sensible manner of living which for the great ma-
jority were sown during the period of military training. Finally,
moral efficiency, which naturally depends greatly on that of mind
and body, has also been increased through military service for
the mass of the people. For here, through the most severe
training, that quality is acquired which transforms a man, as the
result of voluntary and intelligent subordination, into a useful
member of the great present-day organizations — namely, disci-
pline, the modem sister of industry. A sense of duty, such as
the tasks of war require, even to the sacrifice of one's life, cannot
fail to suffice also for cooperation in the tasks of peace. But
only he who can obey can learn properly to command. The
army, therefore, educates for us not alone recruits, but also
officers for the vast undertakings of our industrial life; and es-
pecially does it furnish those efficient intermediate workers^ equally

MODERN GERMANY 93

trained in obeying and commanding, who may be styled the
under-officers of our great industries, and of whom no other
nation can show the counterpart.

Without discipline, even the most able leaders are unable to
make many men effectually useful in one common pursuit. In
such case, the force of their will is broken in endless disputes,
and a conception is lost before it takes shape in action. On
the other hand, a group of men accustomed to discipline are like
plastic clay. They need only the shaping hand of the creative
artist. Nothing so smoothes the way from conception to realiza-
tion, and so widens thereby the empire of the human will, as this
quality of intelligent subordination, which raises the disunited
desires of many wills from the arena of paralyzing conflict into
the realm of powerful cooperative action. A nation accus-
tomed to discipline, and that is likewise educated and energetic,
is, therefore, by its very nature, a nation of organizers. The
German people have proved themselves such in all branches of
the army and in industrial life; in agriculture and manufacture,
in trade and traffic. In times of peace our military organization,
which embraces the nation, and the equally impressive organ-
ization of our economic life, stood side by side and often quite
without mutual understanding. No fact in the present war,
which has entered into all spheres of popular life as no previous
war, is more characteristic, on the German side, than that these
two, in closest cooperation, have been welded together into un-
conquerable unity. Victory will be gained by us, not through
a rigid, antiquated "militarism,*' but throu^ a vigorous concep-
tion of organization that holds promise for the future. Instead
of being abandoned, it will be further strengthened into exem-
plary power.

I

The idea of organization grew in the field of economic life
out of the vital necessities of the people, in the same manner
as this idea in the military field was forced upon us through the
exigency of our position and our past.

Politically, we could hold the difficult position apportioned to
us by fate only by not dividing our national strength, but by
concentrating it, numerically increasing and carefully husbanding
it. On the other hand, the strong union which we finally
achieved through the founding of the Empire and by means of
universal military service, proved a powerful impelling force to
further growth. Immediately following the war of 1870 there

94 MODERN GERMANY

was a sudden remarkable increase in the birth rate, which be-
came an important factor in our further development, in so far
as this new generation, on reaching its full potentiality as a
labor force, proved a powerful stimulant to our economic life
when this began its marvellous rise around the year 1895. But
aside from this temporary increase resulting from the war, Ger-
many sufFered in general under the decrease in the birth rate
conunon to all Western Europe. If the number of inhabitants^
despite this fact, increased more rapidly than those of other
European civilized nations, this, as is well known, is not to be
explained by an increase in the birth rate, but by a decrease
in the death rate. In Germany the "fight against death" was
early taken up on all sides, with German scientific thorough
ness and system._ The death rate constantly decreased fnnn
28.8 per thousand, which was the mark from 1871 to 1880, ta
16.4 in 1912. Thus it was possible, despite the falling birth
rate, to bring the yearly excess of births in 1874 up to 5C)0,ocx>;
in 1887 to 600,000; and again in 1895 and 1896 to register a
further yearly increase of 100,000; in 1902 this excess reached
900,000. This tremendous increase from 41,000,000 in 1871
to nearly 70,000,000 in 1915, or 75 per cent in forty-five years,
so raised the population of Germany that to-day it occupies
among European nations a position second only to that of Rus-
sia. France, which at the beginning of the 19th century held
this position, stands to-day, with approximately 40,000,000, ia
fifth place. Great Britain, on the basis of her white inhab*
itants — ^45,000,000 in Europe and approximately 20,000,000 ia
other countries^ — does not equal the German figure; and although
Russia, which in Europe alone is nine times the size of Ger-
many, excels the latter notably in numbers, it is culturally so
inferior in the mass of its people that it fails to equal us, not
alone in its power of production, but even as a consumer. Hence,.
Germany enjoys the economic advantage over all European coun-
tries of having the broadest basis of production and consumption^
It is the greatest inland market in the world, with the exceptioa
of the United States. Compared to its inland market, its for-
eign market is of relatively less importance than is the case ia
any other European country. We have learned for the first time
during the war the strength that results from this condition.
This valuable knowledge will not again be lost, but will bear
fruit for us in many years of peace.

The constant striking increase of our population has been
primarily of importance in subjecting German economic life to
the driving force of incessantly mounting demand, as is the

MODERN GERMANY 95

case elsewhere only in the United States. Food, clothing and
shelter, and above all a chance to work, had to be provided for
this increasing mass. Thus enterprise and industry are kept
alive in the whole nation, new organizing tasks of the most im-
portant kind are uninterruptedly unfolding, and all efforts to
reduce the increasing volume of work, through the introduction
of improved methods, find rich reward. Under the pressure of
these natural conditions, resulting from healthy German energy,
a scientific spirit and organizing instinct have developed in all
branches of our economic life.

Slowly but steadily, this has become apparent in the field of
agriculture, which at the time of the founding of the Empire
was the most important of all the great branches of our
economic activity. Forty-five years ago Germany might still be
described as an agricultural country. She was able to satisfy
not only her own domestic demand for food, but also exported
her superfluous products to England. The latter country, since
gaining a position of world dominance as the result of the long
Napoleonic wars among the Continental Powers, had sacrificed
its agriculture more and more to trade and manufacture, in re-
liance upon its fleet. German agriculture had, to be sure, dur-
ing the first half of the nineteenth century, improved considerably
in its scientific and technical methods; but even under the strong
influence of Albrecht Thaer, the first successful founder of a
higher agricultural school, this advance had consisted mainly in
introducing here and there better methods, as the result of
experience, in place of those handed down from previous gener-
ations.

Had German agriculture continued to be carried on in this
empirical manner, it would not have proved equal in any notable
degree to the task of providing for the great increase in popu-
lation. The German nation would in that case have found
themselves in an embarrassing dilenuna. It would have been
forced either to feed its increasing numbers with foreign prod-
ucts, and thereby place itself in the position of growing de-
pendence on foreign countries (the dangers of which course the
present war has forever impressed upon us), or it would have
had to send abroad these consumers of food who threatened its
safety, and would thereby have decreased not only its produc-
tive power but also its defensive strength. These two discour-
aging alternatives increased as practical possibilities at this mo-
ment owing to the fact that, coincident with Germany's striking
growdi in population, an historically important development oc-
curred through the beginning of competition in the sale of grain

96 MODERN GERMANY

4

from overseas in our markets. Previously transport of large
masses of goods had been limited to small distances, hence within
European boundaries; but precisely at this time the great mod-
em improvements in communication made possible the importa-
tion of such staple foods as grain, from all parts of the earth.
Simultaneously the great newly opened-up grain territory in the
Western part of the United States invited emigrants in large
numbers, as no other foreign country had ever done. This
double danger became apparent soonest and most emphatically
in England. In that country, subjected as it was to its full
influence, the number of wage-earners engaged in agriculture
and forestry, which in all great European countries fluctuates
to-day between 35 and 69 per cent, fell to 11.9 per cent in
the entire United Kingdom, and in England and Wales even
to 8.5 per cent; at the same time the importation of grain for
bread rose to fully three-quarters of the public demand. In
Germany also this double danger became threateningly apparent.
Importation of those products of the cheap and fertile American
soil, requiring little labor and capital, was felt most disturb-
ingly by German agriculture from 1875 on, while at the same
time the stream of emigrants, mostly agricultural workers, con-
tinued to swell, till in 1881 it reached 220,902. Had this de-
velopment been allowed to continue uninterruptedly in Germany
as in Great Britain, then, on the one hand, our agricultural pop-
ulation would have suffered a diminution of three-quarters of
its numbers, resulting in a probably fatal loss of our defensive
strength; on the other hand, our demand for imported grain for
bread would have increased eight-fold over the present-day fig-
ure, and thereby a starvation of Germany would have become
for us the unavoidable danger which to-day our enemies vainly
strive to make it.

Bismarck took steps to meet this danger. With correct
appreciation of the vital needs of the German people, in 1879,
he introduced duty on grain. By this means, he saved our agri-
culture from being driven to methods of extensive production;
on the contrary, by guarding its market he gained for it that
security which was needed for its further intensive development.
Under the protection of our tariff, the spirit of science and
organization was able to enter upon its astounding path of
victory.

Agriculture, which hitherto had b«en the victim of conserva-
tive routine, was guided into paths of science and progress, as
is well known, by Justus Liebig, the founder of the science of
plant physiology and agricultural chemistry. He undertook the

MODERN GERMANY 97

most extensive investigations regarding the nutritive needs of
plants and the nutritive value of the soil. Our present-day
knowledge of fertilizers is based upon these experiments. Up to
that time, however, England had excelled in many ways in inten-
sive agricultural production.

The science of artificial fertilization was at this time de-
veloped in Germany and it has been practically applied in ever-
rising degree. It was found that that which the soil needed
could be produced outside the agricultural sphere. Thanks
to this valuable discovery, one connecting link after the
other was forged between agriculture and the manufacturing in-
dustries. It was only now that the vast treasures became useful
with which Germany is provided, in striking contrast to all other
countries of the world. She possesses deposits of a salt which in
foreign countries is hardly known even by name — namely, Kali.
In close connection with our agriculture, our industry of Kali
mining has increased ten-fold in the last twenty-five years, its
production rising to io,ooo,cxx) tons in round figures, sq that
to-day we export a considerable amount of this important fer-
tilizer— for example, in 191 3 63,6oo,cxx> marks' worth. Even
more important fertilizers are produced by the great manufac-
turing industries. From the previously worthless and troublesome
slag of our railway industry, in which the so-called Thomas
method is supreme in Germany, we extract as a result of German
discoveries the fertilizer rich in phosphoric acid of the so-
called Thomas "meal," of which to-day io,cxx),ooo tons in round
figures are used yearly. Our coke industry provides us, finally,
with the third chemical ingredient which the soil needs for
plant growth, and this the most important, namely, nitrogen ; this
is due to our having learned to extract ammonia, among other
valuable ingredients, from the previously deleterious coke gases;
but important as this new by-product of our coke furnaces has
become for us — and in the last six years its worth has nearly
doubled — ^nevertheless it does not satisfy the needs of our agri-
culture. In order to secure in sufficient quantity the nitrogen
from which plants build up their albumen cells, we have become
one of the greatest importers of Chili saltpeter. Almost
half of all Chili saltpeter which reached Europe was used by
us. This was a line in which our agriculture was dependent
upon foreign countries. Even in times of peace we had
felt this painfully. The war has already revealed itself to the
Germans in many lines, not only as a destroyer but also as
a creator, but it will doubtless remain the proudest achievement
among many of our industries that, in the midst of the most

98 MODERN GERMANY

bitter struggle which a nation has perhaps ever had to undergo,
we have created a great new industry exclusively by scientific
means. The new nitrogen industry, which the war has magically
called into being, provides us not alone with that of which we
had been deprived, as a result of the interruption of our import
trade, but it provides us with better and more material. It
holds out great possibilities of development likewise for times
of peace. At all events, one cause of depending upon foreign
countries has been removed for all time. And it may be ex-
pected that that which has been achieved with regard to nitrogen
on such a vast scale, and with such astounding swiftness, will
be more or less possible also in other cases, where the inter-
ruption of our imports calls into activity similar forces, which
remain dormant in times of peace.

The feeding of domestic animals has been put upon a similar
basis as the nourishing of plants by scientific means, by which not
alone agriculture but also manufacture was so vitally influ-
enced. The science of feeding was developed, with constantly
increasing care, from all points of view at the same time as
the science of fertilization, and the possibility was thus opened
up of widening the narrow circle of ancient and approved ar-
ticles of food by means of new ones furnished by trade and
industry. It was natural that at first we should take the
easiest course and import with little trouble all that we lacked
and desired. Therefore, in times of peace, trade in fodder
was by far the most important. The war has forced us in
great part to abandon this simple method, and has given us at
the same time the strength to produce for ourselves that which
hitherto foreign countries gladly and cheaply provided. In the
beginning this was accomplished with greater difficulties and
more serious expense, but in the long run it will necessarily prove
to be a step forward.

The scientific theory of the nourishing of plants and animals
was supplemented by scientific advance in their breeding. Plant
and animal rearing was first practiced outside of Germany, es-
pecially in Scotland; but also in this line it was reserved for
Germany to unite practice and science in an inseparable union.
The first great success was achieved in the cultivation of that
species of beets from which the German chemists Marggraf and
Achard discovered the way to obtain sugar, upon the basis of
which discovery a firm, hitherto unknown industry grew up to
take the place of the West Indian cane sugar, of which Europe
had been deprived by Napoleon's Continental System. Through
nursing, the sugar producing qualities of the beet were so in-

MODERN GERMANY 99

creased that the average weight of beets necessary to produce
a kilogram of raw sugar was decreased from about 26 pounds
in 1870-71 to 13 pounds in 1910-11, and at the same time the
average return in sugar from each hektare of land was raised
from 42 cwt., at the beginning of the seventies, to 104 cwt., in
the year 1910-11. Beet sugar thus not only set an example
for agriculture of great and immediate value and of strong in-
citing power, but at the same time this industry, originally due
to war, gained such strength that since 1875 it has made us
quite independent of imported sugar; by rapid strides it ad-
vanced to the point of being our leading export industry, and in
1898 exceeded in the value of its products all others upon our
export list. Germany owes to plant-rearing her standing as the
leading country in the supply of sugar.

The German beet, however, is merely the most striking ex-
ample of a great movement, which with increasing strength
has seized upon Germany's whole agricultural activity. In every
line of agriculture improvements in the methods of manuring,
nursing and soil preparation, based on scientific research, have
increased the returns in an ever greater degree. In the twenty-
five years from 1885-1910, during which our population increased
30 per cent, our grain crop rose from 18,200,000 to 25,800,000
tons, and our potato crop from 29,700,000 to 45,900,000 tons,
an increase of 45 and 55 per cent respectively. As in the pro-
duction of beets, so likewise in the production of potatoes, Ger-
many leads the world. In 191 3 Germany produced 54,000,000
tons on 3,400,000 hektares of land, while Russia, Germany's
closest competitor, produced a crop of only 3,600,000 tons, al-
though she had 4,600,000 hektares of land under cultivation.

In the production of wheat, oats and barley, Germany oc-
cupies, it is true, third position; but in this connection she is
inferior only to the United States and European Russia, which
are, respectively, fifteen and nine times as large. In contrast
to this. Great Britain and Ireland occupy thirteenth position in
the production of wheat, seventh in that of oats, and fifth in that
of barley and potatoes. Although France is more favorably
placed according to statistical returns, occupying fourth position
in wheat and third position in potato production, there is never-
theless a surprising difference in her comparative production on a
like extent of land. To the hektare she produces 27.6 cwt.
of wheat, compared to Germany's 51.2; qf rye 20.6 compared
to Germany's 38.2; and of potatoes 192.2 against Germany's
309.2 cwt.

What is true of agriculture is also true of cattle raising.

lOO MODERN GERMANY

Save in die breeding of horses — ^in which Gcnnany is excelled
in Europe only by Russia, not quite equalled by Austria-Hungary
and followed by France and Great Britain only at considerable
distance — advance is not to be reckoned primarily by the num-
bers of animals. Limited territory sets fixed limitations in this
field. It is in cattle breeding a question rather of carrying out
to its fullest extent the economic principle of accompli^ing the
most with the least expenditure; and this is shown by the fact
that, on one hand, we have greatly increased the weight of the
individual animal in the case of cattle and hogs, and, on
the other, we have strikingly hastened growth to the period of
slaughter. The success of diese extremely important efforts in
the line of meat production cannot, of course, be expressed in
statistics. But even disregarding such considerations, Germany's
position among the nations of Europe as a breeder of animals is
most favorable. In the breeding of hogs, which furnished nour-
ishment for two-thirds of her people, Germany is far in the
van. Russia, France and Great Britain and Ireland together
did not possess in 191 3 as many head of these animals as we
still possessed on December i, 1914 (25,333,772). In cattle rais-
ing, Germany, with 20,000,000 head, is, to be sure, excelled by
Russia, with 37,100,000 head; but this great numerical difiEerence
is without doubt in the main balanced by superior quality. Cer-
tainly, Russia has nothing to show equal to our 11,000,000
remarkable milch cows.

After Germany, in order come Austria-Hungary, with 16,-
500,000 head of cattle, France, with 14,700,000, England, Ire-
land and Wales with 10,600,000; for Scotland no figures are
obtainable. The fact that in the most extensive branch of ani-
mal raising, namely sheep raising, Germany has deliberately re-
mained behind Russia, Great Britain and France — perhaps too
far in the rear — does not vitiate the advantage which she enjoys in
the other two lines of animal breeding. It remains true that by
closely united science and practice we have created in our animal
possessions a source of wealth such as no other people has
achieved. In case of necessity we can consume these, and in
times of peace by means of the acquired methods we can re-
produce this wealth. Nevertheless, the war has shown us, more
emphatically than books and speeches were able to do in peace-
ful times, that there is still room for much improvement in this
field of our economic life, perhaps precisely because our advances
have been so rapid. Tasks which are not only remunerative, but
also necessary, were suddenly by the war brought to the atten-
tion of the whole nation with convincing clearness. Here again

MODERN GERMANY loi

the present enforced conditions will be more than a mere episode,
they will prove the source of new developments rich in promise
for the future. Like agriculture, cattle raising after the war
will be placed upon a firmer foundation than ever. He who has
been forced to learn to do without an imported article returns
to its use reluctantly.

II

In the same manner as in agriculture, so likewise in the field
of industry has Germany, in a short space of time, undergone
changes greater than previously in unnumbered centuries, thereby
rising from a modest position to a height hitherto occupied by
no other great country.

Germany, it is true, in the sixteenth century led all other
nations in the industrial arts. But it was brought down from
this proud position through the Thirty Years' War and the re-
sulting political schism. Even after this there remained some-
thing of the former renown of South German cities, such as
Niirnberg and Augsburg; and many products of German in-
dustry, as the steel ware of Solingen and Remscheid, still enjoy
their ancient reputation far beyond the borders of Germany*
But in general Germany was ill adapted for the new system of
mass production. She lacked a great national market, the neces-
sary capital and enterprise. Not until 1834 were the number-
less local markets hitherto protected by tariiBF walls brought to-
gether by the Gentian Customs' Union into one general market,
commensurate in its power of absorption with modern mass
production. But aside from the union attained in customs' mat-
ters, the unfortunate political division was painfully apparent.
Thus, up to the year 1877 "^^ ^^^ ^^^ twenty-nine different
patent laws were passed in the German Empire. To gain pro-
tection in all the individual German states was too complicated
and costly, and that of a single state was insufficient for produc-
tion on a large scale. Even in Prussia in 1871 only thirty-six
patents had been granted. It was natural that, under such con-
ditions, Germans with promising inventions should turn to Eng-
land, which in 1852 had issued a liberal and uniform patent law.
A patent secured in that country opened up, not only the valuable
market of Europe, but likewise colonial markets — indeed, those
of the whole world. Numerous valuable products of German
inventive genius were therefore patented in England, and many
who were conscious of ability in industrial pursuits emigrated

loa MODERN GERMANY

thither. Thus German technical abih'ty served only to strengthen
England's position of supremacy. The island kingdom had al-
ready through its own strength accomplished much in the line
of modern industrial development, thanks to the fact that its
position enabled it quietly and uninterruptedly to devote its
povt^ers to commerce, while the Continental states were engaged,
for its benefit, in destroying each other in ever-recurring wars.
With the invention of the steam-engine, but before all with the
long series of new industrial machines, notably in the textile
and iron industries, England had won her first great victories in
modem technical fields. Here the means were at hand of
cheaply obtaining the most important raw materials in large
quantities, partly from the rich native soil, partly from the
colonies. In England the factory system was first developed,
consciously, ruthless against the workmen, not shrinking from
absolute cruelty. On the other hand, foreign inventions and
foreign workers of all kinds had here their meeting-place.
Before America became the great land of immigration, this dis-
tinction belonged to England, not, however, for immigrants from
the lowest class, but for those from the highest. England became
the "workshop of the world," not exclusively through her own
strength, but as the meeting-place of much of the industrial
ability of the whole world; as such, she not only exported her
wares to other lands, but served them also as the great model
workshop. Especially Germany passed through these two stages
of dependence. In the- first place, she served as a market for
English goods, and up to the year 1879 scarcely any other great
commercial territory welcomed them so freely. But when she
began to develop her own modern industry, she found herself
in many ways dependent on foreign countries, politically and
economically united — not only on England, but likewise on
France, and even Belgium. She then became a large importer
from these countries of machines, half-finished articles, foremen
and entrepreneurs.

The superiority of England — the result of political conditions
in the past — demanded of Germany a great display of energy, if
the latter country wished to win for itself a position of inde-
pendence and respect, commercially, as it had succeeded in doing
politically through the war of 1 87071. Considerations founded
upon natural conditions, and hence of permanent nature, were
added to this historical and hence temporary circumstance. First
of all, the island position of England gave her an extraordinary
advantage in regard to transportation of goods. Germany, at
the centre of the Continent, is in much higher degree dependent

MODERN GERMANY 103

upon the more expensive form of transport by land. She had
to find some means of compensating this high cost of transporta-
tion if she intended to become a competitor in the markets of
the world. This was especially true in regard to the iron in-
dustry, for which nature, kindly disposed, had deposited coal and
iron ores in juxtaposition in England, and in the immediate neigh-
borhood of the sea; while in Germany, as in the United States,
they are widely separated. Such a counterbalance for the nat-
ural advantages of geographical position was to be found only
in tirelessly perfecting production by all the methods of science
and organization. In many industrial branches recognition in
the markets of the world was possible only through success in
gaining and retaining technical and commercial leadership. But
even in those lines where transportation does not play so decisive
a role, as in the "heavy" iron industry, England's insular posi-
tion gives her advantages. Thus, for instance, especially on the
west coast, the air is heavily charged with moisture from the sea,
a circumstance which so facilitates the spinning of cotton-wool
that for a long time it seemed impossible to equal the fineness of
Lancashire yarn.

All these considerations, taken together, resulted in awaking
a stronger and more versatile scientific spirit and organizing in-
stinct in German industry than was the case in any other na-
tion. That which had originally been withheld and made per-
manently difficult, owing to unfavorable historical development
and geographical conditions, it was necessary to attain through
superlatively efficient training and concentration of power. Here,
as in agriculture, only the most efficient work was satisfactory.

The first prerequisite for obtaining this highly efficient kind
of work was to diminish the pressure of English competition.
For it is by no means true that all kinds of competition act as
an incentive and intensifier of one's powers. This ail-too gen-
eral doctrine, formed to favor the stronger, was perhaps still
true in the days of Adam Smith, when capitalistic industry was
in its infancy. We know to-day that competition may be so
strong that enterprise is paralyzed, not incited, by it. In such
a case it is necessary to reduce the pressure to such an extent that
the stimulating effect of the competition may make itself felt.
It was in precisely such a situation that many German indus^
tries found themselves when the new German Empire came
into being. Bismarck recognized the gravity of the situation
and, in 1879, caused the introduction of a moderate pro-
tective tariff on manufactured articles and grain. Several pur-
poses were served thereby: struggling German industries were

I04 MODERN GERMANY

protected from ruinous competition with foreign-made articles;
the home market was secured for home products; the increase
in price of many foreign-made articles stimulated German in-
genuity and enterprise; with financial conditions thus rendered
•easier, leisure was gained to invent, test and perfect improve^
ments in all departments of production.

At this period, moreover, occurred another event of great por-
tent. Up to this time Germany had profited little by the in-
vention of Benjamin Bessemer, whereby pig iron was transformed
into steel in about twenty minutes. By the methods in vogue
before Bessemer, this operation required about one and one-half
days and the saving in time by the new method caused a reduc-
tion in price of approximately 40 per cent. Bessemer's inven-
tion was the result of experiments with British ores, which are
free from phosphorus. German iron ore contains a great deal
of phosphorus, and hence Bessemer's invention had been of prac-
tically no value to the Empire's mineral interests. England, on
the other hand, had greatly strengthened her industrial supremacy
by the Bessemer process. German iron manufacturers were
forced either to import Bessemer steel or the ores reducible by
the Bessemer process. Some new method was needed that would
apply to phosphorous ores as the Bessemer process applied to non-
phosphorous ores. Germany possessed rich deposits of iron ore
in Lorraine; the pressing problem was to find a way to treat
them. This way was found, oddly enough, in 1878 by an English
engineer named Thomas. British supremacy was menaced, al-
though this was not realized at the time. In fact, so sure were
the British that Bessemer steel would never be rivaled that the
Thomas method was not only not adopted, but was decried.
Not so in Germany, however. Scientists, engineers, mine-owners
and manufacturers united to develop the new invention to the
technical and commercial perfection necessary. These efforts
were so successful that Germany became not only England's
commercial rival in iron products, but a leader in the development
of the iron industry.

The scientific enterprise which carried the Thomas process to
commercial perfection found ample opportunities in the various
branches of the complex process of turning ore and coal into iron
and steel. Experiments tending to the utilization of the gases
produced by the manufacture of coke led to the discovery and de-
velopment of that many-sided secondary industry — the produc-
tion of coal tar, benzol, and ammonia for securing nitrogen, as
previously described. Benzol and coal tar are ^e basis of our
great peace trade in dyes, and in war they have been of ines-

MODERN GERMANY 105

timable value in the production of munitions and as a substitute
for benzine.

With this spirit of scientific enterprise was closely united the-
spirit of thorough organization. In all other European coun-
tries, and especially in England, ore and coal mines, coke ovens,
and blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills were all sep-
arate and distinct enterprises. In Germany these various
branches of the iron industry were at an early period organized
and combined into immense concerns, with the result that great
savings were made in the cost of production and transport. In-
deed, the system of organization was carried beyond the proc-
esses of production into that of marketing, so that the great
series of operations from the first handling of the raw product
to its final delivery into the hands of the ultimate consumer were
united in one vast and systematized undertaking. In so far as
possible, commercial chance and accident were eliminated.

Scientific enterprise and thorough organization naturally
brought about a great increase in productivity and acted as the
equivalent of the natural advantages which England enjoyed^
natural advantages that tended to prevent development along
scientific lines. The steel industry was the first to show marked
signs of growth, since in this line particularly, owing to the
Thomas invention, German methods first developed. In the
twenty years from 1890 to 19 10, the steel business grew ap-
proximately seven times as rapidly as England's in point of
production. We equaled England in 1893, and to-day we pro-
duce almost three times as much steel as our former superior
rival. In pig iron progress was not so rapid, since the Thomas
invention, and its development was not so soon used in this field ;
our output did not equal England's until 1903. But in the
period since then we have gained so rapidly that our present
output is nearly double that of our rival. In 191 2, Germany
produced 17,600,000 tons. Great Britain and Ireland 9,000,00a
tons. Germany at last united politically and devoting herself
to previously neglected fields, by untiring and skilfully directed
labor has won back what she possessed before the Thirty Years*
War — European supremacy in the entire field of the iron in-
dustry.

The importance of this cannot be overestimated. Within re-
cent years a universal change has taken place in the industrial
activities of mankind. Up to the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the utilization of vegetable and animal raw material was
the basis of industrial life. No country possessed a modern in-
dustry on a large scale which could be compared in point of

io6 MODERN GERMANY

strength and firmness of organization with the cotton industry of
Lancashire. In fact, the Lancashire cotton industry was the
standard of modern industrial ideas. With the development of
cheap and quick transportation facilities, however, the basis of
industrial life changed and the utilization of mineral raw ma-
terials assumed first importance. In the United States, owing to
a railroad system whose total mileage exceeds that of all Europe,
the iron industry gained first place; in England, with her su-
premacy in trans- Atlantic shipping, especially after the change
from wooden to iron and steel ships, the iron industry assumed at
least a temporary supremacy to cotton, which had been the in-
dustrial mainstay for centuries. This change, characteristic of
our day and generation, took place earlier and more markedly
in Germany, although even to-day the German demand for rails
is not a third of that of the United States, and her shipbuilding
not a fourth of that of England. Yet, despite these facts, the
iron industry in Germany ranks first in point of importance, and
although it does not stand with that of the United States, it
exceeds that of England.

Great Britain is still preeminent in cotton manufacturing: the
number of her spindles (55,971,501) exceeds that of the fol-
lowing three countries combined — the United States (31,519,-
766), Germany (11,404,944), and Russia (9,111,835). Her
supremacy in iron has been lost to the two countries, which, less
burdened with the traditions of a glorious industrial past, were
able to devote their entire strength to tasks of the present. The
importance of this in present-day economics cannot be magni-
fied. Cotton manufacture is simply the transformation of raw
material into cloth ; iron manufacture embraces many and varied
products. So long as Germany was backward in the iron in-
dustry, these other fields were closed to her; but as soon as her
iron and steel equalled the foreign in quality and price, indus-
trial opportunities gave the skilled German workman ample
employment.

From 1900 to 1907, cotton products, ranging in value from
219,000,000 marks to 432,000,000 marks, occupied first place in
the German export list, with the exception of the year 1902. But
from 1908 on, first place has been preempted by the export of
machines. In 1880, the total value of machines exported was
only 42,000,000 marks, in 1890, 67,500,000 marks, but by 1907
it had reached the sum of 387,000,000 marks, as against an im-
port value of 83,000,000 marks. These figures were still, how-
ever, far behind those of England: her exports were valued at
627,000,000 marks and her imports at only 67,000,000 marks.

MODERN GERMANY 107

Five years later, the tally was different. In 19 12, Germany ex-
ported 630,300,000 marks' worth of machines and England 631,-
600,000 marks' worth, while British imports were greater d^an
Germany's. The year following, in 191 3, the value of the ex-
ports of German machines was 680,300,000 marks. It may
safely be assumed that the domestic sale of machines is greater
in Germany than in Great Britain and Ireland, and, taking this
into account, there seems no reason to doubt that in 19 13 Ger-
many held first place in Europe in the machine industry, the
position which she had reached ten years before in the pig iron
industry and twenty years before in the steel industry.

Since 1908, moreover, iron ware has held second place on
the German export list. The term embraces a multitude of ar-
ticles. The export value of these products in 191 3 was 652,000,-
000 marks. Various forms of iron products are not included
in this list, such as iron bars, sheet iron, iron pipes, iron wire,
iron rails, pig iron and loop iron, which represent an export
value of 672,000,000 marks.

In third place in the export list, since 191 2, comes pit coal. Its
value in 1913 was 516,000,000 marks (coke amounting to 147,-
000,000 marks), only 300,000,000 marks below the British fig-
ures. The closely related iron and coal industries make up a
full quarter of the whole German export trade, amounting to
more than 2,700,000,000 marks annually. No other branch of
industry in any other country has conquered for itself such a
position in the markets of the world. This has been won with-
out force or favor from the government, purely on the face value
of the goods themselves, and although it may be altered tempo-
rarily by forcible measures, in the long run it can be lost only
by superior efficiency of competitors.

This may be taken as a general rule in regard to German
industries, applying to many others with even greater force. Al-
though in many instances the amount of the output is not suffi-
cient to figure largely, yet the methods of production and market-
ing are classic examples of the lines along which German industry
is developing. Take as an example the German chemical in-
dustry. Engaged in this are 195 stock companies, employing
300,000 workers and producing in peace times goods valued at
1,750,000,000 marks, and in war great quantities of both de-
structive and curative agents. The success of this thoroughly
modern industry was not based on any special source of raw
materials but altogether on methods and labor. Success has not
been due to lucky discoveries, to a few secret formulas : it springs
absolutely from systematic efforts to achieve definite goals. This

io8 MODERN GERMANY

organized scientific labor, for example in the case of one factory
alone, led to the application for 798 patents in 191 1, or more
than two per day; this factory was the Elberfeld Dye Works,
which employ regularly four hundred scientifically trained chem-
ists. The energy for such constant achievement cannot be called
forth by the arbitrary exercise of power, no matter how ruthless,
nor by imitation, no matter how close; it can be achieved only
through long, patient and intelligently planned labor. And any
interference or cessation of progress means retrogression in this
field of labor, which is more closely related to scientific investiga-
tion than others.

It is not due to accident, therefore, but to the quality of the
workers and their product, that the German dye industry, which
is characteristic of the Empire's technical skill, is its most typical
export industry. It produces four-fifths of the world's demands
in dye stuffs, and its experienced workers and methods will con-
tinue to develop new fields not only for the benefit of Germany
but for that of the world. As regards the value of its exports,
the chemical industry, to be sure, ranks less than that of the
machine and iron industry; but when the import figures are
considered, it holds third place in foreign trade.

Even more favorable is the ratio of export to import in a
fourth industry, that of electricity and its allied trades. The ex-
port value is less, but that is due in part to the fact that in this
trade more branch factories have been established in foreign
countries than in the chemical industry. All four of these in-
<dustries — the manufacture of machines, iron, chemicals and elec-
trical products — form a group representing in their processes
typical modern industry, turning out products of exceptional
quality and conducted upon the most advanced lines of modern
big business. In all these chief branches of our export industry,
remarkable personalities are in active control, assisted by large
staffs of young workers who have been expertly trained in techni-
cal and commercial schools for their particular line of work.
In these industries there is an unusually high proportion of
educated officials as compared with mere hands, of skilled labor
as compared with unskilled.

To the adequate training of the workingman, Germany has
devoted unceasing care for more than a century. In addition to
universal compulsory school attendance up to a certain age and
universal compulsory military service, the state has added a S3rs-
tem of thorough vocational training for all branches of indus-
trial activity. Nor is purely cultural education for the worker
neglected. In the so-called "extension schools," every oppor-

MODERN GERMANY 109

tunity is given the pupil, and it is made his duty, to carry on his
studies begun in the lower grade schools and to apply them to
whatever line of work he is following. Although attendance
is not compulsory, custom is rapidly making it so. At the end
of 1912, in Prussia alone, 19,371 teachers made up the sta& of
2,235 industrial and 392 commercial extension schools; many
oiF these teachers were practical workers. Other federal states
have advanced even further than Prussia in the development of
this branch of education.

Even more noteworthy is the progress made in social legisla-
tion. The same geographical circumstances that have driven
Germany to rigid economy in handling her natural treasures and
raw material have forced her also to constant care for her
most valuable possession — human energy. Step by step, work-
men's insurance and protective legislation for workmen have been
developed, until to-day they are the greatest organizations deal-
ing with ''human economics" in the world. At the beginning of
the war, for instance, 25,000,000 persons were insured in the so-
called Workmen's Insurance against accident, 18,000,000 against
sickness, 16,000,000 against disability and old age; in 191 3 the
combined insurance organizations, with a capital of 3,057,000,-
000 marks, paid out for relief the sum of 840,000,000 marks, or
at the rate of 2,250,000 marks daily.

The rapid development of our industrial enterprises, calling
as it did for the expenditure of all our strength, brought with
it the danger of imperiling national health. England suffered in
this respect during the early years of the nineteenth century. Our
social legislation, which seeks to prevent injuries and to relieve
them if they do occur, has been the chief means of protecting us
from a like disaster. It is due to this legislation that we possess in
our urban industrial workers soldiers equally efficient as those
of our rural levies. They have shown themselves not only phys-
ically capable of meeting the inclemency of the weather and
hardships and deprivations of all kinds, but more than that,
they have withstood that ''mass test of the national nerves,"
which is one of the effects of the war. In times of peace, when
controversies as to the suitability of certain measures tended to
narrow and obscure the view, it would have been impossible to
foresee how fully the demands of war have justified this social
legislation, to which Bismarck gave the original impetus. The
President of the Imperial Insurance Bureau has said :

"The battle of Koniggratz, it is well known, was won by the
German schoolmaster. Now it is the German schoolmaster and
the system of social legislation that win the victories."

no MODERN GERMANY

All Germans will heartily agree to this.

Encouraged by the numerous insurance organizations in which
he is given a share in administration and jurisdiction, the work-
man himself has taken a hand in his own education. He has
been compelled, in a short period, to pass through a develop-
ment which in England was spread over many years. Although
this did not lead to the violent conflicts which occurred in Eng-
land, naturally Germany did not escape friction and disturb-
ance. Here, too, economic insight defeated political blindness
only after a long struggle. In 1891 our labor unions numbered
in round figures only 350,000 members, while in the previous year
in the Reichstag elections the Social Democrats polled 1,500,000
votes. In 19 12 the economic and political organizations of the
German workmen were in close agreement in numbers. In the
Reichstag elections there were 4,500,000 Social Democratic votes,
and the labor unions of all kinds numbered 3>750,ooo members.
In 1 89 1 our system of unions stood far behind the older Eng-
lish system. It did not show a quarter of the English strength.
In 1906 it equalled the English figures, and in 191 2 it ex-
ceeded them in membership by nearly a million workmen, and
in yearly contributions by about 20,000,000 marks. The organ-
ization of the German workmen is to-day by far the most pow-
erful of its kind in the whole world.

Up to recently nearly the whole German working class seemed
to be separated from the rest of the German people by an im-
passable chasm. In vain in times of peace was a means sought
for bridging this breach. The war accomplished the miracle, be-
cause it was clearly recognized by the whole nation, and by every
individual worker, as an unjust war of aggression and as such was
indignantly resented. Our Social Democratic body of workers,
which had previously opposed our military system and had been
inclined to a pacifist policy, would have continued its opposition
if a single doubt had existed of the justice of the German cause.
Again, for the second time, the German people had reason to
thank their enemies for an inspiring outburst of unity. In the
gathering of princes in Versailles, on the 18th of January, 1871,
the German Empire was created, to the accompaniment of the
thunder of cannon on French soil; again on the 4th of August,
19 1 4, in the east as well as in the west, the terrible voices of can-
non were heard, as the representatives of the whole people in
the German Reichstag united in a holy war enthusiasm. In
1870 a portion of the representatives abstained from voting for
the war credit. In the present war an amount such as the world
has never seen was unanimously approved. In spite of many-

MODERN GERMANY iii

sided jealousy and enmity, the German people have maintained
their outward political unity in fourty-four years of peace. In
the future, when the unavoidable strife of parties again breaks
forth, we shall in spite of all attacks know how to maintain the
finally acquired union of national thought and feeling. That
will remain as an especially valuable gain from the terrible
struggle.

Ill

The financial development of German industry — a subject too
complex to admit of analysis here — demanded capital. Germany
was still a poor country at the time of the founding of the Em-
pire. Even the basis for the development of capital, a uniform,
regulated, sound monetary system, did not yet exist. The political
disunion was apparent in the fact that nearly every one of the
German states had its own coinage, and as a natural result of
the wide-spread poverty, the old silver standard still existed
everywhere, outside of little Bremen. As England, the ruler of
the commerce of the world, had attained the gold standard in
i8i6, through a series of fortunate events, active participation
by Germany in international trade was rendered extremely diffi-
cult. For the same reason, the development of her internal
economic life was delayed. The war of 1870-71 brought the
solution. In political union was found the hitherto lacking con-
stitutional basis for a statesmanlike reform of the German mone-
tary system, while at the same time the French war indemnity
provided the means necessary to the adoption of the gold standard
hitherto enjoyed by England alone. It was not yet practicable,
however, to establish a complete gold standard. As long as the
gold supply of the world was limited, geographically, to western
North America and Australia, and, technically, to the old-fash-
ioned placer or washing method, there was not enough available
metal to meet demands. It was the time of the "universal pulling
at the golden blanket" and the high tide of international bi-
metallistic endeavors.

In 1879, when Germany's gold stock was less than 1,500,000,-
000 marks, we were forced to retain, in conjunction with the
new gold coins, the old silver "thalers," which were legal tender
up to any amount. The great increase in gold production, due
to the process of mining employed in the Transvaal, made the
adoption of an exclusive gold standard possible in Germany.
In 1906, according to the statistics of the American Director of
Mints, Germany ranked second among the states of Europe, with

114 MODERN GERMANY

period fell from 51.5 per cent (July 30, 1914) to 28.5 per cent
(December 2, 1915), and in Russia, where it decreased from
57.6 per cent (July 29, 1914) to 26.4 per cent (October 29,
1915). In regard to the Imperial Bank of Russia, it is even
doubtful whether it does not book the gold transferred to Lon*
don among its assets. Otherwise it is difficult to understand why
the item "gold abroad," showing 35,600,000 rubles on October
29, I9I5) should have risen to 228,500,000 rubles on November
29> 19 1 5) while the gold stock of the Bank, given at 1,600,000-
000 rubles on November 29, 19 15, is approximately the same as
it was on October 29, 1915, and on July 29, 1914. At any
rate, in contrast to the general deterioration of the gold hold-
ings of our enemies, the Imperial Bank of Germany has an im-
provement to show. The gold cover for all its obligations due
without notice — not only banknotes but deposits likewise — ^in-
creased from 30.1 per cent on July 31, 19 14, to 32.1 per cent
on November 30, 191 5.

While the central note bank of England is dependent upon help
from outside, the German Imperial Bank rests entirely upon its
own strength. For Germany from the start refused to assume
this dangerous risk, for the sake of the saving of interest, that
results from a thorough centralization of the cash reserve. The
Empire, in the gold which is in circulation, possesses a strong
internal reserve capable of meeting the demands even of the
greatest crisis, because gold circulates more freely in Germany
than in England, France and Russia; the combined amount of
gold in circulation and gold stock in banks in Germany exceeds
that of England. This explains how the German Imperial Bank,
in the throes of the greatest war which any country has ever had
to sustain, has been able, week by week, to augment its gold
stock, so that after sixteen months of war it had increased by
1,182,000,000 marks, or 98 per cent (November 30, 191 5: 2,-
435,000,000 marks), as compared with the time of the outbreak
of the war (July 31, 1914: 1,253,000,000 marks), and that it
excelled the gold stock of the Bank of England of even date
(December 2, 191 5: 51,100,000 pounds sterling) by 1,400,000,-
000 marks, or 134 per cent. It is true that at first France^
and finally England also, by her proclamation of July 8, 191 5»
have done all in their power to imitate Germany's methods, much
derided at the start, of withdrawing the gold reserves from cir-
culation; but since both countries possess only small reserves
of that kind, their success was very modest* The Bank of Eng-
land up to the end of October, 1915, shows an increase of its
gold holdings of only 13,800,000 pounds sterling, not a quarter

MODERN GERMANY 115

of that of the Imperial Bank of Germany, while the Bank of
France's gold stock rose only by 736,000,000 francs — ^that is to
say, by half of that of the Reichsbank. This strong and steady
increase of Germany's gold stock, which remains inexplicable for
all whose knowledge is confined to the British financial system,
while astonishing in itself, is yet all the more remarkable for the
fact that this flow of gold into the coffers of the Central Bank
from channels of uncontrolled circulation is taking place with-
out application of any measures of compulsion. The sole im-
pulse is to be sought in the universal patriotism of the people.
As a fight carried on with ''silver bullets," the war is in Germany
a national ^ar.

The credit of a country is built upon the gold stock of its
banks. In the present war, in Germany the gold stock is en-
joying larger internal accretions and suffering smaller deletions
than in England, France and Russia. The most important task
of the gold stock is to adapt circulation to rapidly changing de-
mand, by keeping it elastic In Germany this has been achieved
in absolute perfection by bringing the supply of currency into
immediate causal connection with the demand for the circulating
medium, bank notes being issued on the basis of trade bills, the
amount of which rises and falls with the degree of economic
activity. The greater the amount of bills signed and discounted
for the payment of goods purchased, the greater becomes the
amount of bank notes in circulation; and this again diminishes
to the degree that these discounted bills are redeemed. A per-
fect adjustment to the demand for money is thus automatically
brought about, and the Imperial Bank has to provide only the
necessary metal cover. In Germany this is fixed by law as at
least one-third of the face value of the total issue of notes, where-
as in England, France and Russia corresponding rules are lack-
ing. The elasticity achieved through this method of providing
cover for the bills of exchange does not exist in those countries,
or only to an imperfect degree. In France this elasticity is
menaced by the fact that bank notes may be issued, not only
for discount transactions but likewise for loans against commer-
cial collateral. It is quite absent in England, where the bank-
note system, for historical reasons, instead of being in organic
union with the economic life, has been brought into outward
inflexible connection with the financial administration of the state,
and where, furthermore, the amount of bank notes issued with-
out metal cover is limited. This fundamental defect in her
financial system, although at times extremely inconvenient, Eng-
land was able to endure as long as her commerce in gold suffered

li6 MODERN GERMANY

no interference. By means of this she was able, through the
great elasticity in the gold stock, to make up for the lack of
elasticity in her bank-note system. But in case the commerce
in gold is in any way impeded, the results of this fundamental
defect in the system can be temporarily alleviated only by all
the unusual measures for the maintenance of the gold stock
already described.

In Germany, on the other hand, we have been able to maintain,
in time of war, the elasticity which distinguishes our bank-note
system in time of peace. Slight changes were necessary to this
end. In the first place, in war time, the place of the individual
as buyer and as employer of labor is largely taken by the state,
which thus determines to a great extent the amount of payments.
Hence, if it is desired in war time, as was the case in time of
peace, to make the amount of currency conform to the demand
for money, it is necessary to bring die bank-note system into
organic union, not only with the nation's economic activity,
but with that of the state, also. This was achieved by making
the bills of exchange and promissory notes issued by the Grovern-
ment discountable through the Imperial Bank, if payable within
three months; they were thereby given the same standing as cover
for bank notes which private bills of exchange enjoy. By means
of this simple logical adjustment to war conditions, the Imperial
Bank attained the same automatic elasticity for the unusual de-
mands of war that distinguishes it under normal conditions.

Supplementary measures also were necessary. Since the Im-
perial German Bank, in order to maintain its metal cover on a
high level, is not permitted, as is the Bank of France, to use the
funds gained from the issue of bank notes for loans against com-
mercial collateral as well as against bills of exchange, it en-
deavored to limit as much as possible the amount, and especially
the length of time, of such loans. For these 'purposes only the
capital of the bank and the deposits may be used. In times of
war, however, credit demands show a general increase. Espe-
cially was this true on the present occasion; for, following the
lead of the Paris Exchange, the Vienna and Brussels Exchanges
were closed on July 27, 19 14, the London Exchange on July
30, and the Berlin and New York Exchanges on August i«
A relief for the resulting extraordinary difficulty in the sale of
bonds and stocks had to be provided by making loans upon them
legal, and this without obstructing the Imperial Bank in the
fulfilment of its great principal task. Accordingly, as early as
August 4, 1914, after the Prussian example tested in earlier
wars, loan banks were established, authorized to grant loans to

MODERN GERMANY 117

the total of 3,000,000,000 marks against judiciously appraised
securities, as well as with unlimited personal liability on the
part of the borrower.

For this purpose these institutions issue "loan bank notes"
in amounts as low as one mark, whereby a corresponding change
in the denomination of bank notes is avoided. These loan
bank notes, for which, in addition to the double security above
mentioned, the Empire assumes liability, must be accepted at
full face value by all authorities of die Empire and of the
federal states. That the public showed no reluctance in tak-
ing up this new currency was in accordance with the experience
of former wars. It is, however, one of the surprises of the
present war that advantage was taken of this new credit
system only to a degree which seems slight for a nation of
nearly seventy million people. The maximum amount of the
loan bank notes in 191 4 was 1,317,000,000 marks (December
31, 1914) ; in the first half-year of 1915 it rose to 1,574,000,000
marks (April 15, 1915), while on November 30, 1915, the total
issue stood at 1,631,000,000 marks, of which 889,000,000 marks
were in circulation. It is subject to constant fluctuations. If
the increase, incidental to the war loan issues, must be consid-
ered surprisingly small, the decrease wont to follow them must
be called surprisingly rapid. Advances taken in connection with
the three big war loans, which in all amount to 25,500,000,000
marks, on October 30, 1915, stood at no more than 1,054,000,-
000 marks, or approximately 4%. What b more significant in
regard to the economic strength of the German people, under-
rated both at home and abroad, is the surprising fact that the
demands made on the loan banks by subscribers were smaller on
the occasion of each succeeding war loan. Up to the time when
the first installments fell due, payments made by means of funds
raised through the loan banks, as compared to the total pay-
ments, were as follows:

Total From Loan

Total Amount First Payment Banks Funds %

I war loan: 4,481,000,000 2,568,000,000 710,000,000 27.6

II war loan: 9,103,000,000 6,085,000,000 521,000,000 8.6

III war loan: 12,160,000,000 8,732,000,000 566,000,000 6.5

England resorted to a measure similar to the German loan
banks, but narrower in scope, in that it is confined to war loans,
while it is much less stringent as regards the loan conditions.
Loans are made to the full, instead of to a partial value of the
security, for three years, instead of six months, and at a discount

ii8 MODERN GERMANY

of 1% under the legal discount rate, instead of at the rate of
interest for loans on commercial collateral, which would be higher
than the discount rate. When the second English war loan was
to be raised (McKenna), conditions were made still lighter for
subscribers, in that the former liberal conditions, relative to the
loanable value of the security given, were replaced by quite ex-
traordinary rights of exchanging new loan scrip for old govern-
ment bonds.

By organizing the loan business independently of the Reichs-
hankj the note cover by bills of exchange — one of the pillars of our
bank-note system — ^was maintained in its full strength. The other
pillar, which consisted in the metal cover, has been very greatly
strengthened through the notable accretion of gold from inland
sources. But it was necessary, from the very beginning, to or-
ganize this support so that all strains to which it could con-
ceivably be subjected within the extreme limits of possibility
might be successfully withstood. It was therefore determined
that the loan bank notes should be reckoned as governmental
obligations, as part of the cash in hand of the Imperial Bank. By
this means the central German note-bank would be enabled, even
■in face of a diminishing gold reserve, to meet all demands the war
might impose on the inland market. This extreme precautionary
measure — the importance of which has entirely failed of compre-
hension abroad — ^has, like so many others adopted for contin-
gencies that eventually did not arise, not proved of any practical
significance. The sound condition which our monetary system
has preserved, even in war time, is shown precisely by the cir-
cimistance that the German bank notes have more successfully
maintained the ratio of gold cover necessary in times of peace
than the bank notes of the Bank of England, despite all emer-
gency measures, and more than those of the Bank of France or
the Russian Imperial Bank, which have entirely discontinued
their regular reports. In this manner Germany has given proof
that her monetary system is, of its own strength, equal to the
most severe demands, in war as well as in peace. Nor is this
fact militated against by the precautionary measure taken by the
German Imperial Bank, in consideration of the cessation of all
influx of gold from abroad, for the checking of the export of
gold; this it permits only for certain definite purposes. The
same thing has taken place in England, though not quite to the
same extent nor in the same forms. England, too, has not been
able to maintain the free exportation of gold. Thus there is no
difEerence of principle, but only of degree.

Very much the same considerations obtain with regard to

MODERN GERMANY 119

the exchange rates, if only for the reason that much more com-
plicated channels for international payments had to be made
use of. Germany's foreign exchange, soon after the war broke
out, su£Fered a depression which was increased by deliberate mis-
interpretation as well as by genuine misunderstanding, but which,
broadly speaking, was soon checked. The English rate of ex-
change was maintained as long as England's excess of imports
was kept within bounds. Only when, in 191 5, this excess be-
gan to assume inflated proportions, did the exchange begin to
drop, and it has shown unmistakably an increased tendency to
do so since the month of April. The difference existing in this
respect between Germany and England — ^which is all the more
important because the English themselves characterize the pound
sterling as international currency, in contrast to the cur-
rency of other countries — is connected with the question of
trade balance. It is true that to-day Germany's trade balance is
negative, but the excess of imports, owing to the restriction of
German commerce, is moderate. England's trade balance has
developed unfavorably to an incomparably greater degree. In
the first ten months of 191 5, the excess of England's imports
from the United States alone over the exports was 396,600,000
pounds sterling, as against 194,800,000 pounds sterling during
the same period of the preceding year. In this connection, more-
over, it must not be forgotten that the enormous purchases made
for the account of the government are not included in these fig-
ures. It is not unlikely that by the end of 191 5 the unfavorable
balance of England's trade will amount to 8,000,000,000 pounds
sterling.

In England, as is not the case in Germany, there are no obsta-
cles in the way of employing whatever means seem useful in sup-
porting the value of currency, and all such means are being lib-
erally employed. Thus, many hundreds of millions of marks'
worth of foreign securities were sold and — in addition to several
smaller bank loans — the great Morgan loan of $500,000,000
was placed on the market. But all means prove futile.
The pound sterling, the presumed unassailability of which used
to be the mainstay of England's hegemony in the world's trade,
has dropped, as the mark did before, and it will continue to
drop the longer the big British importation of war material,
food-stuffs and raw material continues, the more hands are
withdrawn from the British export industries, the more the ad-
vances grow which England has to grant her allies (which Mr.
McKenna, on September 21, I9i5i figured as amounting to 423,-

120 MODERN GERMANY

000,000 pounds sterling) and, finally, the more the British cred-
its in the United States diminish.

The depreciation of the German rate of exchange, as likewise
the cutting off of Germany from the world's commerce, will
pass into history as an instructive war episode in Germany's eco-
nomic life. Germany possesses sufficient strength to effect the
transition from war to peace just as efficiently as, under much
more difficult conditions, she performed the reverse process. As
regards the depreciation of the English rate of exchange, with
all its many concomitant phenomena, the longer the war lasts,
the more it will grow into an event of world historic character,
the importance of which will still be felt in the years following
the war.

Upon the described basis of our financial system, newly cre-
ated with much care in time of peace and wisely strengthened in
the present war, it was possible to build up an efficient private
banking business. As the reconstructed German Empire was
forced to content itself with an insufficient gold supply, so it
was inadequately provided with capital with which to meet the
great demands made upon it. It was forced, therefore, to have
recourse to the countries of old established wealth. Economical
methods and efficient organization were consequently especially
necessary in the banking system.

The five most prominent banks to-day, taken together, had at
the time of the founding of the Empire a stock capital of only
122,800,000 marks. By 1880 this had risen to 246,000,000
marks; in 1895 to 413,000,000, and on January i, 1915, it had
reached 1,020,000,000 marks, to which must be added 325,000,-
000 reserve funds. These banks placed their capital at the
disposal of the growing industry and trade. They expressly
styled themselves "Banks for Commerce and Industry," went
in deliberately not only for the simple and safe operations of the
money market, like the English joint-stock banks, but also for a
share in the growth of Germany's economic life, and sought to
develop the spirit of enterprise in all promising undertakings
They considered it not only their right, but their duty, to enter
into the more remunerative but likewise more risky stock invest-
ment business.

The close connection which naturally soon developed between
banks and business in the young German Empire was not with-
out drawbacks. The large banks, which showed marked prefer-
ence for long-term investments subject to the fluctuations of
the market, hesitated at the start to go into the short-term
deposit business, which is the prominent feature of

MODERN GERMANY I2i

English banb'ng. As late as 1890 the great Berlin stock
banks had only 100,000,000 marks in deposits. At about
that period, however, the systematic fostering of this branch of
business was undertaken, in order to help the great banks of
Germany to attain their full strength. On January I, 191 5»
the four greatest Berlin banks showed deposits amounting to
1,748,000,000 marks. In connection with this it should be re-
membered that in Germany, contrary to the English custom,
credits granted for commercial purposes, but not yet used, are
not entered on the books as deposits. On the above date the
nine leading Berlin banks combined had at their disposal a
capital of funds and deposits amounting to 6,000,000,000 marks.

But even this does not fully express the strength which they
have attained. The great Berlin banks to-day no longer stand
alone. As they continually engage in great ^eculative undertak-
ings, it has always been their aim to diminish the risk con-
nected with the expansion of that class of business with all the
means at their disposal. The effort to reduce such risk has been
in a large measure responsible for the fact that our young Ger-
man banks have grown to such vast organizations. The first
point to be remembered is that an increase of deposits does not
imply, as in England, a reduction of the banks' own funds; on
the contrary, this gives an impulse to an increase of the stock
capital and reserve funds; for since the assets and liabilities
cannot be balanced against each other, as is the case in Eng-
land, where the banks persevere in the old-fashioned custom of
confining their business to the stereotype short-term credits, in
the German banking system the relation between the bank's own
funds and the deposits is quite different. It is no mere coinci-
dence that the Deutsche Bank, the Diskontogesellschaft, and the
Dresdener Bank excel all other German banks in the develop-
ment of their deposit business, and at the same time have far
outstripped them in the increase of their capital stock and re-
serve funds.

In accumulating these great amounts a means has been sought
and found of balancing the risks by investing the banks' funds
among a great variety of interests, with the result that the debtors'
solvency depends to a great extent on quite diverse economic
circumstances, frequently of a mutually neutralizing effect. Pre-
ponderant dependence on closely connected commercial interests
— that is to say, dependence on the conditions of a single locality
or on a single branch of commerce or industry — is everywhere
carefully avoided. Geographically, as well as in regard to the
lines of business pursued, the activity of the individual banks has

122 MODERN GERMANY

been extended as cx)mpletely as possible. Their investments in
German enterprises are naturally heavy; their activity, how-
ever, is not confined to the Empire's boundaries but extends to
nearly every country on earth.

This expansion has taken place mainly in the form of wide-
spread affiliations. There have been cases of consolidation of
more or less importance; but there is a fundamental difference
between the three great French consolidated banks, with more
than I OCX) branches throughout the provinces, and the compre-
hensive organizations under the German banking system. Local
peculiarities have been retained in a much higher degree. This
has been the case especially where different banks have been
united, not in a giant organization, but merely in details of finan-
cial or personal control, without affecting their separate existence.
The fact that the three greatest German banks in their yearly
statement for 191 4 showed not less than 318,000,000 marks
permanently invested in other banks is an indication of the im-
portance attained in German banking by this system of affilia-
tions. It has been estimated that in the combined balance of
all the German banks these three great institutions, together with
the banks affiliated with them, hold no less than 60 per cent of
the total.

Mistaken foreign theories to the contrary, German banking
has developed along these lines in a few years from small be-
ginnings to a great and powerful position. There is no deaden-
ing conventionality in its vast organization to cause needless
interference with its efficient working, nor are there any worn-
out traditions and governmental regulations standing in its way.
On the contrary, the German banking system is free, in con-
trast to that of France and England, to use its great powers to
the fullest extent. All the fears born of this freedom have
been proved by the experiences of the war to be entirely ground-
less. Without this unrestricted freedom, the German banks
could never have identified themselves with all branches of na-
tional economic life, as they have done, and in which they have
now attained a position of leadership.

To begin with, they won for themselves a dominant position
in the world of finance and capital. Compared with the power
of the great banks with their widely distributed clientele, which
in most cases is easily influenced, the German stock exchange has
come to occupy a secondary position both in standing and in-
fluence. In England the stock exchange is able to maintain its
monopoly largely because of its activity in the floating of securi-
ties. Not without justice has it been said that, while the great

MODERN GERMANY 123

German banks make use of the stock exchange as a medium
in promoting their new enterprises, in England it is the banks
that are made use of by the promoters and speculators. That is
why the closing of the exchange was less keenly felt in Ger-
many, especially as it proved easier in Berlin than in London
and Paris to liquidate smoothly the transactions for the end of
July. A reopening of the exchange ostensibly took place in the
two latter countries, but under such drastic restrictions that a
free market does not exist. Judging from the soundness and
strength exhibited by our great banks in the war, which are
of such paramount importance for the stock exchange, it may
be confidently assumed that when the time comes for the reopen-
ing of the Berlin exchange, happily freed from its old obligations,
it will occupy a position among European exchanges not only as
strong as before the war but even stronger, and that it will
not fail to give proof of its innate sound condition.

In the industrial field, also, the banks have gained a position
of leadership. Without them, the rapid and striking develop-
ment of our industrial production would not have been possible.
Their concentrated financial strength guided our young and
feeble industrial enterprises past the danger of being crushed
out of existence by more highly developed and experienced com-
petitors. Indeed, the banks have not only assisted individual un-
dertakings in case of necessity or furnished them the means for
extensions of their business — they have been mainly responsible
for carrying the idea of comprehensive organization, which proved
so effective in banking, into the entire sphere of industry. For
with its allied banks throughout all Germany, the individual
great bank is no longer interested merely in a single undertaking
in one branch of industry, but in several mutually competing
undertakings. The evils which unrestricted competition in trade
brings about are consequently felt also by the banks. Their aim,
therefore, must be to diminish this harmful competition. Accord-
ingly, they extend their interest in the particular undertaking
to include all allied and mutually dependent undertakings, and
thus become the leaders in the development 'of the "cartel" sys-
tem. They are extremely active in furthering the organization
of our industries along cooperative lines by means of efficient
associations.^

This development of our banking system, which, from dis-
tinct private concerns, has brought forth a great body of insti-
tutions pursuing national and cultural aims, completes the organ-

^A "cartel" is an agreement between industrial or commercial conoema pro*
Tiding for joint action in their buainesa policy, without otherwise destroying
the independence of the members.— Tbamslatob's mots.

124 MODERN GERMANY

ization of the internal forces of Germany's economic life. In
this new setting, the economic strength of the German people,
which was finally freed through the victorious war of 1870-71
from the handicap of political disunion, has developed astounding
vitality in almost all fields. In a period of forty years strenuous
work has thus retrieved that which had been neglected. Ger-
many to-day is no longer a poor country. Careful estimates
agree in showing that Germany now occupies the first position
among European nations, not only in respect to the collective
wealth of the people — amounting to about 310,000,000,000
marks — but also in respect to her total yearly income, which
represents 43,000,000,000 marks. This great change has not
been recognized in other countries, because Germany, in con-
trast to England and France, still continues to devote her im-
mense savings primarily to the development of her own powers,
and invests only a small portion of them in foreign loans. In
the last five years, of the stock and bonds put on the market in
England 18 per cent (38,000,000 out of 210,000,000 pounds),
and in France 30 per cent (1,523,000,000 out of 4,914,000,000
francs) were domestic securities^ whereas in Germany no less
than 85 per cent were so applied, while in 191 2 only 255,000,000
out of 2,425,000,000 marks were invested in foreign securities.
It is on account of this sustained demand for capital within the
country that Germany in time of peace, despite her large sav-
ings, shows regularly a higher rate of interest in the money
market than England and France, where industry does not con-
tinually demand such great sums. It is only since the war that
these conditions, which are so important for German foreign
exchange, have begun to show signs of a readjustment. Ever
since the month of December, 19 14, when the Imperial Bank
reduced the previous 'war discount rate from 6 per cent to 5
per cent, the old established difference in the official rate of dis-
count between Germany and England and France has disap-
peared. And while formerly the price of the French 3 per cent
loan was considerably higher, it is now below the price of the
3 per cent German loan.

The different method in the use of capital explains, further-
more, why at the beginning of the war the German stock ex-
change was in so much better condition than that of England,
not to speak of France. The great economic crisis of the
Balkan States, following in the wake of the Balkan wars (which
were financed mainly by France) and the scarcely less severe
crisis in Mexico, Brazil, Argentine and Canada, as well as the
bursting of the Russian bubble, a£Fected the money market of

MODERN GERMANY 125

France most strongly, that of England in scarcely lesser degree,
and that of Germany least of all. Germany had her capital
undiminished, therefore, for financing the war. It enabled us,
shortly after the beginning of the war, to raise a loan of a larger
amount than the French war indemnity of 1871. The subse-
quent loans, which were twice and three times as large as the
first, were, in part, also raised with the help of money saved
in time of peace. But in the main their great success, which
was a surprise to the Germans also, was due to other causes.

Germany succeeded in making the transition from peace to
war conditions with unexpected ease and thoroughness. That is
partly explained by the character of this war. Every German
felt that it was a war of defense. Every one realized the dan-
ger which menaced the whole, and was ready, as a part of this
whole, to serve the nation and sacrifice himself for it. The
moment that war had been declared, the interest of the individual
subordinated itself to that of the state. There was no opposition
between the state and economic interests. Everything which
the latter had to ofier was placed at the disposal of the state.

Combined with these inner forces, which have never swayed
a great nation in like degree and extent, external forces were
at work creating, as if by magic, that many-sided structure of
our new war economy. This we owed to England. For when
the latter paralyzed our foreign trade immediately at the out-
break of war, our economic organization of peace times to a
very large extent became entirely useless. In many cases there
was no choice between peace and war economy. Activity was
only possible within the new war organization. The pressure
of the enemy from the outside eliminated the necessity of pres-
sure on the part of the government. Voluntary service per-
formed what compulsion could never have accomplished to
the same extent.

In this way Germany was able to restore in striking manner
in her body economic the circulation interrupted by her forcible
exclusion from ttie world's commerce; while in normal times
it pulsated throughout the whole earth, it is now limited to the
narrow circle of national economic life. This narrowing of its
course has resulted in accelerating the circulation. Everything
which formerly served the countless and varied purposes of an
export trade, amounting yearly to over io,ocx>,ooo,ooo marks,
was now enlisted in the service of the one great object of the
country itself. Germany was no longer working for the whole
world, but, even more devotedly and attentively than formerly,
almost exclusively for her own needs. Thus, she accomplished

ia6 MODERN GERMANY

the great feat of freeing herself, in the main, from the old
dependence on extensive imports and on easily exhaustible sup-
plies, by founding her entire war economy on her own work.
So completely has the economy of peace times been transformed
into that of war that it is certain to-day that Germany is able
to provide herself with adequate supplies for any length of
time. It is true that this may not always be done as eco-
nomically as formerly, that it is still necessary to be saving in
many things, that numerous inconveniences must be borne by
those who remain at home, but the times of anxious doubt are
past. We are sure to-day that no matter how long the war
lasts, Germany can keep it up with her own resources. The
"isolated state" which hitherto existed only in theory has become
a reality.

Independence in production also means financial independence.
Practically our entire financial strength remains in the country.
It flows only from one hand to the other, above all in a broad
and rapid stream from the state to the individual. As often as
our money completes this course of inland circulation, just so
often does it become available again for the state in the nature
of loans. It is only a question of carefully selecting the time
for a new loan and of preventing large parts of the stream, which
essentially remains the same, from being withheld from the state
by artificial means. If these precautions are taken, Germany's
defeat cannot be caused by financial difficulties.

If our financial troubles have been overcome, thanks to our
"isolation," they oppress our enemies more and more from month
to month, until to-day no state feels the financial burden of the
war more than England. Our enemies lack the forces which
in Germany produced a new and firmly knitted war economy.

As far as England is concerned, from the very beginning
a deep and serious war sentiment was lacking. It was believed
that diis was only a new, somewhat greater adventure on foreign
soil, to be added to the list of numerous wars which England
had waged all over the world in the course of the past few
decades. At home the public felt itself safe. There the war
was not regarded by all as of vital interest for the entire
nation. On the contrary, the British drew the sword in the
belief that they would suffer no more through the war than if
they remained neutral, and they even endeavored to convince
themselves that they were magnanimously entering the combat
for Belgium and not for their own interests. Under such con-
ditions it was not possible, even among the English people, in
whom political instincts are probably more strongly and more

MODERN GERMANY 127

generally developed than in any other nation, for the interest
of the state to take precedence over the interest of the indi-'
vidual.

Even externally the war had but little effect at first. Trade
with the enemy countries ceased, it is tri^e, but otherwise all
connections with the economy of the world remained the same
and the seas were open for export and import. The economic
organization of peace times was not brought to a standstill. On
the contrary, now that important competitors had been put out
of the way, it was a question of developing it as much as possible.
Great advantages for the economy of the country from the war
were expected by the people and by the government. Economic
interests were not placed at the disposal of the state, but it was
expected that they would be promoted by the state to a degree
impossible in times of peace. But the matter turned out differ-
ently than had been expected. Everywhere the demands of the
war have been miscalculated, but nowhere so much as in Eng-
land. More men and means were required than had been im-
agined. This resulted in that great conflict between state and
economy which is taking place in England to-day. It consists
chiefly in the fact that a war organization which has not been
voluntarily created by the nation is being forced upon it. It
is only partly possible to conceal the coercive character of the
measures that have to be taken. As a matter of fact, it cannot
be doubted that the recruiting system is regarded as an un-
welcome coercion, more so than the military service in those coun-
tries which have for centuries been accustomed to the great idea
of the protective and educational character of universal con-
scription; and as regards production, it is undeniable that the
government of free England had to use compulsory measures in
a manner such as has been witnessed in no other country. While
in Germany all concerns, whether large or small, devoted them-
selves voluntarily to the new tasks imposed by the war, many
hundreds of factories in England had to be placed under gov-
ernmental control in order to supply the urgent needs of the
war.

All of this is of added importance because England, whose
productive power in many fields was not able even in time of
peace to accomplish as much as Germany, has to provide not
only for herself but also to a great extent for her allies. For
France has been affected economically and financially through
the war perhaps even more heavily than in a military sense.
Her territory occupied by Germany contains her most highly
developed industry, that of mining and iron, which might have

128 MODERN GERMANY

been best able to compensate for the prostration of her manu-
facture of fancy goods. Of the French output of coal 68.8 per
cent, of coke 78.3 per cent, of iron ore 90 per cent, of pig iron
85.7 per cent, of steel 76 per cent is produced in the eigjit prov-
inces of which our victorious troops have been in possession
for over a year. Thus France is paralyzed in her industrial
productive strength. She is in need of foreign supplies to a far
greater degree than in time of peace. The circulation of forces
in her economic body has been most severely disturbed. She
is suffering constantly from heavy, depleting loss of blood.

Similar conditions prevail in Russia. Just as England is an
industrial and commercial state, standing in need of the products
of foreign agriculture to a degree hitherto true of no other peo-
ple, so Russia represents the greatest agricultural country which
the world has ever seen. With the agricultural products of her
vast territory, she pays for all the industrial products which her
uneducated population is as yet unable to produce in sufficient
quantity and quality. With these products she must, above all,
meet the interest on the greatest foreign debt which any state
has ever contracted. Russia to-day, cut off from the world, is
unable to dispose of the great staple products of her soil. Con-
sequently she is not only deprived of the strength to which
was lately due, as a result of abundant crops, the satisfactory
condition of her finance and the unmistakable improvement of
her economic life, but she has also suffered so fundamental a
disturbance in the circulation of her economic forces that all
hope of cure must seem futile. Since only a strong, healthy,
industrial state, such as Russia cannot yet claim to be, is in a
position to conduct a modern war by its own strength, the need
for foreign supplies felt by the Russian state and by Russian
national economy must increase with every month of the war.
Germany alone has proved equal to the task of cutting herself
free, without impairment of vitality, from the world's economic
life, with which she was so thoroughly intertwined, and of placing
herself upon her own feet. Germany alone has been able satis-
factorily to finance the war with her loans to the amount of
25,500,000,000 marks. Only Germany is able, from every
point of view, successfully to play the role of the "isolated state."
From this fact, which was a surprise cv^en to the nation itself,
Germany may still have to draw important deductions.

IV

The general systematic development of domestic economic
strength in the field of agricultural and industrial production,

MODERN GERMANY 129

as well as in that of money and credit, was bound to make its
efiFect felt beyond the boundaries of Germany. For the great
quantities of foodstuffs and raw material which, in times of peace,
Germany imported from all parts of the world for her con-
tinually growing population, had to be paid for. This could
be done only with the products of German labor and with
services rendered to other countries in the field of transport or
in money and investments — ^that is to say, only by activity in
those spheres of economic life in which England considered her-
self entitled to a monopoly of the whole world. We have
already dealt with money and capital transactions. We must now
turn to the question of transport and commerce.

Conditions in the field of transportation do not favor Ger-
many. The country is blessed with a number of noble rivers,
but while England is washed by the sea on all, and France
on three sides, Germany has access to the great international
highway only in the North, whither all her rivers, with the
exception of the Danube, flow. Sea-traffic is therefore not only
of slight importance to inland trade, but it does not play in the
field of foreign commerce the same part as in England and
France or the United States. But her central Continental posi-
tion and the wealth of her neighbors are an advantage to Ger-
many. She has a great Continental trade, in addition to her sea-
borne trade. Of the 21,000,000,000 marks which represent her
commercial transactions for 1913, approximately 8,000,000,000
worth was transported by land. When the sea trade is checked,
land trade may be increased; herein lie possibilities of adjustment
and development unknown before the war. Because of this
land branch of her foreign trade, which has suddenly experi-
enced an abnormal increase, Germany must organize her inland
transportation as efficiently as possible. The same is true of that
part of her trade which is carried on by sea; for since out
maritime transport is confined to the short line of our North
Sea coast, most of our import and export goods have to make
long interior Journeys.

Up to the time that Germany determined to adopt a pro-
tective tariff for the sake of her industries, the nations did not
fuUy realize the importance of this transport question. Bis-
marck, who carried the tariff idea to rapid victory, also accom-
plished the nationalization of the Prussian railroads. All classes
in Germany to-day regard this as his greatest and most beneficial
achievement along economic lines. Many separate and poorly
organized enterprises were brought together under one manage-
nienty an operation which represented the first great economic

I30 MODERN GERMANY

consolidation and which even to-day remains the gpreatest that
not only Germany but perhaps the world has ever seen. It
offered countless possibilities of economy, and it has proved to
be the most brilliant stroke of business that Prussia or any other
modern state has ever done. At the same time, this nationaliza-
tion also exercised a strong influence on our industry. In the
first place, it had a wholesome effect on industrial competition
by limiting it to the field of prices and cost of production, and
by preventing it from encroaching on the field of freight rates.
In the second place, by introducing uniformity in the gauge
and rolling stock, it created facilities hitherto unknown in the
transportation of bulk articles; this has vastly strengthened oui
industry in its development into big concerns and has rendered
possible the present high degree of standardization of our products.

As the German railway system is to-day the greatest in Europe,
and only surpassed by that of the United States, so is the
Prusso-Hessian railway combine the greatest single undertaking
in the world. This is not the most important feature in German
inland communication. As long as the German railways were in
private hands, the development of the artificial as well as of the
natural waterways was carried on only half-heartedly ; -with gov-
ernment ownership, hundreds of millions of marks have been ex-
pended in creating a highly developed and closely interconnected
system of waterways, surpassed in efficiency by no other. It is
characteristic of German methods that recently efforts have be-
gun to be directed towards taking the railways and waterways
out of the field of unregulated competition and bringing them
into a powerful union, to the end of a reduction of freight rates.

Our shipping trade is based upon this system of interior com-
munication, which on all frontiers extends far into the neigh-
boring states. Proofs of our old maritime ability, as in the
days of the Hanseatic League, have never been lacking, but the
prohibitive features of Cromwell's Navigation Act, which with
ruthless deliberation established England's position in mari-
time trade, pressed heavily upon German shipping. Not
until the revolt of the United States from England did the
Act suffer a modification important for the Hansa cities, and
not until 1849 was it repealed. Then, for the first time, sea-^
traffic with the coasts of the various continents was legally open
to the Germans. But German shipping still suffered from the
fact that it lacked a national flag, and consequently protection
and dignity. This state of affairs was changed by the founda-
tion of the German Empire. Not alone was the path of de-

MODERN GERMANY 131

velopment now open, but a strong national mainstay had been
created.

On this new basis German shipping gained its first great
success in the emigration trafSc. When the preponderance of
emigration shifted from England to the Continent, the ancient
advantages and disadvantages of the geographical position of the
various countries underwent a complete reversal. England's in-
sular position prevented her from finding an adequate substitute
for the failure of her own emigrants, while the German Hansa
cities of the North Sea took deliberate advantage of their Con-
tinental situation. Through its emigrant trade to the United
States Bremen gained a leading position. With Hamburg, it
succeeded, when the stream of emigrants thinned in Germany,
in making up for the loss and even in increasing the original
traffic by an influx from other countries. Through the merits
of their organization, the two cities were able to retain their posi-
tion as the greatest emigrant ports in the world, even when the
growth of German commerce transformed the country from a
land of emigration into one with an excess of immigration. It
was in this field of emigrant traffic that Germany first suc-
ceeded in securing maritime independence of England. It was
more difficult to achieve this in the field of passenger traffic, for
on account of her Colonial possessions and her position in inter-
national trade, England has more cabin passengers requiring
transportation than any other country. It was possible to gain
a place equal to England's only by attracting a portion of the
non-English traffic through offering the best possible accommo-
dation. Germany succeeded in this on several of the chief ocean
routes, as was most clearly shown perhaps in the attraction ex-
ercised by her ships in the international tourist traffic. Thanks
to her successes in both fields of passenger traffic, Germany has
been enabled to gain a leading position on certain portions of
the seas in the technically highest developed maritime branch,
viz: the liner traffic, which is distinguished by speed and regu-
larity of service. In the North Atlantic field Germany was
able to win the blue ribbon, which England succeeded in re-
capturing only by granting, contrary to German custom, a high
government subsidy to the Cunard Line for its two vessels, the
Mauretania and the Lusitania.

Germany realized, however, that in order to conquer and to
maintain in all departments of shipping a place next to England's,
she would have to increase her competitive power to the hig^t
possible degree by organizing the shipping business along the
most rational lines. This was achieved by developing the liner

iS2 MODERN GERMANY

traffic, which was limited to fixed routes with definite ports and
hence greatly subject to the risks of trade fluctuations, into a
widely ramified system, in which one line helps the other. By
this system a greater freedom of movement, and hence a greater
degree of insusceptibility to natural and artificial crises, is gained,
together with a far-reaching invulnerability against the effects of
competition. In shipping as in banking, the chief impulse to
ifurther development lay in the desire to effect a counter-balance
against local risks, and the novelty and limit placed to that de-
velopment helped to make success possible. For while in England,
with her older traditions, the growth of the shipping business was
scattered, owing to her wealth in harbors and capital, German
shipping is concentrated in two neighboring North Sea harbors,
on whose small population it was originally, and is even to-day,
to a great extent dependent for capital. In this field, too, Ger-
many has achieved deliberate concentration of her strength to
a much greater extent than England. Foreign countries can
show no counterpart to the Hamburg-American and North Ger-
man Lloyd Lines, with their many-sided and systematic organi-
zation. Other countries have not developed their shipping lines
into great coordinated systems to the same degree as Germany
has. Nevertheless, England still enjoys a notable superiority in
the shipping field. In tonnage of ships, she exceeds Germany
five-fold. Wherever the dominion of ^e great liners ceases, and
the task is one of carrying the great volumes of agricultural
staple goods, which are only transported for a short period of
the year and in extremely varying quantities, England still enjoys
her former predominance. In the so-called trampship business,
the most international branch of all, England continues to hold
sway, as in scarcely any other line.

This supremacy in the trampship business is of great im-
portance to the ship building industry. With the change from
wooden to iron and steel ships, the attention of builders was
turned from lumber producing countries to those rich in iron.
At the same time the business grew from the narrow plane of
the small undertakings of artisans to the large scale of capitalistic
enterprise. The system of large production, which England first
developed, owing to the invention of the Bessemer process in the
iron industry, was extended almost inmiediately into all branches
in which iron figured largely. Since the sixties England became
the ship-builder of the world. Even more strikingly than for
the world's carr}'ing trade, do her figures for ship building (65
per cent for the period 1901 to 1910) surpass those of Germany
(9.5 per cent) for the same period. This great superiority is

MODERN GERMANY 133

due, in part, to the international reputation which England has
acquired as the possessor of the greatest navy. She was consid*
ered the builder of the best ships. Under the influence of the
development of our war fleet, on the one hand, and of our pas-
senger liners, on the other, Germany has in a short space of time
established her independence in this field of high-class construc-
tion. Her great passenger steamers stand in the first rank,
and her warships are inferior to those of England only in num-
bers, not in quality. T'he second mainstay of England's ship-
building is the English tramp-steamer. In contrast to passen-
ger and war ships, the trampship is a wholesale article. Just as
up to within a few years our machine industry was limited al-
most entirely to individual products, so our ship-building trade
has neglected cheap construction en masse. Energy has been
concentrated upon the production of expensive and constantly im-
proving individual ships. But just as our machine industry in
recent years passed, as we have seen, through an important stage of
standardization and then became the greatest German export
industry, it is one of the great questions of German economic life
whether we shall succeed in carrying the idea of production en
masse, which is a controlling conception of to-day, into the field
of our ship-building. Here, as in so many branches of industry,
by placing production upon a practical and rational plane, we
should retrieve lost opportunity and recover the flourishing state
of the old Hansa period.

Shipping, which can be maintained on the highest plane of
development only when supported by efficient ship-building, is the
pace-maker for foreign trade. Although in relation to economic
life in its entirety foreign trade does not play in Germany by
any means the part it plays in England, or in France, never-
theless its statistics reflect strikingly the general development.
The table for international trade stands thus in millions of
marks:

Germany. England. France.

1890 8,195 15,300 8,337

1900 ..11,088 17,899 9,208

1907 17,011 23,741 12,104

1913 22,530 28,644 14,814 (1912)

Although in 1890 England was so far in the van that, in a
sense, she was removed from competition, Germany has gained
considerably on England, while France has remained far behind
both countries. The result of this development is that Ger-
many, like the United States, increased her share of international

134 MODERN GERMANY

trade in the period from 1890-1912 from 11 per cent to 12.9
per cent, while in the same period England's share has fallen
from 20.2 per cent to 16.6 per cent and France's from 11 per
cent to 9 per cent. Despite this, these two countries have
maintained their previous superiority to the extent that foreign
trade in 191 3 in England represented 596 marks to each indi-
vidual of the population, in France (191 2) it represented 370
marks, but in Germany only 322 marks. But the chief com-
petitors facing each other are England and Germany. It is with
them chiefly that we propose to deal hereafter.

More important than the total figures are the differences in
single lines. In import trade, in which England is still far
ahead of Germany, raw material and foodstuffs hold first place
in both countries. In 1913, they formed 72.1 per cent of all
German imports; in addition, there were 11.7 per cent of half-
finished goods, which, like raw material, are subjected to a
process of further manufacture, while only 13.7 per cent were
finished goods. The first twenty items on the import list are
raw materials, among which stand, far in the lead, cotton (607,-
000,000 marks), wheat (417,000,000 marks), wool (412,000,-
000 marks), barley (390,000,000 marks), copper (335,000,000
marks), skins (321,000,000 marks).

The twenty-first and twenty-second positions are held by agri-
cultural products, such as butter and oil-cake, with a total value
of 237,000,000 marks, and the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth
by cotton and woolen yarn, both half-finished products, with
a total value of 224,000,000 marks. There follows again a
series of raw materials, until the first finished article of manu-
facture is reached with machines, to the value of 80,000,000
marks, in thirty-third place. On account of this relative unim-
portance of manufactured imports, the two countries of tem-
perate climate which have the most extended territory, the
United States and Russia, compete for first position on the
German import list. England has maintained third position
against Austro-Hungarian competition. No independent coun-
try takes from England so many goods as Germany; not even
her own colonies take so much, with the exception of India. But
even among England's exports to Germany, raw material and
half-finished products play an important part. The first five
positions are held by coal, herrings, and three different kinds of
yarn. In 19 12 the value of finished goods was only 246,000,000
marks, out of 842,000,000 marks for the whole import list.

Of quite a different character is the German export trade,
which in 191 3 reached the 10,000,000,000 mark, and which is

MODERN GERMANY 135

only 622,ooo,ocx) marks behind that of England, and 101,000,000
marks behind that of the United States. In this list in 191 3, fin*
ished goods held the lead, with 63.3 per cent, to which was added
1 1.3 per cent of semi-manufactured goods. All parts of the
earth share in these exports, which consist mainly in industrial
products. In the van stand those countries which possess great
purchasing power, as the result of a high state of development
or of a numerous population. England stands far in the lead.
In 191 3 her imports from Germany, amounting to 1,438,000,000
marks, far exceeded her exports thither, amounting to 876,000,000
marks. But the great difference in the total figures of Ger-
many's trade with England is chiefly explained by the fact that
England was able to maintain her old commission trade by serv-
ing her colonies with European products, and it is counterbal-
anced in great part by the fact that the British colonies, con-
trary to the motherland, show a greater export trade to Ger-
many than an import trade from that country. The former
advanced 560,000,000 marks during the ten years from 1900 to
191 1, the latter only 140,000,000 marks. England is followed
by Austria-Hungary (1,104,000,000 marks), Russia (880,000,-
000 marks) and France (790,000,000 marks). Fifth position
in Germany's export trade is held by a non-European country,
the United States, with imports of 713,000,000 marks, as against
exports of 1,711,000,000 marks. Germany imports more goods
from the United States than any other country. Next rank
again five European countries. It is obvious that the European
countries are the most important for German export trade. In
her export trade, too, Germany shows herself to be a European
Continental state. AH the sea coasts of the world may be
reached with little trouble by water; in the case of transporta-
tion by land, that one of the rivals often enjoys an advantage
who can avoid the trans-shipping of his goods. By the geograph-
ical position of Germany, which in this point proves an ad-
vantage rather than the reverse, the fact may doubtless be ex-
plained that German export trade has gained on that of Eng-
land in Europe. For the period from 1 890-191 1 it has been
shown that in every European state, except Portugal, imports
from Germany increased more rapidly than those from Eng-
land. Germany is still surpassed by England in the outer circle
of European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and
Turkey, as well as France, but she is in advance of Britain in
the other European states, although only slightly so in the inner
circle comprising Sweden, Norway, Italy, Bulgaria, and Bel-
gium. This advantage is marked in all her neighboring states

336 MODERN GERMANY

not yet cited, as well as in Russia and Serbia. Beyond the bor-
ders of Europe, however, the picture is quite different. In the
countries beyond the seas, Albion has maintained the penetrat-
ing strength of her trade. England's exports show almost
everywhere a greater increase in the years from 1890 to 191 1
than Germany's; only Mexico, San Domingo, and Guatemala,
in addition to the German colonies, are exceptions.

The German export trade, which is thus distributed over
the different countries according to a kind of natural law, is
made up of an extraordinary variety of goods, and consists mainly
of finished products. Aside from pit coal, coke, grain and kali,
it shows no such bulk articles as the import trade. For her
machines and iron-ware, which occupy the leading position, in-
clude innumerable separate classes. This versatility may be con-
sidered a German peculiarity. England has among her exports
bulk articles also. These are the products of her textile in-
dustry, which at the time of the founding of the German Em-
pire formed fully one-half of the English export list, and still
to-day make up nearly two-fifths of it. Since the Germans did
not appear until late in the markets of the world, and lacked
such great staple articles, they were forced to interest themselves
in that medley of goods which the English — at first contemptu-
ously, then enviously — styled "German articles," "German nick-
nacks," or "muck and truck trade." This multifariousness vests
the German export trade with that adaptability which distin-
guishes it and which has made the German overseas merchant
the experienced, resourceful and energetic man whom every one
fears as a competitor. The trade in the great staple articles
known as Manchester goods is, on the contrary, carried on along
smooth, well-beaten tracks, in which there is slight opportunity
for gaining new experience. It represents, furthermore, that
branch of modern factory industry which may be most easily
taken up in new industrial countries. Here again original ad-
vantages have been transformed into disadvantages and vice
versa. This is not due in any way to improper competition, but
is the natural result of progressive development.

England has had to suffer under the pressure of this develop-
ment resulting from natural conditions, not alone in neutral
markets but even in her own. English imports from Ger-
many in 19 1 2 were 69 per cent finished articles, while the
German imports from England showed only 29 per cent of such
^ods. At the start it was believed in England that these in-
dustrial imports were the result of an inferior competition based
on starvation wages and contemptible practices. They desired

MODERN GERMANY 137

to protect their own well-developed, high-quality industry against
the undesirable intruder. As a consequence, there was passed
the British Trade Marks Act of August 23, 1887, which re-
quired the country of origin to be stamped on all imported
goods. The stamp "made in Germany," it was intended, should
become a mark of inferiority for all German goods. As a matter
of fact, it has become a testimonial to German ability. It
showed the world, to its surprise, that German goods were no
longer by any means "cheap and nasty," as they were still called
at the Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition in 1876, and it served
as an unintentional English advertisement of German industry.

When it was seen that a mistake had been made, there was
a shift from the attack on foreign "truck" to an attack on for-
eign products of quality. The Patent Act of 1907 increased for
a foreigner the difficulties in securing a patent. Any patent may
be cancelled if the greater part of the goods are manufactured
abroad. In this way, protection for many German inventions
is prevented, or else German patent-holders are forced to sur-
render the rights to Englishmen or to build factories in England.
But this weapon also turns against those who have forged it.
For the patent law injures the English intermediate trade by
forcing the foreigner to ask himself whether a particular product
is intended for use in England, or only for passage through that
country.

At die same time an effort was made to protect the monopoly
in high-class English manufactures by organizing a campaign of
vilification against German products. The entire English press
throughout the world was impressed into this contemptible serv-
ice. The limit, which it would be difficult to surpass in times
of peace, was reached by Eastern Engineering, a monthly maga-
zine founded in 191 2 by the British Engineers Association for
China.

This campaign is still going on, in war time, only with height-
ened wantonness. The campaign of defamation is assuming the
gigantic proportions of the modern war en masse. The restric-
tions placed on patents are developing into patent-robbery, at
least temporarily; the efforts toward tariff protection, started
by Chamberlain, are finding their realization in the prohibition
against "trading with the enemy," which applies not only to
entering into future obligations, but to carrying out those already
assumed. The competition in the shipping trade in times of
peace, for which the British state granted subsidies of hitherto
unheard-of amounts, is now becoming piracy; England had long

138 MODERN GERMANY

prepared for this by stubbornly blocking all progress in inter-
national law regarding naval warfare.

But war is "the continuation of politics, only with other
means." It was reserved for England, whose policy was al-
ivays strongly influenced by economic considerations, to carry
the war spirit into all branches of economic life, with a coarse
brutality such as mankind has not yet seen. What had long been
regarded as a universally accepted attainment of civilization in
regard to warfare is trodden under foot by England, without
regard to the future, and her opponents thereby find themselves
forced to measures of retaliation. The rules which were gal-
lantly observed forty-five years ago in the war between Germany
and France are thrown to the winds by England, who brutalizes
and embitters warfare. The war is systematically extended to
the peaceful civil population, and private property is seized, not
alone at sea but even on land.

Complaints had long been heard over the "inevitable Ger-
man." Now the hour had struck to get rid of the diligent rival.
Immediately with the outbreak of hostilities, all male German
and Austro-Hungarian citizens bet^\^een the ages of seventeen
and fifty-five were cooped up both in England and her colonies
in concentration camps, first invented by the English in the
South African War. Regard for public opinion seems to have
led to certain modifications in the motherland, but the policy of
force was allowed full rein in the Crown Colonies, which are
under the Colonial Secretary, not under Parliament — this, not-
withstanding the fact that in this case the fear of spies coulcf
not be offered as an excuse, and the common interest of the
whites suggested caution. In Hongkong the Germans were even
imprisoned in Chinese prisons, despite the protest of the British
Governor, who replied to the order by resigning his position.

Together with the elimination of these dangerous individuals,
began the destruction of that which they had created by cease-
less work. Wherever the Germans were most successful the
English proceeded to enforce liquidation of their affairs. The
spirit which ruled this procedure is indicated clearly in The Alien
Enemies' (Winding Up) Ordinance, which was promulgated on
December 7, 19 14, in the Straits Settlements and in Further
India. It decrees not alone that enemy firms — even those stock
companies entered according to British law whose shareholders
are at least two-thirds foreigners — are to be forcibly liquidated,
at the cost of a commission of 2^^ per cent; but, following liqui-
dation, all books, letters and vouchers, accounts and documents,
together even with the statement of the liquidator, may be de-

MODERN GERMANY 139

stroyed. The president of the Bremen Chamber of Commerce
expressed the feelings of the whole German nation when he char-
acterized this measure, taken in the name of the King of Eng-
land, as "the worst warping of justice that has occurred since
the existence of civilization"; he adds that the British state has
thereby illustrated "the downfall of all governmental order."

The English, however, look to time for the principal gain
in their economic life. This viewpoint finds expression, with
classical brevity, in The London Times of December 11, 19 14,
in the following words:

"From a British manufacturer's point of view, the longer the
war continues the better for British industries. We may feel
the pinch at present, but years hence we shall get the benefit.
Every German firm in British Colonies, which has been eating
into the very vitals of the British manufacturer and operatives,
will be ruined. If we had had a larger military force to rush
into the field and subdue Germany at the start, the effects would
not have been so far-reaching."

It was in the same spirit that Sir Edward Grey, on August
3, 191 4, in justification of the British declaration of war, made
the following statement, the cold-blooded calculation of which
aroused the indignation of the German people, fighting for its
most sacred possessions:

"For us, with a powerful fleet which we believe able to
protect our commerce and to protect our shores and to protect
our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little
more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside."

One cannot expect from the mouth of a diplomat the cynical
frankness which characterized the British Admiral Monk, when
he gave utterance to the famous words :

"What matters this or that reason ? What we want is more
of the trade which the Dutch now have."

In The United Service Institution for 1909, in the prize essay
of a British naval officer on England's wars, the writer sums up
the results of his investigation in the following equally frank
soldierly declaration :

"We give all sorts of reasons for war, but at the bottom
of them all is commerce."

In expectation of the war now raging. The Saturday
Review made, as early as 1897, this statement, which has often
been repeated in milder form by British newspapers in all parts
of the world:

"If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after
to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would

I40 MODERN GERMANY

not be richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a
right of succession; must they not fight for 250,cxx>,ooo pounds
of yearly commerce?"

If not the whole truth, still a great degree of truth is con-
tained in this statement of an American newspaper:

"This war was not made in Germany, but 'made in Germany*
is the cause of it."

Events, however, have already disappointed the great hopes,
and especially the business calculations, of Sir Edward Grey.
Englishmen will learn that there are higher forces in national
life than cold-blooded desire for gain. As the development of
German commercial strength in production and trade was not
the result of frivolity and arbitrariness, or even of hostility to
the English — an attitude foreign to our people, with few ex-
ceptions— ^but springs of necessity from natural forces which can-
not be eliminated, in like manner war cannot bring victory to
backwardness over progress. It can destroy the careful but anti-
quated work of previous generations, but not the forces of prog-
ress, rich in promise for the future, which created this work. The
longing of the German people is only to gain a freer field for the
exercise of the powers given to them by God, for their own
benefit as well as for the benefit of mankind. As surely as
Napoleonic plans of world-conquest are foreign to the soul
of the nation, just so surely will that longing remain alive in
it while the earth bears German men. For this reason the
war appears to the German people as a war of freedom. It is
aimed against Russia's Pan-Slavic plans of conquest on the
European-Asiatic Continent, and against England's rule of the
sea. ' It aims at a balance of power, not alone on the European
Continent to the advantage of a clever outsider, but likewise
upon the ocean. In this fight for the equality of the nations,
Germany feels herself to be the protagonist of civilized mankind.
And thanks to her scientific training and strength of organiza-
tion, she will win mankind's gratitude, as soon as the mists of
defamation have cleared away and freedom has been achieved for
the judgment of the nations.

CHAPTER IV
GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY

DR. WILLIAM SOLF, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE

COLONIES

THIS article is no apology, no excuse for our having colonies,
and no explanation why we have them. Germany has
colonies because she wished to, and had to have them. We
know that we have obtained all of our colonies in a legal manner
and have not stolen them, and we are responsible to ourselves
and to no foreign power for the existence of our colonial posses^
sions. If I have determined to prepare a contribution for the
purposes of the present book dealing with Germany's colonial
policy, it is done with the well-considered intention of showing,
by means of an analysis of the spirit of our colonial administra-
tion, how far Germany's colonial policy is from being ''mili-
taristic," in the sense in which that adjective is used by our ene-
mies.

Our enemies are not clear in regard to the fundamental fact
that that which is called "militarism" stands in close interrela-
tionship with the geographical, economic and general political
foundations on which a modern state develops. They ignore the
fact that in every modern centralized state, which from the inter-
play of its geographical, commercial and political factors is im-
pelled to form a standing army, the spirit of militarism exists
and everywhere takes on the same or similar forms of activity.

Although in the birth of German militarism in Prussia, the
same factors were originally active as in other countries with
standing armies, nevertheless certain special factors of local geo-
graphical and national-ethical nature gave it a particular stamp.
The principal element in this differentiation was that of bitter
necessity — the position of small and poor Prussia, surrounded by
mighty and rich neighbors, who obstructed and rendered diffi-
cult, as much as possible, her rise and existence. The dira
necessitas, or "holy necessity," made the concentration of all
powers imperative, and left no chance for a costly policy of
force and prestige. Necessity drove the Prussian rulers to a
stronger centralization of their state, to the creation of a bu-
reaucracy which treated the inadequate supplies of the public
treasury with the care accorded to the "Arc of the Covenant/'

141

142 MODERN GERMANY

Necessity has been the great teacher and disciplinarian of the
Prussian state, on the throne, in the army, among the employees
of the Civil Service, and in all ranks of the people; it created
that laconic, reserved, but wiry and persevering Prussian type.

The Prussian state is indeed like the woolen shirt, which irri-
tates but furnishes warmth; it was forced to assume rough and
harsh characteristics, created by bitter necessity. In constant
pitiless discipline and fulfillment of duty, the people and their
princes became great; the state remained long deprived of all
that makes life rich, joyous and beautiful. The peculiar marks
of militarism which gave Prussia her individuality remain with
her to-day, for the reason that the prerequisites for the existence
of Germany as a state are more and more found to be the same
as those which were once the deciding factors for Prussia.

While other countries, as the result of a more fortunate geo-
graphical position, were able more easily to regulate their gov-
ernmental, military and economic needs and institutions, "holy
necessity" — the present time proves this once again — remained
the indispensable teacher and long familiar disciplinarian for
Prussia, lying as she does at the centre of Europe, protected
for long distances by no natural boundaries and surrounded by
jealous enemies. "Toujours en vedette" may serve as a motto,
not alone for Prussia but also for the whole German Empire,
which has only of recent years approached a condition of af-
fluence. The whole German nation is to-day filled with the
same spirit which first rendered Prussia great and unconquer-
able.

The tactics of our enemies in accusing us of militarism are as
unjust as they are foolish. They misunderstand entirely the
peculiar bases of our young empire. Were Germany free to
act and move in the same manner as other states have long been
able to do — most of which have for centuries enjoyed political
and territorial union — she would perhaps have rid- herself of
many characteristics which have been the result of her develop-
ment during a period of great stress.

We see that in "New Germany." We thought in our col-
onies to gain the freedom of development denied us in the
Fatherland. In her colonies Germany did not reckon with
foreign foes, did not contemplate the conquest of her possessions
by European Powers. Trusting in the solidarity of interests of
the white race, and supported by the provisions and spirit of
the Congo Act, the military protection of our colonies was
slight, and intended principally for the preservation of peace
and order among the natives, and for the suppression of the

MODERN GERMANY 143

slave-trade. Such were the legally limited tasks of cmr defence
and police troops. In all the colonies of Africa and in the South
Seas the German government introduced at many points dif-
ferent and freer rules in the field of administration and military
control, as well as in economic life, in trade and traffic, in rail-
road management, in agriculture, etc., than was possible at
home. In none of our colonies is there a military administra-
tion. Were militarism the idol of Germans, and did Germans
really possess the war-like characteristics and piratical instincts
attributed to them, our colonies would inevitably furnish proof
of the fact, and a welcome arena would be seen in them for this
supposed soldierly brutality and love of fighting. The fact that
this is not so, that we have introduced a civil and peaceful form
of government and have not transplanted the restraints and
limitations historically necessary for Germany into these new
fields of our administrative activity — that, taken all in all, we
have developed a freer spirit in them — this appears truly re-
markable. It shows the real spirit of the German nature and
policy as it manifests itself when free from foreign enemies, from
belligerent neighbors and "holy necessity," and as it would
everywhere and universally manifest itself were this possible.

The history of the conception of colonial aspirations in Ger-
many and of its slow, gradual development shows that no am-
bitious impulse for great deeds, no prompting of a sudden whim
or passing ill-humor, no desire for an increase of power prompted
the German government to enter upon the thorny path of an
active colonial policy. Formerly this was freely acknowledged,
even in the camp of our present enemies, who are now actively
engaged in taking possession of our colonies. Prince Bismarck
was finally brought to abandon his views against the acquisition
of distant colonies by the bitter experiences which Germans suf-
fered at the hands of the "impartial" and "just" British colonial
administration in the Fiji Islands, in their ten-year struggle for
lawfully acquired land titles and monetary claims. For a
long time it was his sincere desire to be guided in all ques-
tions of maritime and commercial importance by the assump-
tion of the identity of German and British interests. But the
efFect of the annexation of the Fiji Islands by England in the
year 1874 upon the trade and plantation undertakings of Ger-
mans settled there showed Bismarck clearly that England was
ready to go hand in hand with Germany in the introduction
of freedom in trade and commerce only so far as she herself
was able to gain by this partnership. These experiences were
the main factor in forcing Bismarck to the conviction that Ger-

144 MODERN GERMANY

man interests overseas were in need of a more thorough protec-
tion than could be expected from England, friendly, it is true,
but selfish and under certain circiunstances given to acting ruth-
lessly against foreign interests. With other colonial powers we
h,ad had even worse experiences.

Long enough had the arbiter of the destiny of the young
German Empire postponed Germany's entrance into the ranks
of the colonial powers, for fear of the dissipation of its energies
so urgently needed for internal strengthening. Had the spirit
of German trade and enterprise in foreign colonies enjoyed
protection and equal opportunity, had the expectation been justi-
fied that the colonial territories as yet unappropriated would
remain open to international commerce, German policy would
perhaps never have taken this step. Its ultimate necessity
was the result of bitter experiences. The care and responsi-
bility for the future of the German nation, rapidly growing in
numbers and in economic power, forced the government to place
under the protection of the German flag a portion of the still
unappropriated lands in Africa and in the South Seas. As these
were territories whose position had hitherto not seemed desir-
able to the older colonial powers, it might have been expected
that the recognition of the German occupation would have met
with recognition by the other powers without friction. For
Germany was most careful, in this connection, to avoid encroach-
ment on existing rights or interests.

The reverse was the case. Innumerable obstacles were placed
in the way of Germany's claims to new land. Step by step we
were forced to contend with the jealousy an.d malevolence of
neighboring colonial powers. Attempts were made by every
means to block German colonial plans and to diminish the Ger-
man colonial territory. The other colonial powers had orig-
inally confined themselves to occupation of the unclaimed coastal
districts of the African Continent, but after the birth of the con-
ception of the colonial ^'hinterland'' there began keen competition
in the expansion of colonial possessions from the coast into the
interior of Africa. France especially sought at this point to cur-
tail our West African colonies, by despatching numerous military
missions and by the manufacture of legal claims. In the years
1898 and 1899, French colonial agents in Dahomey, basing their
claims on a wrong longitudinal calculation, occupied a stretch of
land of two thousand square kilometers, to the injury of the neigh-
boring Togo Land. Negotiations covering sixteen years, fre-
quently most delicate but always conducted on the German side
with the greatest patience and long-suffering, were necessary with

MODERN GERMANY 145

die French government, as well as new and expensive boundary
expeditions, in order to convince the latter government of the
incorrect work of its former commissioners and to uphold the
German treaty rights at this boundary.

So difficult was it made for Germany to come to a definite
understanding with her colonial neighbors regarding her boun-
daries that even to-day, after a complete generation, the boun-
dary lines of the German protectorate have not yet everywhere
been finally regulated and settled. Mountains of documents
have been written and oceans of ink spilled in this connection.
The French colonial administration has at all times shown itself
notably lacking in the spirit of conciliation and broad-minded-
ness in questions of boundary regulation.

The responsible leaders of Germany's policy have missed no
opportunity to emphasize how much they valued the preserva-
tion of pleasant relations with their colonial neighbors, espe-
cially with England, and that these pleasant relations should
not be disturbed by differences in colonial matters. In the
report concerning the motives for the German-English under-
standing of July I, 1890 (the so-called Zanzibar Agreement),
these words occur: ''The thought is not to be entertained of
being forced into a rupture with England on account of a colo-
nial dispute. It is not to be doubted that our colonial posses-
sions are materially too unimportant to balance the disadvan-
tages of a war which would deeply affect the prosperity of both
parties. Not alone is actual warfare to be avoided, but alienation
of the nations, embittering of feeling in wid^ circles and diplo-
matic feuds on account of these possessions can not be counte-
nanced. We desire urgently to maintain in the future our former
cordial relations with England."

On December 11, 1894, the Imperial Chancellor, Prince
Hohenlohe, explained to the Reichstag the guiding motives of
Germany's colonial policy. They were, he said, partly of an
economic, partly of a national, and partly of an ideal and re-
ligious nature, the latter in respect to the campaign against the
disgraceful slave-trade and the support of the missions. He
closed with the warning that, with due regard for all foreign,
rights*, the maintenance of our colonial possessions was demanded
by our national honor and was an outward sign of our national
prestige which we would stand ready to defend.

On February 13, 1896, Herr von Marschall, Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, said in the Reichstag:

"It is not the German fashion to seek quarrels or to cause
trouble or to attack others' rights. We are always ready, and

146 MODERN GERMANY

have given proof of it to England, to respect the rights and in-
terests of others. We are most willing on this basis to stand in
close relationship with all nations. But this is on the assump-
tion that our consideration of others is founded upon a full
measure of reciprocity."

On December 14, 1895, the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Bil-
low, declared that by "world policy" he understood simply "that
in die field of commerce, industry and shipping we demand the
same consideration as all other countries, and that we intend to
stand upon a footing of equality with the whole world." Again,
on November 14, 1906, he said that it was his aim so to conduct
a wise, well-considered and deliberately moderate world policy
that the safety of the German people might not be endangered
and the future of the nation not compromised.

But on no occasion have the true aims and the unselfishness
of the German colonial policy been shown in a clearer light
than in our attitude toward the colonial plans of King Leo-
pold II of Belgium. Prince Bismarck, from the start, did every-
thing in his power to further them. His bridal present to the
young Congo State was Catanga, rich in copper and to-day
the pearl of the Belgian colonial possessions. Two German ex-
plorers at that time had just proclaimed its economic impor-
tance. To secure a large free trade zone in Central Africa
appeared to Bismarck almost as desirable as the acquisition of
colonies of our own. But how little the Belgian King acted in
accordance with the spirit and aims of the Congo Act of the year
1885 1 What bitter struggles and material sacrifices Belgium
was compelled to make in order to recover from the selfish mo-
nopolistic policy of Leopold's period in the Belgian Congo!

With justice the geographer, Dr. Supan, declared that no
colonial policy had ever been so inspired by the spirit of peace
and respect for the rights of others as the German.

Even Gladstone saw himself compelled in the British Parlia-
ment, in 1885, in view of the moderate attitude of the German
government, to invoke the blessing of heaven upon Germany's
colonial aspirations, and to welcome her as England's friend
and colleague for the blessing of mankind, and to declare:

"I welcome her entrance into this field of action and' shall
be delighted for her to become our associate in spreading light
and civilization in poorly civilized territories. In this work she
will encounter our most heartfelt and best wishes and every
encouragement which lies in our power."

Many misunderstandings would perhaps have been avoided
had the planless division of Africa in the 8o's of the last cen-

MODERN GERMANY 147

tury, dictated by various outward circumstances, been more
organically regulated by mutual understanding and considera-
tion of the interested states. Proposals were frequently made
looking to a consolidation and re-grouping, especially of the
German and English colonial possessions in Africa, and aiming
at a simplification of their administration. Unfortunately these
eSoTts were made at a time when in the colonies in question,
through private and governmental activity, so many interests
of various kinds had been created that a peaceful territorial
adjustment or exchange could not but seem impracticable, even
with the best intentions. The right moment for the regula-
tion of European possessions in Africa on a natural basis had
been irrevocably neglected.

One might, however, have expected that with the outbreak
of the present war the interested Powers would have remem-
bered Article 1 1 of the Congo Act of February 26, 1885.
This article binds the parties to the Congo Act, in case one
of the Powers exerdsing rights of sovereignty in the Congo
Basin should be involved in a war, to lend their good oiEces,
in order that, at the request of the state in question, the dis-
puted territory be placed during the war under the rule of
neutrality. This wise and humane provision had been in-
cluded in the Congo Act at the special initiative of the United
States of America. One of that country's delegates, Mr. Kasson,
had, in an exhaustive and convincing exposition, shown what
terrible atrocities had resulted from involving the Indian tribes
in the military complications of the European states which
possessed colonies in North America in the eighteenth century.
The repetition of such unfortunate happenings should, he
said, be avoided in the Congo Basin. Efforts should be made
to prevent, in case of war, the arousing of the passions of the
Central African tribes, already by nature inclined to pillage
and plunder, so that the work of incipient civilization and the
entire success of the missionaries might not be destroyed at one
blow.

On the German side, immediately following the outbreak of
hostilities, the necessary steps were taken to bring about,
through the intervention of the United States, the neutralization
of that part of the Cameroons belonging to the Congo Basin,
covered by the convention, as well as of German East Africa.
A similar effort was made also by Belgium, as shown by the
Belgian Gray Book; France was at the start inclined to agree
to the proposition; later, however, under the influence of Eng-
land, who openly declared it necessary to injure Germany

148 MODERN GERMANY

at all possible points, she rejected the proposal, in union with
Great Britain. As the reason for the rejection, it was declared
that Germany was the one who had started the opening of
hostilities in Africa.

According to all available reports, however, it stands estab-
lished that in East Africa, as well as in the Cameroons, hos-
tilities were begun by the Allies. Particularly in the Cameroon
portion of the Congo Basin, the German stations at the begin-
ning of the crisis were cut off from all news from Europe,
and in many cases were surprised by the enemy forces. But
even in the event that later searching investigation should prove
that in individual cases these conflicts had been precipitated
by subordinate German representatives, unfamiliar with the
Congo Act, there would still have been time according to the
wording of Article ii, had there been the proper desire, to inter-
vene and disregard an isolated incident.

Germany fulfilled her duty by working for the peace of
Africa, despite the fact that the only information which reached
her was of attacks by English ships in German East Africa. As
is shown by the Belgian Gray Book, with almost cynical frank-
ness, England and France did not themselves take their officially
oflEcred grounds of refusal very seriously. These were nothing
more than masks for their true intentions of violence.

The opening of hostilities on Colonial soil reawakened all
those instincts and inclinations which it has been the earnest
endeavor during recent years to restrain among the natives by
peaceful training, and gradually to eliminate altogether. This
cannot fail to undermine seriously faith in Europeans as the
representatives and imparters of "civilization," All previous
achievements in the opening up of Africa and the elevation of
its population have been wiped out at one blow. The un-
counted millions expended by Christian missionary work in
Central Africa have been spent in vain. The action of the
English and French toward the German civil population in
the protectorates, contrary to international law and all colonial
tradition, has thoroughly undermined the position of the white
race.

Upon England and France, then, rests the full responsibility
in the judgment of history for the disastrous violation of the
Congo Act, which, but a short while ago, would have been
considered unthinkable.

The general administration of the German colonies has fre-
quently been characterized by foreign critics as military and
bureaucratic. This criticism is unfounded. A military admin-

MODERN GERMANY . 149

istration exists nowhere in the Gennan protectorates; civil
administration has been introduced everywhere in such a way
that the troops are subject to the governor, and the latter again
to the Colonial Secretary, as the representative of the Imperial
Chancellor in the field of Colonial Administration. This is
not universally the case in foreign countries; a great part of
the troops in the French colonies, including the Foreign Legion,
is directly responsible to the war ministry at Paris, which in
West Africa has even introduced universal conscription. One
might here more justly speak of militarism than in regard to
our system, since under our administration in Togo Land and
the South Seas there are no colonial troops at all, and but few
in the other colonies.

The charge of bureaucracy, which has also frequently been
made in Grermany, has been answered by a report (1913)
regarding the administration of the European colonial states.
Extensive investigations have shown that the number of officials
in the German colonies was by no means excessive, that they
were even fewer than in most of the colonies of other countries.
A comparison of the budget appropriations for the officials of
tropical colonies demonstrates that the German protectorates in
Africa have lower expenses for the administrative staff than most
of the neighboring English, French, Belgian and Portuguese col«
onies. Equally incorrect is the statement that bureaucracy in
the German colonial administration excludes the people from
a share in it. In no other colonial state in the world is, for
instance, the home administration of the colonies subject to
so extensive control through Parliament, as in Germany. But
likewise, in the colonies themselves, the people's representatives
organized in the governmental council have not less influence
than in the tropical colonies of like development of other colonial
powers. This is true to an even higher degree of the representa-
tive body in our only settlement colony, South West Africa.
With the progress of the financial independence of the colonies
from the mother country, self-government will increase in scope.
This principle has repeatedly been announced by the central ad-
ministration.

Like the general administration, the financial management
in the German colonies is thoroughly liberal. The greatest
publicity, the most punctilious accounting and the strictest con-
trol on the part of the financial authorities of die Empire and
of Parliament prevent all exploitation and inhuman tendencies
in the financial administration of the colonies.

There is in our colonies no special taxation of fbTeigner8>

150 MODERN GERMANY

no deviation from the principle of equality and justice. Only
in the case of the missions are certain privileges granted.

One of the principal sources of income is from the customs
duties, which are laid in the main upon articles of luxury or
such other goods that can be dispensed with or that may be
replaced — seldom or never on those needed for the increase of
production, such as machines, utensils, etc Owing to the fact
that revenue is chiefly based on the customs, it is possible in
the German colonies to keep those taxes low by means of which,
in other colonies, the raising of the revenue is shifted entirely,
or in great part, on to the shoulders of the natives. While, of
course, fully realizing the educational value of the tax for the
natives, the German government believes that it ^ould be
increased gradually, according to the natives' understanding
of the nature of taxation and with consideration for their eco-
nomic strength.

The financial administration of the German colonies has also
refrained from imposing taxes on articles of consumption, in
addition to the import duties, a system which has been developed
in the colonies of countries in which discriminations in the im«
port tariff in favor of the motherland cause a shortage in the
customs revenue. Such consumption taxes have mostly the pur-
pose of placing the burdens of the colonial administration upon
the natives.

These prindples which, after some years of hesitation and
uncertainty, are at present universally applied throughout the
Grerman colonies, have had the pleasing result that the native
population gradually has developed not only peaceful coopera-
tion but absolute confidence in the administration, while the
economic situation and state of civilization have advanced every-
where in the most favorable manner. The financial sacrifices
which were necessary for a considerable time were not made
in vain, and the liberal and lenient methods applied in the
financial administration have been so far from preventing a
favorable economic development that to-day Togo Land and
Samoa are able to meet all their expenses, while the three great
African colonies meet all those of the civil administration, only
New Guinea receiving a subsidy for general administrative
purposes.

The economic colonial policy of Germany is filled with the
same spirit of humanity and inspired with the same liberal
ideas that distinguish the other branches of her colonial policy,
espedally that in regard to social matters, which stand in such
close connection with those of an economic nature. Wher-

MODERN GERMANY 151

ever the contrary is asserted abroad, there is an absence of
facts to serve as proof. It is true that occasionally some German
writer or politician is cited to testify to the correctness of
such false statements. For example, Meynier, the French
writer on colonial subjects, refers to a German colonial poli-
tician entirely unknown in Germany, "Carl Otto," who is said
to advocate economic exploitation of the colonies, without re-
gard for the natives. On the strength of the authority quoted
by Meynier, the respected French colonial magazine, La
Depeche Coloniate, believes itself justified in writing: "L'oii
appliqua sans mesure la politique de la colonisation a la maniere
forte/* Thus simply by substituting the word "Von' for
"Otto," the German Government is held up as the representa-
tive of principles in its colonial policy which are not only illiberal,
but actually detestable.

Every chapter of this book shows how little the German
colonial policy is inclined, in its care for the welfare of the
natives, to the principles of colonization a la maniere forte,
and how determined it is in its resistance to all contrary de-
sires. This policy "a la maniere forte" has been entirely absent
from Germany's general economic policy of colonial adminis-
tration, althou^ in this field opposing desires and interests
were not lacking. These measures, based on force, belong
to the arsenal of the old Mercantilism, which has recently re*
appeared under the name of the New Mercantilism. Their
aim is to exploit the colonies exclusively from the standpoint
of their financial usefulness to the motherland, with disregard
of the welfare of the colonies themselves, and with the greatest
possible exclusion of other countries from remunerative under-
takings in them. Such a policy tends to the most ruthless ex-
ploiting of the natural resources and of the strength of the
natives, by means of monopolies, differential tariffs toward
foreign countries, and bounties for the motherland. Although
these measures are no longer employed in the same brutal
manner as in the palmy days of Mercantilism, nevertheless
colonization a la maniere forte is being tentatively put forth
by this Neo-Mercantilism in the field of international eco-
nomics. Germany has not followed this current in her colonial
economic policy, although nearly all the colonial Powers mani-
fest an inclination to readjust their economic policy from this
point of view. Germany has remained consistently faithful in
her protectorates to the principles of free trade and the open
door, of international competition on an equal footing and of
industrial freedom of trade and residence. Likewise, monopo-

152 MODERN GERMANY

lies and concessions tending to check economic development
have been recently refused by the German colonial administra-
tion, which, indeed, has sought to set aside those already
existing.

Germany is the only colonial state, except Holland, that
has not favored her own trade either in the tariff laws of the
motherland or in those of her colonies. France has assimilated
Algeria and a portion of her colonies from the point of view of
customs. She regards them almost completely as within her tariff
boundaries, which fact gives French commerce the advantage over
that of other nations trading with these colonies. In regard to
her other colonies France has introduced preferential tariffs favor-
ing the motherland, and reciprocally the colonies, which amount
to as much as 85 per cent of the normal duties. In Tunis,
likewise, France has favored her own trade in important lines,
such as grain, by admitting them free of duty when carried
in French bottoms. Portugal has introduced discriminating
customs rates up to 90 per cent of the regular tariff in favor oi
her own colonial shipping. Spain has acted similarly. England
also enjoys tariff advantages as high as 33 per cent of the normal
rate in her self-governing colonies. She has in this manner
secured for British industry a market which, without this
preference, she would not have been able to maintain to the
same degree. Likewise, the United States has to a large extent
assimilated its colonies in customs matters. Belgium has, it is
true, no preferential tariff, but by means of her extensive system
of concessions she has practically precluded the competition of
other states and secured a monopoly in the trade with her own
colonies.

Further measures for the benefit of the motherland in its
relation to the colonies are shipping subsidies without correspond-
ing return, rebates of charges made to national trade (as in
the Suez Canal) as well as export duties on goods not intended
for the motherland. In the French colonies the export duties
are entirely or partially remitted for goods bound for France.
In Further India the export trade with France is quite free
from duty; in other colonies it is reduced 50 per cent. If the
goods are from the plantations of Frenchmen they are wholly
or in part relieved of export duty. Cocoa pays in St. Thome an
export duty of eighteen rets per kilo when exported in Portu-
guese ships, but sixty rets per kilo when shipped in foreign bot-
toms and bound for foreign ports.

German economic policy practices none of these measures
in favor of Germany's own colonial trade. The few export

MODERN GERMANY 153

duties on the products of the German colonies are entirely of
a fiscal or protective character, and not for the purpose of
discriminating to the advantage of the motherland. This almost
unique adoption of the principles of free trade in the German
colonies has occasionally resulted in hardships which have
been publicly aired in Germany. It is sufficient to mention
the fact that important classes of products from the Grerman
colonies do not find a market in Germany, although they are
badly needed there and have therefore to be imported from
other countries. Thus, in the absence of any preferential regu*
lations, the following articles do not go to Germany, but to
foreign countries: Diamonds, principally to Antwerp; South
West African copper to the United States and Belgium; East
African skins and hemp to North America. While France
exports the products of her West African colonies almost en-
tirely for use in French factories, most of the cocoa and palm
oil from the Cameroons is sold in England. The principal
export article of our South Sea colonies, copra, is carried in
great part to Marseilles and other non-German ports. We, on
the contrary, buy these raw materials in large quantities from
other countries, eq>ecially from foreign colonies, thereby de-
veloping their export trade. The result of this is that our
import trade with these colonies stands at a disadvantage com-
pared with our export trade, and that we furnish excellent
markets for the industries of foreign colonial states. The
Manchester Guardian justly remarked in regard to this liberal
trade policy of ours:

"Germany, in mounting degree, receives the products of
our English factories indirectly, by our disposing of them in
India and other colonies, which obtain the money for them by
the export of raw materials to Germany."

Germany's international economic policy stands consistently
on the principle of "Live and Let Live," and everywhere main-
tains the open door for foreign commerce and shipping in her
spheres of interests and colonies, in the hope that German trade
and shipping will be treated in equally liberal manner. There
was from the start no room for a narrow-minded colonial policy
in connection with such broad and generous principles. There
would seem to be more reason to reproach Germany's colonial
policy with the opposite fault, when it is borne in mind that
only since 1893 have the Grerman colonies enjoyed the right
of the most favored nation in the German customs territory;
and when the praise is remembered which the French colonial
politician, Renty, gives to our colonial trade policy:

154 MODERN GERMANY

"The German colonies in Africa are surrounded by trade
rivals, who will profit by the former's inactivity in order to
gain the market for themselves and to develop a predominant
influence under the protection of the German flag."

In one field only has the German colonial trade policy
sought to make use of measures of colonization a la maniere
forte, not, however, in order to promote German trade and
injure that of other countries, but, at the sacrifice of important
commercial and financial interests, to advance humanitarian
aims and common international interests in the African Con-
tinent. The German government is a leader in the movement,
by means of international measures, of exclusive and prohibitive
duties, to impede and if possible to prevent entirely the im-
portation of brandy, as well as of weapons and ammunition
into the African Colonies of the European states, according
to the declaration of Brussels relative to the Congo Act. It
is only owing to the opposition of other European colonial
states that this object has not been entirely accomplished. Some
of the states would not support the idea of an international
agreement to put an end to the smuggling of weapons and
ammunition, so beneficial for their trade, and to the not less
lucrative trade in brandy, so deleterious to the natives of Africa.
Although exposed to the danger of smuggling from neighbor-
ing colonies, the German government took steps against the
trade in weapons and brandy in its African colonies by introduc-
ing measures which are more radical than anything that other
colonial states were willing to adopt. For instance, the im-
portation of brandy for the use of natives is absolutely forbidden
in German East Africa and German Southwest Africa and
Samoa. In the Cameroons its use has been greatly restricted
by an especially high duty, prohibition zones and other meas-
ures of control; in Togo Land, the importation of brandy was
materially reduced, despite financial loss to this protectorate,
whose revenues are small.

In the same manner as freedom of trade is absolutely un-
restricted in Germany's colonial policy, save as affected by the
above-mentioned humanitarian measures, so is commercial free-
dom the rule in connection with a liberal industrial policy.
While in the colonies of other countries there is frequently a
ruthless effort to prevent industries and trades from being
developed which flourish in the motherland, there are no such
measures in the German colonies; even for foreigners there is
absolute freedom of trade and residence. In German East
Africa several thousand East Indians, who are British sub-

MODERN GERMANY 155

jects, find themselves freer to practice their trades undisturbed
than even in several British colonies, as, for example, South
Africa. On the other hand, no industries are artificially en-
couraged by means of premiums and other kinds of favors, as
in Australia and Canada, with the aim of crushing out inter-
national trade. The German colonial trade policy makes use of
such measures as little as it does of colonial protective tariffs.

The attitude of the German government in regard to the
investment of foreign capital in the colonies corresponds to this
liberal policy in regard to trade and industry. No obstacle
is placed in the way of foreign capital. Of course, in cases
where capital is found to be entering upon a course contrary to
the general interest, as was the case with some large chartered
companies, the endeavor is made by the same measures as are
employed in like case against German capital — viz., by agree-
ment or by redemption of their rights — ^to obviate the evil. As
a result of these liberal conditions, the investment of foreign
capital in the German colonies has considerably increased. Of
the 506,000,000 marks represented by the capital of various
companies which is at present invested in German colonies, not
less than 89,000,000 belong to foreigners. The German gov-
ernment is careful to assure itself that the invested capital and
the undertakings founded thereon in the protectorates are as
sound as possible. A "Permanent Trade Commission of the
Colonial Administration" acts in an advisory capacity to the
colonial authorities in questions which regard capital and its
influence.

Likewise in the field of money, banks, and credit, thoroughly
liberal tendencies are the rule. The use of money is introduced
everywhere in the protectorates in place of barter, and wages
are paid in cash instead of in kind. In agreement with this,
we find markets encouraged in the German colonies with the
aim of facilitating for the natives advantageous sales of their
products. In the field of credit, also, the German colonial ad-
ministration has been successful in advancing ideas of social
protection for the natives, by prohibiting the giving of credit
by merchants for tropical products, the so-called trust system,
that is so harmful to the native element. Further steps along
this line have been taken by the creation of savings banks through
the local authorities and post offices, or in connection with the
existing trade banks.

From all this it is plain that the general economic policy
of Germany in her colonies is in no way a colonization a la
maniere forte, but that it is rather a colonization decidedly

156 MODERN GERMANY

a la maniere douce; for it is free from mercantilism, whidi
is militarism in the field of political economy. Despite the
rejection of all severe measures calculated to injure other na-
tions for the benefit of German interests^ it is able to show such
brilliant successes that it finds its justification in itself and sees
no cause to depart from its well-tested principles. Especially
during the last ten years this policy has produced such rapid
economic progress in the German colonies as is seen in but
few colonies of other countries. Capital, which was at first
shy, has shown an increasing confidence in the economic de-
velopment of the German colonies, so that to-day more than half
a billion marks is represented by the companies operating there.
Twenty years ago less than 62,000,000 marks of private capital
were invested in the German colonies. If capital during this
period has increased tenfold, the extent of the foreign trade of
the German colonies has grown twice this amount in the same
time. These brilliant economic successes have been achieved
under a thoroughly liberal colonial trade policy, thanks to the
efficiency of the merchants, planters and other entrepreneurs
active in the colonies, who are mostly Germans, supported
as they are by a liberal and far-sighted administration, with
an understanding of economic questions.

In matters of jurisdiction in the colonies there exists a dif-
ference between the whites and the natives, but no one who
knows the principles underlying the treatment of the natives
will for a moment doubt that this difference owes its origin to
fatherly care for the natives, and finds its justification therein,
and that this legal differentiation is not planned to bring about
a privileged position for the whites as a master race. In regard
to these guiding principles, I expressed myself exhaustively two
years ago, before the Reichstag, and I should like to repeat here
what I then said:

''The natives are our proteges, and the German government
has, therefore, the duty to regard their lawful interests as its
own. For we do not wish to annihilate the natives, we vnsh to
preserve them. This is a duty of common decency which we
undertook with the raising of the German flag in our African
colonies and in the South Seas. The exercise of this duty is
also a matter of wisdom ; for by this means alone can we secure
the possibility of a reasonable economic policy and thereby the
basis for German national activity.

''I shall not repeat the phrase of the 'master nation' and the
'serving race.' I am of the opinion, however, that the white
man stands in relation to the natives as the guardian to the

MODERN GERMANY 157

ward, as the grown person to the child. If, for example, the
native is granted unrestricted control of his land, he will dis-
pose of it in a short time, waste the money received for it and
fall into poverty. If the government, in addition, permits the
free use of alcohol, moral deterioration is added to poverty; the
natives degenerate and disappear. Of course, to colonize in
this fashion is possible, and it is the desire of many so to do.
For what else is the aim and the hope of the great horde of
colonists who regard natives chiefly as a handicap to the develop-
ment of their own interests? To what other goal do all the
efforts lead which are sought to be justified by phrases like the
'struggle for existence' and the 'survival of the fittest'? That
colonization simply implies the economic exploitation of the
colonies is just as false as that the duty of our home adminis-
tration is limited to efforts looking to the improvement of trade,
industry and agriculture. Besides the natural wish of the
ruling nation to reap advantages from its colonies, we must not
forget that the colonies are the home of people to whom we
have promised our protection, for whom we must take thought.
Other duties are bom of this one, equally great for the colo-
nizer. The peoples with whom our colonization activity brings
us in touch stand upon a lower level of civilization, occupy a
much inferior standpoint than we civilized whites — in some cases
they are very far beneath us. Not alone the legal obligation
which belongs to us as protectors, but our position as a civilized
state forces us, with the obvious arguments of a civilized cosmic
conception, to aid these peoples, and to try to provide better
living conditions for them than they, with their limited intel-
ligence and capacity, have been able to provide for themselves.

"To colonia^e is to 'missionize' — to missionize in the noble
sense of educating to Kttltur. In the same manner as the cor-
rect appreciation of the spiritual essence of his own nation is
one of the most important duties of a statesman, likewise the
colonizer must unceasingly strive to study and to fathom the
thoughts and feelings of the natives, and must regidate his
methods accordingly. His tasks are many and multifarious.
The natives are Ignorant — they must be instructed. They are
lazy — the>' must learn to work. They are afliicted with all kinds
of diseases — they must be cured. They are savage, cruel and
superstitious — ^they must be tamed and enlightened. All in all,
they are big children who need training and guiding.

"These principles have nothing in conunon with the stand-
point of a master class which is so violently attacked by the
Social Democrats. Nor can they be characterized as a weak

158 MODERN GERMANY

policy of cuddling the natives. These principles are pre-
eminently practicable; by means of them alone can one solve
the diief problem of every colonial system, the problem of
rendering native labor useful, and of releasing the energy stored
up as rudis indigestaque moles in the lower peoples for the aims
and broad field of activity of our higher intelligence.

''I come now to a difficult point, and I beg you not to misp
understand me — I believe, indeed, that I cannot be misunder-
stood in this connection. How are the natives to be educated
to this work of civilization — are they to be persuaded to work
(I do not use the word 'forced' in order to avoid misunderstand-
ing), or what means are to be employed? That depends upon
the character of the different peoples, on their moral level, and
the degree of their education. This problem must be solved
differently in every protectorate. It cannot be accomplished
from this end by means of general principles. Each governor
must study the question in his territory and act accordingly.
But for the planter, as well as for the merchant, there is in
the colonies but one single policy — that of the preservation of
the natives, the utilization of their work for the planters, a
multiplication of their needs and therewith the increasing of
their purchasing power to the advantage of our trade.

"The division of work between the natives and the whites
must be such that the native places the work of his hands at
the service of the white man's intelligence. The policy of feed-
ing on the lower races, of extermination and destruction, is
antiquated and immoral, likewise unwise — one does not kill the
hen that lays the eggs. Treat the native with justice. This
may not preclude severity and harshness where they are neces-
sary. But grant him conditions of life consonant with his
wishes, and raise him gradually. For periods of fifty and one
hundred years make but slight difference in the development
of peot)les. In this manner the economic development of the
colonies will vigorously progress — ^by means of the natives and
xjnth them, not despite the natives and against them."

These principles governing the policy to be followed with
the natives are not newly announced and introduced by me,
but since the beginning of our colonial activity they have been
practiced with absolute conviction by every one of my prede-
cessors in office. In the interest of the natives, as the postulate of
harmonizing in an equitable manner the traditions of the primi-
tive peoples, the protection of whom we have undertaken, with
the conceptions of Germans as representatives of European cul-
ture and civilization, the creation of a separate legal position

MODERN GERMANY 159

for the natives was a prerequisite. While, in the main, for the
whites the law of the motherland holds, the tribal customs of
the natives were on principle not disturbed, in so far as this did
not offend against the most elemental rules of common sense
and morality. This consideration was our duty as human be-
ings. The colonies are the home of the natives. The white
man is more or less a guest* There are millions of negroes to
a few whites. The natives have a right to see their view of
life and law respected. German law can demand from them
only secondary recognition. Where tribal customs offer no
solution, German legal principles may be applied. And this
actually occurs, only on the basis of custom, it is true, not by
force of express legislation. The introduction of German law
as a whole had to be withheld for reasons of legislative policy.
Germany herself had had occasion to learn, when in the sixteenth
century the foreign Roman law was forced upon her, that how-
ever excellent a law system may be, it is not calculated to satisfy a
nation and awaken confidence if it has not grown out of the life
of the people itself. A system of law so developed in all lines as
the German can be grasped and made use of only by a correspond-
ingly developed intellect. The native of the German colonies is
absolutely without this mental maturity. He would be incapable
of making beneficial use of the rights which the German law
would give him, and he would be unable to fulfill the duties
which it would place upon him. It is only necessary to think
of the oath upon which German procedure is based. The
native has not yet learned to make clear, trustworthy observa-
tions and to repeat them simply and unadorned before the court.
His unbridled imagination causes him to see visions which have
little to do with reality. The taking of an oath would place
him in danger of legal prosecution. Were we, however, to
release him from responsibility, on the ground that he lacked
mental training and the required perception, the oath would
sink to a mere empty formula and lose all its value as a proof
— the very purpose for which it is taken. It would then be bet-
ter to suppress the taking of all oaths.

The retention of the tribal laws can be nothing more than a
transition in a progressive development. The association with
the whites constantly creates new complications which require
legal settlement. As a matter of fact, numerous breaches have
already been made in the tribal system, and it is the undeviating
aim of the government to maintain the natives' law on a level
with improving economic and cultural conditions.
All members of tribes indigenous to the protectorate, as well

i6o MODERN GERMANY

as hybrid tribes, come under the head of "natives." In addi-
tion, members of outside negro tribes are reckoned in this cate-
gory. Those belonging to other races than the white who pos^
sess Grerman citizenship, or who, as citizens of other civilized
states, stand on a footing of equality with our own, either accord-
ing to treaty right or by custom, are subject to the laws of the
whites.

The German Empire represents the protective power in the
colonies, which is nothing less than full sovereign power. It is
exercised by the German Emperor in the name of the Reichstag.
By virtue of sovereignty, the Empire and the Emperor possess
legislative power, which the Empire exercises in the form of
laws and the Emperor in the form of ordinances. To a limited
degree, the right of issuing ordinances is vested also in the
Imperial Chancellor and the governors. The Empire makes
law primarily for the whites; the regulating of the native law
lies within the provinces of the Emperor, the Imperial Chan-
cellor and the governors. A greater mobility is called for in
this latter field than is possible with the legal machinery of the
Empire. Since the Empire regulates the budget of the protec-
torates, it possesses a far-reaching influence on the administra-
tion, together with the possibility of supervision of legislative
measures, most of which are issued in the form of laws.

For the whites and that part of the native population on a
like footing, the German civil, criminal and bankruptcy laws,
as well as the German rules of procedure, are in general in
effect, by virtue of the law concerning the protectorates. This
is true, likewise, of the regulations touching matters of volun-
tary jurisdiction. Provisions of Prussian law have supple-
mentary force. It was necessary for the courts to be organized
on a basis of simplicity corresponding to the existing primitive
conditions. Only two grades of courts were created: district
and upper courts. The district judge has individual jurisdiction
in questions which in Germany are under the jurisdiction of
the judges of local courts. In other matters the district court
sits with three members in some cases, with five in others, on the
bench. The larger number acts in cases of crime or serious
misdemeanor. The upper court consists of the chief justice and
four assessors or associates. The district judges and the chief
justice must be qualified to hold the office of a judge in one of
the federal states, and they are authorized to exercise their
judicial functions by the Imperial Chancellor. In the exercise
of these functions they are independent and subject only to the
law. The assessors are chosen from the ranks of those subject

MODERN GERMANY i6i

to the jurisdiction of the court {Gerichtsetngesessenen) . The
right of appeal (Revision) is still lacking. Its introduction is
contemplated through the establishment of an Imperial colonial
court. The state's attorney takes part in criminal cases only
at the main proceeding in the first instance, in connection with
the prayer for legal remedy, and in cases before the higher court.
Lawyers and notaries have a similar position as in Germany.

The law for the natives, as already explained, is based on
the tribal law. The resulting difference in comparison with
the law governing the whites is limited to the question of ma-
terial rights and the manner of procedure in the presentation
of claims; it does not extend to the personal standing before the
law. The native has different, but not inferior rights. Life,
health, freedom and property are secured to him to the same
extent as to the white man. To him also the government lends
its strength in obtaining his rights. There are, it is true, in
East Africa, Togo Land and the Cameroons remnants of so-
called house-slavery. But this is without influence on the
personal legal standing of those subject to it. The house-slave
is considered by the judge as legally competent, and enjoys full
legal protection. The government has taken steps to prevent
such conditions arising in future and an early termination of
those still existing is aimed at.

For the protection of the natives againt the exploitation of
their inexperience, detailed regulations have been issued in regard
to the making and to the nature of credit and surety under-
takings and of contracts for work. Credit and surety under-
takings must have in some cases official approval, while in others
reduction to writing suffices. Especial attention has been given
to labor contracts. It was important, among other things, to
prevent conditions similar to slavery from arising, as well as to
obviate alienation of the worker from his home connections.
Labor contracts may not exceed a certain length of time. The
hours of daily work are fixed. The rate of wages is regulated.
Wages must be paid in cash and may not be curtailed. In addi-
tion, the employer has numerous duties regarding the social
welfare of the workers. He must provide healthy living quar-
ters, proper care, sufficient food, nursing in the event of sick-
ness, medicine, bandages and, if necessary, medical attendance.
In the case of a sufficient number of workers, specially ar-
ranged sick-quarters and a complete apothecary shop must be
kept ready. Disregard of these duties entitles the worker to
break the contract without losing his right to wages, or the con-
tract violated by the employer may be voided by the authorities.

i62 MODERN GERMANY

In connection with the regulation and development of real
estate rights, it was the constant aim of the government to main-
tain the natives in possession of land sufficient for them and
their descendants to be permanently protected against eco-
nomic ruin. They were either confirmed in their original hold-
ings or received as much land as they needed for their liveli-
hood. Disposing of this property to whites, as well as its en-
cumbrance, has been either absolutely forbidden or made con-
tingent on the approval of the governor. It was intended diat
the natives be protected against exploitation by foreign greed.
These protective provisions are still in force, despite the fact
that, owing to continued development, native real estate law
has appreciably approximated to that of the whites.

The real estate book (Grundbuch) forms the nucleus of
German real estate law. In it the holdings of land are fixed
officially as to size and location, as well as the conditions of
ownership and encumbrances. In the real estate book, which
may be inspected by any one, reliable information is given in
regard to the actual and legal conditions of any piece of ground,
and the necessary data are offered for the conclusion of a real
estate transaction. Especially does it promote the extremely
important branch of credit on real estate, by giving trustworthy
information on the points important for this purpose. This
institution has been introduced into the colonies and arrange-
ments have been made for the natives to avail themselves of it, in
so far as it does not threaten them with disadvantages. Land
entered in the real estate book may be acquired by the natives
without limit. The governor, however, decides as to the entering
of their holdings in the book, in the interest of the natives them-
selves; for the legal and economic conditions resulting from this
entering presuppose, for their profitable use, a higher degree of
understanding than the native on the average possesses.

Family and inheritance laws of the natives have been least
influenced by German legal ideas. Marriage and its legal re-
sults are so deeply rooted in the spiritual life of a people, how-
ever low it may stand in the scale, that it is impossible to at-
tempt to adapt them to our higher conceptions until the neces-
sary moral basis has been created. The spread of Christian
principles through instruction and exemplary conduct prepares
the way for leading the natives to the proper goal. The gov-
ernment is constantly endeavoring to bring about by all mild
means a moral elevation of the people's character, in order to
give to the wife and mother her proper position in the family.

The material law of inheritance of the natives has hitherto

MODERN GERMANY 163

proved unamenable to legal regulation, in the same way as
has the law of the family. In German East Africa, how-
ever, where Indians and Arabians live in conditions of com-
fort, a beginning has been made toward official regulation of
estates. The heirs, in the case of an inheritance, may entrust its
administration and distribution to the local authorities. Similar
possibilities have been created among the inhabitants of Samoa,
among whom, as a result of deaths, disputes as to title and
land play an important part.

A radical change has taken place under German rule in the
field of criminal law. The decisions of responsible authorities
resting upon established principles of penal law took the place
of the frequently arbitrary caprice of tyrannical chieftains.
Such principles were seldom found in the natite laws, which
showed scarcely the first beginnings of an enlightened system of
penal laws. They could be abstracted only from the German
statutes. German penal law thus furnished the provisions ac-
cording to which the natives are made responsible for criminal
offenses. There could, however, be no thought of proceeding
sweepingly by introducing the German criminal code as a whole.
With its sharply defined legal conceptions and definitions of
criminal acts, it would have remained incomprehensible to the
natives. On the other hand, it was necessary to leave a certain
amount of freedom to the judge, in order that he might give
to die customs and conceptions of the natives the proper influence
in weighing die question of guilt. Thus far no exhaustive enu-
meration of punishable acts has be^ made in any of our protec-
torates. It is, however, a matter of course that punishment
is dealt out for such crimes as result from superstition or from
the cultural conceptions of the natives, as, for example, the giving
of poison, blood-revenge, etc.

The considerations which operate against an enumeration of
punishable acts are not operative as regards the fixing of the
different kinds of punishment. There are, therefore, general
rules respecting them. Admissible punishments in the African
colonies are castigation, fines, imprisonment with enforced labor,
imprisonment in chains and the death penalty. In the South
Seas castigation and imprisonment in chains are not permissible,
but in their place enforced labor without imprisonment has been
substituted. Where castigation is permitted, it was already cus-
tomary before the establishment of German rule. It is still
indispensable as an educational measure, since the natives them-
selves consider it necessary for their own protection and demand
its application. It cannot be applied in the case of women or

i64 MODERN GERMANY

dder persons; natives of higher education or of a better social
position are, on prindple, to be exempted from its operation.
The right of castigation may be exercised only upon approval
by the governor. The punishment is applied under the super-
vision of a physician. The deadi penalty rests on the ultimate
decision of the governor.

Jurisdiction /Over the natives rests, on principle, in the hand
of the local administration, as represented by the Bexirksamt'
mann (sub-governor) and the heads of the stations. The
reasons urged against the separation of the judicial and ad-
ministrative functions are convincing. The administrative of-
ficial is in uninterrupted touch with the natives; he is in the
best position to discover their ideas of right and he enjoys
their confidence. His dignity would suffer if he did not have
the power to punish and to decide disputes. Natives are ad-
mitted to the proceedings as far as possible as advisors and
experts. In this manner they help to spread a knowledge of the
law and themselves become familiar with the legal conceptions
of the whites. This tends to strengthen confidence in the legal
verdicts. Native customs serve as a model for the conduct of
the proceeding; the hearing is oral and public. The natives
are not sworn, but a deliberately false statement is punishable.
Measures for securing a confession which are not permissible
according to native custom may not be employed.

While in German East Africa and South West Africa the
law is administered only by whites, in the Cameroons, Togo
Land and in the South Seas, part of the jurisdiction has been
left in the hands of the natives or entrusted to them. The gov-
ernment, however, has retained control and the right of re-
vising the decision. In the Cameroons for certain native tribes
and territories, local chiefs are active as single judges, and
native courts of arbitration serve as collegiate courts. Their
jurisdiction is limited according to the amount at issue and the
seriousness of the offense. They have no jurisdiction in cases
of murder and manslaughter. The courts of arbitration serve
furthermore as courts of appeal in cases heard before the na-
tive chiefs. All cases can in the last instance be submitted to
the governor for decision. Furthermore, provision has been
made for a revision in cases where large sums of money are in
dispute or severe punishment is involved. The decision in these
circumstances rests with the governor or the chief justice.
Execution is limited to such property which the debtor can dis-
pense with without endangering his economic position. Tribal
possessions may be taken in no case. The proceedings take

MODERN GERMANY 165

place without the presence of a state's attorney. Criminal
prosecution is left to the decision of the court. There is thus
no legal obligation in the matter. The accused is at liberty at
any stage of the proceeding to secure counsel.

From the history of the development of our military strength
in the protectorates, it is clear that the acquisition of colonies
by Germany was carried on by peaceful means and that her en-
trance into the ranks of colonial Powers was not prompted by
conquistador instincts. When Germany entered upon the acqui-
sition of colonial possessions, those in authority conceived of
their development as purely mercantile and under mercantile
forms, as great trade and plantation undertakings. It was not
considered advisable or wise to employ military force for these
chartered companies. The Empire provided protection for them
as regards the outside world; internal safety was left to their
own police-soldier forces.

This system did not prove adequate. The companies, in
their attempts peacefully to open up die country, encountered
the opposition of native potentates, or came into conflict, as in
the Central African districts, with tribes that had long car-
ried on trade there and whose ruthless exploitation and slave-
trade could not be quietly endured.

The companies were likewise powerless, through lack of the
necessary force, to put a stop to the incessant fighting of the
native tribes among themselves. The possibility of their exer-
cising influence toward a healthy development of their spheres of
interest continued to decrease. The various concerns soon found
themselves at the end of their financial resources. The Empire
stepped in, and by means of the power at its disposal succeeded
in establishing an orderly state of affairs.

The experience was thus again repeated, which has been
that of all colonizing Powers, that the opening up and develop-
ing of territories occupied by peoples of inferior civilization is
impossible without the protection of military force.

As a result of this observation, police and defence troops
were established in the possessions of the companies, which
were taken over as protectorates by the Imperial Government.
The express purpose of these troops was, as stated^ in the be-
ginning, the maintenance of peace and order in the protectorates
and the suppression of the slave-trade. Neither at the beginning
nor in the course of later development was there any thought,
in connection with the organization of a military force in our
colonies, of guarding the territories under our protection against
states belonging to the civilized community of international

i66 MODERN GERMANY

law. While in Southwest Africa, our sole colony suitable for
settlement purposes, the defence troops are made up of white
officers, petty officers and men taken from the home army as
volunteers, in the tropical colonies only the first two classes are
white, die rank and file being negroes serving for pay.

The strength of the various defence troops was regulated ac-
cording to the power of the natives in the colonies in question.
From small beginnings their numbers increased automatically
with the progressive opening up of the colonies; nevertheless,
they remained widiin moderate limits, save for temporarily
necessary increases. In recent years there has been rather a
reduction than an increase of diese troops in the various
colonies.

The fighting unit generally is a company. Divided into such
units, and widely scattered, the defence troops are distributed
over the colony. That which the individual troop lacks in
numerical strength must be made up for by its intrinsic worth,
which is the result of adequate training and instruction. The
soldiers who have come from the home army furnish the quali-
ties necessary for this purpose, but the European instructors
have also succeeded, by tact and discretion, in raising the negro
troops to the highest possible standard of discipline and military
efficiency. It is a proof of the sound condition of the whole
organization that up to this time none of the negro troops have
failed in any case. Their reliability stood the test in brilliant
fashion in recent occurrences.

Not alone, however, in the purely military field, but espe-
cially in the non-military fidd have the defence troops accom-
plished great things. From the beginning of our colonial ad-
ministration up to the most recent time, officers and petty-
officers of these troops have worked hand in hand with the civil
authorities in the peaceful labor of general administration. The
results achieved in this connection furnished the basis on which
the civil administration could proceed with its extensive measures
as soon as a district was pacified.

In the work 'of establishing stations and district offices the
troops were of the greatest assistance. Officers, petty-officers
and men have never failed, by strenuous work together with tire-
less interest and practical common sense, to accomplish their
prescribed work, despite a frequent lack of training in the
technique of civil administration. The individual tasks were
by no means slight and required political skill and a grasp of
the affairs of the natives. Supported in general by only a
slight military force, these men, transplanted into absolutely

MODERN GERMANY 167

unfamiliar territory, had, first of all, to gain a firm footing in
order, by gradually extending their influence into broader spheres,
to accustom the inhabitants to their new masters and to the
new order of afiEairs.

Qosely connected with the general activity of the adminis-
tration are the technical and cultural tasks performed by the
troops in the various districts. Most of the stations are entirely
the work of the troops, who succeeded in creating not alone
practical, but likewise architecturally pleasing buildings for the
administration, surrounded by hospitals, wells, storehouses, mar-
kets and slaughter houses, and where the means were available,
tasteful gardens and all kinds of useful institutions serving
cultural aims.

Special attention was paid to the development of roads. Most
of them were laid out by the troops and provided with bridges,
dams, tunnels, culverts, etc. Worthy of mention are also the
attempts made in raising domestic animals. The efforts met with
excellent success, for example in Southwest Africa in the line
of horse-breeding. The achievements of the troops in the field
of administration and the cultural improvement of the colonies
deserve all the more acknowledgment because in most cases the
means for diese purposes were very limited.

In addition to the manifold claims upon them in military
and administrative fields, a large number of officers of the troop
and of the medical staff find time for scientific activity and have
published in pamphlets and current scientific works the knowl-
edge of land and people which they have gained in the colonial
service. Others, dirough extensive work in the field of cartog-
raphy, have gathered extensive material important for the open-
ing up of the colonies. Special attention must be called to the
service which the officers of the medical staff of the troops have
rendered, not alone in the exercise of their medical profession
with the troops, but also in scientific study of tropical sickness
and animal epidemics, as well as in the line of tropical hygiene.

We thus see that in all branches of colonizing work the
troops have developed a multifarious and strenuous activity.
Though with the continuing development of the colonies they
will have to place in other hands one or the other of the
branches of their successful activity in the field of general ad-
ministration to which they have become devoted — thus finally
limiting themselves entirely to their military duties — ^neverthe-
less the satisfaction and the credit belong to the troops for
having laid the foundation for the political, cultural and eco-
nomic development of the colonies.

i68 MODERN GERMANY

Now that the war has extended even to the colonies, the
defence troops find themselves face to face with tasks which
they were never intended to perform. Their use for purposes
of defence against an enemy from abroad had not been con-
templated. Such a contingency seemed excluded, since, as al-
ready mentioned, the protectorates had been neutralized by the
Congo Act in case of war-like developments among the signatory
Powers in Europe.

It remained for the enemies of Germany to break that agree-
ment and to carry the war into the colonies. But despite the
employment of numerically much superior forces, they have
not yet been successful in obtaining any decisive success. The
<lefence-troops have proved worthy of their traditions also in
meeting this absolutely new task.^

*Thls chapter was written in the early part of the year i9I5.»<Tbanslatob's
jroTz.

CHAPTER V

THE GERMAN MILITARY SYSTEM
COMPARED WITH THE FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND

RUSSIAN SYSTEMS

PROFESSOR HANS DELBRUCK, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

BERLIN

THE Prussian army, which forms the backbone of the
Imperial German army, goes back to the reconstruction
of die old Prussian army, which, shattered by Napoleon in
1806, had gone to pieces. In order to free Prussia from the
French yoke, General Scharnhorst conceived the idea of sum-
moning to arms the entire population capable of bearing them.
In 181 3, this plan was put into operation. Only through this
tremendous effort of Prussia, in conjunction with all the other
Powers, was it possible to put an end to the menace of Napoleon's
universal dominion. Napoleon's power was already so great
that his mediate and immediate subjects amounted to seventy
million; his opponents, taken all together, were scarcely more
numerous. No one of them, therefore, could be spared for
victory, neither England, nor Prussia, nor Austria; and Prussia^
which did not yet number five millions, was forced to intro-
duce universal military duty and carry it to complete adoption.
This universal duty of bearing arms proved such a brilliant
success in the Wars of Liberation that it was retained in times
of peace, although it was not alone a heavy burden for the
Prussian people but was fraught with difficulties in execution.

The standing army still showed great resemblance to the
armies of the eighteenth century, as the English army still does
to-day. A large proportion of the soldiers served twenty years,
and even longer. As a result, there was in this army but little
room for the recruits who were called by universal conscription,
especially as these were to be retained with the colors for a
period of three years. The great mass of the recruits, very
superficially trained or not at all, were incorporated into the
Landwehr. This Prussian Landwehr thus bore a great sim-
ilarity to the British militia, and its military usefulness was
slight. Only gradually, in the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury, was this evil overcome. On the one hand, the class of
soldiers serving for a long number of years dwindled, as the

169

170 MODERN GERMANY

favorable development of economic life and industry brought
about better wages than the slender pay in the army. To-day
it is considered sufficient to retain merely that number of soldiers
after a long period of service adequate to satisfy the need for non-
commissioned officers. On the other hand, after long hesita-
tion, the time of service was reduced from three years to two
years — ^with the exception of the cavalry and the mounted field
artillery. This reduction, in 1893, aroused great apprehension
in officers' circles and among many patriots. It was thought
that the military spirit would suffer, and that the army would
really be no army at all, but merely a Volkswehr, or militia,
since only the first-year class would be under arms at the
moment when the elder class was released and the new re-
cruits were not yet trained. But subsequent success proved
that the fears were groundless. Through continued and great
efforts, and through the most careful use of the time, the two-
year period of service has been made to furnish excellent mili-
tary material.

The organization is now very simple. The duty of military
service extends from the twentieth to the forty-fifth year. The
two youngest classes form the standing army. The next
classes are made use of in the event of war, approximately to
double the strength of the regiments, to form reserve regiments,
and to create Ersatz or compensating battalions with Ersatz
reserves. Landwehr regiments are formed from the elder Land-
wehr soldiers, and finally from the last classes up to the forty-
fifth year are formed the Landsturm, or last reserve regiments,
who are used principally for barracks service and as guards for
prisoners, but who in this war have frequently fought at the
front. Recourse is had only in the last event to the youngest
class from the seventeenth to the twentieth year.

When Minister of War Boyen, the disciple and follower of
Scharnhorst, organized the new army of peace in the autumn
of 181 4, he established the principle that the standing army
should contain about ten thousand men for every million of
the population. This represented at that time, as Prussia num-
bered ten million in population, something over 100,000 men,
or I per cent of the total number. This percentage has varied
but little during the last century. When no fresh contingents
were formed for some time it would occasionally sink slightly
below that level; and when for the purpose of absorbing the
excess of young men, new regiments were authorized, usually
as the result of parliamentary struggles, the ratio would increase
by a fraction over i per cent. In the summer of the year

MODERN GERMANY 171

1914 it stood at 1. 117 per cent for the army, and 1.27 per
cent for the army and navy together, not counting the officers.
Tlie natural aim, however, of such a policy — to have all service-
able young men pass through the training school of the army —
has never been realized, not even at the outbreak of the present
war. Although in the year 1913 the standing army was in-
creased by 63,000 recruits, there still remained 30,000 thor-
oughly serviceable young men, and not less than approximately
200,000 with slight physical disabilities {Enatz reserve and
Landstorm with weapons), who might have been called to the
colors and who are now, with the progress of the war, gradually
being drafted into the army. The reforms undertaken in the
army during the last century had, on the whole, for their pur-
pose not so much to increase the numbers in the army in propor-
tion to the population as through reduction of the term of
service to reduce the individual burden connected with this
militaristic system, and to make room for the training of a
greater fraction of the nation. But we have never carried the
universal duty of military aervice to its final conclusion.

Of the greatest importance, from the political as well as the
military standpoint, is the institution of the One-Year Volun-
teers {Einjahrig-Frekvillige) . The name "volunteer" is no
longer applicable. It originated at the time when the army
was not yet large enough to accommodate all eligible men, and
when lots were drawn among the superfluous. In order to
enjoy the privilege of one-year service, a recruit had to relinquish
the right of drawing lots, and to this extent the service was vol-
untary. To be eligible to serve as a one-year volunteer a young
man has to provide his outfit, and receiving no pay, to support
himself. Likewise, proof must be given of a superior education,
by means of school testimonials or on the basis of a rather severe
examination. The one-year voluntary service, then, is in no sense
a privilege of wealth, hut rather 2 privilege of education, for,
whereas the examination may never be remitted, assistance is
jjven to young men of superior education who lack the means
for supporting themselves throughout the entire year.

The OTje-year service, which was introduced by Minister of
War von Boyen in 1814, together with the duty of general
military service, has two striking advantages. In the first place,
military service for only one year interrupts but slightly the
general training of our young men. On the contrary, it is
r^arded by many as a great advantage that young men, whether
merchants, students or farmers, interrupt once in their life their
civil employment and become familiar with an entirely new

172 MODERN GERMANY

world. In the second place, these one-year volunteers provide
the indispensable material for replenishing the body of officers.
After one year of service has rendered a sifting possible, the
superiors select those suitable for the position of officers, who
are then called to the colors twice for a period of eight weeks,
thoroughly trained, and commissioned as officers. In the event
of mobilization, these reserve and Landwehr officers are inter-
mingled with the regular officers in such a manner that a great
number of reserve officers are drawn into the line regiments,
while regular officers are assigned to the reserve and Landwehr
regiments, especially in positions of command. Acquaintance
with German officers' corps in time of war shows that a large
proportion of them are judges, state's attorneys, teachers, pro-
fessors, artists, writers, farmers, merchants, engineers and officials
of all kinds.

The French army is different from the German in three
important points. In order to maintain a strength approxi-
mately equal to that of Germany, in view of the difference in
population (thirty-nine and one-half million as against sixty-
eight million), the levy is much stricter than with us. In
France the duty of universal military service is not merdy a
theory, but a reality. The army, therefore, does not, as in
Germany, form i per cent but i^ per cent of the population.
Further, the system of one-year voluntary service is lacking.
An attempt was made in 1872, it is true, to introduce it, but as
time passed it became more and more apparent that the French
administration was too unreliable in its application. The one-
year service became the privilege of wealth and influence. All
of the representatives in parliament were active in procuring
this advantage for the sons of their constituents, and the ex-
amination became a mere farce. Accordingly, in 1906 the
system was abandoned. This was bearable as long as the time
of active service in the French army was only two years, as in
the German. But with the return to a period of three years
(August 13, 1913), a condition was created that in the long
run could result in nothing less than the choking of higher
education in France. From a military point of view, the gain
was a corps of reserve officers of admirable qualifications. But
it is self-evident that a student or an engineer who is forced
' to interrupt his course for a period of three years, and not for
two as in Germany, and to immerse himself in a military exist-
ence, is able to resume his former studies only in exceptional
cases. In respect to the French military organization, it may
be truthfully said that militarism has become a power inimical

MODERN GERMANY 173

to civilisation. Finally, the French army is distinguished from
the German through the make-up of the corps of officers. In
Germany, officers are chosen exclusively from among young men
of higher education and members of educated families. Only in
time of war ase non-commissioned officers who have distinguished
themselves by unusual bravery promoted to the rank of commis-
sioned officers. In France, non-commissioned officers may rise
to the rank of captain. This is not the place to discuss the
relative advantages of the two systems. Politically, the obser-
vation may be permitted that these old captains were the chief
supporters of "Bonapartism,'' of the rule of the sword, under
Napoleon I as well as under Napoleon III.

The Russian army resembles superficially the French most
closely. It also is based on the universal duty of bearing arms
and on the three-year service — indeed, for a large proportion
of the army, as the cavalry, mounted artillery, engineer troops
and the five army corps in Asia, this extends to four years. In
1 91 3 this period of service was increased by a further half-year,
through the provision that the eldest class of soldiers may not
be released until the recruits have completed their training.
It may be said, then, that there is in the Russian army an
average period of service of four years. This is without refer-
ence to the Cossacks, who are a permanent and but poorly dis-
ciplined body. But even greater is the distinction which re-
sults from the difference in wealth and education of the French
and Russian peoples. While in France all young men who are
at all serviceable actually serve, in Russia, despite the immense
size of the army, many of them remain exempt, so that universal
service exists in theory but not in practice. Russia possesses
neither the wealth nor the human material for a corresponding
body of officers. The great mass of the Russians — approximately
eighty per cent — are peasants, who in almost all cases can
neither read nor write. The broad middle class, which in France
as in Germany furnishes the corps of reserve officers, exists in
Russia in but slight degree. Indeed, there is even such a lack
of individuals fit to become non-conmiissioned officers that the
companies have only half as many as in Germany. Russia is
thus not in a position to form the reserve and Landwehr bodies
which serve to increase the French and German armies to
8uch a great extent in case of mobilization. Reserve divisions
are formed, it is true, but in the main the veteran reservists are
used simply to fill out and replace the cadres of the standing
army. On the other hand, the mass of the Russian people is
so great that the Russian army on a peace footing is larger than

174 MODERN GERMANY

the Gennan, Austrian and Italian armies reckoned together.
In 191 1, on a peace footing, Germany had 615,000 men under
arms, Austria-Hungary 395,000, Italy 243,500, or a total of
1,253,500, while Russia had 1,380,000.

In foreign countries the effort has been made to spread die
view that the mad race in the increase of the armaments of
European countries was caused by the constant growth of the
German army. This is true only to the extent diat, following
our victories in 1866 and 1870, all the other states increased
their armaments. But how slight the growth of the German
army has been during the last twenty years is seen from the
following table:

Called to the colors in Recruits ^

1894 283,200

1898 267,900

1904 262,600

1905 282,100

1906 270,400

1910 285,400

191 1 292,200

1912 308,000

Not until the year 191 3 did the number of recruits rise to
382,900 (one-year volunteers, eta, included). This notaUe
increase, like the lesser increases of the three previous years,
was caused by the extremely threatening attitude of Russia
on our borders, in connection with the disturbances in the
Balkans. In 1913, simultaneously with an increase of our army
by 63,000 recruits, the Russian contingent of recruits was in-
creased by 130,000, and since at the same tidie the period of
service was lengthened by a half-year, die army's peace footing
rose from 1,380,000 to 1,850,000, or by 470,000. The German
army at this time numbered in round figures 790,000, including
the officers (30,000) ; and, by a further increase of the con-
tingent of recruits in the autumn of 191 4 to 661,175 privates,
the entire army (including officers, non-commissioned officers,
volunteers, etc.) would have stood ^proximately at 830,000
men.

Let us now contemplate, from the point of view of ''militar-
ism," the three armies which we have compared. Various
meanings may be attached to this word. First/ we may under-

* Including the navy, one-year yolunteers^ public-school teachen, etc

MODERN GERMANY 175

stand the absorption of the nation's strength to a degree that
seriously hinders its cultural development This is most strik-
ingly the case in France. The combining of the absolutely
universal obligation to bear arms with the three-year period
of service proved a condition intolerable in the long run for
a civilized nation. A few months previous to the outbreak of
the war, a French visitor who called upon me could not restrain
himself from expressing his absolute despair at this French
law. As a result of it, French civilization, he declared, would
be destroyed. Not without justice, therefore, was the suspicion
rife at the time the law went into effect that it indicated the
early coming of war. It was impossible to conceive of it as
a permanent condition; it could be regarded only as a disguised
and round-about form of mobilization. To deny or to doubt
this is to concede all die more unreservedly that France had, in
fact, fallen into a militarism inimical to civilization.

Conditions were not otherwise in Russia. Although in that
country the three or four-year period of service affects only a
small proportion of the people — and those mostly peasants at
that, who are on such a low level that it is a matter of in-
difference whether they wear the uniform of the Emperor a
shorter or longer time — nevertheless, it is all the more un-
fortunate for the mass of die nation that the army and navy
absorb so large a part of the annual revenue of the state that
nothing is left for a public school system. It may be true that
the ruling classes and the Church in Russia do not desire a
public school, because they fear that an enlightened peasantry,
able to read, might disrupt Church and State; but even if this
design and the sinister motive prompting it does not exist,
the means to the end would be lacking. A universal public
school is an extremely expensive institution. Russia, however,
is too poor to maintain at the same time an immense army, a
great fleet and a good general system of education. Here
again we find a kind of militarism which one must designate
as an enemy of culture.

The German military system is so little inimical to culture
that it has not alone not prevented us from maintaining together
with it a model system of education from the public school
up to the universities, but we have also been able to carry out
great social reforms, as a result of which in Germany there is
practically no longer a proletariat class.

The military spirit in the three armies which we have ex-
amined is chiefly represented in their corps of oiScers and in the
education which they impart to the youth of the land. If it is

176 MODERN GERMANY

justifiable to call this education "militarism," it is nevertheless
clear that the reproach which that word carries again applies
to Germany least of all.

Here is the declaration which was signed by more than four
thousand German teachers of the higher schools:

''We teachers in Germany's universities and advanced schools are
servants of science and conduct the work of peace. But it fills us with
indignation that the^ enemies of Germany, with England in the van,
seek to draw a distinction, ostensibly in our favor, between the spirit
of German science and what they call Prussian militarism. In the Ger-
man army there is the same spirit as in the German people, for the two
are one, and we also are part of it. Our army also cultivates science
and owes its achievements to this fact in no slight degree. The service
in the army renders the youth of the land capable for all works of
peace, science among them. For it educates them to a self-denying
sense of duty, and gives to them the self-confidence and sense of honor
of the truly free man, who willingly subordinates himself to the state.
This spirit lives not alone in Prussia, but it is the same in all the states
of the German Empire. It is the same in war and in peace. Our army
is now engaged in war for Germany's freedom, and therewith for all
the possessions of peace and morality, not alone in Germany. Our
belief is that the whole culture of Europe is dependent on the victory
which German 'militarism' will achieve — manly discipline, fidelity and
the spirit of sacrifice of the united German people."

He knows the German army of to-day but superficially who

judges it by the outward uniformity and the severe, often

harsh form of drill by which it is created. The aims and

achievements of true military training are dius characterized by

a leading military authority (Deutelmoser) :

"An army fit for war is not a great machine in which, if it is prop-
erly constructed throughout, the motive power proceeds from one point
and by automatic compulsion sets the most distant wheels in operation.
Each element of which an army is composed is an individual being, has
its own world of thoughts and feelings, with an individual will, which
may just as easily express itself against the operation of the whole as in
agreement with it Herein lies the principal di£Bculty in the leading of
great masses. If the highest plane of agreement is to be reached, it is
needful that the many thousands act together, not under mechanical
compulsion, but as independently thinking and willing units. Formerly
this was quite different from today, since the close-rank formations of
the past left but slight latitude for the individual. King Frederick's
Grenadiers fought shoulder to shoulder, closely knit in serried ranks.
Each one supported the other, and the command of the leaders regulated
the gunfire or the fight with the bare weapon quite as mechanically as
did the orders on parade. The battle formation of present-day infantry
fighting, on the contrary, is that of the deployed firing line. The deadli-
ness and quick fire of modern weapons means sure annihilation to mass
formations, such as the close ranks of the linear tactics. They demand
that the fighting troop be split into its smallest elements, the individual
riflemen. And the carrying power of these weapons necessitates further
that this separation take place while at a great distance from the enemy.
Thus the individual, at the very moment when brought face to face

MODERN GERMANY 177

with the immediate dinger of death, ii deprived of the iDflucuce of ttie
word of conunaod. He mutt, furthermore, aeek cover io the landacaDe
in order to offer the imalleit powible target to the enemy. Ai a remit,
he diiappeari from the auperviiing eye of the leader more than might
be deaired, and he ia in a high degree left to himaelf. The daogei ii
herewith created that the cipedieocy and uniformity of the action be
loat, and that the 'nil! to victory' give nay to the coDadousness of the
continuing presence of death, calculated to undermiDC the morale. There
ia but one counter-measure for this: so to develop in each man in time
of pea(% the independent power of decision that he knows how to act
correctly nithout constant direction, and above all to train him to hon-
orable feelinga and atrength of will which under the stress of necciaity
and daoger by their own fotce overcome the instinct of telf-preserva-

Can one blame us Gennans that we value highly, from a
purely pedagogical standpoint, quite aside from its military
worth, such a training, which aims at subordination, obedience
and fulfillment of duty, as well as at free and independent deci-
sion, but never at d«potic oppressi(»i; and that we wish the
entire youtli of the country, as far as poesible, to enjoy it?
That is all diat Germany has done. It is true that from time
to time we have increased our army and created new units, but
only in correspondence to the increase in the number of young
men. The reproach of competing in military preparation, there-
fore, is directed really against the German motht^rs, who have
takoi care that Germany since 1870 has increased from forty
to sixty-eight millions, while France has remained stationary
at ^ut diirty-ninc to forty millions, owing to a lack of the
maternal instinct among Frenchwomen.

The British army stands, as a purely mercenary institution,
in fundamental contrast to the German, French and Russian
armies, which are all three more or less national armies. The
Englishmen hates the compulsion which the universal duty of
bearing arms implies, as well as the military spirit with which
the entire people become filled, as the result of passing through
military training. From this feeling, therefore, has proceeded
the reproach of "militarism" which is directed gainst Ger-
many, especially Prussia, since this institution was first created
in the latter country and has been only imitated by the others.
Is a mercenary army, however, in every connection less mili-
tary than a national army? I read recently in an Ei^lish news-
paper (the London Morning Poti) that the essence of mili-
tarism lies in the misuse of military power for ambitious aims.
The English nation, thanks to its mercenary army and its tre-
mendous fleet, has brought into subjection more than 530 million
people, nearly a quarter of all the inhabitants of the earth, and

178 MODERN GERMANY

it exercises supremacy over all the seas of the world. This
would never have been possible with a national army.

General Ian Hamilton demonstrates in his book "Compulsory
Service" (1911), that precisely for this reason England must
not introduce universal military service, since the recruiting
for the colonial army, which upholds England's world su-
premacy, would thereby sufiEer too great a restriction, and since
a popular army is not adaptable for this work. Lord Esher,
the friend of King Edward VII, expresses the same opinion
in a pamphlet, "The Maritime and Military Position of the
British Isles."

"The British people," he says, "arc war-like and aggressive;
they have for centuries been constantly fighting, and, indeed,
until quite recently it has been difficult to find any single year
in which the British Empire has not been at war in some part
of the world."

One should, therefore, he says, speak not of "Imperial De-
fence" but of "Imperial OflEence." A popular army is not
suited to such work. As a matter of fact, all states which have
created great colonial empires have always made use of specially
hired troops for this purpose, with the exception of Russia, and
recently Italy in the Tripoli campaign. But the Russian army,
as a result of the low state of culture, the limited levy and the
long period of service, is nearer to the nature of a mercenary
army than that of Germany and France. English militarism is,
therefore, much more adaptable for a misuse of poiyer than is
Continental militarism ; and it is only necessary to read in "The
History of Our Own Times," by Justin McCarthy, the story
of the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, in order to see what
spirit the Colonial army produces in its officers. The entire race
of the descendants of the great King Baber, twenty-four princes,
were exterminated. Lieut. Hodson murdered three princes with
his own hands, on detecting them among the prisoners; and
McCarthy declares that public opinion in England, as a whole,
recognized Hodson's deed as patriotic and worthy of praise. A
mercenary army, it is true, has also its sense of military honor,
and is, therefore, not without idealism ; but this idealism is quite
different from that which inspires the German army and, we are
glad to add, the French army as well. For that which we style
a universal duty to bear arms, the English have no other expres-
sion than "compulsory service." It will not be long before they
have learned otherwise on this point. In quite the same manner
as with us, tens of thousands of young men in England, especially
of the upper classes, have voluntarily entered the army, not for thi?

MODERN GERMANY 179

sake of the "king's shilling/* but in order to stand shoulder to
shoulder with Tommy Atkins in the defence of their country, or
more accurately, to uphold England's world supremacy. Even
at the moment when they summon the whole world to battle
against Prussian militarism, they themselves are already in the
midst of it.

The German army is the most thoroughly trained and most
powerful war instrument of all the armies of the world, but at
the same time the one which is the least available for a mere
policy of ambition and diirst for power. It is true that it is
bound in unconditional fealty and obedience to its Emperor,
but the Emperor himself dare claim this obedience only as the
representative of the nation's interest as a whole, or as he him-
self expressed it on the occasion of his coronation, as "The First
Servant of the State." In other words, our army is strong only
on the political defensive, as when it is a question of defending
the existence and the honor of the Empire against foreign aggres-
sion. If in foreign countries the German spirit of aggression
Is often spoken of, and to this end German military writers are
quoted, it must be made clear that by this is meant a strategical
and tactical ofiEensive, the spirit of which, it is true, is properly
cultivated in our army. But to a political offensive, to the delib-
erate starting of a war like the present, for the sake of conquest or
for world supremacy, our people would never lend themselves;
and of what value would be all the technical skill and discipline
in this army without the spirit which results from free and full
agreement, and which is none other than die spirit of the entire
nation? Not more than 15 per cent of the army now in the
field was in uniform on the day before the mobilization; the
other 85 per cent are citizens and peasants, workers and students,
the great proportion heads of families. Would such men
be ready, for the sake of mere plans of ambition, to let them-
selves be led to death?

But the objection to this is made in foreign countries that
the real ruling class in Germany is the officer caste. In the
first place, our officer class is not a caste. Under Frederick the
Great it possessed something of this character; to-day entrance
into this body is open to every qualified young man of educa-
tion and breeding. War Minister von Roon spoke of that class
on one occasion when writing to Emperor William I as: "That
part of Your Majesty's subjects who bear Your Majesty's weap-
ons." This class, upon whose efficiency and educational activity
our national freedom in great part depends, enjoys among us the
greatest consideration, but it is far removed from ruling the

i8o MODERN GERMANY '

dtatc. The English officer-corps, shortly before the outbreak
of the war, was on the point of mutiny and had already refused
obedience to the civil government, because the parliamentary
policy in Ireland displeased it. The French officer corps has
obeyed the civil government since 187 1, but, as is well known,
with inward revolt. They .had to submit to the leaders of the
parliamentary groups, of the political slate-makers and dema-
gogues, not because they were victims of the superstition that
rfie Chambers represented the will of the French people (the
French themselves speak with the greatest contempt of this rul-
ing body), but because they had been defeated at Sedan. Every
one in France is aware that had the French army been success-
ful in defeating Germany, it would have marked the end of
parliamentary lawyer-rule, and the army would have seized the
powers of government, as under the Bonapartes. In Germany
it is not the army which rules, but the Emperor, with the Federal
Council and the Reichstag. To be sure, the Emperor feels
himself to be the supreme commander and head of the army,
and he will always have respect for its feelings, but he will
consider in equal degree the feelings of his people, because he
knows he is able thoroughly to fulfill his duties as ruler and to
exercise, to its full extent, his royal right, only if the army and
people are united under his leadership. Neither will the officer-
corps ever mutiny as in England — not even if the Emperor, for
political reasons, acts against its desires — nor can the victorious
army oppress civil freedom, as in France, because the army is
the Emperor's, who is bound by the Reichstag and the Consti-
tution. If there have ever occurred disputes between officers
and civilians, it was only in regard to questions of local and
slight importance, which were exaggerated abroad in an un-
friendly fashion. How superficial these differences were has
been strikingly brought to our realization by this war.

From whatever point of view one contemplates the constitu-
tion of the armies of the four states which we have considered,
it is dear that the reproach of "militarism" applies least of all
to Germany; unless it be for the fact that this country first of
all enunciated the principle that every citizen is a born defender
of the Fatherland, and consistently carried it through, the other
states falling into line later. With this principle, however, Prus-
sia first saved Europe from the universal domination of Napoleon
and then from that of the Czar.

Even if we may claim that Germany (Prussia) for the last
one hundred years has kept, with slight variations, her army in
the same ratio to her population (i per cent), we are neverthe-

MODERN GERMANY

i8i

less forced to admit, and we do it gladly, that ia one respect
we have greatly increased our armament.

In order not to be excluded from international politics, in
order not to be forced te be an idle spectator when the other
Great Powers divided Africa and Asia among diemsdives, in
order finally to protect her constantly growing maritime trade,
Germany has gradually, since 1888, developed her fleet and
thereby aroused England's deepest jealousy. But in this con-
nection, also, quite false data are circulated abroad regarding
us. In order to prove how the Germans were hastening the
growth of their navy, the English have always compared the
number of ships which were laid down; but this gives quite a
false impression, as England needs only two, Germany three
years for the building of a great battleship. A correct com-
parison is a£Forded by the following table, which groups together
the battleships and the big armored cruisers.

BIG BATTLESHIPS READY

England

1907

z. Dreadnouglit

2. lodomitaue

3. TnflfflrihiB

4. Invincible

Z908

5« Tenienire
o. Bdlerophon
7. Superb

1909

8. St. Vincent

9. Collingwood
xa Vanguard

19x0

. Neptune
. Tnnefatigil

H. N(
13

bfe

Z9ZZ

13. Coknus

14. Hercules
z|. Orion
zo. ConQuevor
17. Monareh
z8. Thundeier
Z9. Lion
ao. PrinceaB Roiral

Gekmaht

None

None

Z909

z. Naasan
a. Wcstlakn

Z9ZO

3. Bheinland

4. Posen

5. y. d. Tann

Z9ZZ

6. Ostfriesland

7. Helgoland
0. HiQringen
9. Moltke

England

Z9zfl

31. King Geofge V.
as. Centurion

33. AJUE

34. Audacious

35. Austnlia

36. New Zealand

37. Queen liiary

Z9Z3

38. Iron Duke

39. Marlboroiu^
30. Emperor ofln
3X. Benbow

'33. Tiger

Gebkahy

Z9Z3

za Oldenbmg

zz. Kaiser

Z3. Friedrich def

Groase
Z3. Goeben

Z9Z3

Z4.

Z5. Prinzregent Luit»

pold
z6. K(k^ Albert
Z7. Seyduts

1914

33. Queen Elizabeth

34. WarB[»te

35. Barham

36. Valiant

37. Malaya

191S

38. Resolution

39. Revenue

40. BamillWB
4Z. Royal-Oak

43. RpyakSovcicigii^

1914

z8. ICaricgraf
Z9. Grosser KuifBnt
30. Kfimg
3Z. Deifunger

Z9Z5

33. KionpciBS
33. Lfltaow

and 44 were bfoilt for

1 To this must be added: 43. Agincourt; 44. Erin; 45. Canada. ^
Ttakey, 45 for Chili; these were wibsecpiently seized and added to the

i82 MODERN GERMANY

In the year 19 15 England had thus from 42 to 45, Germany 23
great battleships ready; since 1910 the ratio has changed but
slightly; and if a certain competition in this line has existed
between England and Germany, it was begun by the former,
not by the latter. Germany, it is true, has taken the liberty
of building a fleet, of entering upon the construction of modem
dreadnoughts, but only as following England's lead.

The charge is thus disposed of that Germany created her fleet
in order some day to attack England with it. For more than 150
years the English nation has lived in the constant fear of a
foreign invasion. At one time it was the Spaniards, generally
the French, occasionally the Russians, and now it is the Ger-
mans who disturb the peaceful sleep of the English citizen. To
what purpose, however, does Germany build a fleet, if not to
attack England with it? England, it is true, needs a fleet to
protect and maintain her world empire, such as history and the
bravery of her ancestors have bestowed on her ; the German fleet,
however, is not in keeping with the meagreness of the German
colonies; it is a strong battle fleet; it would be a pure luxury if
it were not intended for an attack on England.

The error in this reasoning lies in overlooking the value
and importance of military preparation, even if not put to any
actual use. Our naval experts have always claimed that a
fleet, even in the face of a greatly stronger enemy, is of notable
importance, because the latter, even widi the prospect of com-
plete victory, is sure to suffer severe losses himself, which will
v/eaken his position In the world. This has been called the
"principle of risk." If there were, perhaps, in Germany persons
so fanciful as to dream of an immediate landing in England,
in responsible circles there was a much soberer line of thought.
It was desired, it is true, that the great battle fleet should be
for something more than the mere protection of our own coasts,
but this by no means implied a desire for an attack on those of
England. What was desired lay between these two extremes.
Our aim was to' be able to exercise, whether on England or
on other Powers, a pressure sufiicient to compel them to grant
to Germany in world politics such a place in the sun as her power
and her internal strength gave her the right to demand by the
side of die others. New and extensive territory in Africa
and Asia was continually being divided up among English,
French, Russians, Americans and Japanese. Germany could
not permit herself, and did not intend, to be permanently ex-
cluded from this. Had Germany built no fleet she would not
have been able to prevent the dismemberment of Turkey. Eng-

MODERN GERMANY 183

land, no doubt, found it extremely unpleasant that the main
part of her fleet was held permanently in the North Sea through
the growth of Germany's navy. But it is a long step from this
to an attack, and England would have removed the drawbacks
of the situation without great trouble by an honest understand-
ing with Germany. Undoubtedly, there was in England a party
which loyally strove for such a peaceful understanding, and the
Emperor and Chancellor, supported by universal public opinion,
met this movement willingly half-way and without any arriere
pensee. If, nevertheless, the opposition party in England finally
gained the ascendency, this was not due to the actual impossi-
bility of a compromise, and in still less degree to any aggressive
intentions on Germany's part; it was due solely to the fact that
the aggressive policy of Pan-Slavism in the Balkan Peninsula,
which finally resulted in the murder of the Archducal Heir
Apparent, brought about a general crisis in Europe and gave the
English war-party the upper hand.

CHAPTER VI

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF GERMAN

INSTITUTIONS

PROFESSOR GUSTAV VON SCHMOLLER, OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF BERUN

THE charge has been brought against Germany and Prussia
that they lack the spirit of free institutions, that they are
ruled by a harsh militarism inimical to culture. He who speaks
thus may perhaps have in mind Herbert Spencer's thoroughly
mistaken conception of the two separate modern types of state:
the old reactionary type of the military state, and the advanced
liberal type of the industrial state. Or the present-day glorifica-
tion of democracy may hark back to the constitution of Attica,
to the days when the great statesmen of Athens from Solon and
Kleisthenes to Pericles created the democratic constitution by
which the demos, or people, were supposed to rule. Spencer's
conception is as mistaken as is the comparison of our great states
with tiny Attica. This state had, at all events in the period of
its democratic glory, a thorough military form; and to-day the
United States of America maintains a small army only because
it has no powerful neighbors. It would support a large standing
army, says Professor Sloane of Columbia University, if it had
three such dangerous neighbors as Germany has {Preussische
Jahrbucher, Vol. 158, p. 466). We admire Attica, which at
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War counted 250,000 inhabi-
tants, not so much on account of the rule of the demos, as for
the fact that it saved western civilization from suffocation by
Persia. It saved this civilization because it was able to unite
its infantry division of hoplites, who were drawn from the
burghers and peasants, with its aristocratic cavalry squadrons,
and to build a war fleet capable of opposing the Persians. The
true greatness, however, of this incomparable democratic state
is to be seen in the fact that, three hundred years before Christ, it
followed its great aristocratic leaders, and that these leaders, while
not emancipating the slaves and half-free classes, educated the
mass of the ordinary citizens to a devotion to their public duties
that has scarcely been equalled since. The superiority of Athens
lay not in the rule of its demos, but in the obedience of its people

184

MODERN GERMANY i8s

down to the Peloponnesian War to their aristocratic leaders,
and in the fact that these leaders created in the people a strong
public spirit and educated them to devote themselves to the ideals
of the state.

There have been, no doubt, barbaric and semi-barbaric peoples
of warlike nature who, as a consequence of a rough nomadic life,
possessed a military, more or less despotic constitution preclud-
ing free political institutions, like the Arabians under Mahomet,
or like many of the German tribes and states during and after
the wanderings of the peoples. But a military constitution and
lack of political freedom are by no means historically inseparable,
nor does one by any means always follow the other.

If we exclude the older types of states organized on a military
basis (which cannot really be compared with the present-day
states), the best explanation for the causes of the development
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of military states, lead-
ing to certain limitations of civil freedom, is given by the great
Oxford professor, Seeley. He says: "The amount of free-
dom that may reasonably exist in a state is in indirect propor-
tion to the military-political pressure exerted by foreign states
against its boundaries."

Germany was driven to universal military service by the un-
precedented pressure of the French wars and of the Napoleonic
domination from 1792 to 181 3. The development of the Germain
fleet and the army increases from 1890 to the present day are
traceable to the English encircling policy {EinireisunfffpolUU)^
and to the increased pressure of Russia and France against Ger-
many. Had England, who, during the period from 1792 to
1 8 14, destroyed the fleets of the other nations and conquered
most of their colonies, been content with the position of power
which she enjoyed from 181 5 to 1850; had she continued to the
present day the peaceful policy pursued from 1846 to 1870^
when she granted independence to her most important colonies
and limited her naval programme — in such event, we Germans
would probably have built no fleet nor made such increases in
our army as we have made. But since Disraeli's day she has
followed a new policy of conquest. During the period from
1800 to 1900 she annexed between seven and eight million
square kilometers of land and one hundred millions of people,
and increased her fleet enormously. England has again become
such as Kant described her in the eighteenth century: most
greedy for conquest and the most warlike state in Europe. It
is no wonder that the other states have been forced to imitate
her in » degree. But has England by this fact become less free.

i86 MODERN GERMANY

less democratic? Certainly not. Just as untrue is it that Prus-
sia and Germany, because during the last two centuries they
assumed a military character, have become a country without
freedom, without a constitutional form of government. Ger-
many is different, it is true, in essential points, from France,
England and the United States. She does not have parliamentary
government — that is to say, control of the highest administra-
tive positions by the parliamentary majority. But the freedom
of the citizen is protected against arbitrary encroachment on the
part of the state authorities as well, if not better, than else-
where.

But what is understood by this political freedom in which
we are said to be lacking? Principally two things: i, A cer-
tain influence of the people on the government, on legislation
and on the leading principles of interior and foreign policy; 2.
a secure guarantee of the freedom of action of the citizens in
questions of faith and religion, in family life, in expressions of
opinion, in literature and in the press, in private economic af-
fairs, in the formation of societies, in public gatherings, etc. It
is necessary that every civilized state should to-day exercise
influence in such matters by certain legislative measures. But
It must do this with tact and discretion, applying the laws im-
partially; the courts and the administration should act in a
strictly legal manner.

In determining the powers of the Government, as well as in the
citxrumscription of the sphere of individual freedom as against the
powers of the state and arbitrary actions of the Government,
one thing above all must be avoided: class rule and class abuse.
Or rather, since this is never entirely feasible, class abuse must
be limited by law as much as possible. And since for the last
two hundred or three hundred years all civilized states have
seen entirely new class systems develop, with the most pro-
nounced tendencies toward class abuse and class dominance, the
vital question of the new interior development of the state is in
many cases the following: Where, under what forms and in-
stitutions of government, and with what laws has the nearest
approach been made to preventing the degradation of the lower
classes and to limiting the abuses of the ruling classes ? It can-
not be questioned that, although royal despotism in ancient
times and in the Middle Ages in many cases manifested and
directly promoted pronounced class abuse, nevertheless the later
enlightened despotism as well as the military and bureaucratic
state of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have limited this
notably. Just as certain is it that, although the development of

MODERN GERMANY 187

the democratic idea in the constitutions led to the expectation of
the elimination of class abuses — indeed, it held this out as a
promise — nevertheless, while not unavoidable nor common to
all states, in many of them the increase of democratization
brought with it an increase of these abuses. This was the result
chiefly of the moral and political level which the upper classes
had reached before gaining greater rights and greater influence;
and of the moral and mental development of the lower classes,
who fought against the upper in the free state for political
rights, but even more for possessions and income.

The greater the political freedom is in any given state from
the dual point of view of influence exercised by the people on
the Government and the protection of the individual rights of
freedom, the more emphatically can it be aflirmed that these
two factors have a beneficent effect proportionate to the degree
of morality and of political and individual virtues attained to
by the upper and lower classes. Premature granting of politi-
cal freedom leads ofttimes to the downfall of the nation, or at
least to bitter and long-continued inner strife. Extensive politi-
cal freedom is held to be more easily realized with success in
small states, especially those protected against the outside world,
like Switzerland, than in large states, among well-balanced na-
tions than among hot-blooded races. Such freedom, it is
claimed, operates much more often in a beneficial manner in
times of quiet development than in times of great social changes,
of technical advances and of outward and inward struggles.

But let us come to the point. Let us try to grasp the spirit
of German institutions as it developed from 1650 to 1815, and
as it was rounded out from 1815 to 1915. It first took form
in the secondary states, which were mostly ruled by the patri-
cian classes of the cities and the rural nobility. These states
gained a firm governing power through gifted families, through
the union of several territories and through the political strug-
gles and wars of the period; from semi- or entirely aristocratic
republics they became military and bureaucratic states. There
arose here the best type of that which has been styled enlightened
despotism. Representatives of this were the Prussian Princes
from 1640 to 1786, Maria Theresa, Joseph II, and certain
Saxon, Brunswick, Hessian, Bavarian and Wiirttemberg princes.
In England the same type of state had been discredited by the
Stuarts of the seventeenth century, while Cromwell's dictator-
ship had approximated to it temporarily. In the Netherlands
the princes of the House of Orange had been too weak, as

i88 MODERN GERMANY

opposed to the capitalistic city aristocracy, to reach their goal.
In France love of display and conquest, religious intolerance,
royal extravagance and vanity undermined enlightened despo-
tism. In the England of a later period a foreign dynasty, with
mostly incompetent princes, was able to accomplish nothing from
1714 to 1815 and was crowded aside by a great and capable
aristocracy. The latter succeeded in establishing England's trade
supremacy, but at the price of outrageous enrichment and domi-
nation of the upper classes, and of degradation of the workers,
which caused the country to stand on the brink of a social revo-
lution practically from 1790 to 1850. This was prevented from
coming to a head only by the severest of discriminating laws, by
military force and cannons.

What, now, did the German bureaucratic and military state
in Prussia and in Austria and in the German secondary states
achieve from 1640 to 1840? What did it indicate? Of what
did it consist? What were its aims? How is the spirit of the
resulting institutions to be expressed in a few words?

This German bureaucratic and military state suppressed or
checked feudal class rule and made it possible for the ruling
princes to create efficient executive state organs at the centre and
at the periphery. It put an end to the economic struggles between
the city and the country. There was thus created a strong mon-
archic power of a type which became an example for the whole
world. It brought together the best elements of the people of
all classes in bureaucratic and military service to form a new
leading class, a new civil service aristocracy that stands high
above the feudal as well as the money and capitalistic aristocracy
of other countries and times. In the main, it succeeded in pro-
tecting and saving the peasant class from being overburdened or
impoverished and from being robbed of its land by extortionate
sales. It reformed the corrupt city and guild constitutions of
the Middle Ages, and rendered the city inhabitants ready for
sound self-administration and for freedom of trade and resi-
dence, and it assisted the peasant class to gain free ownership
of its land. It introduced religious tolerance and universal edu-
cation. It created at first in the individual states, then in the
Customs Union and the Empire, a free interior market and a
national trade constitution. It advanced and emancipated science,
through the codification of the law, through great reforms in
the organization of the courts, and through the suppression of
all Star Chamber justice it guaranteed in the years from 1746
to 1840 personal individual freedom such as existed at that time
in no other European state. Although at the same time the

MODERN GERMANY 189

military burdens, the weight of taxation and the governmental
conduct of economic matters did at many points operate oppres-
sively against the citizens; although England, through her par-
liamentary constitution (the admiration and imitation of which
was preached by Montesquieu in the eighteenth century) was
in certain respects much in advance of Germany — despite all
this, there is room for a difiEerence of opinion whether the Eng-
land of the three Georges or the Prussia of Frederick the Great
stood higher from a cultural point of view. Of none of the
English kings or statesmen could an English poet have said what
Goethe said of Frederick: *'He shone upon us from the north
like the pole star, about which the whole world seemed to
turn."

It is true that the energetic development of the bureaucratic
and military state had also its drawbacks: from 1780 to 1850
it became somewhat petrified, and the change to constitutional
life was not made easily or quickly. We shall later return to
this point. But, on the other hand, its traditions prevented
hurried, ill-considered constitutional experiments, and its vital
institutions, adapted both to the nation and to the times, have
laid the foundations for a free constitutional life.

In order to prove this, let us first examine somewhat more
closely the personal elements of the bureaucratic state and then
its more important government reforms. Our first question is:
Of what nature was the class of civil servants and officers who,
in Germany, under the leadership of the prince, the ''first servant
of the state," from 1640 to 1840, secured governing powers —
the class that from 1640 to 1820 ruled mainly alone, but from
then on in cooperation with the estates and the constitutional
representatives — and that in Germany to-day still possesses po-
litical preponderance, as in no other state in the world? Imita-
tion of it, it is true, has been attempted since the middle of the
nineteenth century in many differently ruled states, for instance,
in the American Civil Service reform and in the British service
in India.

Since the once healthy local system of self-government had
degenerated into oligarchic class domination, and since the
landed aristocracy and the city patricians more and more abused
and exploited the peasants and small burghers, the better Ger-
man princes felt increasing need of protecting the middle and
lower classes through councilmen, judges and magistrates who
stood outside of the old aristocratic and city cliques. For this
purpose clergymen and court officials offered their services, but
especially jurists who had studied in Bologna, Prague, Leipsic,

I90 MODERN GERMANY

and other new German universities, and had gained knowledge
of Roman law and of the imperial prerogatives it prescribes;
in other cases these officials were burghers or noblemen from
neighboring states who had no connection with the home cliques*
In this way the HohenzoUern of the fifteenth century ruled in
the Mark Brandenburg by means of knights, priests and writers
from their Prankish home state. Their successors in the six-
teenth century depended, in the main, on the Saxon or Meissen
jurists, like the two Chancellors Distelmeyer, and also on Saxon
and Bohemian noblemen. When, under Joachim Friedrich
( 1 598-1608), the estates complained of the many foreigners in
office, the elector replied that they themselves were quite lacking
in the necessary knowledge; and his minister, the Bohemian
Count Schlick, added that with the exception of one or two
persons, the elector had no faithful men among the Brandenburg
nobility.

In the seventeenth century there appear, by the side of and
above the native Brandenburg civil servants, the powerful Prot-
estant nobility of East Prussia (such as, above all, the Dohnas),
and capable officials from Cleve-Mark, Magdeburg and West-
phalia, whom the Great Elector gladly attracted to Berlin. An
especially important foreign element for the Brandenburg-Prus-
sian officers' and officials' class was furnished by the French
Huguenot families, who had fled to Brandenburg-Prussia, and
among whom were many learned men, jurists and officers. In
the year 1688 there were, among 1,030 Brandenburg officers,
not less than 300 Huguenots, and probably also many Dutch,
Swedes and Danes. We shall refer again to the fact that in
many provinces, as late as 171 3 to 1740, the nobility would not
enter the Brandenburg army. The daughters of Huguenots in-
fluenced the official class by marriage with the nobility of all the
provinces; in like manner the Princesses on the Brandenburg
throne of the families of Orange and the Palatinate brought with
them from the Netherlands and Heidelberg thoughts and men
of Protestant and progressive stripe, thereby forming at the
court itself a strong counterweight to the ruling squire class, or
Junker stand. From the time of Friedrich Wilhelm I, it became
the custom to fill the higher provincial offices with a prepon-
derant number of men from the other provinces, in order to
create a royal local administration which stood above the selfish
interests of the provinces and the nobility. Under Frederick
the Great, and even more perhaps under Friedrich Wilhelm III,
the great talents and characters from the whole of Germany
thronged to the Prussian service. The great Minister of Jus-

MODERN GERMANY 191

tice, Carmer, was from the Palatinate and of Scottish extrac-
tion; the Minister of Mining and Commerce, Heinitz, was a.
Saxon; Baron von Stein was from the Rhine. Hardenberg
and Scharnhorst were Hanoverians; Gneisenau came from Aus-
tria, Niebuhr from Holstein. The great reforms from 1808
to 1820 could scarcely have been carried through without this
foreign contingent in Prussian officialdom.

It is a simple physiological fact that through this blood and
race mixture from 1680 to 1820 the production of remarkable
talent, even of genius, in Prussian official circles was likely to
be considerably increased.

At all events, within this order of officials and officers from
difiFerent provinces and classes there grew up a united spirit,
with distinctive feelings and views; there came to exist a strong
bond of union, a pronounced esprit de corps, in contrast to the
classes and circles inimical to the king and the civil service, to-
gether with an increasing devotion to the ruler, the government
and the state. The officials all felt themselves to be an ecclesia
militans, a reform party within the state, opposed to all manner
of local, special and class interests. Sons of officials and of
officers were encouraged to follow the career of their fathers.
Frederick the Great was fond of saying that in this manner the
sons grew up from their youth in an atmosphere of honor and
with the welfare of the state at heart. Talented and striking
characters from both high and low social strata were welded
into a uniform official class. It was here possible — as once in
the Roman Church — for the lowest day-laborer or peasant's son
to rise. Ministers of such origin sat beside counts and princes
from 1640 to 1850, although for certain positions nobles were
preferred, or ordinary citizens were ennobled to fill them. One
need only refer to the career of Rother, who advanced between
the years 1 806-1 848 from the rank of an army clerk to that of
a minister of state.

The sons and grandsons of the most selfish squires {Junker),
the most oitter enemies of the monarchy, acquired quite different
feelings in military and government service, and became imbued
with the conception and interests of the state. The new associa-
tions in which they found themselves and amid which they
worked freed them from the old ties, and turned many of them
into efficient cooperators in an anti-feudal policy for the benefit
of the peasants, trade and industry — a policy which tended to
strengthen the monarchy. They shared in the enlightened tend-
encies of Frederick the Great, and in the political ideals of
Friedrich Wilhelm III and his advisers.

19a MODERN GERMANY

This sense of ^iritual unity in the bureaucratic state was
strengthened by the gradual development of an identical eco-
nomic basis for all members of the official and officer class.

Those occupying official positions in the old established states
were landed proprietors and generally hereditary holders of the
office, or they held yearly elective positions which, as wealthy
aristocrats, were open to them only. With the increasing divi-
sion of labor, both of these classes of officials proved insufficient^
even harmful. In neither case was the office-holder's chief
devotion given to his work, but to his material possessions and
their increase, to family and class interests. With the growth
of the power of money in the economic life and the increasing
division of labor, appointment by the ruler of officials for life,
living exclusively for their work, and receiving fixed remunera-
tion and special training, became feasible and more and more
frequent in the monarchic state. The Roman emperors were
the first to develop such an official class, working for fixed sal-
aries; the Church of Rome applied this form of the imperial
administration to its priests, and the other states, with France in
the lead, sought from the thirteenth century on to develop such
an official class; from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century it
gradually repressed the older official system. Burgundy and
Austria imitated the French model, and the more important
German territorial states followed suit.

It was a new and difficult question to organize all the offices
and bureaus, to find, educate and train suitable men, and to
develop official careers; this effort could succeed only gropingly,
and against great difficulties. The chief problem was to con-
quer constantly arising abuses. It was a question of creating
in that epoch of incipient money circulation a social mechanism
of the most complicated kind; even the most capable princes
and governments succeeded in accomplishing this only through
particularly favorable circumstances and by efforts continued
through decades and centuries.

German officialdom of the fifteenth to the seventeenth cen-
tury had been, to a great extent, a body of rather doubtful men ;
but in Prussia from 1670 to 1750 trustworthiness and efficiency
had become the rule among them. Gneist speaks of the officials
and generals who surrounded Frederick the Great as forming
one of the most intellectual generations which Germany had
ever produced. The old system of payment by perquisites or in
kind from property administered by the officials themselves had
to be superseded by a regular and reliable system of salaries in
cash; the hunt for vacant fiefs and other similar privileges had

MODERN GERMANY 193

to be done away with and the right of appointment to be gath-
ered into the hand of the sovereign. A dear civil service law,
distinct official instructions and a strict government control had
to be introduced, while allowing the officials far-reaching initia-
tive in making proposals within the province of their office.
The officials had to be made subject to just laws of disciplinary
punishment and a gradually adapted system of examinations,
admitting only the efficient and well-trained. A certain routine
of promotion had to be established, and in consequence thereof a
certain tradition as to the classes from which officials were to
be taken. The result of all this was to create uniform stand-
ards of duty and official probity throughout the entire official-
dom.

To be sure, there were dangers connected with this institution
of professional officials, such as development of diquedom, of
patronage by superiors and members of Parliament, and of a
tendency to stagnant routine. Furthermore, with the guaran-
teed income and comparative security from dismissal which the
officials enjoyed, there was also the danger of their indining too
much to consulting their own convenience and developing a
lack of initiative in their official activity. The official is called
upon to display the greatest degree of ardor and devotion for
objects which do not concern his personal interests. Personal
ambition alone is not sufficient as an impelling force; it must be
supplemented by a strong sense of duty, high ethical and intel-
lectual training, and a strong moral and political esprit de corps.

The assured economic position, income and pension, the rule
adopted at an early period against taking part in stock transac-
tions or engaging in business, had the beneficial effect of en-
abling the official to devote himself entirely to his work and to
the interests of the public, and of placing him above the social
battles of the classes.

"The essence of the state and of official position," says Ernst
Meyer, "is the protection of the general wdfare against the
particular interests of the wealthy classes."

It was the historical task of the bureaucratic state to create
for this purpose an. order whose collective intellectual and spir-
itual qualities were devoted to the service of the state, who
subordinated their personal interests as wdl as their prejudices
to official duty. To be sure, that ideal was unconditionally
attained only in the case of nobler natures, in connection with
home education, school and university training.

Prussian officialdom, however, approached thereto most
closely in the eighteenth century, and again from 1810 to 1840.

194 MODERN GERMANY

Furthermore, in the constitutional period from 1 850 on, the
ethical and political qualities of the official class remained the
intellectual and moral backbone of the state. Only in connec-
tion with great events and great spiritual, political and moral
movements, and under the guidance of great princes, generals
and statesmen, was Prussia able to raise her officials to their
high plane of efficiency, of integrity and cooperation. And in
the other great territorial states the development had been simi-
lar in the years from 1700 to 1850. But in 1786, as well as in
the period from 1720 to 1850, the natural drawbacks of the
bureaucratic state became evident. The officials had become a
ruling class. The people rightfully demanded a greater share
in the state and government. It was necessary that a constitu-
tional epoch should rejuvenate the bureaucratic state, raise it
again to a higher plane; competition with nobility and civilians
demanded greater efforts of it. We can with confidence state
that the political transformation which took place from 1840 to
the present time has not destroyed the chief qualities of our
just, intelligent, mentally and morally elevated official class»

We shall now speak of the principal achievements of the Prus-
sian bureaucratic aristocracy from 1640 down to our own time.
They deserve careful consideration, if one wishes fairly to judge
the drawbacks of the German bureaucratic and military state in
the period to 1840 and if one desires duly to appreciate its effect
on present-day conditions. These achievements consist in: i.
The introduction and carrying out of universal education, the
founding of the public school as well as of other institutions of
learning. 2. The organization of the army and the adoption of
the universal duty of bearing arms. 3. The judicial reforms.
4. The reform of the system of self-government, beginning in
this period, and its later development.

In considering the inner structure of society in the European
civilized states from the Carlovingian period down to the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, nothing is more important, next to
the division of wealth, the feudal system and the beginnings of
monetary development and government finances, than the fact
that the thin upper stratum of the country and city aristocracy,
under the guidance of priests and clergymen, had learned to read,
write, reckon and keep books, while the mass of the people in
city and country, owing to their lack of such knowledge, were
condemned to social subordination, to dominance and exploita-
tion at the hands of the aristocracy of the learned. The Ger-
man Reformation had set up the requirement that the entire

MODERN GERMANY 195

Gennan nation must learn to read the Bible unaided. That is
the origin of modern public schools, the first message of good
hope for the elevation of the lower and middle classes. The
enlightenment of the eighteenth century next demanded the
sharing of the people in this intellectual progress, and thus gave
a strong impulse to the development of the schools. The better
ruled German states, especially Prussia, underwent in the eight-
eenth century and down to 1850 an important improvement in
their school system, althou^ the upper conservative classes
feared that as a result the young men would become insubordi-^
nate and the girls dissolute. The development of the public*
school, however, was not completed in Germany and elsewhere,
until the period from 1830 to 1850. At the same time the
government school system, effecting a marked restriction of the
religious and private schools, gained a general victory in Ger-
many. Nowhere else was universal education made a reality
to such an extent as in the German bureaucratic states. The
result was a uniform spreading of moral and cultural concep-
tions, and an approach of the lower and middle classes to the
upper without parallel anywhere else. In France, Guizot had
created a more or less widespread school system in the period
from 1830 to 1840; in England the state did not begin to con-
cern itself with education until a generation ago. The moral
and economic destitution of the lower classes in England from
1750 to 1830 is one evidence of this fact. The generation at
the helm to-day in Europe was born from 1850 to 1870. In
the sixties, of children from six to fourteen years of age, only
4 per cent were non-attendants at school in Prussia, while in
France 20 per cent, in England 25 per cent and in Russia 90
per cent came under this head.

The greatest social reformers of all times have appreciated
the political and social importance of the public school. Solon
desired to open the schools of Attica to the great majority of the
people ; Robert Owen laid chief stress in social reform on schools
for the children of workers; and the best English administra-
tive officials of India demanded schools for that country, in
order to combat the caste system from within. Extensive politi-
cal rights and a democratic constitution, without a good public-
school system, are a political paradox, if not, indeed, a madness
or a crime. And, in addition to the public school, the people
must have extension schools, and industrial and vocational
schools. The higher system of education, the universities, the
technical and commercial schools, can be built properly only
upon this foundation. Especially in this line has no other nation

196 MODERN GERMANY

in the world made greater progress than Germany, from 1850
down to the present. It may be stated without exaggeration
that the advancement of talent in the lower classes, a certain
freedom of vocational choice, the approach of all classes to each
other and the bridging of the abyss separating the people from
the aristocracy is rendered possible only through a broad and
efficient system of educational institutions, from the lowest grade
to the highest. The 110,000 non-commissioned officers in the
present-day German army, who became soldiers with a conmion-
school education, thanks to the instruction offered them as non-
commissioned officers, enjoy the opportunity, as well as the right
to enter, when 32 years of age, into the lower and middle posi-
tions of the army, civil or municipal service. This service has
from a third to a half-million excellent officials, of whom many
before i860 passed on to higher careers, and whose sons and
grandsons are still to-day in many cases advancing to the upper
ranks of officialdom.

Previous to 1834, when graduation from the Gymnasium was
first introduced, and down to 1840 when it became more and
more the requirement for admission to all hi^er official posi-
tions, many of the numerous ex-non-conmiissioned officers ad-
vanced from the middle positions to the higher service. This
still occurs to-day in individual cases. It would have been bet-
ter to retain in the main the principle of advancement which
obtained from 1790 to 1850.

Finally, on the subject of education let us make one more
observation in regard to scientific freedom in our universities,
since they have recently been frequently branded as unfree
government institutions. The European universities grew up
from the fourteenth century, in connection with the Church;
their first great achievements were in Bologna, Paris, Prague
and Leipsic, and then throughout Germany after the Reformation.
Their guildlike character, however, led in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries to a narrow-minded system of cliques and
nepotism. The free university administration degenerated in the
same manner as the old free city constitutions. A striking new
revival of the German universities begins with the great princely
foundations; Halle and Gottingen in the eighteenth century,
Berlin, Munich and Bonn at the beginning of the nineteenth
century head the list. The older universities followed the mod-
ern lead and were remodeled on similar lines. The right of
the princes to appoint professors rejuvenated the universities.
Government funds in greater and greater amounts were placed
at their disposal. Appointment by the state does not preclude

MODERN GERMANY 197

the fact that savants proposed by the faculties are almost al-
ways appointed. The absolutely free body of Privatdozenten,.
or free-lance lecturers, furnishes the necessary healthy competi-
tion for the officially appointed professors. Each of die numer-
ous federal states strives to attract the best men. He who is
disciplined in Gottingen may receive a call to Berlin, as did the
brothers Grimm. Freedom in lecturing, teaching and method,
as well as in literary activity, is unlimited. The administration
of the university by the faculty and the academic senate pre-
serves the republican form, as contrasted with the American
absolutism of university presidents and the influence of trustees,
who, believers in a protective tariff, remove professors advo-^
eating free trade — a thing which could not happen in Germany .^
At aU events, the German universities during the last sixty
years have stood assuredly not under but above those of other
civilized states. This has always been unconditionally admitted
in Russia, North America, Japan and elsewhere.

The European armies of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies rested upon the system of the free enlistment of paid
mercenaries from the home country and from abroad, these mer-
cenaries being welded together into brotherhoods and companies
by private military contractors (condottieri) , mostly noble cap-
tains who had become rich, or by war commissioners who had
received an enlistment patent from some prince. The traditions
of the Swiss who hired themselves out in foreign lands, and the
mercenary brotherhoods {Landsknechtsbruderschaften) which
had been formed by Emperor Maximilian, originally controlled
this development. William of Orange, Gustavus Adolphus,
and the French kings and generals improved the organization
and the methods of fighting, sought to transform these bodies
partially into national troops, and paved the way for monarchic
discipline. The regiments, which were formed only for the
sununer months, gradually became permanent. The Great Elec-
tor was the first, in 1660, after the Northern War, not to re-
lease his troops in Brandenburg-Prussia. From that time on
there was a Brandenburg-Prussian army, which from 1660 to
1786 was the first, as well as the best, in Europe. The Elector
transformed the purely private enterprises of majors and cap-
tains, who were only perfunctorily controlled by princely war
commissioners, into bodies of troops whose officers he appointed.
During the period from 1680 to 17 13 the army became a purely
governmental undertaking of permanent nature, the officers
changed from greedy money-makers into officials with the gov-

198 MODERN GERMANY

ernment's commission and under princely control. An increas-
ing proportion of officers and men were already natives and sub-
jects, or became such. The system of levies was used in con-
junction with that of free enlistment; communities and cities
were called upon to furnish soldiers. The general canvassing
of soldiers as the only method, especially in foreign countries,
proved to be too dear, and often furnished useless rabble that
constantly deserted.

When Friedrich Wilhelm I, for the sake of his household, as
he said, from 1714 to 1730 at times went too far in the hiring
of foreign soldiers and thereby brought about unfavorable re-
sults, recourse was had to the mixed system, which continued
until 1808. A portion of the company consisted of enlisted
foreigners, who served almost for life and who were encour-
aged as much as possible to marry native women; during part
of the year, for reasons of economy, they were given furloughs
within the garrison for industrial work — the so-called Fret-
wdchter. This part of the army could not be increased in time
of war. The other part consisted of native peasant boys, who
were apportioned to the regiments according to the so-called
canton districts. They received training for one year, supple-
mented by several periods of from one to two months, and
remained for twenty years subject to call. They were the
more numerous in time of war, as the foreigners were in time
of peace. Although the so-called canton ordinance of 1773
declared that ''all the inhabitants of the land are born to bear
arms," the tiigher classes of society were not yet subject to this
military duty, and the exceptions increased for economic reasons
until 1806. A determined opposition against this duty of national
military service was offered from 1733 on, not primarily by the
peasants, who were proud to be enrolled and have a bunch of
feathers in their hats, but by their overlords. The latter con-
sidered it an infringement of their rights that the peasant was
now more dependent on his regiment commander than on his
overlord. The duty of military service was a great step toward
the development of universal citizenship. The peasant had now
a direct connection with his king, whom he had often seen, per-
haps spoken with, and whose battles he had helped to win.

A still more important fact was that, with the increase of the
army (171 3, 38,000; 1740, 83,000; 1786, 200,000; 1806, 250,-
000 men — the last two numbers equalling 2.3 per cent and 3.7
per cent, respectively, of the population ) , the whole nobility were
more and more drafted into the corps of officers. The poor lower
nobility of Pomcrania early entered military service in order to

I

^

MODERN GERMANY 199

increase their small incomes; the Brandenburgian nobles alsa
readily joined the army. But it was quite otherwise from 1 7 IS
to 1740 with the East Prussian aristocracy, who lived generally
on their feudal incomes and whom Friedrich Wilhelm I had
frequently to compel to send their fourteen- to eighteen-year-old
sons to the cadet schools and regiments. The result as a whole^
however, was that the entire nobility of the kingdom, by the
year 1800, had become accustomed to seeing all of their sons
officers or officials. That nobility, in 1700 still in great part
feudal and anti-monarchic, was now a faithful and trustworthy
monarchic party, to which fact was due their loyal devotion in
the nineteenth century to the national cause.

Under this system Prussia had a small army for peace, a large
army for the field. The foreigners, lifelong professional sol-
diers, formed the core and backbone about which the native
peasants were grouped. A relentless discipline was needed to
keep these utterly difiEerent elements together. In time of war
there were usually no more foreigners to be had, but it was
always easy to fill out the regiments by means of the numerous
men liable for service in the cantons who had not yet been
called. Although the whole Prussian military system had a
certain harshness, nevertheless it appeared, even to Mirabeau-
Mauvillon, despite its drawbacks and evils, to possess great
advantages. It provided for the poor nobility, he said, and
gave work and shelter to the idle proletariat ; as a result Prussia,
despite her poverty, had a like birthrate with the most prosperous
and fertile countries of Europe.

On the other hand, unfriendly criticism of the Prussian mili-
tary system increased from 1786 to 1806. The elder officials
supported it unreservedly, but public opinion and the young
generation of the most capable officers demanded more and more
the abolition of the foreign levy, the formation of reserve or
militia troops, or even indeed universal military service.

The government down to 1806 was not energetic and bold
enough for a great reform; the footless war against France
from 1792 to 1795, the ill-conceived divisions of Poland between
1793 and 1795, which strengthened Prussia only outwardly, not
inwardly, had been too costly to leave any money over for mili-
tary reform. This came, however, from 1808 to 1820. Among
the regulations introduced during this period were the univer-
sal duty of bearing arms, the creation of a large Landwehr in
connection with the regular army, a thorough reconstruction of
the officers' corps, on the basis of equality of the ordinary citizen
with the nobles. It was no slight task, even under the pressure of

30O MODERN GERMANY

ivar, for War Minister von Boyen, in the years 1814 to 181 5,
to create a moderately large army of peace, with three years*
service, besides the two classes of Landwehr reserves which
were formed on the basis of universal conscription. This was
an achievement of the great idealistic and liberal statesmen and
generals to which the vacillating King, Friedrich Wilhelm III,
gave his approval only because Boyen cleverly represented it to
him as merely the development of existing institutions. The
two Ministers, Altenstein and Dohna, had been, in 18 10, as
were later the Berlin city representatives, against general mili-
tary service, in the pretended interest of civilization. Scharn-
horst conceived of a standing army of the indigent and of a per-
manent militia of the upper classes in connection with it. Gnei-
senau attributed the relaxing and deteriorating of the nations
and the dying out of a sense of public duty to the standing mer-
cenary armies. Universal military duty, he said, mingles the
upper and lower classes, does away with social prejudices, com-
pels better education of the common people and rests upon a
moral principle which sets the masses in movement and blends
them together. Baron von Stein regarded the universal duty
of bearing arms as the chief means of creating a sense of soli-
darity, of combating the opposition of the various classes to each
other and the tendency of the upper classes to unwarlike and
effeminate habits.

Metternich, of course, regarded universal military duty as a
mistake. Emperor Alexander feared the democratic character
of this institution so greatly that in Paris he expressed doubt
whether it would not soon be necessary to send help to the King
of Prussia against his own army. In Koblenz, Gneisenau, as
commanding general, was suspected of being a demagogic gen-
eral. The French made merry over the Prussian "child-army."
General Biilow and many of the elder generals urgently de-
manded the return to the old system. Only Adjutant-General
von Witzleben held the King in 18 19 firmly to the great re-
form.

The Prussian army law of September 3, 181 4, is perhaps
the most important law of this epoch. It has been of funda-
mental importance for the development of moral and political
conceptions, at first in Prussia, then in Germany, during the
whole period down to the present. It was a democratic law in
the best sense of the word. Germany stands, as does no other
state, upon universal education and the universal duty of bearing
arms. With universal military duty the standing army became,
labove all else, a training-school for the whole nation. Its intro-

MODERN GERMANY 201

duction, says one of our great historians, was a bold stroke, with-
out precedent, bringing to mind the energy of the antique concep-
tion of the state. Universal military duty presupposes the agree-
ment of people and government. It permits of no war of which,
the nation does not approve. With it no war of conquest is possi-
ble, but only a defensive war, a war for the life and existence^
of the nation.

The changes which, from 1814 down to to-day, took place
in the Prussian and German army constitutions need not be
traced here. They did not change its basic character. How-
ever heatedly the reform of the army was discussed from 1859
to 1866, however strongly feudal the officers of the standing
army temporarily seemed, while the Landwehr appeared to be the
only popular part of the organization, nevertheless this basic
idea remained: The standing army, with its professional offi*
cers, is the backbone of our military strength and the school for
the whole nation; but the greater part of the troops who take
the field are citizens, not professional soldiers nor professional
officers. We still have, as from 18 13 to 18 15, as in 1830, 1848,.
1864 to 1870, a people's army, which is more truly popular
than any other army in the world. It is not more beloved of
our princes and nobility than of our citizens, peasants and
workers. Every one who is familiar with our Social Democ-
racy knows that even for the Social Democrat his period of
service remains the most delightful memory. We have wit-
nessed the manner in which the Social Democrats, without ex-
ception, joyously responded to the summons. He who knows
the relation of our officers to their men is aware that I have
been justified in often making this declaration in lectures and in
writing: "If our entrepreneurs and their agents stood toward
their workers on the same footing as our officers toward the
men imder them, we should have no social question among
us."

All this chatter about an unsocial despotic German militarism^
inimical to liberal civilization, is the talk of people who bave»
or desire to have, no knowledge of our internal conditions.

We pass now from the reform of school and army to the
judicial reform. Nothing is more important for the security of
the individual freedom of modern man in the state of to-day
than a high standard of public justice: Justitta fundamentum
regnorum. No task was more difficult in the change from the
state of the Middle Ages to the modern commonwealth, than
the creation of an able, impartial body of judges, of an up-to-date

202 MODERN GERMANY

court organization, of efficient civil and criminal laws. Much
of this was accomplished by the old Prussian state before 1800;
and together with the other German states, Prussia made con-
siderable progress from i8cx) to 1870. Between that date and
the present day Germany has achieved a model of uniform court
organization and a uniform code of civil law, which unites the
merits of the Code Civil and of the old Prussian state law
{Landrecht) .

It is no easy task to present concretely, in a few words, the law
reforms of a thousand years. But let us attempt it.

The elder Germanic legal procedure provided for the conduct
of cases by the community under the presidency of the count and
of the magistrate, whose functions were merely formal; a
strictly formal verbal process, without appeal, led to the deci-
sion. As early as the time of Charlemagne the communities
proved inefficient and the Emperor replaced them by sheriffs
{Schoffen), This reform was not sufficient. The Schofferi
court in the late Middle Ages had completely broken down.
From the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries, in all European
states, it was necessary to introduce a monarchic S3rstem of court
organization, judges appointed by the ruler, and a scientific body
of law. But the change from the old to the new was extremely
difficult. To create a learned body of judges was no easy task,
especially for the lower courts. Old and new institutions re-
mained for himdreds of years, existing side by side, and mutually
obstructing each other. The Roman Law gained the upper hand
more and more from the fifteenth century on, not as a better, but
as a written, learned system of a higher state of civilization. The
legal procedure of the Roman Church, with its principles of
equity, and that of the princes and their counsellors, which was
fashioned after it, was preferred to the procedure of the old court
organizations. At the same time there grew up the written pro-
cedure with clerks of the court. Next, from the eighteenth cen-
tury on, there appeared, as an important step forward, the col-
legiate courts, like the Imperial Court and the higher princely
courts. i

In the local courts everything remained unchanged; the func-
tions of the sheriffs sank, in most places, to mere codperation In
the drawing up of legal documents. The judges had insufficient
legal training, or none at all ; they became dependent on grasping
clerks and cunning lawyers, as well as on the latter's go-betweens,
the so-called procurators, who were the channel through which
aU corruption passed. Almost all the judges, especially those of
the lower courts, were without regular pay and were supposed to

MODERN GERMANY 203

live from perquisites of the court. As late as the sixteenth cen-
tury, the courts sat only one to two weeks four times yearly^
although the written procedure long since had demanded a con-
tinuous official activity throughout the whole year. The civil
law was entirely uncertain, the criminal barbaric ; the procedure
was everywhere conducted according to precedent and whim.
Interference with justice by the princes and their commissioners
was the order of the day; the dragging out of the cases was pro-
moted by the cupidity of the judges and lawyers, and the tedious-
ness of the written procedure became unbearable. As there
was confidence in no body of judges, in no city or manorial court,
the sole hope of a just decision rested in sending the papers in
the case to the law faculties, or to the few Schoffen courts that
were still respected. Jurisdiction in Germany reached its lowest
point about 1650.

The attempts at reform in Brandenburg-Prussia from 1650 to
1740 were numerous — ^but of little avail. Provincial upper
courts were created ; in 1 7 1 7 criminal cases were taken from the
local county courts, that is to say, from the overlords; in 1718,
in East Prussia, the county law was reformed ; frequent attempts
were made to revive the system of oral pleadings in the Berlin
Upper Court {Kammergericht) , But it remained mere patch-
worL The reformers were powerless against the advocates of
the old dilly-dallying methods. There were no funds with which
to pay competent judges.

It was the great achievement of Frederick the Great and of his
relentlessly energetic High Chancellor, Samuel Cocceji, that
during the period from 1745 to 1755 an upright, learned body of
judges was created, no longer dependent on perquisites, but with
regular salaries, that the "procurators" were done away with and
reduced to lawyers' clerks, that the body of judges and lawyers
was thoroughly overhauled and placed under close surveillance,
and that the payment of lawyers was deferred until the termina-
tion of the cases. Through Cocceji justice became speedy in
Prussia. Cocceji, says Ranke, founded the Prussian judiciary
anew. From that period on, he adds, personal freedom was to a
certain extent guaranteed. Star Chamber justice was done away
with and jurisdiction confined to the regular courts admitting of
two appeals. All judges stood now under the surveillance of the
chief justice, all lower courts under that of the upper courts.
The training of judges was strictly regulated by examination and
by promotion through the preparatory grades of Auskultator
and Refer endar. The personnel and the organization of jus-
^ce had now reached the plane to which the Prussian adminisF-

:204 MODERN GERMANY

■trative system had already attained in the years from 1680 to
1740.

What Cocceji began was completed by two men, less ruthless
than he, but standing even above him in point of moral nobility
and intellectual endowment — the High Chancellor von Carmer
^nd his Councillor Suarez (i 780-1 795).

The reform of the civil procedure (April 26, 1781, and July
6) 1793)) the introduction of oral pleadings, the increase of the
judges' power to unlimited freedom in establishing the material
truth, and the limitation of lawyers' activity was designed to se-
cure justice for the peasants and the people of the lower classes.
This has been called the procedure by inquiry: The judge was
bound ex officio to discover the truth. He was vested with a
kind of tutelary, almost state-socialistic power, which was to
counteract the untrustworthiness of the lawyers of that time and
the helplessness of the litigants. The judges were intended to
occupy, on a small scale, a position such as the all-powerful king
occupied on a large scale, with his desire to understand and to
help the lowly. The windmill owner of Sans-Souci who is sup-
posed to have impelled the King to leave him in peace by saying:
^7/ y a des juges a Berlin^' never spoke thus. But Carmer's code
of procedure, like the King's interference in behalf of the miller
Arnold against his overlord. Count Schmettau, made the whole
Prussian people believe that there was now one state in Europe
in which the obscure man could secure justice against the great
man.

Attempts were made in all the greater German territories,
irom the sixteenth century on, to create a uniform whole out of
the conglomeration of the adopted Roman Law, the German legal
institutions, and the legislation subsequent to the year 1500.
Friedrich Wilhelm I attempted to do what Leibnitz had advised ;
0>cceji also outlined a plan, but only Carmer possessed the cour-
age to influence Frederick the Great to attempt the creation of
a code comprehensible to the people. It was intended to make
it so clear and complete that the disputes of the jurists should
cease. The outline was printed during the period 1 784 to 1 788 ;
and despite many attacks and criticisms it was put into effect on
June I, 1792. Its aim was not to create a new law but to codify
and elucidate the existing law.

This general common law {Allgemeines Landrecht) reflects
the conditions of the half-feudal, half-absolute state, ojf the bu-
reaucratic and military state. It was from the start subject to
much discussion, but it was nevertheless recognized as an epoch-
making advance by the greatest and most far-seeing men of the

MODERN GERMANY 205

age. It provided for the first time a uniform law for a state with
radically different provinces. It created a fixed and purely Ger-
man law nomenclature; it was a compromise between Roman and
German law. It vastly increased legal security. It helped more
than anything else the transition from the ''police state" to the
legal state. It was the worthy predecessor of the French code
civil and of the German general civil code {Burgerliches Gesetz*
buck) of our day. It became the foundation for the whole Ger*
man legal life of the nineteenth century.

The nineteenth century continued to build upon the founda-
tions of the eighteenth century. The jurisdiction of the ma-
norial courts in Prussia, which had long since been restricted,
was in 1849 entirely abolished, although it was much superior
to the jurisdiction of the English justices of the peace; Lord
Brougham, as is well known, once remarked of the latter that
it was worse and more partial even than the justice of a Turk-
ish "cadi." Trial by jury was introduced. The great reforms
in procedure and court constitution between 1 877-1 879 created
in all Germany a uniform procedure, and attached laymen as
assessors to the courts of the first instance. In short, Germany
has to-day a system which, as regards the legal protection of
the people and of individuals, is surpassed by that of no other
nation; it has enjoyed this, in its main outlines and principles^
for quite a number of generations.

We come finally to the question of self-government. It is,
in the proper form, the best training school for political free-
dom; it can, however, develop along false lines into an instru-
ment of class rule and of political corruption. We understand,
in this connection, by self-government the administration of the
municipalities and other communal units by the citizens them-
selves, with more or less independence as regards the state
authorities and officials. If this independence goes as far as it
went at one time in the German Free Cities, or in the greater
Territorial Cities from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, as
well as among the manorial lords, or in the county and district
corporations, the resistance of the state to this independence
and its abuses becomes necessary, as the German princes from
1500 to 1800 found to be the case. Since in England a strong
monarchy from the early Norman kings down to the Tudors kept
the nobility and cities subordinate to the central power, the
healthy self-government which grew up in the county, township
and parish caused great admiration on the Continent, espe-
cially in Germany, down to the time of Gneist, and sugges-

2o6 MODERN GERMANY

tions were made for its imitation in Germany. But the advo*
cates of such measures failed to see that the English self-gov-
ernment in county and township had long since degenerated
into class rule.

In the state of to-day the central power and its organs must
rule absolutely in the whole legislative field, in foreign and
military affairs, and as regards justice. In the field of finance,
police ^nd internal administration the authorities of the munici-
palities and other communal corporations may be entrusted with
the carrying out of certain governmental affairs; others, espe-
cially institutions of general utility of all kinds, may be left
entirely or partially to them, ordinarily in such a manner that
they choose their own bodies and appoint their own officials
for these undertakings. Especially does the purely business ad-
ministration of the municipalities belong to this category.

Where the communal authorities are inspired by die proper
feeling, this self-government, within its proper limits, is a
higher form of political life. These locally diosen authorities
stand nearer to concrete conditions, and bring a great sum of
character and intelligence to bear on the public service which
would otherwise be lost to it. Such a self-government edu-
cates the whole people politically, raises its sense of solidarity.
But it must not be forgotten in this connection that the well-to-
do classes are primarily the ones to enter this service of self-
government, and that they are continually subjected to the
temptation of misuse of power. An eminent teacher of German
constitutional law said, therefore, not without justification:
"Self-government is always more or less class rule." Only by
taking this point of view, which enables one to contemplate as a
whole the historic development of self-government and its dif-
ferent possible results, is one able correctly to appreciate the
various phases of its growth.

From this point of view it is easy to understand why the
German governmental authorities of the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries were obliged, in the same manner as they found
it necessary to eliminate the rule of the nobles in the heart of the
state, to resist just as strongly the freedom of the German cities
as that of the manorial rulers and of the county and district cor-
porations of the rural nobility. The Prussian city administra-
tion, as well as the rule of the rural nobility, had to be brought
under governmental control during the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries; the administration of the taxes and debts of the
Estate^ proved too corrupt and had to be transferred to the
state. It was found necessary to place the district and county

MODERN GERMANY 207

government under partial or entire state management, and the
city administration had to be freed of its pronounced abuses.

Let us examine somewhat more closely the transformation of
urban and rural self-government in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. The German Free and Territorial Cities
were in the seventeenth century in a deplorable condition. The
economic decadence from the end of the sixteenth century, the
destruction due to the Thirty Years' War, the vast indebted-
ness, the clinging to the ideal of local economic independence
in the age of upgrowth of national states, the selfish exploita-
tion of city rule by a small oligarchy — these are the characteris-
tics of urban life of that period. The rising territorial state
had to combat as anachronistic the independence of the cities in
matters of economic policy. The cities in which the rulers of
the great German states had their abodes, Berlin, Munich, and
Dresden, began at this time to revive again, but all others were
losing ground in proportion as they were independent

In the Brandenburg-Prussian cities, governmental interfer-
ence was brought about primarily through the municipalities'
inability to meet the interest on their debts, and through the
complaints of their creditors. Princely commissions for inves-
tigation were numerous from 1680 to 1750; they revealed not
alone the hopeless condition of the city finances, but an abyss
of the worst abuses of the governing clique as well.

In the same period, through the creation of a standing army,
the cities were given princely garrisons — ^barracks did not yet
exist. Every citizen had soldiers permanently billeted upon
him; the commandant of the city assumed position beside the
aldermen and was forced frequently to interfere. He had to
inform himself as regards the city administration, negotiate with
the body of aldermen, and regulate various matters in conjunc-
tion with them. He reported to the War Commissioner of the
territory or to the Chief War Commissioner in Berlin. As the
old direct city taxes proved unavailing, the Great Elector and
his son introduced in their place the city excise tax (1664 to
I7i3)» which the aldermen generally opposed, but which the
plain people desired. It was possible to collect this tax satis-
factorily and justly only by changing it from a city to a princely
tax. The commissioner, the so-called tax councillor of later
times, who supervised the excise in six to fifteen neighboring
cities, automatically became between 1680 and 1740 the royal
comptroller for the whole city administration. Was his report
too unfavorable, there would be appointed for the city in ques-
tion, for one or two years, one of the above-mentioned investi-

2o8 MODERN GERMANY

gating commissions, which would result in a rearrangement of
the whole constitution and administration of the city in the
form of a so-called ''city hall ordinance."

The most important point, at the same time the preliminary
for all material reform, was the regulation of the city indebted-
ness. A greater part of the indebtedness was paid off from the
royal treasury, the unduly high rate of interest was reduced, in
some cases the means for payment of interest and refunding
were gained from the excise tax. The suffrage for the city
council and city courts and their powers were regulated anew.
Everywhere the yearly changing city administration was done
away with, and a maffistratus perpetuus created; the super-
fluous and dishonest aldermen and city officials were elimi-
nated and replaced by better elements. Appointment to many
offices by the head of the state remained customary, although
the old right of election was usually not formally rescinded.
The, aldermen, who were, according to precedent, called in for
auditing purposes but contemptuously treated — in case of dis-
pute even beaten — ^gained an established position. The magis-
tratus perpetuus, cut down to a smaller number of members,
. came under the strict surveillance of the tax commissioner
{Steuerrat).

This commissioner also, it is true, occasionally abused his
power. But, on the whole, the tax commissioners in the eight-
eenth century were among the most capable officials; through
them the whole city administration once more became honest,
economical and just. An entirely new and better police system
was rendered possible. The greatest obstacle to such a system was
eliminated. In almost every city of from five to forty thousand
inhabitants and over, there were from two to five independent
communities, existing side -by side, and ten to twenty so-called
princely, noble, and religious "franchises" (Freiheiten) y inde-
pendent of all city authority. This condition was done away with
by centralizing all executive powers in the hands of one city coun-
cil and of the city commandant. The Prussian state obtained
thus from 1680 to 1750 uniformly governed cities, an ideal
which London did not realize until 1888 or 1889, for which
reason the condition of its police and administration was often
likened, even in England herself, to that of Constantinople.

The Prussian state had thus from 1706 to 1808 achieved a
city government thoroughly controlled by the central power,
but absolutely honest and capable, and which was able to make
proper use of the far-reaching communal freedom that Baron
von Stein gave to it in the City Ordinance {Stddteordnung) of

MODERN GERMANY 209

1808. This law became the basis of Prussian and German inde-
pendent self-government of modem times. It is, together with
the law regarding general military service of 18 14, politically the
most important and beneficent German law of the nineteenth cen-
tury.

The Prussian City Ordinance of 1808 determined the later laws
of 1 83 1 and 1853, and those of the new Prussian provinces, and
up to a certain point also those of the rest of Germany. Its
characteristic features were: i. That the collegiate magis-
tracy governs the city. 2. That the representatives of the citi-
zens, the aldermen, elect the members of the magistracy and
also vote the budget and the taxes. 3. That numerous depu-
tations or commissions formed from the magistracy, the alder-
men, and qualified citizens administer the city's affairs in de-
tail. In the magistracy there is a minority of paid members
elected for from six to twelve years (burgomaster, syndic, cham-
berlain, public works commissioners and superintendent of
schools), together with a majority of honorary members elected
from among the citizens and who usually give their whole time
to the city's administration. The paid members receive a pen-
sion in case of failure of re-election. The best elements of the
professional state officials have placed themselves at the disposal
of the cities for these positions. The aldermen naturally possess
great influence, for the reason that they appropriate the funds for
the administration of the city; but one reaches membership of
the council as a rule only after having learned to fulfill serious
duties by years of work in the mixed commissions, and in the
various administrative branches. In this manner the boards
of aldermen of the German cities have, on the whole, been
kept from developing into city parliaments, in which only
honor, influence and contracts are sought and in which the
majority, by cunningly devised tax schemes, lays the minority
under contribution, and individuals selfishly pursue their own
interests.

The German chief city burgomasters stand head and shoul-
ders, as regards capacity and achievement, above the majority
of their colleagues in other civilized states; the latter in part
are capable only of presiding at banquets or of putting their
name to what their secretaries have thought out, planned and
submitted to them, like the Lord Mayor of London, or like
the majority of the mayors of the French cities; those in the
United States stand in many cases at the head of secret or open
unions which plunder the cities, as has long been the case in
JJcw York.

2f<» ,; MODERN GERMANY

Tlie German burgomasters often play a decisive part in the
German parliaments;, they rise to ministerial positions or be-
come chief burgomasters after having been ministers, like the
present chief burgomaster of Berlin, who is a retired Imperial
minister. The German burgomasters have become the real
educators of the German people in political thought and in the
fulfillment of their duty toward the state.

The German city constitution founded by Stein was justly
taken as the model for the Prussian county ordinance (Kreisord-
nung) and the constitution of the counties from 1872 on. Before
this end was attained, however, the Prussian and German county
constitutions had to pass through many crises and make many
false starts.

If in East Prussia the rural village communities remained
too long merely an appanage of the feudal manor, nevertheless
the development of the aristocratic County Estates {KreU-
stande), from the seventeenth century on, and their employ-
ment for the military and tax purposes of the state from 1640
to 1806, resulted in the county commissioner (Landrat), who
had originally been chosen from among their members, becom-
ing more and more a royal official, without ceasing to be a
trusted confidant of those within the jurisdiction of the county.
Hardenburg attempted to make him altogether a dependent
professional official, but did not succeed in his attempt. The
feudal reaction, under the guidance of the romantic Crown
Prince, from 1820 to 1840, gained the upper hand in the con-
duct of the state, without being able to suppress entirely the
old Prussian liberal officialdom, which from 1806 to 1820 had
saved and reformed the state. The provincial constitutions on
the basis of the old Estates and the provincial county ordi-
nances (1823 to 1848) were a baneful victory of the feudal
reaction, but the controlling officials did not surrender to
these bodies the right of taxation or other important funo
tions. The victory of liberalism brought from 1848 to 1850 a
one-sided liberal county and communal ordinance, which was
again set aside in 1853. The reform of local sellf-govemment
made no progress until 1872. But then, from 1872 to i89i>
came one of the most sweeping reforms which the Prussian state
ever experienced: the introduction of a healthy form of rural
self-government, together with the reform of the administra-
tive organization and the creation of the jurisdiction by admin-
istrative law courts ( Verwaltungsrechtsprechung) calculated to
protect the rights of the individuals and the public We will
not enumerate the individual laws in question. A central posi-

MODERN GERMANY 211

tion is held, as mentioned, by the new county constitution of
1872, an imitation of the city ordinance. Its characteristic
points are a justly divided representation of the great landed
proprietors aiid the smaller holdings, and of the small cities
belonging to the county system; a corresponding taxation of
the counties voted by this representative body; and a reform of
the office of county commissioner (Landrat). The Landrat
remains half state-official, half-trusted confidant of the county,
but a county committee assists and controls him. The county
authorities attend to government affairs, and the economic ques^
tions of the county. The development of administrative juris-
diction, the reform of the local governments and of the provin-
cial authorities, finally the ordinance for rural communities
{Landgemeindeordnung) of July 3, 1 89 1, all conceived and car-
ried out in the same spirit, complete the great reform.

The spiritual fathers of this reform were the liberal his-
torian of constitutional law, Rudolf Gneist, and the conserva-
tive Minister of the Interior, Fritz von Eulenburg; moderate
liberals and those conservatives friendly to great reforms had
united for this work, towards which there was violent opposi-
tion. Bismarck had come to realize more and more the neces-
sity for such reform. It was a question of imposing strict
duties of self-government upon the county aristocracy and the
peasants, and of letting the lower classes share in these duties.
By this means, that which had been done for the city inhabi-
tants by the city ordinance of 1808, was now done for the open
country.

All classes down to the workers take part to-day in the city
and county administration. The beneficial effects of this are
seen to-day among the Social Democrats whose share in the
system of self-government is praised by all unbiased leading
officials, especially by the burgomasters. They are doing excel-
lent service in this line, and they thereby become accustomed to
fulfill serious official duties, like the middle and upper classes.

In most of the other German states, reforms similar to those
here described have begun to be undertaken. England, after
long seeking in the dark, achieved modern laws of self-govern-
ment comparable with those of Germany only through her two
great Local Government Acts of August 13, 1888, and March
15, 1894. Ill France, Napoleon did away with almost all self-
government, and since 1870 not much has been done to change
this.

What is left, then, of the reproach of our enemies and of

212 MODERN GERMANY

many of our lukewarm well-wishers among the neutrals, that
Germany is to-day still a reactionary military and bureaucratic
state, without political freedom, and that since Bismarck's days,
instead of working for political and democratic advance, we
have striven only for power and military strength, and finally
that we proclaim the doctrine that might is greater than right
and wish to destroy England's position of world supremacy and
place ourselves in her stead by the power of arms? It is true
that the German Empire was born amid the clangor of arms
from 1864 to 1870; it would not exist at all had it not been
for the Prussian army and Bismarck's plans for practical politi-
cal power. But would the United States have come into exist-
ence without the Revolutionary War, without Washington,
without France's military aid, and would it continue to exist
without the victory of the Northern States in the Civil War?
Is it possible to conceive of France without her wars from 1490
to 1 81 5? Did England's world power arise without maritime,
commercial and colonial wars extending through centuries?

It is certain that Prussia and Germany issued triumphant
from the pitiful divisions of the German nation in the Holy
Roman Empire only by means of the Brandenburg-Prussian
military and bureaucratic state, which finally from 1866 to
1870 brought about Grerman unity. It was not victorious, how-
ever, because of its military strength alone, but because at die
same time it possessed a model interior administration and
because its organization represented a political training and
schooling of the highest order for Germany.

Certain South German states, it is true, did not gain a con-
stitutional form of government until the period from 181 8 to
1848 — Prussia, indeed, not until 1848 to 1850. It would per-
haps have been better for Prussia had she entered upon the
constitutional path as early as 1820 or 1830. But the earlier
entrance upon this course would not materially have altered
the fact that the monarchy, army and officials, even after the
granting of the constitution, remained the chief controlling
powers, which remain to the present day. Nor would an earlier
adherence to such principles have altered the fact that Germany's
geographic position, as it had done for centuries and is still doing
to-day, invited her neighbors to invasion and conquest. Germany
would have shared the fate of Poland, if the military and bureau-
cratic state had not been victorious and survived, feudal control
by the nobles being out of the question. If in 1830, 1848, or later,
some, or even a majority of the German states had followed the
course of the Swiss democracy, the spirit of the "little canton"

MODERN GERMANY 213

would have become triumphant with us, as in Switzerland. We
should assuredly not have become a united Empire. Nor should
we, in compensation, have produced other poets like Goethe and
Schiller, which, according to English jingoism, should be our
only legitimate occupation.

But if we did not have the official aristocracy of our con-
scientious civil servants and of our incomparable body of offi-
cers, we might have a ruling aristocracy of money and cap-
ital, such as on the whole impose their will in England, France
and in the United States. In that case, to be sure, we should
have a somewhat more complete democratization of all
our institutions. We are undoubtedly advancing toward
changes along these lines — for example, toward a reform of the
Prussian suffrage law. But we desire neither England's nor
France's parliamentary system, nor party rule such as that in
the United States, based in part upon purchased votes. Cer-
tainly, many of our institutions are still a long way from per-
fection. But we, nevertheless, consider them better than those
of the great western democratic countries — ^at all events more
adapted to Germany's spirit and history.

Undoubtedly, democracy is able to bring forth healthy con-
ditions in small states. And the great states, likewise, to-day
strive more earnestly than formerly to educate the mass of the
people to self-rule and to a share in the government. But in
doing this certain dangers are always run: the democratic form
of government usually brings forth capitalistic class-rule, cor-
ruption, buying of votes, and an uncertain, changeable foreign
policy. At all events, the blessings of democratic reforms are
to be gained only in those cases where a strong, self-reliant,
central power is preserved, and where the populace, before gain-
ing greater rights and influence, ' has been accustomed for a
long time to important government duties. The degree of ad-
missible democratic institutions is determined to-day more than
ever, as Seeley teaches us, according to the security of the
state's exterior position (such as Switzerland, but not Germany,
enjoys), and according to the degree in which healthy, aristo-
cratic strength is preserved, such as England possesses in her
gentry, and Germany in her officialdom.

The present-day German Empire presents a strange mixture
of "great state" and "little state," of aristocratic forces and
conditions in Prussia, of democratic in the west and south.
These forces have learned to adapt themselves to each other, to
understand each other, and to unite for the accomplishment of
llgreat tasks. Prussia has developed from a territorial state.

214 MODERN GERMANY

which was almost a republic of nobles, to a constitutional state,
after passing through the military stage; she has educated her
aristocracy to the conception of public duty through service as
officials and officers and through self-government. The royal
power has reconciled itself with the democratic and constitu-
tional tendencies, on the basis of the official state which it pre-
eminently represents. The Imperial power has made social
reform its motto, in conjunction with exterior protection, with-
out in any wise destroying the spirit of industrial enterprise.
The landed aristocracy and the aristocracy of wealth have
clasped hands, and each of them finds honor and occupation in
the army and in the administration. The means of reconcilia-
tion with the lower classes is found in the universal duty of
bearing arms.

Our ministers and party leaders spring to-day almost more
from the middle class than from the aristocracy, in part also
from the lower classes. But almost all of these political lead-
ers have been through the school of official service and of self-
administration, so that they do not bring with them into their
high positions the instincts of the money-maker or the van-
ity of the position-seeker. Bismarck and the Eulenburgs, Ca-
privi, Hohenlohe and Biilow, Bethmann and Delbriick, Bot-
ticher and Miquel, Bennigsen and Eugen Richter, as well as
Schulze-Delitzsch, rose by passing through this school and that
of self-government. In the middle-sized and small states purely
official ministers are more common even than in Prussia. Nat-
urally this type of character, which prevails on the ministerial
benches and among the party leaders, has its drawbacks as
well as its advantages. But where does one find a type of
humanity, a ruling class, or an institution without the comple-
mentary faults of its good qualities?

The attacks which are made to-day in such violently exag-
gerated fashion, especially in England and France, and even in
the United States, against the manner in which Germany is
governed, result chiefly from a lack of understanding of Ger-
man conditions and from the difficulty of grasping them with
English or French conceptions and prejudices, when viewed
from the standpoint of fundamentally different governmental,
administrative, legal and social conditions. In addition, in
individuals, anger at the destruction of war, the influence of
aroused national passion, personal experiences, the degree of
politico-historical training, or the lack of it are factors which
give birth to such fairy tales as the one that Germany was
driven into the war by the teachings of a neurasthenic philos-

MODERN GERMANY 215

opher (Nietzsche), of a chauvinistic general (von Bernhardi)
and of a great historian who hated England (von Treitschke).
These three wicked men, it is claimed, have for the last twenty
to thirty years hypnotized the whole of Germany, deceived her
into believing that England was bound for destruction in any
event, and that Germany must seize her inheritance. We shaU
not examine this stupid invention more closely; it is disproved
in another part of this book. In closing, we shall say a few
words further in regard to the misleading statements of Pres-
ident Emeritus Eliot, of Harvard University, in the New York
Times. He is well known to many German scholars, who had
certainly hoped to hear more veracious and more sensible things
from him about Germany.

We are not conversant with his earlier work as a natural
scientist. As a director of the leading American university, his
achievements have been great and exemplary. But as a politi*
cal historian he is an absolute failure; he looks down upon
Germany with arrogant superiority, because he sees that Ger-
many has other institutions than his native country.

He speaks somewhat in this manner : You Germans have, it is
true, achieved something in literature, art, science and edu-
cation, but if you do not renounce your autocratic government,
your standing army with its universal military service, your
secret treaties, your unyielding bureaucracy, your love of
power, your aspirations for colonies, we free Americans can
have no sympathy for you.

Much — indeed, most of that which he blames us for — ap-
plies to the majority of European and non-European states, and
above all to France, Russia and England. But France appears
to him sufficiently democratic to be pardoned for having founded
by military means an immense colonial empire in the last forty
years. He closes his eyes to Russia's brutal policy of force and
conquest, because she was the originator of the Hague confer-
ences! In regard to England, he does not seem to be quite
aware through what measures of force her tremendous colonial
empire came into existence, or how gigantic her conquests by
force have been precisely in the period since 1870. But Eng-
land, in compensation for this, does not have universal military
duty, which, according to him, takes away freedom, restricts
unfettered social movement, and costs even the well-to-do lib-
erty, health, and under certain conditions life itself. All states
to-day enter into secret treaties, even the United States, but
Germany alone is made responsible for this. Germany is blamed
by Eliot for having conquered and annexed Schleswig-Holsteia

3i6 MODERN GERMANY

and Akace-Lorraine, in 1864 and 1870, respectively; he for-
gets to say that both were German countries, and that the latter
had once been taken from us by force. Eliot complains bit-
terly that there was no vote of the people taken in regard to
these conquests. I should like to remind him of what his
colleague, Sloane (Preussische Jahrbucher, Vol. 158, p. 460),
fiays in regard to the conquests of the United States: "We
have gained neighboring territory through force, through war
or occupation, and through purchase or exchange. In none of
these cases have we inquired through a vote of the people as to
the wishes of the inhabitants in the particular territory, nor have
we approached the Hague tribunal for advice. We have always
had the same excuse, namely, that it was required by our inter-
ests." Professor Sloane possesses the historical and constitutional
knowledge in which President Eliot is so sadly lacking. The
latter declares that our relation to other states cannot improve
until we have repudiated Bismarck's policies. Eliot would as-
suredly consider us insane were we to demand of the Americans
that they renounce the policy of Washington and of the great
Federalists, who gave them a fatherland, in the same manner
as Bismarck's policy gave us ours.

Eliot takes the attitude of the child who expects roses from
an apple-tree when he blames us for not sharing the political
opinions of the present-day American, who stands for "human
freedom and peace." We answer him that we do stand for these
things, but we cannot strive for such goals at all times nor
always under the conditions which appear proper to him and
to some Americans who share his views.

We have reached the end of our discussion. Its aim was
to attempt an exposition of the spirit of our public life as this
presents itself to the German writer on economics and consti-
tutional law. Naturally, our view is in direct opposition to
that taken of this spirit by our enemies, who in many cases are
quite ignorant of Germany and her history.

The judgment of our enemies will not be easily changed.
But the truth in regard to the causes of the present war and
the state of German conditions will, nevertheless, finally pre-
vail— more, to be sure, through the logic of facts than through
the efforts of German scholars. With time the world will
learn the truth as to German militarism, German lack of free-
clom and German barbarism. It will be recognized that Ger-
mans know well how to appreciate the blessings of political
freedom, but only when it is joined with a strong sense of feel-

MODERN GERMANY 217

ing for the state and for the fulfihnent of political duty. The
fact will be recognized that we sufiEer from fewer abuses of
class power, because in addition to and above the aristocracy
of wealth, we possess an unimpeachable official aristocracy and
a strong monarchy and imperial power. It will be recognized
that we appreciate the right of self-government for municipali-
ties as highly as other nations, but that we are willing to grant
these rights only to such as have been educated to them. It
will be recognized that we are no warlike, aggressive nation,
precisely on account of the universal duty of bearing arms, and
that we are by far less greedy of conquests than the English,
the Russians, the French and the Americans. It will be recog-
nized that our imperialism demands only ''a place in the sun,"
while that of England aims at exclusive control of interna-
tional trade. The world will come to realize that we protect
the smaller states better than England, unless they conspire
against us. We prevented France in 1830 from annexing Bel-
gium, and in 1867 Napoleon from annexing Luxemburg.

In contrast to the world-embracing plans of our enemies, we
stand for the balance of power among all the great civilized
states, for the system which the great Scipio family once de-
sired to introduce in the Mediterranean, when selfish merchants
of Rome forced the state into the course of international trade
supremacy. Since that time, in every case, the momentarily
greatest states have succumbed to the «ame temptation — ^first
Spain, then Holland, then France, then England. To-day the
United States faces a like danger. These tendencies toward
world supremacy have always injured rather than benefited
the states manifesting them. We Germans shall not succumb
to this danger. We are, therefore, the nation capable of doing
most for the advancement of international law and interna-
tional arbitration.

CHAPTER VII
THE SPIRIT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY

DR. HANS LUTHER, CITY COUNCILLOR OF BERLIN

CO-OPERATION of the citizen in public affairs is a char-
acteristic of the modern state. Strange to say, the opin-
ion is encountered among foreigners, even among intelligent and
usually well-informed foreigners, that such a citizenship scarcely
exists in Germany, if, indeed, at all. This conception seems to
result from the conviction that the democratic form of govern-
ment is the only one that gives citizens the proper influence on
the destinies of the state. This is a confusion between form
and substance. The important question is the realization of
the state as a corporate entity in which the individual lives in
freedom and can assert himself. By what means this goal is to be
reached is a question of form, which must be decided differently
according t6 the historical and geographical conditions of the
individual nations. The constitutional principles of the so-
called democratic states, likewise, vary greatly among them-
selves. It is only necessary, for example, to compare the United
States with France. Furthermore, constitutional forms, like
all things human, are subject to development. The German
constitution will continue to progress without doubt in the
line of an ever-increasing development of citizenship.

If the present condition of citizenship within the German
Empire is to be understood, one must consider not only the
right of suffrage, as it exists in the Empire for the Reichstag,
and in the component states of the Union, e, g,, for the Prus-
sian legislature, or Abgeordnetenhaus, The fact is of great
importance that citizens whose appointment depends on election
cooperate to a marked degree in ordinary administration — that
is to say, not alone in connection with legislation, which is
reserved for the legislative bodies. Such elected members, for
example, are found in Prussia in the County Councils
(Kreisausschusse) and District Councils (Bezirksausschiisse).
These authorities are called upon to decide in regard to a
variety of important administrative questions; in addition, they
constitute Administrative Courts (V erwdtungsgerichte) . Fur-

218

MODERN GERMANY 219

ther, the laity is well represented also in the other courts. Thus,
the more serious crimes are tried by the Schwurgericht, in which
the jurors decide questions of fact as well as of guilt. Less
serious offenses are decided before a court consisting of a pro-
fessional judge, who presides, and two lasrmen, who are called
Schoffen. Laymen are active, likewise, in civil cases, in so far
as they deal with affairs of trade and industry or with condi-
tions relating to commercial employers and employees; in all of
these courts the presiding officer alone is a professional judge,
while the associates, who are in the majority, are laymen. The
associates in the industrial and mercantile courts ( Gewerbegericht,
Kaufmannsgericht) are chosen directly from the members of the
business in question, primarily according to the principle of pro-
portional election.

All these rights of the citizens concern the state in a narrower
sense. No one, however, will be able to judge or even to under-
stand the German state organism who sees nothing on the one
hand but the state, and on the other the individual Public life
is built up in numerous intermediate steps passing over the family,
over the community, the profession, race connections and many
other unifying conditions until a comprehensive whole is reached.
This comprehensive whole alone is the state in the narrow sense.
If, now, it is the duty of the state organism to adapt itself to the
actual conditions of the nation's life, it must in its various activi-
ties do justice to all of these intermediate phenomena. The
resulting organisms of a vastly manifold nature are, however,
not an exclusive peculiarity of the German Empire. England
has a great number of such organisms intervening between the
individual and the state in the narrow sense, and which in their
collectivity represent the sum total of public life (Staatsleben).
These intermediate organisms exist, of course, also in France and
other countries, although less developed. Hence, if one wishes to
gauge the importance of the individual in public life, the ques-
tion must not be: What influence has the individual upon the
affairs of the state in the narrow sense? It must be framed
thus: To what degree does the individual play a part in the
general expression of public life? Having thus correctly ex-
pressed our question, we are faced by an abundance of rights,
but likewise duties, of the individual citizen in the public life
of Germany. In no other country are the intermediate organ- ,
isms between the state and the individual endowed with so
many rights and so much actual influence on public life as in ■
the German Empire.

The legal point of departure for these intermediate organ-

220 MODERN GERMANY

isms is the conception of self-government, or municipal home-
rule. G)nsidered purely from the juridical point of view, the
corporations for the exercise of self-government are legal per-
sonages of the public law, who are not subordinate to the state
as its appointees, but stand side by side with the state with a
certain degree of independence. By means of such a legal for-
mula, however, one cannot grasp the fundamental nature of
these typically German forms of expression of public life. The
whole of German history reveals a strong impulse of the people
toward self-government, in the broadest sense of the word.
This tendency has at times proved most dangerous in the his-
tory of the German people. In the old German Empire the
tendency of the individual to regard rather the particular ob-
ject close at hand than a more distant general goal was a de-
structive element, which was overcome only gradually along the
course of development leading through the strong "territorial
state." To-day, however, self-government is no longer a disturb-
ing factor. For the mighty German Empire of the present has
given to the German people that state and national consciousness
which almost all the other nations of the world have possessed
for a long time, and which they, therefore, begrudged us Ger-
mans. On this basis, self-government is a source of strength,
since it directs the attention of the individual not alone to those
afiEairs of public life which are removed from his immediate per-
ception, but also to those matters directly under his eye and hence
subject to his judgment. A German body politic without a
system of self-government is unthinkable.

In the modern development of self-government, the cities, or
municipalities (Stadtgemeinden) j can claim for themselves the
right of priority. They are followed by the rural communi-
ties {Landgemeinden) , Organizations of a higher kind in
Prussia are the counties (Landkreise) y which embrace the
smaller cities and the rural communities, and the provincial
units (Provinzialverbdnde) J which are formed from the greater
cities and the counties. Provinces and counties are called com-
munal unions {Kommunalverbdnde) y in contrast to the single
communities (Gemeinde). Besides these communal corpora-
tions, with extensive functions, there are still a large number
of special organs of self-government, namely, such bodies as
are called upon to fulfill one or more definitely specified duties.
These bodies have in many cases come down from olden times,
especially as local associations for common interests {Interest
senvereinigungen) , These cooperative bodies are most highly
developed in regard to water rights; an example are the numer-

— I

MODERN GERMANY 221

ous dike-associations. Modern vocational representation is of
more widespread importance: the chambers of agriculture, the
chambers of commerce, the chambers of trade and industry;
undoubtedly also we shall soon have labor chambers or cham-
bers of workmen. All of these chambers, each of which is
limited to a definite territory, have public legal authority to
protect the vocational interests which they represent In the
case of disputes as to the extent of their autiiority, they can
appeal to the decision of the Administrative Courts. The Gov-
ernment does not exercise any influence on the appointment of
the chief ofllicers of these bodies for self-government. Thp
members of the trades or callings represented in these cham-
bers work in perfect freedom through their many organs. Fur-
ther, these bodies are not restricted in their freedom of combi-
nation. In this way associations have arisen whdise influence
on our entire public life has been very perceptible: the Council
of Agriadture (Landwirtschaftsrat) from the chambers of ag-
riculture, the Diet of Commerce {Handelstag) from the cham-
bers of conunerce, the Diet of Trade and Industry from the
chambers of trade and industry. L^slation has recognized
these free associations in various ways; for example, the Council
of Agriculture, as well as the Diet of Commerce, were given
seats in the Imperial Distribution Board {Reichsverteilungs-
steUe)y whose important task is the distribution of the grain
and flour on hand to the various communities.

The German Diet of Cities {Stddtetag) is also represented
in the Imperial Distribution Board. It is a union of the Ger-
man cities sprung from their own initiative. This association
is all the more important because it is in the city organizations
that the idea of self-government is most highly developed. The
tasks of the cities are more comprehensive than those of any
other self-governing body, including the other communal cor-
porations. The counties and the rural communities have, only
when considered as entities, approximately identical tasks. The
activity of the provinces is more or less confined to definite
lines, such as highways, care of the insane, of the blind and of
the deaf and dumb, and supplementary charities. The cities, on
the contrary, can each claim in their particular territory the
same universality of aims as the state. To be sure, they are
excluded from a number of fields of public activity, naturally
from that of foreign affairs. For the rest, the cities determine
alone what tasks lie in their province simply by assuming them.
Their decision is influenced by the state only to the degree that
certain tasks are assigned to the cities by law. On the other

222 MODERN GERMANY

hand, there is no legal requirement for the cities to secure the
state's approval before extending the field of their activity. Ac-
tual development has forced them, in many fields, to the fore-
front of progress. A few statistics will prove the truth of this
statement in a general way. In the period from 1895 to 1908
the budgets of Prussian cities of 25,000 inhabitants and over
increased more than threefold. At present the total cost of
running the German communities is not less than that of the
Empire itself. The debts of the municipalities — in the main
contracted for profitable purposes — are notably higher than the
Imperial Government debt before the outbreak of the war.

The constitutional form of the German cities is republican —
if, indeed, one can properly apply to self-governing bodies this
conception adapted to the state as a whole. Chief importance,
in this connection, attaches to allowing individual citizens the
greatest possible participation in affairs. It may with confi-
dence be asserted that the acts of the self-governing bodies are
acts of the citizens. To be sure, chief place in the city adminis-
tration is held by a burgomaster, generally styled "Chief Bur-
gomaster," who is always a professional official, and nearly al-
ways a lawyer (jurist). His constitutional influence, however,
is clearly circumscribed. He is not appointed by the central
government (as in Holland), but is chosen by the other officials
of the city, and requires only the approval of the state govern-
ment. The overwhelming majority of Germans agree that this
practice of filling the chief city positions with professional offi-
cials is one of the greatest safeguards for the relative independ-
ence of the cities from the state as a whole. Professional su-
periority of the central state officials, constantly in touch with
public affairs, by which the layman is so likely to be unduly in-
fluenced, carries no weight with a Chief Burgomaster; for he,
too, has professional experience, generally of an entire lifetime,
to draw upon. The danger, moreover, that the Chief Burgo-
master, since he himself is an official by profession, might secretly
feel himself more in sympathy with the government officials than
with the inhabitants of the city, is obviated in the first place by
the fact that the other city officials elect him — generally for twelve
years. Further, the preeminence of his position depends precisely
upon the independence of the city administration from the state.
Hence the professional Chief Burgomasters, as well as the assist-
ant burgomasters, city councillors, deputies, etc., are in the prac-
tice of our public life determined supporters of the idea of self-
gpvernment.

The position of these professional city officials within the

MODERN GERMANY 223

self-government organism is quite different in the various Ger-
man states, nay, even within the various sections of the indi-
vidual states. In this connection the individual ''city ordi-
nances" are determining. Efforts to create a uniform system
in place of the existing variety are sporadic, and, except where
special abuses have developed, are generally regarded as inad-
missible interference with justifiable local peculiarities. This
is a further proof that German constitutional life has not been
built up according to some system or other thought out with
pen and paper. Therefore, it finds no favor with those persons
who believe in the beneficent power of only one formula. Ger-
man constitutional life has developed organically and is, there-
fore, multiform and variegated, like a mountain group which
does not lack uniformity in its basic outlines and inner harmony.
We have thus in the city administration in some places the bi-
cameral, and in others the uni-cameral system. In the case of
the uni-cameral system, there is only one determinative body,
namely, that of the city aldermen — municipal representation
after the model of popular representation in the state; their pre-
siding officer is the Chief Burgomaster. In the case of the
bicameral system, there exists, beside the body of aldermen, a
* 'magistracy," with co-determinative functions. In this system
one of the aldermen is elected from their midst as chairman at
their meetings, whereas the Chief Burgomaster presides in the
''magistracy," but has only an equal vote with all the other
members. The underlying principle, however, of all the mu-
nicipal systems is the same, namely, that the aldermen are
elected by the citizens. Electoral franchise varies in the dif-
ferent city statutes; in some we find three classes of voters, in
others universal equality of direct suffrage, et cetera. The
method is predominant of electing only a third of the repre*
tentative body at a time, so that a certain amount of consistency
is preserved in the administration. Widespread, but recently
much opposed, is the so-called houseowncrs' privilege, whereby
half of the aldermen must be houseowners. In all cases the
aldermen are elected directly by the inhabitants of the city.
The Chief Burgomaster, on the contrary, and the other prin-
cipal city officials, and especially the members of the "magis-
tracy" (where such exists), are elected in some cases by the
aldermen, in others in the same manner as these themselves,
by the citizens. The "magistracy" is not made up exclusively
of professional officials, but at least half of its members are
citizens who serve in an honorary capacity. This variety of
suffrage rights does not appear to be of decisive influence on the

224 MODERN GERMANY

quality of the work of the various city administrations. For,
taken byr and large, despite the fact that certain differentiations
exist, the main tendencies of the work of administrations is
everywhere the same.

Everywhere, also, the prerequisite of administrative success
is identical, namely, cooperation of citizens and professional offi-
cials. This cooperation is extremely close. In the first place,
the fact that all city administration is local in many cases gives
the aldermen familiar with the conditions the advantage over
the professional officials, who are often strangers. Further, it
is a distinctive characteristic of our system of self-government
that the officials and the elected representatives of the citizens
do not stand in the same relationship to each other as the
Government and the popular representatives in the states. The
division of power between Government and Parliament is
nearly always such that the Parliament only has cooperative
functions in regard to law-making and appropriation of funds.
The actual administration, however, which is the part of the
state's activity most keenly felt by the individual, is exercised
exclusively by the Government. This is true not alone of Ger-
many, but likewise of states with a parliamentary form of gov-
ernment. Matters are quite different in the German city ad-
ministration. Here the representatives of the citizens, the
aldermanic body, are the executive power, enjoying equal rights
with the "magistracy." In those cities in which there is no
"magistracy," the aldermen administer the city's affairs alone.
It is self-evident, however, that so great a gathering as that of
the aldermen (about 75 members in a city of 300,(XX); in Ber-
lin, 150 members) cannot decide every single administrative
question. For this reason the notion of "current administra-
tion" has developed in our municipalities. Every important act
of administration, such as all special matters of moment, and,
of course, all fundamental questions, are decided upon by the
entire aldermanic body, at least concurrently. At the same time,
the current administration is not controlled entirely by the pro-
fessional officials. For this purpose administrative deputations,
or committees, have been created. These administrative commit-
tees are the most ingenious contrivance of our city constitutions.

Since the Chief Burgomaster, or the "magistracy," is respon-
sible for the current administration, the committees are subor-
dinate to them in a legal sense, it is true; but as a matter of
fact, the committees are a means of making the aldermen, and
even individual private citizens, permanent participants in the
current administration. For although, generally, a professional

1

MODERN GERMANY 225

official is cfaairman of the committees, the vast majority of the
members are aldermen or so-called citizen deputies {Burger-
deputierte) — that is to say, citizens who are elected as members
of the committees by the aldermanic body, although they are not
aldermen. With such a membership of the committees, it is
impossible for the professional officials to conduct the adminis-
tration otherwise than in agreement with the committees. The
members of the committees, however, gain an insight into all
the details of the city's afiFairs. The custom exists of having
certain committee members constantly attend to a certain line of
affairs. In this manner the city administration is conducted, in
its smallest details, under continuous, active and decisive coopera-
tion of the citizens. For as a rule the entire municipal adminis-
trative field is divided up among the various committees. Thus
ive have committees for the administration of buildings, gardens,
charities, schools, hospitals, bathing and other sanitary branches,
cemeteries, savings banks, street railways, drainage, water-works,
g:as-works, electric works, slaughter houses, etc.; in addition,
according to the field of activity of the individual cities, there
are committees for theatres, orchestras, museums, public libraries,
harbor improvements, factory sites, forestry and universities.
Further, there are special committees for individual undertakings,
as for example, the building of a bridge, the making of treaties of
municipal incorporation, cooperation in the building of a local
railway, the starting of an exposition, etc. In these executive
committees the citizens are called upon for extremely active
administrative participation, for in these cases the citizens do
not act from a distance and through the intermediary of some
outside intelligence, as they do in the exercise of their federal
suffrage right. The citizen here decides of his own knowledge,
and the privilege therefore becomes an important duty. One
ideal of citizenship is thereby achieved.

The best proof of any public institution is furnished by its
success. By their fruits ye shall know them. SchmoUer has
already called attention to the fact that the excellence of the
institutions of a state may be measured by the services rendered
to the poorer classes. That these services are greater in the
German Empire than in any other state in the world is disputed
by no one who knows. In this connection, the activity of the
German state as regards the poorer classes is to be measured not
only from the point of view of the state — that is to say, on the
assumption that the state wishes to maintain its human material
in as good a condition as possible. Equally decisive is the de*
sire to create real citizenship. This is apparent from the one

226 MODERN GERMANY

fact alone that the nucleus of these endeavors has always been
the development of the school system. Germany is the countrv'
with the fewest illiterate persons. But likewise the social in-
surance institutions (sick insurance, invalidity insurance, old-
age pensions and accident insurance, together with the assist-
ance given dependent relatives), are devised with care and fore-
thought in such a manner that the persons insured are not
alone not dependent on the state but that they themselves or
their employers pay a considerable insurance premium. Hence,
these insurance undertakings, owing to the feeling of right and
security which they give to the insured, work for an enhance-
ment of citizenship. I shall now endeavor to describe more I'n
detail the achievements of citizenship in the field of self-govern-
ment.

As a determining factor the question may be asked, first,
as to whether class politics are played in our municipal adminis-
tration. In answering this question, one must start with the
fact that the municipal representative bodies seldom reach their
decisions from political considerations such as govern the poli-
tics of the state. Thus, in a great number of cities, factions
are not known in the representative bodies. In other cities, it
is true, factions exist, but the lines of division separating them
are not political in a broad sense, but of a communal nature.
In a final group of cities, it must be admitted, the factions cor-
respond to certain political parties of the state, but even with
such conditions, experience shows that important municipal de-
cisions are reached without decisive regard for political party
programmes. This applies to a considerable extent even to the
Social Democratic party, which is striving to form a faction of
its partisans in every municipal body, as it does in the national
representative body. Since our city administration, owing to
the extent of its activity and to the degree of its independence,
is so powerful a body, the result is that the decisions are pre-
ponderantly made with a view to particular local conditions.
These particular local conditions, however, usually cannot be
included in a political programme, all the less so since every
alderman has personal knowledge of the matters upon which
he has to decide. For this reason, the work in the municipal
bodies is far more personal than in the national representative
bodies. This fact alone offers a certain protection against class
politics, since personal opinions and private interests need not
by any means coincide. Where they do agree, and where per-
haps single families or groups of families possess a predomi-
nating influence, there exists the danger of affairs being con-

MODERN GERMANY 227

ducted against the public welfare; this danger may as a rule
be considered the greater, the smaller the municipality is. The
"houseowners* privilege," according to which half of the city
representatives are houseowners, is regarded by many as a idnd
of legal basis for class politics.

In spite of this privelege, however, in very many cities the
houseowners are of the opinion that the city administration does
not sufficiently consider their interests, and that, owing to their
burden of taxation, they stand in need of particular protection
against the conmiunal authorities. Now, the opinion of the
houseowners is mistaken, but the very existence of such an opin-
ion proves that one is not justified in speaking of a general
houseowners' oligarchy in the city administrations.

There are still other drawbacks which some persons thought
they discovered in the text of the city constitutions but which do
not exist in practice; as, for instance, the fear lest the city
administration, as controlled by the ''three-class" suffrage, might
act anti-socially. As a matter of fact, in the majority of the
Prussian cities, suffrage is proportional to the income, so that
only under quite exceptional circumstances can the working class
gain a majority in the aldermanic body. Nevertheless, the
city administrations show an unmistakable social tendency.
Practically everywhere, at least in all the larger communities,
the spontaneous activity of the city authorities in one line or
the other has surpassed, in many cases very considerably, the
social legislation of the Reichstag. Even the question of insur-
ance against lack of occupation, toward which the German Im-
perial government has hitherto turned an unfriendly ear, has
in many cities, in so far as single communities can undertake
such a problem at all, been solved to a certain extent. Like-
wise, the workmen in the employ of the city enjoy benefits of a
social nature which are entirely lacking in the vast majority of
private undertakings.

Yet the number of the workmen employed by the cities is in
many cases considerable. This is to be explained by the fact
that the German municipalities, in ever-increasing degree, have
taken over those great undertakings which are for the immediate
benefit of the community. For us the thought is incomprehensible
that the city's waterworks should not be under municipal adminis-
tration. So, too, the gas and electric works are in a vast majority
of cases under city management. The same is true of most of the
tramways. All this was possible becai!se the German cities were
entitled to undertake these enterprises of their own volition, with-
out need of any cooperation on the part of government. The

228 MODERN GERMANY

influence of capital, which is not slight in Germany, is equally
powerless to influence the decisions of the city administrative
boards. It is true that in individual cases capital has shown itself
friendly to the idea of having the city acquire public utilities.
On the whole, however, bitter fights were fought, for it was a
question for the cities not of acquiring possession of the under-
takings, but above all, of doing this at a price which insured a
return on the money. Undoubtedly capital is at the present
moment endeavoring to maintain, as far as possible, what remains
of its power in city works, and to recover lost ground as far as
possible. Characteristic illustrations of this condition are the
"mixed economic concerns" (gemischtvrirtschaftliche Unterneh^
mungen)y which have been much discussed in Germany recently.
In this species of enterprise great public undertakings are to be
worked conjointly by the municipal administration and private
capital. Outwardly, the creation of such "mixed economic con-
cerns" is advocated on the ground that purely public enterprises
are not conducted in a sufiiciently business-like manner. Whether
this claim is to the point or not is open to dispute. It may be
stated, however, that in such enterprises, which are carried on
for the public interests, the essential point is by no means only
to place them on a paying basis in the sense of a private enter-
prise ; often the general economic condition of a city is benefited,
when this aim is abandoned, as for example, when a tramway
is run rather from the point of view of facilitating transportation
than with an eye to high dividends. This is the common opinion
in our cities. For this reason a year ago in the general session of
the Diet of German Cities, the designation "mixed economic
concerns" was replaced by the new one of the "public enterprise
under legally private form" {Offentliche Unternehmung in Pri"
vatrechtsform) , This means that the German cities are deter-
mined, even if in such great enterprises they profit l^ existing
advantages of the private legal form of the concern — ^as, for
example, when founding their electricity works on the basis of a
stock company — not to let them lose the character of public utility
concerns conducted exclusively for the public interest. But opin-
ions differ, likewise, in regard to the question whether the private
legal form is advisable or necessary for the attainment of the
desired goal. Thus, in regard to the gigantic electricity works of
Berlin, which are soon to be taken over by the city, the attempt is
to be made so to determine the changeable provisions of the city
statutes that even without the private legal form the advan-
tages of private management may, nevertheless, be secured for
the new city undertaking; the directing and supervising board

MODERN GERMANY 229

are to enjoy the same powers as they would in a stock company.
Unfortunately, I must refrain from consideration of the
other fields of activity to which the city administrations ex-
tended in times of peace. The reader is referred to the pre-
vious enumeration of the various administrative committees,
w^hich gives a general though by no means exhaustive idea of
communal activity. That enumeration does not comprise all
those matters which the city administration undertakes, not as
intrinsically within its province, but which are referred to as
affairs "transferred by the state." Under this head, for ex-
ample, is to be reckoned the police administration, which is in
the hands of special government authorities only in the largest
Prussian cities, and even so not in all cases. On the other
hand, I cannot close my discussion without mentioning the ac-
tivity of the municipalities since the outbreak of the war.

The war tasks of the communes in the beginning were based
upon legal obligations only to a slight degree. Even in regard
to the granting of assistance to the families of soldiers, at least
in the larger cities half of the burden rests on the shoulders of
the munidpalities, which must in addition devise proper means
for carrying out the various measures. Thus, in every city the
question arose as to what portion, if any, of the grants to sol-
diers* families, should be paid to the landlord as rent, and un-
der what conditions. It had to be decided whether grants
should be made in the form of money or goods. The extending
of help to the unemployed lay entirely in the discretion of the
municipalities. It is necessary still to-day to continue this form
of assistance, although our economic life has again reached a
very high standard, for there are numerous branches of economic
activity that are entirely suspended in time of war. In addition
to this support, there are many direct contributions toward the
needs of the army, such especially as furnishing quarters for the
soldiers. A line in which work of the communes attained quite
special importance was the providing of food.

When, after several months of war, it was realized in the
German Empire that special measures would have to be taken
in order to make our food and provender supply hold out, the
first attempt made was to secure the necessary amount and its
distribution by means of private enterprise. To this end the
War Grain Company was founded, whose task it was to buy up
the necessary amount of grain for the last months of the harvest
year. Two-fifths of the compansr's capital was contributed by
the large German cities. In order to give an idea of the elas-
ticity of the administration in the large cities, mention may be

230 MODERN GERMANY

made of the fact that it was possible to raise this money ^thin
a very few days. But after a few more months it became evi-
dent that the method of private economic enterprise was not an
adequate solution of the food problem. The Empire, therefore,
took the matter in hand as a public task. As such, it ivas di-
vided into two main undertakings, apart from the plan of or-
ganization. One was the collection of the existing supply of grain
and flour, the other was its distribution to the consumers. For
collecting the supply, the form of private enterprise was adhered
to with complete success, the purchase of the material being
entrusted to commissioners of the War Grain Company — on the
basis, it is true, of previous requisition. In later undertakings —
as, for example, the securing of the supply of oats and potatoes —
the method of collecting by private means was abandoned and this
task was assigned to the counties in which the supplies lay. The
county communal organizations took up this work widi great
energy. But even more general is the activity of the communes
in the distribution of the supply to the consumers. In this con-
nection, the most difficult task fell to the share of the cities.
Many things are to be distributed, as oats and other provender
to owners of horses, but especially flour in the raw state, or as
bread to the consumers; care for the potato supply also was
imposed on the cities. The attempt to limit the consumption
of bread at first appeared difficult to the degree of impossibility.
Nevertheless, the cities completely solved the problem within a
few weeks after the order was issued by the Imperial govern-
ment. Everywhere the new economic condition is evident from
the presence of bread and flour cards. These cards are not or-
ders issued against money for a certain amount of bread and
flour; they are a manifestation of an absolutely new economic
problem which the war has brought with it — the problem of
supply. They give to the holder merely the right to purchase
a certain amount of bread and flour, a right which he has not
without such a card. It is characteristic of the German system
of self-government that by no means all the cities have diosen
the same form of bread and flour cards. Only such economic
territories as, in certain respects, belong together, despite mu-
nicipal separation, have effected a union. In many cases the
cities have also linked themselves together with the surroimding
country districts to form economic units. For the rest, the
flour and bread cards show clearly that they are adapted to
local conditions. The system of control is different in large
and small cities. The amount of flour in proportion to bread
varies according to the customary food consumption of the

MODERN GERMANY 231

inhabitants. The task of the cities, however, was not completed
^%with the issuing of bread and flour cards. Less noticeable, but
just as difficult, is the regulation of flour distribution to the
leakers and dealers. It is thus not alone the measures taken
l>y die Imperial government that deserve to be regarded as
SL remarkable achievement in organization ; even more noteworthy
is the vigor with which the municipalities took hold of
^e great problem. The solving of the problem indicates
nothing less than a complete change in our economic life. In
the city administrations politically liberal views are in the as-
cendancy, tending to uphold the freedom of private enterprise.
But as little as this fundamental political conception hindered
the municipalization of the great interests serving the public, as
little has it been an obstacle when it was necessary to safeguard
the people's food by means of quick action.

The activity of the municipalities in the work of feeding the
nation, however, goes much further. A considerable number of
cities, especially the largest, held it to be their natural duty
with the outbreak of the war to lay aside a certain emergency
supply of the chief foodstuffs. The leading idea in doing this
was mainly the consideration that in war-time, when the rail-
roads are frequently subject to unexpected strain in transporting
troops, a stoppage in supplies could easily take place. At the
same time, from the very beginning the possibility of a certain
shortage in foodstuffs in the last months of the harvest year was
taken into consideration. In addition to these voluntary accom-
plishments dealing with the various food supplies, it was made
compulsory for the cities in the course of the winter to provide
for a supply of non-perishable pork. The reason for this meas-
ure was the economic consideration that, through the slaugh-
tering of a number of millions of hogs, the danger would be
eliminated of their being fed with food suitable for human be-
ings. The solving of this task fell in great part to the cities.
In its accomplishment the previously mentioned voluntary union
of municipalities in the Diet of the German Cities {Stadtetag)
facilitated the framing of uniform contracts, which in many cases
are backed by government funds.

All these achievements of the cities in war-time were accom-
plished without serious dispute in the city administrations. Al-
though in the municipal executive bodies tongues were not
stopped by a general civic political truce, nevertheless action was
speedy and energetic. In view of the novelty and vastness of
the tasks, this seems to me to mark a great success in organiza-
tion in the field of self-government. The success is all the

232 MODERN GERMANY

greater in view of the fact that for the accomplishment of these
undertakings considerable sums of money had everywhere to
be raised, which was accomplished without recourse to the open
market. The finances of the cities proved to be in so sound a
condition that for the new fiscal year, 1915, in many cases no
increase of taxation was necessary, while in other cases rela-
tively slight increases sufficed. At the same time, no municipal
administration repudiated any of its financial obligations. There
was not even an interruption in the redemption of the city
debts.

In a state which possesses so efficient and independent a form
of self-government, there lives assuredly the spirit of free citi-
zenship. Indeed, our whole body politic is imbued with this
spirit. The wholesome struggle in internal politics is only con-
cerned with the limitations and the form in which that spirit
is to manifest itself. Without doubt, continued development will
tend to an ever fuller growth of the rights of the individual
citizen. The power and strength of the German Empire must,
of course, not be allowed to suffer on that account. For, al-
though we desire to be free citizens, we wish to be such only
on our free native soil and as members of a powerful state.

Closing Word by Chief Burgomaster Wermuth of Berlin

We are aware how many ill-considered opinions the world
has formed in regard to the essence and value of the spirit of
German citizenship. It will be difficult in the future, as it has
been in the past, to prepare the way everywhere for a correct
appreciation, nor shall we be successful in this with a single efiort.
But the war has advanced us materially in this respect. It has
become an important witness for the truth, whose voice other
nations will hear. It shows the Germans not as a nation re-
stricted in their internal political life, under 'guardianship and
in bonds and without political self-consciousness resting on con-
viction; on the contrary, it reveals a picture of the consciously
disciplined strength of an inwardly free commonwealth, which,
ready for self-sacrifice and with a clear vision of its aims in
each of its members, stands at the helm of its own destiny.
What nation not imbued with a free spirit of self-determination
could do this? What nation in such case would be able to raise
herself, not only in culture and science, commerce and technical
achievements, but also politically to the height achieved by Ger-
many?

It is true that the movement toward freedom which governs

MODERN GERMANY 233

our public life ever more strongly is not without checks and
limitations. But wherever in our state organism we encounter
such control, of which foreigners disapprove, it proves to be the
very factor which has made us great and strong. What is fore-
most in my mind is compulsory military service, which claims an
important part of the strength of the nation and of its economic
powers. It is dismissed with the contemptuous catch-word ''mili-
tarism," and yet in our ears it has a pleasant sound. It is the great
leveller and educator, it is one of the tested foundations of our
national life in which are rooted our strongest moral forces.
"We shall always retain this military duty, and we shall always
use our military power exclusively to protect ourselves against
injustice; if used for other purposes, it would disintegrate.
Equally important as the blessings resulting from compulsory
military service must we regard those which spring from the
long-standing institution of compulsory education, that has now
broadened out into compulsory attendance at the so-called "con-
tinuation schools."

Our citizenship has ample room for free development. Uni-
versal and equal suffrage throughout the German Empire guar-
antees to the individual his proper influence on the fundamental
principles of our public life. This finds expression in the right
of legislation and control of the German Reichstag. But of
special importance for the position of the citizen is his immedi-
ate participation in the administration of public affairs, whether
these be affairs of state or of the municipalities or of other pub-
lic associations. More than anything else, this direct interest
in the great public workshop gives to the right of citizenship
its highest value and awakens as does no other factor the sense
of solidarity, sharpening the sense of responsibility for future
development. The broadest field in this connection is offered
by self-government in the municipalities, which for more than
a hundred years have regarded this as their most precious pos-
session. The high development of the German city system is
due to the free and untrammeled activity of the best men in
their administration. The excellent results which have been
accomplished in this line will be unconditionally acknowledged,
even abroad. Especially under the stress of this world war
have the German cities shown themselves amply prepared for
the onrush of difficult tasks. And when, in the future, history
shall render its decision as regards this great period, it will not
neglect to give due praise to the unselfish work of German citi-
zens in the self-government of the German municipalities.

BOOK II

GERMANY'S ALLIES

CHAPTER I
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

A, The Inner Structure of the Austro-Hungtarian Monarchy

PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH TEZNER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

VIENNA

THE world has always been skeptical as to the solidity of
the monarchy ruled over by the Austrian Royal House.
Napoleon I contemptuously referred to it as a "geographical
conception," by which expression he meant that practically all
prerequisites were lacking for its existence as a state. Strange
to say, no one ever took the trouble to learn by what means this
conglomeration of countries, formed by the marriage of the
Austrian dynasty with foreign dynasties, and lacking all inte-
gral unity, has been able, from 1526, the year of its birth,
down to the present day to play a world-historical role, which,
as far as we can predict, it will continue to play for many
years to come.

The backbone of this unique commonwealth, to which with
the passage of time other German countries have attached them-
selves (Hungary and Bohemia, 1526), is formed by the "East
Mark," erected by Charlemagne as the outpost of his vast empire
against the Avars, the "yellow peril" of that time. This
culturally important function, both for Christianity and Euro-
pean civilization, was later eflEectively exercised by the "East
Mark," developed into the Eastern Empire, or Austria, against
the Magyars, and again in conjunction with a portion of the
Magyars against the Turks. As already mentioned, in the year
1526 the countries of the Hungarian and Bohemian crown at-
tached themselves to the House of Austria — that is to say, to
the ruling branch of the House of Hapsburg in Austria, the
powerful dynasty of the Holy Roman Empire of the German
Nation. They did this by choosing as their king Archduke
Ferdinand, the later Roman Emperor Ferdinand I. From the
standpoint of the controlling constitutional view at that time,
Ferdinand, through marriage, had acquired clainis to the suc-
cession in these kingdoms. But it is subject to no doubt that
these claims to the royal power would have been unsuccessful
had not the noble and religious oligarchic corporations in both

237

238 MODERN GERMANY

kingdoms (known under the name of "estates"), believed that
they would gain, from connection with a dynasty so powerful in
the German Empire, security for their own preeminent political
position in the face of inner disturbances — ^more especially revolts
of the peasants — as well as against foreign attacks. For Hun-
gary, it must be remembered, the Turkish danger was always
imminent. In so far as the Hungarian and Bohemian nations
remained under the rule of the nobility and the church, the
preservation of both of these nations was dependent on the con-
tinuance of the monarchy. The achievements of the dynasty
for safeguarding and strengthening all the countries ruled over
by it, were acknowledged by the estates of these countries from
1720 to 1722; this they did, partly in the manner of the Hun-
garians by offering the right of female succession to the dynasty
threatened with extinction in its male branch; partly, like the
non-Hungarians, by acknowledging the family law of 1 7 19
founded upon this principle. The public acts of the dynasty
and of the estates looking to this result are included under the
general name of the Pragmatic Sanction, which might thus, in
view of the pronouncement of the estates, be styled a plebiscite
for the monarchy and the dynasty — ^were there not a contradic-
tion of terms in the name "plebiscite" when applied to aristoc-
racy and estates.

The peculiar laws which governed the feudal monarchy and
according to which the ruler could dispose of his prerogatives
as of his own property, or the so-called patrimonial conception
of the state, made it possible for the Austrian rulers, by means
of their royal or princely right, to unite the countries under
their power which resisted a joining together through a federa-
tion of the estates. Supported by this patrimonial view of the
state, tke various monarchs welded together those rights of
rulership which belonged to them by virtue of the various con-
stitutions, as well as those which were not dependent on feudal
cooperation, to form a single sovereign right; they, then, by
virtue of their prerogative of organization, created uniform or-
gans of authority for the whole territory under their rule, for
the purpose of gaining uniform exercise of the rights created
by this welding process.

At the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth
century, the royal administration and legal procedure in the
German-Austrian countries were remarkably well organized,
when compared with the inefficiency of the preceding period;
this organization extended to all conceivable conditions. The
chief aim of the legal reform was to furnish protection to the

MODERN GERMANY 239

unfree peasants and other socially inferior groups of the popula-
tion (the so-called minus potentes) against the misuse of power
by the feudal over-lords, who possessed jurisdictional and police
powers, or against such misuse by the authorities in existence
under the system of self-government which obtained among the
estates. The princes derived their authority for this reform from
the "missionary" conception of their right of jurisdiction, accord-
ing to which it was a power given to them by Grod for the
suppression of every form of injustice, and in the exercise of
which they were responsible to God alone. Their position was
strengthened by the fact that the members of the estates, who
were at loggerheads among themselves, assumed the identical
standpoint by appealing to royal assistance in their disputes.

It was not possible to proceed with the same thoroughness in
organizing the Hungarian and Bohemian territories, as these
countries were burdened with vastly more powerful feudal
groups than was the case in the Grerman-Austrian lands.

Nevertheless, the Austrian rulers, by firmness and wisdom,
which were especially necessary in the case of the recalcitrant
Hungarian estates, were able to maintain their jus belli ac pacts
— that is to say, the military administration in the constructive
or organizing sense of that word, as well as the management of
foreign affairs. Further, they established the right of forming
crown and governmental councils for consideration of the prin-
ciples of government and of the governmental acts of the crown,
as exclusive monarchical prerogatives and removed from the co-
operation of the estates. In this manner, they were enabled
throughout the whole territory under their rule to establish,
within the above-mentioned limits, those uniform and central regu-
lations which made it possible for the monarchy to carry out its
world-historical role. The Austrian rulers were financially able
to pursue their policy of centralization, for, according to the
constitutional view of the time, they possessed unrestricted right
of disposal as regards the income from the domains set aside in
each country for the benefit of the monarch, and also as regards
that accruing from certain tributes levied for the same purpose
(the so-called "chamber revenue") ; in addition, they controlled
the taxes which were voted by the estates. The underlying
principle of this policy is known as the Austrian unity, or im-
perial concept (Gesamtstaats- oder Reichsidee).

The extremely primitive form of the feudal-monarchic constitu-
tions, which gave to royal absolutism legal authority to use its
rights to the full scope permitted by the political situation, ren-
dered it possible under Empress Maria Theresa, in the year 17499

240 MODERN GERMANY

to establish both for the German-Austrian and the Bohemian
lands a single supreme legal tribunal and a single office for
the consideration and preparation of the government's decrees.
For the same reason, it has been possible to maintain this central-
ization down to the present day, whereas Hungary succeeded in
resisting all centralization extending beyond the army adminis-
tration, the administration of foreign affairs and the immediate
participation of the Sovereign. Imperial decrees sent to Hungary
could be promulgated only through the Hungarian Royal Chan-
cellery. This was due to the fact that in Hungary the feudal
system found a broader basis- in the constitutionally organized
lower and middle nobility, and was therefore more capable of
resistance than in Bohemia, where the agrarian foundation of the
prerogatives of the higher nobility became constantly more inse-
cure, as the result of the agrarian reforms in neighboring Prus-
sia. In this difference as regards the success of centralization is
to be seen the reason for the later development of so-called
Dualism.

At all events, the efficiency of this centralization, carried
through with such patience and foresight, was brilliantly at-
tested at this period: all the uniform national states had ac-
quiesced in the destiny prepared for them by Napoleon I, yet
this state, which he had styled a "geographical conception," un-
dertook the role of ultima ratio and destroyed the fiction of the
Emperor's invincibility. Through this success the monarchy
aided the development of the idea of national freedom, which
had been threatened by Napoleon's plans of universal power, at
the same time that it created for itself the great problem which
down to the present day governs its political life; as a result of
the development of hunlan rights, this problem took the place
of that other one, which had been solved, of the suppression of
the privileged estates.

In the year 1804 the regent of the monarchy was proclaimed
Emperor; in 1806 the royal sovereignty was announced as ex-
tending to those countries that had stood in a constitutional
relationship to the old historical German Empire, which was
abrogated. With these countries Austria entered into the Ger-
man Confederacy, founded in 181 5, but whose dissolution oc-
curred in 1866, as the result of the unfortunate outcome of the
struggle with Prussia for the leadership of Germany.

The extremely difficult task of transforming the monarchy
on a constitutional basis took place in the year 1867, after
several failures between 1848 and 1867, and again after an in-
terregnum oif absolutism extending from 1849 to i860; the

— I

MODERN GERMANY 241

result vras that the non-Hungarian countries known as Reichs"
ratslander gained permanent constitutional representation in
the Reichsrat (Austrian Parliament), and that the Reichstag
(Hungarian Parliament), under the form of a convention widi
llie monarch — that is to say, by means of the so-called compromise
— agreed to the demand for recognition of uniformity in the
management of foreign affairs and in the army organization. As
a result the centralization, previously so extensive, became limited
to those activities which at all times have been the absolutely
undisputed prerogatives of the monarchy. In the matter of par-
liamentary control of the affairs of state, the t\^'o agglomerations
of territories which had been formed into states act independently.
Despite the uniformity of the army organization, this independ-
ence is maintained even in the furnishing of recruits and also
as regards the system of defense, for which only an agreement on
general principles is provided ; all the more is it true in regard to
those affairs which are not common to both states. The contribu-
tions of the two states toward the expenses of the common ad-
ministration, the so-called quota, are agreed upon at regular
intervals of ten years between the two parliaments and by sanc-
tion of the monarch. For the same period of time, with the
approval of both parliaments, the agreement of the two states,
or the compromise, is effected in regard to the regulation of their
customs and commercial-political relations; down to the year
1907 this was in the form of a customs-union, but in that year
it took the form of a treaty of customs and trade. This treaty
extends also to the sumptuary taxes, which are so closely
related to the customs, to the minting of coins and printing of
paper money, and to other commercial-political matters. The
fixing of the yearly budget of the two states for the common
administration — the so-called common budget — whose larg-
est item is for the army, is accomplished separately by means
of two parliamentary bodies, the so-called delegations; these are
elected by vote of the two chambers in either of the two parlia-
ments and meet always at the same time in Vienna and Buda-
pest, alternately. These delegations also exercise parliamentary
control of the common ministers, according to the forms exist-
ing for this purpose. This system of union between the two
monarchic states is called dualism, not only because the ruler
enjoys separate and distinct prerogatives as King of Hungary
and Emperor of Austria, but also because of the separate parlia-
mentary handling even of those affairs common under the union.
The Emperor's autograph letter of 1868, announcing the change
of the state's name from "Austrian Monarchy" to "Austro-Hun-

242 MODERN GERMANY

garian Monarchy," and of the ruler's title from "Emperor of
Austria" to "Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary," was
intended as an outward sign of the altered constitutional position
of Hungary within the monarchy.

Universal, equal and direct suffrage was established in the
year 1907 as the elective system for the Austrian central parlia-
ment, the Reichsrat, through the decisive influence of the
Emperor, before which all obstacles yielded. In Hungary a
movement has been launched by the monarch, as King of Hun-
gary, for the development of the same elective system, which
is already in preparation.

In both states legislation has been decentralized. Among
the Hungarian crown lands, the kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia
and Dalmatia occupies a preeminent position, like that of a
separate state, by virtue of which the constitutional relation be-
tween Croatia and Hungary proper can be altered only through
agreement between the Croatian diet and the Hungarian parlia-
ment. The Croatian diet likewise controls cultural legislation.
The head of the government, who is called banus, is constitution-
ally responsible to this diet.

In Hungary proper not alone the administration of local and
provincial interests, but also to a great degree the administra-
tion of the state, is carried on through the self-governing bodies
of the municipalities and counties; the formation of these bod-
ies, it is supposed, was effected by the administrative organiza-
tion of Charles the Great ; throughout the ages they have formed
the bulwark of the political freedom of the ruling classes of the
Magyars.

As regards the kingdoms and countries represented in the
Reichsrat and making up the state of Austria, they have
throughout the whole period of constitutional growth formed
the basis on which the Austrian state was built up. All of
them, seventeen in number, have representative bodies in their
one-chamber diets, which cooperate in legislation, especially in
matters pertaining to agriculture, public works, charities, schools
and municipalities; they have legislative rights as regards laws
touching nationality, civil and criminal matters. Further, it is
the practice of the Imperial legislative powers to turn over to the
various countries control of all affairs within each one's sphere.
The diets and the national committees elected from their midst,
control the provincial administration or the administration of
the land by virtue of the right of financial self-government consti-
tutionally granted to them; they furthermore exercise oversight
of the extensive self-government of the communities, which also

MODERN GERMANY 243

enjoy local police authority. The system of home-rule is almost
republican, in so far as the central administration cannot auton-
omously settle disputes with the independent local government
of the country ; it must appeal to the Imperial Court for a deci-
sion. The system is republican also in the fact that the state
can establish its legal financial claims against a province only
in the civil courts or in the Imperial Court, according to their
private or public nature. The municipal authorities, as well as
the highest communal authorities who supervise them, including
the national committees, are called autonomous authorities, owing
to their independence of the state ; for the same reason the central
and autonomous administration are spoken of as a dual adminis-
tration.

The two countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were
united to the monarchy in 1908, received in the form of an im-
perial decree a catalogue of universal rights of citizens; they
received also an almost complete constitution formed after those
of the Austrian provinces, but containing some deviations due to
consideration for the peculiar religious and national conditions
of the two countries. The supreme government of the two
provinces is in the lands of a conunon ministry.

It is noteworthy that as early as 181 1, that is to say, in the
epoch of pronounced absolutism and centralization, the univer*
sal Civil Code {burgerliches Gesetzbuch)^ regulating the civil
law in the non-Hungarian countries, announced in articles 16
and 17 that every human being has certain natural rights which
are dictated by reason; and that all prerogatives resulting from
these rights must be assumed to exist as long as their restriction
by law is not proved. The same law announces in article 1459
that the right of a person in respect to his own acts is subject to
no limitation through the lapse of time. These principles of
natural rights are the formal sanction of the efforts of the
Austrian rulers, beginning as early as the sixteenth century,
which looked to the improvement of the position of the bonded
peasantry, who were under the dominance of their feudal masters
and manorial lords; these effdtts find their culmination in
the elimination of this personal lack of freedom under Emperor
Joseph II, and in the suppression in the years 1 848-1 849 of the
imposts and personal services to the over-lords, partly on the
basis of indemnification and partly without such indemnifica*
tion. To have brought about this legal condition without blood-
shed, in the face of a socially powerful body of feudal nobility,
is one of the great achievements of the Austrian policy.

The constitution of April 25, 1848, which was t'v n-«:r effort

244 MODERN GERMANY

to found constitutionalism in the non-Hungarian provinces, con-
tains in Article IV this important statement of natural rights:
''The inviolability of nationality and language is guaranteed to
all classes of society."

This principle was given emphatic expression in the following
manner in Article XIX of the fundamental law concerning the
General Rights of Citizens, which forms the basis for the develop-
ment of Austria's law as regards nationalities: "All the dif-
ferent races of the state stand on an equality, and each has an
inalienable right to have its nationality and religion respected
and preserved. The equality of the various languages in school,
in office and public life is recognized by the state. In those
provinces where more than two races live, public schools are to
be so organized that each race receives the support necessary
for the development of its language, without compulsion to learn
a second tongue." Despite the fact that famous jurists have
taken the position that this principle, as it stands, cannot be
directly applied and that special laws are needed for its execution,
nevertheless, the two highest courts — ^namely, the Imperial Court
and the Court of Administration — have formulated, for the safe-
guarding of public rights by means of ingenious decisions, a far-
reaching protection of the national minorities in the various
provinces; nor, in view of the strong nationalistic tendencies of
the autonomous local authorities, has difficulty been encountered
in its practical application. Further, the legislatures of the
various provinces with mixed nationalities seek to attain the same
object by means of thorough-going laws regarding language,
school and electoral rights for the diet.

The organizing of Austria's various nations by law into cen-
tral and branch associations is in process of being carried out.
This advance is due mainly to the noble-spirited writings of the
publicists, Adolph Tischof, Ofto Lang and Karl Renner. Le-
gal development along this line has been less favorable in Hun-
gary, owing to the undeniable obstacles created by the dogma
of the national supremacy of the Magyar race. Nevertheless, a
comparison of the legal position of the non-Magyar nationalities
with that of the non-Russian nations of Russia, or with that of
the barbarically suppressed Balkan countries, is quite inadmissi-
ble. There are, furthermore, plain indications that in the im-
mediate future, as a result of the contemplated adoption of
universal and equal suffrage, the dogma of national priority will
be subjected to further modification.

As a result of the stubbornness and violence of the national
idisputes within the Monarchy and of the emphatic manner in

MODERN GERMANY 245

whidi the constitutional demands of the Magyar nation are
customarily expressed, extremely unfavorable conclusions have
been drawn throughout the entire world regarding the solidity of
the Austro-Hungarian union. This unfavorable estimate may
safely be assumed to have been one of the causes for the decision
in favor of war by the Triple Entente. But from these national
struggles, which, compared with the deathlike silence of the non-
Russian peoples of Russia, must be regarded as a symptom of
an extensive freedom of movement among the nations of the
Monarchy, there has been developed, as we have shown,. as a
result of the hearty cooperation of the legislative and judicial
branches, an admirable law system regarding the relation of the
races among themselves, such as is found nowhere else. This
may serve to give an idea of the extent of the demands of the
various races, which, whenever necessary, are satisfied by judicial
protection, without regard for the increased administrative diffi-
culties. An admirable short summary of this ingenious system of
law is to be found in a recent article from the pen of the Austrian
jurist, Hermritt, in the Austrian Zeitschrift fur Oeffentliches
Recht. This S3rstem regarding nationalities, at a period when
nationalism has developed into a serious danger for the West-
European world, represents a cultural achievement by the state
of the highest order; the various races of the Monarchy have
never resdizcd its benefits more than at present, when Russia
feels herself called upon to substitute her "civilizing and liberating
mission" and her policy of nationalities for the work done within
our borders by our own Monarchy. The Austrian Monarchy^
owing to its ancient character as a tribunal of arbitration, in
which point no other monarchy in the world is to be compared
to it, has for centuries been able to bind together its heterogeneous
national elements into a conservative commonwealth; it has aston-
bhed the entire world to see how these diverse elements prove
equal to tasks in cooperation through the influence of the mon-
archical power to which they would not have been equal through
ties of confederation. And if we are again successful in re-
pelling from Europe the Asiatic hordes, which England and
France have so unexpectedly sununoned and so powerfully sec-
onded, history will be forced to ascribe a glorious share in this
success to our monarchical system, that is the subject of such
great misunderstanding.

^46 MODERN GERMANY

B. Austria-Hungary's Foreign Policy

PROFESSOR OTTOCAR WEBER. OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

PRAGUE

The foreign poliqr of Austria-Hungary finds problems
awaiting it in three directions: toward Germany. Italy and
the Orient. The connection with Germany and Italy has existed
for centuries. It came about through the fact that the ruling
princes of Austria, the Hapsburgs, became at the same time
Roman-German emperors. Not alone in Germany, but in Italy
also, the Empire has interests at stake, as the result of family
possessions. After the dissolution of the German Empire in
1806, there was created the German Confederation, in which
Austria again played the leading role. But in the year 1866 a
change took place. Austria separated from Germany, and under
Prussian leadership was first formed the North Crerman Con-
federation, and then, following the Franco-Prussian War, the
German Empire. The question arose in Austria as to what
attitude she was to assume toward the new state.

Austria had in Italy, on the one hand, her own possessions;
on the other, near relatives of the Imperial family were ruling
in the small Italian states. The Austrian occupation was re-
garded as the greatest obstacle in the way of Italian unity. In
1859, the Kingdom of Sardinia succeeded, with the aid of for-
eign assistance, in acquiring Lombardy, and in 1866 Venetia.
Between these two dates the Italian kingdom had been formed,
into which the small Austrian states were absorbed. Despite
this success, a portion of the Italians considered their task not
yet accomplished, since territory occupied by compatriots was
still under Austrian rule. From this fact was derived the doc-
trine of Italia irredenta, which held that there was still an "un-
redeemed'' Italy. Even with the most liberal interpretation, the
term could be applied only to certain parts of Istria and Dal-
matia, which had previously formed part of the old Republic
of Venice. The other portions of Austria-Italy had never be-
longed to the territories which to-day constitute the Kingdom of
Italy. Trieste, Gorizia and the County of Mitterburg in Istria
have for centuries belonged to Austria ; while the Trentino, whose
connection with Austria dates only from a century ago, was
an independent bishopric. The second question, therefore, for
Austrian diplomacy to decide was as to the attitude it should
assume toward the new Kingdom of Italy and its ambitions.

The problem is quite a different one as regards the Orient.

MODERN GERMANY 247

From the earliest times Austria had stood as a barrier s^ainst the
tribes who poured in from the East: Avars, Magyars, Turks.
It ivas a question of preserving Western civilization, and at the
same time of carr3dng it into the East. Austria has alwajrs
served as a connection between West and East : the course of the
Danube — the great river flowing through the country — urged to
a commercial connection with the Orient. With the incorpora-
tion into Austria in 1526 of Hungary and Transylvania, this
oriental policy gained a further impetus. Fresh acquisitions in
the eighteenth century, like Galicia and Bukovina, rounded out
still more the eastern boundaries of the Monarchy.

The third question which demanded an answer was whether
Austria, following the course of the Danube, should make new
territorial acquisitions, or content herself merely with the eco-
nomic conquest of the Orient. While Austria-Hungary early
came to an understanding with Germany and Italy, her relations
with the Power which also had important interests at stake in
the Orient — namely, Russia — ^remained always doubtful. On
this account the relations of the Danube State to Russia during
the last sixty or seventy years have been of the greatest impor-
tance.

For the last two hundred years the aim of the Muscovite
State has been to gain Constantinople and a passage into the
Mediterranean. For this purpose it was necessary to destroy or
absorb Turkey and split it up into its various elements — Slavs,
Greeks, Rumanians. With the Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula,
Austria-Hungary had intimate connection through her own
South-Slavic subjects. Of these South-Slavs, the Croat ians have
always been distinguished by their pronounced attachment to
Austria and a certain unfriendliness toward Hungary. The
feeling at the beginning of the eighteenth century that started
the movement of the Pragmatic Sanction was a logical outcome
of this. It established the indivisibility of the Austrian coun-
tries and the succession to the throne within their boundaries.
The Croatians had feared lest they might be separated even-
tually from Austria. Their South-Slavic sister-nation, Serbia,
who is distinguished from Croatia by religion and script, found
her chief point of accord with the latter country in hatred of
Hungary. This was intense enough to outweigh her affection
for Austria. Thus movements against Austria always found
encouragement on Serbian soil. Austria-Hungary's attitude
toward Turkey and toward the latter's vassal states, as well as
toward her own Slavic subjects, is strongly influenced by Russian
politics; in the changeable attitude of the latter toward Austrian

448 MODERN GERMANY

policy the key is chiefly to be sought for the acts of the Austrian
foreign minister.

The relations between Russia, Austria and Prussia had been
friendly since the "Holy Alliance" had transformed a romantic
idea of Emperor Alexander I, of Russia, into a practical reality.
Personal friendship among the monarchs strengthened this con-
nection. In the year 1849 Russia helped to suppress the Hun-
garian revolt. The manner in which this was done, it is true,
did not quite meet the wishes of the Austrian government. The
message which the Russian general after the capitulation of the
Hungarian army sent to his Emperor — "The whole of Hun-
gary lies at Your Majesty's feet" — gave no intimation that the
Austrians had cooperated bravely in the suppression of the Hun-
garian revolution and that the Russians had merely been their
allies.

Russia herself over-estimated the value of her assistance to
Austria. She believed that she had made the entire Austrian
policy subject to her dictates. In the year 1853, trusting to
this and filled with contempt for the other European Powers, she
undertook an attack against Turkey. She had, however, made a
mistake in her calculations. Not only did Austria refuse to
cooperate with her in this attack against the Porte, but likewise
France, England and later Sardinia proclaimed their opposi-
tion to it. We are interested, however, only in Austria's attitude.
She hoped to be able, under the guidance of Count Buol, to
support the Western Powers, to persuade Russia to abandon
her dangerous design, and thereby to gain territorial acquisitions.
And this she thought to do without taking part in the war.
This proved to be a mistake. The result was that without
gaining the confidence of the Western Powers, she earned Rus-
sia's bitter hatred, and in the treaty of peace (1856) was forced
to give up the principalities of Moldau and Wallachia, which
she had sdready occupied. Russia made Austria pay dearly for
her course. As a matter of fact, she had no reason to resent
the attitude of the Danube State, for if Austria had joined the
other enemies of Russia, the latter might have been brought
at that time into the greatest distress, and the fruits of a suc-
cessful war for Austria would probably have been the acquisi-
tion of one or more of the Balkan States. One may say of
Austria's policy at this time that it was weak, but uncondi-
tionally peaceful.

From this time on, at every turn, Vienna encountered Russia
as an enemy. This enmity was without cause, for it was Aus-
tria's foreign minister. Count Beust, who at the end of the six-

MODERN GERMANY 249

ties pointed out the possibility of altering the conditions of the
peace of 18.56, which had placed sharp limitations on Russia's
naval power in the Black Sea, When later, during the Franco-
Prussian war, Russia, of her own initiative, declared the agree-
ment void, she was able to refer to Beust's proposition. Neither
Germany nor Austria offered opposition to Russia, but it proved
difficult to win England over. In the year 1871 the new Crerman
Empire was brought into being; Austria-Hungary accepted this
condition without hesitation, and took successful steps to enter
into pleasant relations with the new state and also with Russia.
Beust's successor, Count Andrassy, followed wisely in this path.
In the year 1872 there was a meeting of the three Emperors in
Berlin, the immediate result of which was the establishment of
friendly relations among them; and during the next year this
led to treaties among the three Powers. Visits of Emperor
Alexander II to Vienna and of Emperor Franz Joseph to Petro-
grad rendered possible the settling of all delicate diplomatic ques-
tions in a peaceful manner.

But this truce was not destined to last long; critical days
began in the Balkan Peninsula. The states standing under
suzerainty longed more and more for full independence, and the
peoples directly subject to the Porte wanted freedom. In Herze-
govina a dangerous rebellion broke out, which communicated it-
self to Bosnia, was encouraged by Serbia and Montenegro, and
even affected the South-Slavic provinces of Austria-Hungary.
So deeply was the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy affected by this
that two absolutely unimpeachable witnesses, the Russian diplo-
mat Count Ignatiev and Prince Nikita of Montenegro, expressed
the thought independently of each other that Austria would
have to interfere. Above all, however, Russia desired to profit
by the disturbances in the Balkan Peninsula for her own pur-
poses. As a prerequisite to this she had to be certain that
Austria-Hungary would not attack her from behind. Hence
in Reichstadt in Bohemia, on July 8, 1876, a treaty was made,
according to which, in case of Russian success, the Danube
State was to acquire a portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This agreement was supplemented at the beginning of the
year 1877 to the effect that these provinces were to fall
entirely into Austria-Hungary's hands, not alone for occupation
but for absolute possession. Protected in this manner, Russia
began the war against Turkey, in which she at first suffered
heavy losses; but later, when Rumania had joined her, bril-
liant successes followed. Russia desired to profit unrestrictedly
thereby. In the treaty of San Stefano (March, 1878), the

250 MODERN GERMANY

map of the Balkan Peninsula was completely altered. There
was no more talk, however, of a cession to Austria-Hungary!
The latter country could not allow itself to be treated thus, and
since England also assumed an attitude of emphatic opposition
to Russia, a great clash of arms seemed imminent. It was due
to Bismarck that this catastrophe was prevented.

In the Congress of Berlin, that lasted from June 13 to July
13) 1878, Russia was forced to submit to material changes in
the treaty of San Stefano. The destiny of Bosnia and Herze-
govina was settled. On June 28, England's second representative
at the Congress, Lord Salisbury, made the motion that the two
provinces should be given up to Austria- Hungary for occupation
and administration. For reasons of safety, she was also granted
the right of military occupation of the district of Novi-Bazar
(Sandjak). It would have been easy for Austria at that time
to carry through the annexation of these provinces; neither
England nor Russia would have been able to prevent this. It
was due primarily to the consideration of Count Andrassy for
Turkey, whose feelings he desired not to wound, that Austria-
Hungary did not occupy them. The Sandjak of Novi-Bazar
remained under Turkey's civil administration.

A glance at the map shows how important the possession of
these provinces is for Austria-Hungary. They furnish the nec-
essary hinterland for the South-Slavic provinces, Dalmatia espe-
cially gaining protection in her rear. It must not be forgotten
that Herzegovina territory touches the Adriatic Sea at two
places, cutting Dalmatia at these points. Further, it must be
remembered that the continual disturbances in these countries
were a constant danger to Austria-Hungary and that an end
could be put to them only by firm and energetic administration
on the part of Austria. Even the most uncompromising enemies
of the Dual Monarchy cannot deny that it has accomplished
important cultural work in the two provinces in the period since
1878.^ Military occupation of the Sandjak was important and
of value for Austria's political position, as by this means a
wedge was driven between Serbia and Montenegro. It was
assumed in foreign countries that Austria some day would take
advantage of this advance post to make an attack against Sa-

* See Austrian Policy since 1867, by Murray Beaven, Oxford Pamphlets^
<9i4> PP* 8-9: .. . "That Austria efficiently carried out the task entrusted to
her is not now disputed. . . . The condition of Bosnia and Herzegovina at
the date of their definite annexation in 1890 is a standing contradiction to Mr.
Gladstone's Midlothian statement: 'There is not a spot upon the map of Europe
where you can lay your fingers and say: "There Austria did good. '

See also The War and Democracy, by R. W. Seton-Watson, London, I9i4«
p. 146: "Great material progress had been made. Roads, railways, public buila-
uigs had been created out of nothing, etc"

MODERN GERMANY 251

loniki, through the Vardar valley. A state with an aggressive
military policy would assuredly have taken this step in the
course of the following years.

We may be permitted finally to recall to the mind of the
reader that at ^e Congress of Berlin the independence of Ru-
mania, Serbia and Montenegro was established, the principality
of Bulgaria created, and, in addition, a separate Turkish prov-
ince of East Rumelia. The last two, after a few years, cele-
brated their union. As a reward for Rumania's faithful assist-
ance her "patron" (Russia) deprived her of the valuable province
of Bessarabia, giving her in return only the Dobrudja.

The attitude of Russia in these last years had been so unre-
liable and so threatening to the general peace of Europe (as a
result of Emperor Alexander II having given himself into the
hands of advisors who preached the evangel of Pan-Slavism and
were obsessed with the most rabid Germanophobia) , that Prince
Bismarck was most doubtful of the continuance of German-
Russian friendship and sought to guard against a Russian attack.
It was evident that such an attack would instantly have caused
a war between France and Germany, and against this double
danger Bismarck was called upon to protect the German Empire.
He, therefore, made a treaty offer to Austria which met the secret
wishes of Count Andrassy. Emperor Franz Joseph forgot in
the most generous manner the events of 1866, and gladly agreed
to this treaty. Bismarck succeeded in convincing Emperor Wil-
liam I of the necessity of such an alliance. On October 7, 1879,
a treaty was signed between Austria and Germany of a purely
defensive character. It was aimed expressly against Russia and
obligated both signatories, in case of an attack by Russia, to
support each other with their whole strength, and to sign peace
only in common. No other state was mentioned, but it was
said that in case "such a Power" (meaning France) should attack
Germany, or Austria-Hungary (probably indicating Italy), and
should be supported in this attack by Russia — in such an event
also the above-mentioned treaty should come into force. The
treaty was drawn for no definite period of time, but was to
continue automatically, unless abrogated. So clearly did it meet
the needs of the two states, and so great a factor has it been for
thirty years in preserving European peace, that it has thus con-
tinued automatically since 1879.

The fact must be emphasized that this treaty had a most de-
sirable influence on Russia. In the year 1881 it was possible to
renew, among the three emperors, the friendly conferences
which, in 1884, led to the meeting of the three monarchs in

ayz MODERN GERMANY

Scierniewicc. It was intended to prevent war-like complica-
tions, and to this end misunderstandings were to be settled hy
discussion as they arose. This was a revival of the agreement of
1872.

Lord Salisbury called the signing of the German-Austrian
alliance "an event of great joy"; three years afterward it re-
ceived an important extension, which was greeted by England's
hearty expressions of sympathy.

In the year 1881, France unexpectedly occupied Tunis. Italy
had designs upon this country; she regarded this ruthless act of
France as the result of her own absolute isolation, from which
she now made energetic efforts to free herself. The negotia-
tions, begun in Rome, were brought to a relatively speedy con-
clusion through the visit of the royal Italian couple to Vienna.
As early as May, 1882, the alliance between Austria-Hungary,
Germany and Italy was signed, which is known as the Dreibund.
It is said to have been made for a period of twelve years, with
certain clauses relating to its abrogation, and has subsequently
been regularly renewed before its expiration. The last term
ran until the summer of 19 14, but it was renewed as early as
December 7, 1912. We are not definitely familiar with its pro-
visions; it is known only that the three Powers have reciprocally
guaranteed each others' possessions, and that the alliance is ex-
clusively for purposes of defense. We know, further, that in
the year 1902 it was supplemented by a provision touching Aus-
tria-Hungary and Italy alone, to the effect that territorial ac-
quisition in Macedonia by Austria-Hungary was to bring with
it a compensation for Italy. This provision, however, was
rendered nugatory by the recent Balkan wars.

Count Andrassy retired from his position immediately fol-
lowing the formation of the German-Austrian alliance; but his
successors, no matter who they have been, have faithfully pur-
sued his policy. This policy may be expressed in the following
manner: continuance of the friendship with Germany and Italy,
maintenance of correct relations with England and France, with
whom Austria has but a few points of contact, careful preserva-
tion of peace with Russia, strengthening and upholding of the
Turkish Empire, and preservation of peace in the Balkans.

To preserve friendship with Germany was the easiest of all.
This was largely owing to the fact that Kaiser Wilhelm II has
maintained the most intimate personal relations, not only with
Emperor Franz Joseph, but with the latter's probable successors
as well. We all vividly remember the close bonds of friendship
which united the German Emperor both with Crown Prince

MODERN GERMANY 253

Rudolph and with Archduke Franz Ferdinand. This Austro-
German friendship successfully stood the test on many occa-
sions. To mention two striking examples will suffice. It was
the Austrian diplomatic representative, Count Welsersheim,
who, at the portentous conference of Algecirds (1906)1 at a
very critical moment, supported Emperor Wilhelm, to use the
latter's own expression, ''as a most brilliant second" ; Austria in
1909 received a full return when her ally checked the threaten-
ing attack of Russia, and thereby preserved peace.

It was a much more difficult matter always to preserve peace-
ful relations with Italy. The exaggerated ardor of Italian
patriots, who were united in the effort to rescue "unreclaimed"
territory {Italia irredenta), has been a stumbling block in the
path of our well-intending statesmen; but in conjunction with
the never-failing skill of Italian statesmen, it has proved possible
for Vienna to overcome these obstacles. For the Italian Govern-
ment was hitherto always wise enough to perceive that the great-
ness and prosperity of the country did not depend upon the
acquisition of a village in the Trentino or in Dalmatia, but that
it did depend upon the development of Italian supremacy in the
great and promising territory in North Africa. After Tunis had
been lost to Italy, and her Abyssinia enterprise had come to
naught, she finally turned her attention to Tripoli, and during
the conquest of this country and the war against Turkey she
found her rear most effectively protected by Austria. Questions
of common interests between Austria and Italy in the Balkan
Peninsula were also settled in a thoroughly satisfactory manner.
Apart from the already mentioned treaty concerning Macedonia,
It was necessary to confer in regard to Albania. According to
a report which has never been contradicted, toward the end of
the nineties a division of the spheres of interest in the Balkans
was effected between Austria and Russia; through this division
Albania would have come under Austrian influence. It was
obviously important for Italy not to lose sight of the east coast
of the Adriatic. In full appreciation of this condition, in the
year 1897, and again in the year 1900, the Austrian Government
gave the Italian Government the assurance that it desired to
settle the future of Albania only on a basis of mutual under-
standing. The result of this loyal agreement was that, when in
191 3 the re-formation of the Balkan Peninsula was being dis-
cussed, the two Powers conjointly advocated an independent
principality for Albania, the practicability of which, it is true,
has not yet been proved beyond doubt.

As we have seen, through the meeting in Scierniewice, the

354 MODERN GERMANY

relation of Austria with Russia had taken on a more or less
favorable aspect, which the ministers, Counts Kalnoky and Go-
luchovski, strove honestly and successfully to preserve. Nor
was this relationship disturbed by any direct Austro-Hungarian
differences, such as border disputes in Galicia or Poland, or by
commercial rivalry; the only disturbing factor was jealousy as
regards the Balkans.

In that connection there were many dangerous shoals to be
crossed. As, for instance, when in the year 1885 Bulgaria and
East Rumelia formed their union, and immediately war broke
out between Bulgaria and Serbia; in 1886 the fall of the first
Prince of Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenberg, took place, and in
the next year the new Prince, Ferdinand of Coburg, was forced
to sue for Russia's recognition. In these various affairs Austria
succeeded in gaining many important concessions from Russia.
These matters lead us to discuss in detail the relation of Austro-
Hungarian politics to the rise and development of the various
Balkan States.

As early as the fifties in the last century, weighty voices in
Austria had called attention to the importance of Serbia. Many
persons believed that Serbia was destined to play the same role
in the Balkan Peninsula as Sardinia had played in Italy, and
Prussia in Germany. It was, therefore, in Austria's interest ta
maintain the most friendly relations with Serbia, without, how-
ever, allowing this state to become too powerful. The first of
these aims was accomplished at the time of the war already re-
ferred to between Bulgaria and Serbia (1885-86), when the
Austrian government placed an emphatic check on the victorious
advance of Bulgaria into the heart of Serbia. The immediate
result was a close treaty of friendship between Serbia and Aus-
tria. As long as King Milan reigned, conditions remained un-
changed. With the advent, however, in 1889, of Milan's son»
Alexander, to the throne, the relation of the great state to its
small, restless neighbor became less favorable. A condition bor-
dering on anarchy, fostered by Russia, came into existence, and led
eventually to the king's murder. The murderers placed Peter
Karageorgevich on the throne, and Russian dominance now be-
came evident in Serbia, driving the country into increasing en-
mity toward Austria. The statesmen of Austria felt called upon
to combat this unfriendly attitude in the commercial field and
this led to the so-called "Hog War." The heavy economic
losses which resulted from it rendered the name of Austria
daily more odious, and drove Serbia unreservedly into Russia's
arms. There may be people who hold the opinion that Austria'^

MODERN GERMANY 255

Hungary might have acted with more consideration for Serbia's
feelings, and have shown greater readiness in meeting the de-
mands of the king's murderers, without regard to political eti-
quette. Translated from diplomatic language into plain Eng-
lish, this would mean that the statesmen who had gained power
in Serbia should have been flattered by gold and favor. But, on
the other hand, it must not be forgotten that this course was
generously followed with regard to Montenegro, which has ex-
isted down to the present time on Austrian gold; yet, despite
this fact, the Russian Czar was able to declare that Montenegro
was ''Russia's sole genuine friend in the Balkan Peninsula."

Another consideration to which weight must be given is the
fact that, as a result of the racial affinity of the Serbs on the
two sides of the Austrian boundary line, Serbian enmity early
succeeded in arousing tendencies within the Empire which ren-
dered a friendly attitude toward the new government in Bel-
grade scarcely possible.

The relations of Austria to Bulgaria have at all times been free
from such difficulties; so that the Vienna government, after the
failure of its efforts to support Serbia against Bulgaria, was
able to turn, without scruple, to the advancement of the Bul-
garian plans. The disagreement between Serbia and Bulgaria,
which had assumed unexpected proportions as a result of the
last Balkan War, offered a tempting opening for the Austrian
statesmen, nor did the Vienna government need to have this
pointed out to it a second time. Unfortunately, this led to less
favorable relations with Rumania.

Of the two non-Slavic states which, toward the north and
south, guard the entrance to the Balkans, Rumania has from
the start been favorably inclined toward the policy of the Drei-
bund. She had felt all too keenly in 1878 the thanklessness of
Russia, who, as already mentioned, had deprived her of the
fruitful province of Bessarabia. Other factors, however, con-
tribute to render Rumania's attitude comprehensible — the na-
tionality of King Charles, who was never able to forget that
he had been a German prince, and Italy's alliance with Aus-
tria. There was naturally a bond of union between Rumania
and the linguistically related country south of the Apennines.
Rumania carefully abstained from participation in the last Bal-
kan War, awaiting the development of affairs. When, after
the victory of the Balkan League, disputes that eventually led
to war broke out in regard to the division of Macedonia be-
tween the previous allies, Serbia and Bulgaria, the two leading
Slav states, Rumania at the last moment drew her sword to

356 MODERN GERMANY

enforce a decision. The territorial extension which she desired
was to be secured only from Bulgaria. The Viennese govern-
ment thereby found itself in a difficult position — should it side
with Rumania or Bulgaria? To decide this question in a man-
ner above criticism was, perhaps, beyond human wisdom. At
all events, the immediate result was in so far unsatisfactory that
neither Bulgaria nor Rumania felt that their interests had been
sufficiently considered; especially did the Bukharest government
make this known through a perceptible cooling in its Austrian
sympathies. Fortunately, however, great political policies are
not controlled by temporary sentiment, but by permanent interests,
and these tend constantly to lead Rumania back to the Central
Powers.

In this connection mention must be made of the fact that in
view of the unavoidable action and reaction of interior and foreign
politics, the governments both at Vienna and Budapest will find
a rich field for activity after the war: a more general regard
for the feelings of the Italian subjects in one part of the Empire
and of the Rumanian subjects in the other will lead to a better
understanding between the two states.

As regards Greece, the other Balkan border state, she has
always enjoyed friendly treatment at the hands of Austria-
Hungary, as was repeatedly made clear at the time of the set-
tlement of the Cretan question.

It must not, however, be forgotten that all of these states of
which mention has been made formerly formed part of Turkey
in Europe, and that every increase in power of any of them
denotes a weakening of Turkey. How difficult was it, then, to
reconcile the preservation of Turkey with the benevolent atti-
tude which the young, ambitious Balkan States expected of
Vienna! In this connection it must be borne in mind that each
sign of coolness from Austria-Hungary was apt to drive the
states in question into Russia's arms. The difficulties which the
various Austro-Hungarian ministers were called upon to meet are
scarcely to be gauged. These difficulties were often still fur-
ther increased by Turkey's recalcitrant attitude in regard to sin-
cere suggestions of reform.

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, Russian and
Austrian politics in the Balkans were fairly at a balance ; no par-
ticularly warm friendship developed between Austria- Hungary
and Russia, but on the other hand there was no marked clash
of opposing interests. In Petrograd diplomats were well satis-
fied to be able to oppose to the Dreibund the alliance with
France, which had taken shape during the years 189 1 to i895>

MODERN GERMANY 257

and efforts were made to preserve the friendly relations of the
moment. Russian statesmen at this time conceived ambitious
plans as regards Asia. They hoped to be able to carry them
through without great difficulty; the only Power which might
be dangerous to them in this connection, England, stood ''in
splendid isolation." These Asiatic plans demanded European
peace as a prerequisite, and when, in 1897, Emperor Franz Jo-
seph paid another visit to Petrograd, the opportunity was taken
advantage of to divide the Balkan Peninsula into Russian and
Austrian spheres of interest. The friendly understanding
thereby achieved seemed to justify a hope that in the future
every movement in the Balkan Peninsula would be observed by
the Austro-Hungarian and Russian statesmen, and discussed
by them before it could develop into a dangerous conflagration.
The plan seemed to be successful, and a few years later it was
decided to subject the Macedonian trouble to the same treat-
ment. On October 2, 1903, the Russian and Austrian foreign
ministers met at the Imperial Austrian hunting lodge at
Murzsteg and reached a definite understanding by which all
problems arising in the future in the Balkans were to be solved
in common. The Macedonian revolt was to be the first ques-
tion so treated ; in this manner, the Austro-Russian understand-
ing was confirmed, and Russia was able without anxiety to de-
vote herself to her Asiatic endeavors.

Russia's Asiatic plans had encountered opposition from a
quarter where it had not been anticipated — ^Japan. In the year
1904-5 war broke out between the two states, resulting, after
stubborn resistance, in Russia's complete defeat. As a result of
this war, an internal movement started in Russia, which for a
long time paralyzed the resources of the state and occupied its
entire strength. While Russia was passing through this grave
crisis, Austria-Hungary observed a strictly correct attitude. The
possibility of proceeding to a change of the status quo in the
Balkan Peninsula during this period (even if this had meant
merely the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was
not taken advantage of by the government on the Danube. Aus-
tria-Hungary's statesmen may perhaps be blamed for weakness
at this point, but they can in no wise be charged with war-like
proclivities. Austria-Hungary was at that time in just as favor-
able a position for war as ten years later. The provisions of
the Dreibund, which was intended for defense, not for attack,
were carried out literally. Russia was enabled undisturbed to
recall her defeated regiments from Asia and to employ them
for the suppression of the revolution — her influence in the Bal-

258 MODERN GERMANY

kans sufiFered not the slightest diminution. Austria-Hungary
carried out the programme of Miirzsteg in a meticulously con-
scientious manner. Count Goluchovski was displaced in the
Vienna foreign ministry by Count Aehrenthal. But for the mo-
ment Austria-Hungary's policy continued as before, although
European conditions had long since undergone a great change.
This change must be briefly considered here, since the policy of
the Danube State could not escape its influence.

An English pamphleteer of the present war has characterized
the Dreibund and its epoch, in a manner which calk for im-
reserved endorsement He states that the Triple Entente was
created as a reply to the Dreibund, and he continues thus :

''Both alliances were concluded originally as purely defensive.
For twenty years European peace rested upon a secure basis, for
the simple reason that there was no Power which mig^t have
profited by a disturbance of the peace."

This is correct down to the last word — for if one reckons
twenty years from the formation of the Dreibund one reaches
the year 1902, and this was the first year of the reign of King
Edward VH. Under him the one Power which might have had
an interest in a disturbance of the peace, namely, England, came
into the foreground. This is not the place to enumerate the
reasons and the many proofs of England's belligerent attitude.
The fact remains that at this time the encircling of Germany
began, which was gradually to include Austria-Hungary also.
There followed King Edward's trips to Paris, Spain and to
Italy, in the course of which this policy was partly prepared and
partly carried through. The crowning touch was put to it by
the English king's visits to Ischl and Reval. We are unfortu-
nately insufficiently informed in regard to these events, but the
results plainly indicate their inature. The attempt to entice
Austria to abandon the Dreibund was a failure; but, on the
other hand, the pronounced differences between England and
France and between England and Russia were temporarily elimi-
nated. One could not long fail to see that storm clouds of the
most threatening character were gathering at all points.

Quite unexpectedly, however, even to the most trained ob-
server, the storm broke in Constantinople. The Young Turk
movement in 1908 brought old Turkey to her knees. The
"Sick Man," for whose recovery the European doctors had so
often vainly striven and who had been forced to swallow so
many "reform pills," to no avail, was now finally made an end
of; a new and youthful spirit, armed with all'the modem meas-
ures of Kultur (parliamentary system, etc.), was to rule at the

MODERN GERMANY 259

SuUIme Porte. The states of the Dreibund encouraged in the
most emphatic manner this movement toward betterment at the
Golden Horn, as it was in accordance with their conservative
peace policy that the existing Turkish State be upheld. At the
same time, however, it appeared to Aehrenthal high time finally
to put an end to the uncertain status in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and frankly to apply the proper name to a situation which had
in fact long existed. Austria-Hungary, through thirty years of
tmremitting effort, had so striven for the welfare of these occu-
pied provinces that it appeared only right that the occupation
should be changed into an annexation, as a reward for this labor.
We will let the English pamphleteer speak again on this point.
He says:

"Bosnia-Herzegovina had been Austrian territory for thirty
years, save in name only; and there was no more reason for
assuming that Austria would ever leave these countries than for
the assumption that Great Britain would willingly abandon
Egypt." ^

How was this measure carried through ? Far from springing
a fait accompli on Europe, Austria had carefully prepared the
ground for the annexation. According to our information, the
Russian Foreign Minister Isvolsky, on June 19, 1908, suggested
to his Austrian colleague the words which the latter afterward
used. He did even more: he advised not only the annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but likewise that of the Sandjak. In
September of the same year the two ministers met at Buchlau
in Moravia. Aehrenthal made no secret of his intention to
carry out the annexation. The Russian minister seems to have
agreed in principle, but with diplomatic slyness at the same time
he attempted to gain for his own state what in June he had
already hinted at: he demanded a further revision of the Treaty
of 1856, namely the opening of the Dardanelles to the Russian
war fleet. Russia was at last to gain the long-desired entrance
into the Mediterranean. The demands of the two ministers
stand in marked contrast to each other as regards their import.
One of them desired only clearly to establish an existing condi-
tion, whereby the actual relations of the Powers would not suf-
fer the slightest derangement; the other sought to force the

^Aushriam Policy smct 1S67. Beaven, pp. 16-17, See also The War and
Democracy, by R. W. Seton- Watson, p. 146: "To any impartial observer it had
been obvious from the first that those who dreamt of Austria-Hungary's vol-
untary withdrawal from the two provinces were living in a fool's paradise.
The formal act of annexation merely set a seal to thirty years of effective
Anstrian administration. . . . Austria had come to stay, and Aehrenthal. in
annexinff the provinces, felt himself to be merely setting the seal to a docu-
ment wnich had been signed a generation earlier. . . ."

26o MODERN GERMANY

Eastern question into a new phase and greatly to strengthen
Russia's power.

Both statesmen, however, separated in seeming satisfaction.
As was later learned, Count Aehrenthal ofiEered no objection in
principle to the passage of the Russian ships through the Dar-
danelles, on the condition that certain measures of precaution
were taken for the safety of this maritime highway, similar to
those taken with regard to the Suez Canal. But this matter
was by no means ripe for action and settlement, while there was
no reason for delay as regards the Austro-Hungarian proposi-
tion. In connection with Bulgaria's proclamation of the change
to a kingdom, Austria-Hungary completed the annexation of the
two provinces on October 5, 1908.

Thereupon a storm broke loose in the Russian, English and
Serbian press, which was calculated to make one believe that the
three Powers had suffered injury in the most unheard-of manner.
As a matter of fact, they seem to have been surprised only by
the speedy action of the Austro-Hungarian minister, whereas
there could be no room for doubt as to his intention, and also
as to harmlessness of the act. Isvolsky asserts, however, that
he had been outwitted by von Aehrenthal — a fact which does
slight honor to his skill as a diplomat. The date of the annexa-
tion, it is true, seems not to have been fixed in Buchlau, Aehren-
thal promising to write once more beforehand to his colleague.
The Russian received this letter in Paris on October 2, but
allowed the following days to pass without making a move. Not
until a week later, in London, did he make an outcry and pub-
licly declare that he had been duped.

Russia and Serbia stood in need of an excuse for their anger
against Austria-Hungary, and England also desired to let the
Vienna government feel the force of her displeasure for having
resisted the English bait. Both sides began to arm, war ap-
peared inevitable between Austria and Serbia, and Russia
seemed ready to take part.

In this connection one step of the Austrian minister must be
clearly remembered. Simultaneously with the annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary surrendered her val-
uable and important position in the Sandjak and gave this terri-
tory back to Turkey. An act of such unselfishness is unknown to
history. Thereby Austria abandoned her designs on Saloniki
and retained for herself only the commercial conquest of the
Balkans. It might have been expected that the new Turkish
government would appreciate Austria's moderation and give its
blessing to the rechristening of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfor-

MODERN GERMANY 261

tunately, the new rulers at Constantinople were badly advised,
and offered the most stubborn opposition to Austria's poliqr.
Only as a result of extended discussion, and of a boycotting
which bore heavily on Austria's commerce, followed finally
by the payment of a large sum of money, was the approval of
the annexation gained in Constantinople.

Meanwhile, a veritable witches' sabbath had come upon
Europe, and it required a very emphatic declaration by Germany
that if Russia attacked Austria the German Empire would be
found by the latter's side, to force Russia to call a halt, thereby
placing a damper on the Serbian outburst. But the wick con-
tinued to smoulder with much evil-smelling smoke. Serbia
declared herself threatened in the highest degree by conditions
which she had calmly contemplated for thirty years, and she now
sought to mobilize Serbians in Austria-Hungary for her own
purposes. Austria's desire for peace, for which her surrender of
the important Sandjak had again given so convincing a proof »
was contemptuously interpreted as weakness. It became an
axiom in the Balkan states, especially in Serbia, that Austria
was a dying power. It was claimed that the patriarchal
respect which the aged Emperor Franz Joseph enjoyed among
his subjects scarcely sufficed to hold the state together. This
view was spread throughout the whole political world, was
everywhere more or less accepted, and influenced opinion against
the Danube State in the most remarkable manner. As excuse
for the credulous, who have since had their calculations upset
by Austria's cohesive strength, it must be stated that they were
unfortunately to a great extent supported in their view by
Slavic voices within the Monarchy itself. This is an ex-
tremely regrettable confession, but one which cannot be with-
held in devotion to truth. It was not a question of agents
provocateurs who were paid by the Austrian Government to
mislead foreign countries, but of conscienceless, traitorous scoun-
drels whose company we do not begrudge to our enemies.

Count Aebrenthal, who had guided the ship of state with
firm hand during a difficult period, became seriously ill and
was forced to make place for Count Berchthold. Difficult
tasks awaited this diplomat as he undertook the burdens of
office. Serbian discontent continued uninterrupted, partial
mobilization had to be undertaken anew, Austria's commerce
suffered under continued threat of war, and the state paid
heavily for this apparent peace.

The Balkan Alliance continued meanwhile to be quietly
formed. Before the Young Turkish state could develop its

a62 MODERN GERMANY

full strength, the one-time vassals of European Turkey hoped
completely to destroy it.

The Balkan War broke out. Austria-Hungary took no
steps to furnish aid to Turkey — a course which would have
been to her political advantage — ^but abandoned the Balkan
Peninsula to the Balkan peoples. Turkey was conquered and
lost nearly her entire European possessions. A violent dispute
immediately broke out in regard to the booty, the allies being
unable to agree on the division of the spoils. Serbia was de-
termined, before all, to reach the Adriatic and acquire a harbor.
Montenegro likewise demanded a portion of Albania, together
with Scutari, the old Albanian capital. The Vienna Govern-
ment offered uncompromising opposition to both of these de-
mands; in this it enjoyed the most ardent support from its ally,
Italy, which could permit as little as could Austria, a Slavic
great power to gain a firm footing on the east coast of the Adriatic
or occupy important portions of Albania. For it was perfectly
clear that Serbia or Montenegro would serve merely as proxy
for Russia. The two allies were successful in their opposition,
and Serbia, ousted from the west, turned toward the east. It
was demanded that Bulgaria surrender Macedonian territory,
upon which she had already placed her hand; over this dispute
war broke out between the two previous allies, the results of
which have already been discussed. The peace of Bukharest of
191 3 is the epilogue to these conflicts.

Serbia's machinations against Austria, incited by Russia, con-
tinued to increase in violence. The tension between the two
Powers became unbearable. On June 28, I9i4» the explosion
occurred. Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his consort were
shot down in Serajevo by Serbian murderers. This death was
really a dramatic fatality. It had been said of the murdered
Archduke that had he lived he would have worked for an im-
provement of the condition of the Slavs in Austria; certain is it
that his whole environment had educated him to Slavic sym-
pathies. It would be presumptuous positively to assert that the
Archduke would have substituted for the Dualism a Trialism in
Austria, by which the South Slavs would have been enabled to
play an important role. Nevertheless, such an intention must
be considered as within the realms of the possible. By this means
the South Slavic inhabitants of Austria would perhaps have been
able to win over their brothers beyond the border and thus offer
the strongest check to Serbia's propaganda in Austria. All these
dreams were shattered by the death of the Archduke. A
diorough-going search for the actors in the tragedy and their

MODERN GERMANY 263

backers, which Austria was in duty bound to make, led to persons
who were in positions of honor and trust in Serbia. Indeed, the
tracks led even beyond the Serbian boundary. It would have
been unworthy of a great state to permit such a band of murderers
to remain at its borders without making an effort to avenge the
crime and to prevent a recurrence of similar events, which the
next time might involve the monarch himself. Vengeance was not
demanded in the first heat of anger, but only after four weeks
had elapsed and after contempt had again begun to be expressed
at Austria's weakness. It was demanded that an investigation
of the strictest kind be made by the Serbian government, and
that guarantees be given that the affair would not degenerate
into fine phrases and regretful shrugging of the shoulders.
The sole possible manner of securing a serious investigation was
to undertake it with the cooperation of Austrian officials. Only
with such control would it have been possible to get to the bot-
tom of the matter, and to prevent the Serbian government from
encouraging such crimes in future. But precisely against this
condition did the Serbian government protest most violently,
thereby giving proof that it had cause to fear the investigation.
A government quite uninvolved in the affair might quietly have
submitted to this formality. That Austria had at last developed
energy was regarded in Belgrade as an insult.^

Although Austria's demand was justified and, as pointed
out, offered the only guarantee for a rigid prosecution of the
investigation, the Vienna government would have been willing,
as we know to-day, to renounce its demand at the instigation
of its ally, Germany. But Russia, desiring war, did not await
the residt of German intervention, but mobilized, and thereby
started the World War.

If we now throw a comprehensive glance back on the Austro-
Hungarian policy of the last twenty or thirty years we cannot
but arrive at the conclusion that it has been conservative and
peace-loving in the highest degree. True friendship towards Aus-
tria's allies, and friendly readiness to meet her rival, Russia,
half-way — such have been its characteristics.

Austrian diplomacy refused to take advantage of favorable
opportunities to increase its power, such as the Russo-Japanese

^ See Austria-Hungary and ih€ War, Ernst Ludwig, Conml of Austria-Hungair
at Cleveland; New York, 191 s> p. 6^. An interesting precedent is noted. On
Tune 10, 1808, Prince Michael Obrenovich of Senna was assassinated in
Topchider. The traces of the murder led to Servians living in Hungary. For
this reason an investigation was started by the Hungarian government. There-
upon Servia requested that Servian officials be allowed to assist in the investi-
gation, and the Hungarian government, having nothing to hide, consented
without hesitation.

264 MODERN GERMANY

War. One is almost tempted to say that it neglected to pro-
tect the Turkish Empire against its vassals. It abandoned the
Balkans to the Balkan nations, and protected its own interests
only to the minimum of necessity. For herself Austria desired
and received nothing beyond the possession of the two provinces
which had been ofiFered to her by Russia and almost forced
upon her by Europe. Nor were these provinces taken until
thirty years of beneficent service had been rendered to them.
But all this restraint availed Austria nothing. At the moment
when she showed courage to demand vengeance for a crime
without parallel, her enemies attacked and sought to punish
her for the sole crime which she had committed — ^namely, that
of living.

History, the judge of events, will undertake in more peaceful
future times the impartial award of praise and blame. It
will establish this fact: the Austro-Hungarian policy may fre-
quently be accused of unduly calm reserve and caution, but
never of belligerency or desire for war. The best expression
of this is to be found in a statement of the universally revered
Emperor Franz Joseph:

^'Austria-Hungary can never wage an offensive war, At
^ust wait until she is attacked."

CHAPTER II
TURKEY

PROFESSOR CARL BECKER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN

TURKEY'S accession to the cause of the Central Powers
was a great surprise to outsiders. For many years we
had been accustomed to see the Sublime Porte skillfully play
one Great Power off against the other, without identifying her-
self with the interests of either. The friendly relations of
Germany and Turkey were a matter of common knowledge,
but so was the deep-seated influence of the Entente Powers.
From Germany and Austria-Hungary the Porte had nothing to
fear; at the beginning of the war England, Russia and France
had solemnly guaranteed her territorial possessions in case of
loyal neutrality. The Ottoman Empire, moreover, had shortly
before suffered the terrible disaster of the Balkan War; party
conflicts were raging within its boundaries, and sweeping re-
forms demanded attention. In short, even a superficial acquaint-
ance with conditions seemed to show that Turkey's traditions
and interests dictated absolute neutrality. Nevertheless, from
the beginning of the war those in authority at Constantinople
left no stone unturned in the effort to be prepared for a pos-
sible struggle on four fronts against the Entente Powers; and
when finally the demands of the Western allies became un-
reasonable, in the last days of October, 19 14, they drew the
sword.

The ofiicial publications of England and Russia make it
appear as if peaceful Turkey had been plunged into an under-
taking of incalculable consequences and of a nature contrary
to her true interests, through pressure from Germany exercised
through the German military mission and through the cruisers
Goeben and Breslau, which the Turkish Government had pur-
chased. For purposes of anti-German propaganda, this expla-
nation is admirable; unfortunately, it does not accord with the
facts. The English and French fleets lay at the entrance to
the Dardanelles; the faintest sign, therefore, from the Sublime
Porte would have sufiiced to bring relief from unwelcome Ger-
man coercion. The German military mission might have been
rendered innocuous just as easily as the English naval mission.

265

a66 MODERN GERMANY

But these considerations are not to the point. Turkey entered
of her own initiative into this war, which is for her a war of
defense in the strictest sense of the word. The fact that the
decision of the cabinet was not unanimous proves nothing as to
the government's desire for war — it is a matter of common
knowledge that several of the English ministers resigned their
portfolios. That Turkey was in close touch with her German
advisers in regard to this decision is only natural. But the very
fact that she had selected German advisers and that she had
joyfully welcomed German ships in the Dardanelles proves
conclusively that in responsible Turkish circles an identifica-
tion with the German cause was desired from inner conviction.
According to the Turkish, as well as to the German view, the
interests of the two countries were identical. The development
of the German friendship into a German-Turkish community
of interest, in the face of the political supremacy of the Entente
Powers on the Bosphorus and of the French and English
influence in matters of education and the press — that is the real
problem of the German-Turkish alliance.

The only possible course for the Asiatic states, if they wish
to survive despite the European policy of power, lies in strength-
ening themselves internally by making use of the ideal forces of
the modern state and in adapting themselves to the demands of a
world organized along capitalistic lines. The decisive problems
are, therefore, those of the state and of economics. The problem
of civilization, or culture, is inseparably connected with each of
these. Hence, that Asiatic state will show itself most capable of
survival which is able to graft the new requirements onto the
ancient roots of its strength, and which gains the opportunity for
organic development through outward conditions of peace. Japan
occupied this unique position, thanks to her insular situation far
removed from Europe, and thanks to the homogeneity of her popu-
lation and to the adaptability of her ideals of government and of
her civilization. China, which might easily follow in the same
course, is forced to contend with other and more serious diffi-
culties: ancient historical divergencies between the provinces,
the proximity of the Great Powers, whose greed for land and po-
litical and commercial interests run counter to the strengthening,
even to the preservation of China, and finally childish experi-
ments with a form of state that disregards all national tradi-
tions. But, from every point of view, the position of Turkqr
favors survival the least.

Geographically, Turkey invites the interference of the Great

MODERN GERMANY 267

Powers. Placed at the meeting-point of three continents, she
commands the natural gateway into Asia and threatens the
flank of Africa* If strengthened in a military way, she might
blodc land communication between the Mediterranean and the
Indian Ocean, she might indeed threaten the water connection
between these two seas. As mistress of the Bosphorus and
of the Dardanelles, Turkey holds in her hand the key to the
international commerce of all the Mediterranean powers. At
the same time, her territory is by nature one of the richest in
the world and the seat of the most ancient civilization of man-
kind. There where the Babylonian, the Assyrian and the Greek
civilization has bloomed, as well as that of the Caliphs, a new
and glorious world might at any moment arise. The ruins and
deserts of Asia Minor call, as it were, for the living waters of
European organization.

Even more complicated are the ethnographic conditions. Tur-
key unfortunately is not inhabited by Turks, as Japan is by
Japanese; Turks and Arabs, Armenians and Kurds, Greeks and
Bulgarians are forced to live side by side in this empire, not
to speak of smaller femnants of other races. This mixture of
races was much worse before the Balkan War, and in this
respect the painful amputation of the European provinces was
undoubtedly beneficial to Turkey. The racial mixture, how-
ever, is to-day still a problem. This multiformity, however,
would not be such an impediment did the peoples in question
live entirely within the Turkish boundaries. But the bulk of the
Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians, the Christian citizens of
Mohanunedan Turkey, live outside of Turkey. Especially do
the Greeks flirt with the thought of liberation and the realization
of the national ideal of a Greater Greece. Their enthusiasm,
therefore, for the renaissance of Turkey is not great. Likewise
the Bulgarians, who are not very numerous, regard themselves
as '^unredeemed." The Armenians are scattered throughout the
entire empire, but the main portion of the nation dwells in Russia
and Persia and the recollection of their national independence lives
unquenched in their hearts. The unfavorable position of the
Russian Armenians influences them, it is true, in the main to be
loyal cooperators in the rebuilding of Turkey; but certain circles
have sought too long by sanguinary means to force the interfer-
ence of Europe and have suffered too greatly from the Kurds to
be able entirely to repudiate this past Of the Mohammedan
peoples, the uncivilized Kurds are not for the moment to be
considered in the work of cooperation; while the Turks and
ArabSy the most important national elements, stand in sharp racial

^68 MODERN GERMANY

opposition to each other. The Turks are the master nation,
they have conquered all these countries and peoples, they are the
upholders and the military backbone of the state. The glorious
traditions of Turkey are bound up with their name, with their
national dynasty. The Arabs, on the other hand, are the chosen
people of religious tradition, according to the Mohammedan
view the chief among the nations ; in their aristocratic pride they
submit only with inward protest to the rule of the Turks, who
excel them in capability and especially as regards character. The
leadership of Islam properly belongs to the Arabs. But the
opposition between Turks and Arabs is by no means the whole
of the problem. The Arabs are split as regards religion; their
most industrious radal relatives are the Catholic Syrians, to whom
for a double reason Turkish supremacy is hateful. Both peoples,
finally, are represented beyond the boundaries of Turkey, and
Pan-Turkish interests are furthered among the Turks, Pan-
Arabic interests among the Arabs — a fact which does not con*
tribute to simplify the ethnologic problem of the Ottoman State.
National and political boundaries thus coordinate at no point ;
we have here the difficulties of Austria-Hungary translated to
the Orient. They are increased still further by an economic
factor. The nations most active commercially of Turkey are
Christian, especially the Greeks and Armenians. They have
for a long time furnished the commercial as well as the cultural
connection with Europe, or more properly expressed, with the
Levantines, the South-European emigrants who settled on the
east coasts of the Mediterranean, where they served to advance
the economic interests of European expansion. The elder
Turkish civilization oppressed and molested this class, and in
consequence it sought the protection of those powers interested
in the weakening of Turkey. Such ancient habits are not to be
uprooted on the spur of the moment, by means of a still very
imperfect constitution. The ruling race of Turks has not been
able, in view of its national character and traditions, to com-
pete commercially with these elements. The Anatolic peasant,
upon whose labor in the last analysis the welfare of Turkey
depends, is too undeveloped and too ruthlessly exploited to
form the nucleus of the national economic system of the Moham-
medan-Turkish state, though, together with his Arabian co-reli-
gionist in Irak, he will one day be called upon to play this role.
Political power and economic strength, the two fundamentals
of a modern state, are thus divided among different peoples in
Turkey, a fact which plainly tends to sharpen racial contrasts.
Then, too, there is the constantly threatening danger of commer-

MODERN GERMANY 269

cial and political interference by great and small Powers, which
see in the evolutionary conflicts in Turkey only the "beginning
of the end," and eagerly await the moment which, with the
ruin of Turkey, will bring the long hoped-for and carefully
prepared realization of their secret desires.

Previous to the age of capitalism, of conunercial intercourse
and imperialism, these centrifugal elements of Turkey were
held in check by the patriarchal and absolute Islam state. Herein
the Turkish-Islamic elements, strengthened by Arabs, Kurds
and Albanians, ruled not alone de facto, but also de jure, as a
master caste over the economically active Christian Raja peoples.
If the latter provided public revenues, the former bore arms
for their protection. The real state was formed only by the
faithful; the Christians were subject peoples, who as regards
their individual and legal rights formed separate groups under
the protection of the Turkish government. The Turkish
Sultan was the absolute ruler, for the Turks had conquered
the Arabs and Kurds, although the latters' position as Moslems
was a different one from that of the non-Moslem races ; the fiction
of the Islam state with the Caliph at its head was preserved.
The Sultan as the most powerful ruler in Islam claimed the
Caliphate, that is, the temporal leadership of the faithful. He
was the protector of the Holy Cities, he waged his wars as
Holy Wars (d jihad) y he was the protagonist of the Faith
against Heresy. The Holy Law of the Skeriat was the law of
the state, although in practice it was frequently not applied, or
was supplemented by secular laws, the so-called kanun-nameks.
With all the conscious strength of racial bonds, the Ottoman
state rested upon a purely religious foundation. Nationalistic
thought is in the Orient a product of most recent development.
The state was held together by the will of the ruling Turkish
class and supported by the consciousness of religious solidarity
among its Mohammedan subjects. The Christians were sub-
ject foreign peoples, like the Tartars in present-day Russia.
The economic bond, well into the nineteenth century, was the
Turkish feudal system, which was not based like the Western
system on land, but on rent and tax-rent. It lies in the nature
of Orthodox Islam to spread ; if it retreats its destiny is sealed.
Turkish supremacy is slowly being crowded out of Europe, and
the previously so despised "heathen" are beginning gradually
with their commerce, with their political power, and above all
with their ideas, to undermine the ancient conception of the
state. The superior strength of the modem state is recognized,
hence the work of reform by Mohammed II. The army was

270 MODERN GERMANY

reorganized, the feudal system gave way before the provincial
constitution, European jurisdiction and legal equality of the
Christians was proclaimed ever anew, but never, or only par-
tially, made a reality. The previously contemptuously granted
"capitulations'* became an unbearable burden, which robbed the
growing modern Turkish state of all freedom of movement The
premature ultra-liberal experiment of a western constitution
(midhat, 1876) was crushed by the reaction of Abdul-Hamid.
The power of the state became a despotism. Opposed to the
advance of European ideas, the Sultan emphasized more and
more his title as Caliph. With increasing feebleness, he attempted
a policy of prestig&^eeking by gathering, at least theoretically,
around his tottering throne the Mohammedans of the whole
world, who, in the face of increasing intercourse, become more
conscious of their solidarity, although their political union is
no more than a Utopian dream. Europe, therefore, ignorantly
regarded him as a Prince of the Church, a sort of Mohammedan
pope. But absolutism in its exaggerated form led to a catas-
trophe. Young Turkey came into being with the watchword of
the French Revolution.

The belief in the omnipotence of modern ideas gives the Turk-
ish Revolution and the resulting attempts at reform a touching
character. Only gradually and following bitter experiences were
the ideal value of historical inheritance, and the importance of
power for practical politics recognized as the real state problem
of the present. The question arises : How must the new Turkish
state be organized under the above described geographic, ethno-
graphic and historical conditions, if it is to assert itself?

Self-assertion was the goal clearly in view of everybody follow-
ing the revolution; indeed, in regard to the question of sover-
eignty, there was a marked sensitiveness, even where this
sovereignty was nothing more than a name. Bulgaria's declara-
tion of independence, the Bosnian and Cretan questions were
the source of almost as great excitement as later the Tripoli
and Balkan wars. Up to the time of the outbreak of the World
War, the degrading tutelage of the "capitulations" was keenly
felt. All interference of the Great Powers in internal affairs
was indignantly resented. Maintenance of Turkish independ-
ence— this was the first, the fundamental demand of Young
Tutkey. No protectorate, of whatever nature it might be, no
international supervision was to be endured. But for the carrying
through of this program, strengthening of the state was neces-
sary, and before all a reorganization of the army. This task,
however, demanded as a prerequisite the purifying of the consti-

MODERN GERMANY 271

tutional conception of the Empire. But on this point there was
a wide divergence of opinion among the different parties, and
the embittered conflicts of the various conunittees were mainly
in regard to the fundamental attitude toward the problem of
the state. There was a violent struggle as to the form of govern-
ment— whether it should be that of a union or of a federation —
and also as to its character — ^whether a neutral Turkish national
state on a constitutional basis, or a state of the Caliph of all
Islam.

The first of these questions was the chief point of dispute
between the Committee for Unity and Progress, on the one hand,
and the Liberals, on the other. A Turkish statesman has char-
acterized this antithesis, which seems to him also a structural
antithesis, as the difference between the centralization of France
and the decentralization of England and her daughter states.
"At bottom, the battle of the two parties was in effect that
between the ideas of Auguste Comte and those of John Stuart
Mill and Desmoulins." Closely connected with this was the sec-
ond problem of state, although on this point the defenders of the
different theories frequently united in a single party. Should
the various nationalities and religions be brought together with
equal rights and duties under the standard of Ottoman national
unity? This was the view especially of the theorists from
Paris. Or should the Turks, as the rulers, dominate all and
seek contact with their ethnological relatives beyond the borders
of the Empire ? This was the hope not alone in many circles in
Constantinople, but equally among the tools of Russia. Or,
finally, should the glorious Caliph tradition be preserved as de-
veloped by Abdul-Hamid, and Pan-Islamism be used as a weapon
against the outside world, as many among the Mohammedans
held, especially the Arabs and the rank and file of the army?

The Turkish parliament and the struggles of the committees
have often been severely criticized; but could such a portentous
decision be reached without conflict ? The ideals of the Caliphate
as a state and those of the French Revolution cannot be com-
bined without compromise.

The liberal, European neutral form of government was at
first triumphant; Christians, who had previously been excluded
from the army, were now admitted. Utopians throughout the
world were jubilant. It had not been a revolution, it was de-
clared, but an evolution. It was proper that the form of state
should thus develop of itself. The experienced politicians of
the old regime, however, continued to rule, the Young Turks
not immediately assuming the actual direction of affairs. Time

273 MODERN GERMANY

was to be granted for the new ideas to make their way. This
was the great mistake in the calculation. Power, not ideas, is
the decisive factor in all historical development. Presently out-
lying territories were lost, while within the Empire itself con-
fusion reigned ; in short, the exigencies of the battle for existence
forced the advocates of centralization to assume responsibility.
The idea of a federal state gave way at the moment of need,
because those upholding it coquetted with the possibility of foreign
protectorates and thereby endangered the basis of the state's
preservation.

The army, as the upholder of the revolution, was forced to
seize the reins of government, or all would have been lost.
All "imported" desires of the theorists had to be sacrificed to
the necessity of maintaining the morale of the army. Thus, under
the spur of necessity, return was made to the old conception of
the Islam state, with retention, however, of the constitution.
The Christians in the army had not measured up to the standard ;
but neither had the Turkish soldier proved of great value in a
secular war for the unfamiliar conception of the "Fatherland."

"Fanaticism is the only motive able to move the Anatolian
soldier. . • • The idea of a fatherland is foreign to the Turkish
mind, and the Young Turk Committee that had striven to
create 'Ottomanism' achieved naught." These are the words of
a French eye-witness of the Turkish collapse in the Balkan war.*
For the army, the state conception of Islam was a necessity. The
emphasizing, however, of the Islamic idea in the constitutional
state had become less dangerous, as the result of the Balkan
War, since the most important Christian provinces had suflEered
amputation, and the Islamic element was numerically far in
excess in this new and diminished Turkey. In addition, there
had been a steady stream of Mohammedan immigration from
the lost provinces. Further, in the Islam state Arabians and
Turks, the most important national elements, were able to work
peacefully together on the basis of historical tradition, and with
typical Oriental disregard of nationality. A decisive factor,
finally, was the knowledge that the European Powers with
Mohammedan subjects regarded with suspicion the idea of the
international solidarity of Islam; but since the days of Abdul-
Hamid the Turkish government had learned how to play on this
string. To counteract the increasing pressure of die Powers,
the decision was reached in Constantinople to cultivate Pan-
Islamism as a political weapon. The Young Turks desired to

^ Histoire de V Empire Oitoman, Le Vicompte de la Jonqm^* Paris, 1914 (ame
ed.). Vol. II, p. 396.

MODERN GERMANY • 273

be an Islamic Great Power, and by means of the international
nature of Islam they thought to increase their prestige. Thus,
the outcome of the constitutional struggles and of the military
reverses has been a centralized Islam state — ^not the state, how-
ever, of the old Caliphate, but a modem constitutional state,
with the Caliph at the helm and with Pan-Islam tendencies. The
Christian subjects enjoy freedom and equality in the Turkish
Empire, but the state religion is Islam. We have a parallel in
the religious character of the Christian constitutional states,
Austria and Russia. In the same manner that Russia is waging
a war for the realization of ancient religious ideals, so likewise
the Sultan-Caliph proclaims the holy war of Islam. The Turkish
demands, on the basis of this solution of the problem of state
are: self-preservation, strengthening of the army, a constitution,
and the Islamic character of the state.

The economic problem has, of course, not yet been solved;
but its elements, so far as the state's interests are concerned, are
evident. Every genuinely Turkish policy must reckon with the
inherited economic conditions and with the natural treasures
of the soil. The new state authorities, however, despite their
good intentions, found themselves face to face with a difficult
situation springing from inherited conditions. In their efforts
to pursue a national economic policy, they ran counter to foreign
interests at every turn. Foreign policy and economic reform
were inseparably bound together. This resulted not only from
the backwardness of the country, but very largely from two fur-
ther fundamental causes, one historical, the other economic:
from the ''capitulations" and from the lack of capital in Turkey.

The "capitulations" have developed from old commercial
treaties. As regards the state, their chief economic significance
lies in the fact that tariff increases require the approval of the
treaty Powers, and that Europeans enjoy immunity from taxa-
tion. The customs duties are exclusively ad valorem . In recent
years they have been gradually raised from eight to fifteen per
cent. The economic condition is monstrous which allows a state
no tariff differentiation, either as regards countries or classes
of goods. In case of an increased need of revenue, quite uncon-
templated economic injury may result. Every fractional tariff
raise must be arranged with the Powers, each of whom demands
compensation in the form of commercial or even political con-
cessions. But even this is not all. The immunity from taxa-
tion of the Europeans, who are almost exclusively merchants,
makes it impossible adequately to tax the natives engaged in

274 MODERN GERMANY

commerce, since they would thereby be rendered incapable of
competition. It has thus hitherto been impossible, though these
circles are financially the most competent, to tax them cor-
respondingly, and the chief burden has been laid on the feeble
shoulders of the rural population. The leading men of Turkey
longingly awaited the moment when it would be possible to
free themselves from this economic strait-jacket, to say nothing
of the restrictions placed upon the authority of the state as
regards police and judicial matters. The war has at last
opened the way in Turkey for healthy reforms in these fields,
especially for die regulation of the finances on an independent
basis.

Lack of capital in Turkey, both government and private,
was another incentive for the policy of interference. The fact
that the Turkish national bank, la Banque Ottomane, is an
absolutely French undertaking, will not be gone into further
at this point, important as it is; but Turkey is a thoroughly
typical debtor state. In the balance of trade the item of commer-
cisil paper stands exclusively on the debit side of Turkey's ledger.
In order to secure money for her loans, she is driven to great
sacrifices — indeed, the attempt has even been made to force her
to grant political accessions in return for loans. For economic
and strategic reasons, extension of her railroads was needed.
European private capital was eagerly offered for these promising
undertakings, but behind the companies stood the political repre-
sentatives of the capitalists, and their desires were defeated or
hindered by competing statesw The Anatolian railway was not
allowed to be continued through the eastern part of Asia Minor^
since Russia considered her boundary threatened thereby; and
even the Hedjaz railway, which had been built by Turkey herself
with non-European capital, was refused a terminus on the Red
Sea, since England feared for the Suez Canal. When one Power
gained a concession, despite the protests of the other Powers, the
latter immediately demanded indemnity concessions. Turkey's
national economic policy, therefore, was not dictated by her own
interests, but by the private economic interests of European
capitalists, or by the political ambitions of the great Powers.

As long as Turkey worked in conjunction with all the Powers,
there could be no great uniform plan for her benefit, or for
strengthening the country internally. To throw herself un-
reservedly into the arms of any one of the Powers was not possible
without a complete breach with all the others; and the danger
was always present that the price of healthy economic develop-
ment might be the loss of independence. For was there a single

MODERN GERMANY 275

great Power which had an interest in seeing Turkey strengthen
herself as an independent state? Was not the desire of all of
them to gain economic spheres of interest in order to pave the
way for territorial acquisitions? The interests of the Turkish
state demanded European guidance, since economic reform could
not be achieved independently. The more uniform this guidance
was, the better it would be. The natural leader of Turkey,
from the Turkish point of view, must be that great Power whose
own interests demanded a strengthening of Turkey. But did such
a Power exist?

Before we attempt to answer this question, however, we must
contemplate the economic problem from the economic point of
view, in the narrower sense of the word. What are the economic
conditions and demands for the future suggested by Turkey's
natural treasures? Soil and climate predestine Turkey as an
agrarian state along great lines. Grain is not the only factor
in this connection; the most important place is held by the
product which has greater value in the world's market — cotton.
In addition to the well-watered territory of Southern Anatolia,
which offers a fine field for this staple, the ancient country be-
tween the Euphrates and the Tigris, where cotton even grows
wild, is one of the natural places for its cultivation on a vast
scale. Were the necessary irrigation provided, results might
be achieved according to the statement of the English engineer,
Sir W. Willcocks,^ which would far surpass in quality and quan-
tity the Egyptian product. New Turkey must reckon with this
great potential factor in determining her future political attitude
toward the Powers.

But Turkey has also an industrial future. In view of her
stage of development, she will not be able for many years to
count upon native industries of a quality equal to those of Eng-
land or Germany, since a high grade of popular education is
a prerequisite for this. But she will be in a position before
long to provide independently for the industrial utilization of the
products of her soil by simple weaving and milling industries.
The production of petroleum will be another important activity.
There are petroleum deposits of great extent in Asiatic Turkey,
not to speak of mineral treasures which are as yet almost un-
touched. Turkey's interest, therefore, demands that if she is
to enter into closer relation with any Power, not only must the
political aims of the two states be reconcilable, but their natural
economic conditions be complementary, so that Turkey may
be hindered neither politically nor economically in her justifiable

^ Thg Irriioiion of Mesopotamia^ 1905.

276 MODERN GERMANY

development into a modem state, but assisted in a full and
speedy evolution.

What, then, must be the nature of Turkey's foreign policy,
on the basis of her political and economic needs as outlined above ?
To continue to solve the problem as hitherto — namely, with the
rival cooperation of all the Powers — ^has already been shown
to be irreconcilable with Turkish interests. Let us for this
purpose examine the political and economic relation of the vari-
ous states to Turkey.

Russia, Turkey's powerful northern neighbor, must at the
start be rejected as a possible mentor, for the Muscovites are
hereditary enemies of the Ottomans. The gradual advance of
the Russians, first to the banks of the Black Sea and then around
this great inland body of water, was made at the cost of Turkey.
The Dardanelles are the historical goal of Russia's imperialistic
policy, they are the gateway to the ocean for Russian trade,
while for the Russian Church the possession of Constantinople
and Jerusalem would mark the fulfilment of century-old long-
ings. Political hopes, economic necessity and religious antitheses
make Russia the natural enemy of Turkey. Far from strength-
ening Turkey as a state, for more than a century the policy of
the Czars has been in every way to weaken her as much as
possible. Whoever strengthens or supports Turkey is the enemy
of Russia. This is the explanation of Russia's anger against
Germany in the matter of the German military mission of
1913-14. The view taken by public opinion in Russia at the
time was "that a real strengthening of Turkey appears to the
Russian Empire as something which must be prevented." ^ Rus-
sia, it is true, saved Constantinople in the Balkan War from being
engulfed by the Bulgarians; but this she did not in order to
preserve it for the Turks, but that she might conquer it for
herself, as Sassonov boldly stated on February 9, 1915, during
the war session of the Duma. Whatever may be thought re-
garding the indiscretion of this statement, nevertheless it formu-
lated the will of the nation. ' In keeping with this, Russian
schools, churches and conunercial enterprises were established
for the purpose, not of strengthening, but of undermining Tur-
key. Moreover, Russia is an agrarian state like Turkey, she
produces the same things in great quantities; her industries are
in a state of infancy to which Turkey's might easily attain —

^DeMttckiands auswdrtige PoKtik x888 bis X9i3» Count Ernst ra Rcrentlow,
p. 383.
* See Prtussischg Jahrbucher, Mitrofanor, 1914.

MODERN GERMANY 277

hence, economically an alliance between Russia and Turkey would
be contrary to reason. In such a case, Turkey would sink,
politically as well as economically, to the condition of a Russian
province, and Russia would merely acquire a few additional
enslaved foreign peoples.

But if Russia was the hereditary enemy of Turkey, until re-
cently England was her traditionsd friend. Up to the last few
decades of the nineteenth century, England had a genuine interest
in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire : English and Turkish
interests seemed identical.

England's interest in the maintenance of Turkey was two-
fold— it was governed by colonial as well as international con-
siderations. With one hundred million Mohammedan colonial
subjects of her own, England could not with impunity view
the growing sentiment of Pan-Islamism. Since the mutiny of
1857, 1^0 security was felt regarding the Islamic population of.
India. Friendly diplomatic relations with the Sublime Porte
were sought in order that England might pose as the protector
of Islam and thereby influence the loyalty of the Indians. The
chief factor, however, in England's Turkish policy was her
antagonism to Russia. The hig^ tide of this feeling was reached
at the time of the Treaty of Berlin. In keeping with an old
principle of action, England avoided the creation of a land
boundary between her own possessions and any Continental Great
Power, and for this reason she strove for the preservation of
Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan as the naturad buffer states
between the Russian and English spheres of interest. The aban-
donment of this policy was not the result of a sudden decision,
but was due to a number of motives. After the opening of the
Suez Canal, despite England's efforts to prevent it, this direct
course to India became so important that Great Britain was
forced to occupy Egypt. The Red Sea, however, is a continua-
tion of the Suez Canal. This meant for England the beginning
of the problem of an Arabian question. But at the same time
the new course of English policy, commonly called Imperialism,
had been entered upon.

In addition to the Cape-to-Cairo program, there arose the
new battle-cry "From Cairo to Calcutta 1" Egypt, which was
still legally a Turkish province, became the comer stone of
the British world empire. The occupation of Egjnpt, called
temporary in all official statements, became thereby definitive.
The friendship between England and Turkey suffered a severe
strain. The logical extension of this policy could result only in
the severance of the Arabian provinces from the Ottoman Em-

278 MODERN GERMANY

pirc Only if weakened, could Turkey be permitted to remain
mistress of the borderlands of the Red Sea. England, therefore,
began to foster throughout Arabia the seditious elements and to
hinder the strengthening of Turkey. The rebels in the province
of Asir, in the Yemen district, whidi had never been entirely con-
quered by Turkey, found support and encouragement from Eng-
land. The Hedjaz railway, which is vital for the strengthening
of Turkish influence in Arabia, could not be continued to the
Red Sea, owing to English opposition. Turkey, it is true, was
badly advised in the unfortunate Akaba affair. Further inland,
where the Bedouin Empires of the Banu Sa'ud and of the Banu
Rashid stood opposed to each other, the former, who were enemies
of the Turks, gained the .upper hand by means of English
weapons. As a consequence, Turkey saw herself forced to fur-
nish weapons to the Banu Rashid; this was a measure which
cut both ways as regards the peace of Arabia and Mesopotamia.
This policy carries us through the Central Arabian uplands
to the Persian Gulf, where Turkish supremacy had never been
very firmly established, although individual local sheiks and other
rulers found it to their advantage to accept an ofiicial Turkish
title. The extension of British influence to this point was
part of the policy that aimed at the protection of India's flank,
and that did battle against the pirates and slave-dealers, and is
not to be construed as a manifestation of political enmity to
Turkey, any more than England's relations with the southern
coast of Arabia. The treaty with Maskat in 1798 was aimed
rather at France and Holland. The treaties in the early part of
the nineteenth century, also, were merely treaties of commerce
and friendship — ^thus England's connection with the Gulf was
legitimate and long-standing. As early as November, 1839,
the first Anglo-Indian report was published in regard to the
harbor of Koweit, which later became so celebrated; but in the
period of imperialism these treaties gradually acquired a different
character. One little sheik after the other renounced the right
of negotiation with foreign powers — in 1892 the Sheik of Bah-
rein, in 1899 the Sheik of Koweit. These are protectorate agree-
ments with careful avoidance of the word. But Turkey like-
wise asserted certain claims to Koweit, whose sheik was a Turk-
ish kaimmakam, and to Bahrein. Koweit became of the greatest
importance for Turkey with the beginning of the Bagdad rail-
way, as for a long time it was regarded as the only possible
terminus of that road. England, however, sought to gain posses-
sion of this harbor. It was not until 1913 that an agreement
was reached in regard to Koweit between England and Turkey,

MODERN GERMANY 279

by which Turkey was forced to yield to English pressure along
the whole line. England at the same time sought and gained
a free hand in respect to Bahrein. At about the same period
Ibn Sa'ud occupied the last Turkish possessions on the Persian
Gulf in which Turkish garrisons were still to be found, namely
the districts of El-Hasa and El-Katif. According to the general
belief of the Orient, Sa'ud is merely a tool of England. Thus
at the very moment when Turkey's outside possessions began
to be of importance for the increase of her strength, she found
herself face to face with the silent and tenacious Arabian policy
of England, seeking to deprive her of one province after the
other.

In regard to England's ultimate aim, however, there could
be no doubt in the mind of any thinking Oriental after her action
in Persia. Russia, following her disastrous defeat at the hands
of Japan, had ceased to be England's chief opponent. Germany
was so greatly strengthened that England changed her tradition^
Asiatic policy fundamentally, in order to secure a free hand
against Germany. The idea of a buffer state was definitely
abandoned in the Persian Treaty of 1907, and North Persia was
sacrificed to Russia. In his book, ''The Strangling of Persia"
(London, 1912), W. Morgan Shuster has shown the absolute
lack of scruple in the course which was followed. He had been
employed to reorganize the finances of Persia. But as this did
not agree with the interests of Russia, he was forced to yield.
He says:

''Russia is now (April 30, 1912) the sovereign power in
Persia. She is the practical and effective ruler of the country.
The whole of Persia is to-day a satrapy. The peoples, however
brutally treated, have no means of protest. Fear, deadly sicken-
ing fear of the prison, noose and torture, is the force with which
Russia governs." (p. 236.)

According to Shuster's opinion, however, responsibility for
this lies with England, who, from dread of Germany, has sacri-
ficed every one of her ideals in her Asiatic policy. "British
prestige has suffered all over the world, and the English people
are openly dissatisfied because they can no longer appear as
the friend of weak and struggling nations." The Turks under-
stood this. The interest of the British world empire, as conceived
in the Foreign Office after 1907, demanded the dismember-
ment of Turkey, for in view of the unparalleled rapidity of Rus-
sia's advance in Persia, the Persian Gulf was threatened unless
Russia could be deflected toward the Dardanelles. Arabia,
Mesopotamia and South Persia to be given to England; the

28o MODERN GERMANY

north of Turkey to Russia — such was the plan which would
have fulfilled Muscovite hopes and at the same time have realized
the uninterrupted English overland connection of Cairo and
Calcutta. Furthermore, this would have given the death blow
to Germany's ambitions in Turkey. Such political aims are
seldom realized by a direct process; but only by keeping these
ultimate aims of England in mind is it possible to understand
her policy toward Turkey. This has been openly admitted by
French observers. Rene Pinon speaks thus of England :

''She boldly assumed the offensive, encouraged the revolts of
Yemen and Hedjaz, gave shelter in Egypt to the committees of
the 'national Arab party/ despatched the engineer Sir William
Willcocks to Mesopotamia — provoked finally the Koweit affair
and profited by that of Tabah."^

The aim of all these undertakings was to weaken Turkey.
And that policy which had been successful in Egypt, should
it not be feasible also in other Arabian provinces of the Ottoman
Empire ?

England's imperialistic course and her understanding with
Russia rendered her impossible as a political guide for Turkey,
whereas from a purely economic point of view she seemed to be
predestined to be such. France, the oldest friend of the Porte,
was for similar reasons excluded from this candidacy, despite
the fact that since the days of Francis I her enmity towards Aus-
tria had frequently brought the two countries together in a
community of interests, that the "capitulations'' had developed
mainly from French treaties, that the modern Orient is quite
controlled by French cultural ideals, and that France is not alone
the traditional banker but likewise the chief creditor of Turkey.
The author of the anonymous Oxford pamphlet No. 39 ("Tur-
key in Europe and Asia") even regards this indebtedness of
Turkey as the chief reason for her continued existence down
to the present day. France, it is true, has for a long time
advanced claims against Syria. She has no desire to be excluded
from a division of Turkey ; but on the other hand, French inter-
ests might easily have become reconciled with the maintenance
of Turkey. It is even possible that Russia's advance may have
disquieted her ally on the Seine, but France was ready to sacri-
fice everything to her policy of revanche. Therefore, she sec-
onded the Anglo-Russian political work of undermining Turk^,
and this she did with her most characteristic weapons — with her
press and her financial policy. The aim of the latter especially
was to keep Turkey in leading strings: on the occasion of die

^ L'Europe et VBmPire Ottoman, Reni Pinoo, Paria^ 1908, p. 39a.

MODERN GERMANY 281

loan (1910) France did not hesitate to demand the rig^t
of political interference in the internal affairs of the Turkish
ministry of finance. This caused, as is well known, the failure
of the transaction, and Germany thereupon sprang into the
breach; the money was, it is true, not so cheaply obtained, but
on the other hand it brought with it no political humiliation*
From the purely commercial point of view, France, with her
plentiful capital, might very well seem a desirable friend to
an impecunious Turkey; but Turkey, growing in strength, did
not offer the needed commercial advantages; for France does
not possess a highly developed industry like England or Ger-
many, but exports to Turkey simple articles manufactured en
masse, which might be produced equally well in Turkish territory
within reasonable time. The two countries are not comple-
mentary to each other in respect to trade, but are competitors.
Further, such satisfactory deals could not be made by French
bankers with Turkey if she became strengthened. Hence, while
it was to France's interest to maintain Turkey, it was so only
under the status quo. The financial independence of Turkey,
on the basis of an active trade balance, which would be in keeping
with the country's own interests, ran counter to the interests of
the money market of Paris, and on that account was undesirable
in the eyes of the French government.

Thus as regards the Entente Powers, there was no great
objection to the dismemberment of Turkey — ^at all events, they
were all equally interested in her gradual disintegration and
the prevention of her renascence. But Turkey did not fall to
pieces; for before an agreement had been reached as to her
dismemberment she had found a strong helper in Germany. The
accession of Emperor Wilhelm II to the throne coincides, approx-
imately, with the time when Germany, through her economic
development, was forced into the path of world politics. Follow-
ing the Emperor's first visit to Constantinople (1888), the
building of the Anatolian railway was started; the second visit
(1898) ushered in the period of the Bagdad railway. To the
superficial observer it appeared that a new power, in addition
to France, England and Russia, had entered the lists in order
to gain economic concessions from disintegrating Turkey, and
thereby to lay the foundation for claims to territorial acquisi-
tions in the final division. It so appeared without doubt; in
Germany, too, "unofKcial" politicians spent their time in ''an-
nexing" Anatolia and Syria in order to secure colonies for
Germany's future excess of population. And yet a glance at the

282 MODERN GERMANY

map, at Germany's unfortunate geographical position, sho^^s the
folly of such plans. In the face of the Mediterranean Powers
and Russia, a German colony on Turkish soil would have proved
a still-born child. The German Imperial policy proceeded from
healthier considerations, and had none but economic aims. Herem
lies the fundamental difference between the German Oriental
policy and that of every other state, with the possible exception
of the United States. Since Germany could not think of occupa-
tion nor of protecting herself even in local possessions, ^e advo-
cated the independence and the strengthening of Turkey. There
was system in this policy, for in Morocco and China the same
course had been pursued. Germany discouraged premature re-
forms, which would have led only to a guardianship for the
Oriental states, or even to the dominance of some especially inter-
ested Great Power. This may have given rise to the opinion that
Germany was the upholder of barbarism.

''In Macedonia, as in Russia, as in China, as in Morocco, as
everywhere, the interests of William II run counter to the
needs of humanity," says Victor Berard. ^

The author is undoubtedly right in stating that our policy
was not of a sentimental kind, but was guided solely by German
interests. But those interests did not demand territorial acquisi-
tions, as was the case with the other Powers, but exclusively
economic influence. In the entire Islamic world, in North Africa,
in Egypt, in India, everywhere where higher races had first been
commercially exploited by European Powers and then deprived
of their political rights, it had been demonstrated that territorial
acquisition was, in the long run, a mistake; this policy had, it
is true, been of great advantage for a few generations, but with
the increasing education of peoples capable of development it had
inevitably led to serious conflicts. In view of this fact, Ger-
many had no intention, in the general division of the Oriental
world still remaining independent, to acquire even a slight
portion for her exclusive exploitation; on the contrary, a much
better bargain was anticipated through the maintenance of the
Oriental states, since we reckoned on being able more than to
hold our own in a market thrown open to international compe-
tition. From this point of view, therefore, a strengthening of
these states, especially of Turkey, was desirable in our own
interest; for only a strong state is in a position to develop its
trade to its own advantage without diplomatic concessions. It
is only necessary to follow this course of reasoning to realize diat
Germany promised to be for Turkey an ally whose help and

^ La France e* Gvillaume II, Psrifl^ 1907, p. 208 ff.

MODERN GERMANY 283

advice the latter state could accept, since Turkey was not the
object of, but a partner in, Germany's political reckoning, and
that not alone from an economic point of view.

In his book, in which he justifies his foreign policy, Prince
Buloiv says regarding this point:

"Especially since the Oriental voyage of the Emperor and
Empress have our relations with Turkey and Islam been care-
fully nurtured. These relations were not of a sentimental na-
ture ; -w^c had, on the contrary, an Important economic, military
and also political interest in the maintenance of Turkey. The
country was for us, both from the economic and financial point
of view, a fruitful field of activity, to which Rodbertus and
Friedrich List had already called attention, and which we have
cultivated to great advantage. In the undesirable, but not im-
possible case of a general war, the military strength of Turkey
might have been a very perceptible factor on our side. Turkey
'wzs the most desirable neighbor possible for our Austrian allv.
That her collapse might be a loss for us was revealed by the last
army bill, which resulted from the situation brought about by
the Balkan War. — ^Turkey has for many years remained a useful
and important link in the chain of our political relations." ^

From the point of view of these military and political interests,
it is explicable that the German Empire, following old Prussian
traditions, at the very beginning of its Turkish economic policy
assisted in modernizing the famous Ottoman Army. Likewise^
German-built railways did not serve economic purposes alone.
In many places, in planning the course of the line, economic
advantages were sacrificed to the strategic desires of the Turkish
general staff. During the period of absolutism, many a desirable
plan could not be carried through, but there was no lack of
good will and sincere work; a Frenchman, Victor Berard, who
is by no means a friend of Germany, is forced, in speaking of
the Graeco-Turkish war, to acknowledge the success attained.
He says:

**Without the discipline and the strategy of von der Goltz,
the army of the Caliph would never have gained the Thessalian
victories." *

Rene Pinon, another unbiassed Frenchman, thus characterizes
the German policy:

"The certain and permanent interest of Germany is to pre-
serve and increase the Turkish power, and to make use of it
in order to extend her own power throughout the domain of

^DetascMand unter Kaiser Wilhelm II, Vol. i, p. 31.
*La mort de Stamboul, p. 96.

284 MODERN GERMANY

Islam. To galvanize the Sick Man, to fortify his army for the
purpose of using it as an auxiliary for her own political designs —
such is the interest of Germany and such is the policy of the
Emperor. Thus the Ottoman Empire continues, despite so many
predictions, stronger perhaps than it has been for a long time,
at all events more Mussulman, more Turkish." ^

With these words, a political opponent frankly admits that
the German policy, by its very character, has served the best
interests of Turkey. He is forced to admit the same of Ger»
many's economic policy, especially as regards the effect of
the Bagdad Railway:

''If, then, the Bagdad Railway is to become an instrument
of domination, this may well be for the benefit of the Turks and
of Islam. As for Germany, if she succeeds in carrying through
her gigantic enterprise she will, without doubt, gain political
advantage from it, but she will find it primarily a means of
economic expansion, a market from which her products will
be scattered throughout Central Asia." *

That Turkey also would enjoy great economic profit from it
is self-evident; demand increases with traffic facilities, and auto%
matically revenues from customs and taxes rise. The history
of the Chemin de Fer Ottoman d'Anatolie has again proved the
fact that railways, even when they show a private deficit, never-
theless pay well from a government point of view, and this is
the best justification for the ''kilometer guarantee" granted in the
case of the German undertakings. But even more important
for Turkey than the increase of revenue, is the fact that through
her railways the distant provinces have been brought so much
nearer to the capital that her political solidarity gains in strength
throu^ the greater mobility of troops and officials.

The great problem of the German-Turkish relations is char-
acterized by the catchword "Berlin to Bagdad." Political enmity
has seen in this an effort by Germany for dominance; Turkey
has been spoken of as "a German province," or at all events a
German protectorate over Turkey has been thought possible.
The problem, however, is purely economic; it would be non-
sensical to develop a future protectorate in a military way to
the point of being self-protecting, not to speak of the geographical
and political obstacles to a possible German desire for conquest.
No, Bagdad and Berlin stand here in opposition, as the termini
of a vast railway undertaking that is approaching completion,
and which binds together countries of quite di£Eerent commercial

^L' Europe et VEmpire Ottawum, p. 76.
*Ibid.» p. 334.

MODERN GERMANY 285

structure and renders possible an exchange of their products.
It makes them independent of inimical competition, of the attacks
of enemies, and above all of the dominance of the sea. What is
in question, therefore, is a great unified trade territory as the
basis of political friendship. Every one of the states through
which the line passes — the German industrial states in the north,
the great Turkish agrarian state in the southeast, and the Balkan
states in between — ^will seek to carry out their own national
policy; but they all have the same interest in exchanging their
products through this new artery of international communica-
tion. Although, on account of the lower cost of transportation
in times of peace, freight will be sent by sea, nevertheless pre-
cisely the present international crisis shows the incalculable
importance of such a secure means of land communication,
which is comparable in importance to the great trunk lines of
the United States. Germany, however, has not the least inten-
tion of taking advantage of Turkey's economically undeveloped
condition by crushing her with capital. The experiences of other
states have taught us that a political friendship can never con-
tinue if the stronger party exploits the weaker economically.
The attempt, at all events, will be made to protect the future
economic interests of Turkey, against ephemeral private interests,
even of German entrepreneurs; for only in this manner can
there be permanent profit. Thus the words "Berlin to Bagdad"
have also an idealistic meaning. They symbolize the friendly
relations between Germany and Turkey, they show the path
which Germany has followed in opening up the riches of Turkey
for the Turks, as well as for the whole world, the path along
which Germany will continue to provide Turkey with whatever
of a material and spiritual nature she needs for her inner de-
velopment.

The identity of German and Turkish interests was so evident
that Abdul Hamid, in pursuance of a wise policy, turned ever
more emphatically toward Germany. In view of the unpopu-
larity of absolutism which had finally led to political caricature
and to oppression, it was easy for our enemies to represent "reac-
tionary'' Germany as the fortress of the old regime, and the
enemy of Turkish freedom. These disseminations found, it
is true, no credence among the military circles of the Young
Turks, who had learned the blessing of German industry; but
they encountered belief among the refugees who had been
affectionately welcomed in Paris and London, and who after
the successful revolution controlled the opinion of the thoughtless

286 MODERN GERMANY

mob with French catchwords of freedom. But even they, after
a period of error, were won back by the force of facts to Abdul
Hamid's pro-German policy. A "former Grand Vizier" who
is friendly to the Entente Powers, has recently in a neutral
publication admirably characterized this reversal. His course
of reasoning brings us directly to the threshold of the war. He
writes:

"All that Germany had done to uphold Turkey, as providing
her with the weapons of war, sending a military mission, ab-
stention from active participation in anti-Turkish movements,
great works of public utility — the Young Turks had attributed
all this to the personal friendship of the sovereigns or even to
a desire for 'fat' and onerous contracts. All the Franco-
English acts harmful to Ottoman interests, as the seizure of
Egypt, questions regarding the frontier of Yemen and Akaba,
the Armenian, Cretan and Macedonian questions, the benevolent
protection of Greece, the protectorate of Tunis, the occupation
of Metelin, etc. — all these were considered only as a natural
consequence of a tyrannical system and of a disastrous political
course, and not as marking a new departure in the policy of
the states who were the authors of these moves." *

For this reason. Young Turkey with Kiamil, the friend of
England, threw itself into the arms of Great Britain, who at the
time of the separation of Bosnia and Bulgaria, reached the
zenith of her influence. Gradually, however, the truth began
to make itself felt. Russia was unmasked as an accomplice in
the Bosnian affair, and she recognized Bulgaria after establishing
her influence at Sofia. After the fall of Kiamil, brought about
through internal causes, England treated the Young Turks as
her enemies and supported the opposition.

"The Young Turks, full of illusions as regards the liberal
sentiments of Western Europe . . . were greatly astonished
to find that this liberal Europe had welcomed Ottoman consti-
tutionalism not as a new instrument of Turkish unity but rather
as a new means of separatism for the Christian races in Turkey."

Europe made concessions to "Liberal Turkey" as little as she
had done when Turkey was "absolute." The furious press
campaign against the Turkish loan of 1910, which even frightened
off England from undertaking it, shows the unreliability of the
feelings of the Western Powers. The sale of the German men-
of-war and the granting of the loan through Berlin and Vienna

^ "Reflections sur le role de la Turquie," Revue Polititiite IntemaiionaU,
November and December, 19x4, p. 351 ff. The editor says the writer of this
article is "a. very high person who played a r61e of the first importance in the
events of the last five years."

MODERN GERMANY 287

showed where Turkey's true friends were to be found. Russia
feared that a strong Turkey would permanently block her way
into the Mediterranean, England entertained similar fears for
Egypt "The Young Turks were thus brought to retrace their
steps, to enter into a path of German friendship which appeared
to them to offer a better way out."

Even worse was the effect of the reproaches which were ad-
dressed to Young Turkey from the camp of the Entente Powers.
They were blamed for their nationalism because, on the basis
of local autonomy, a crowd of small and easily influenced
states had been hoped for on Turkish soil. When it was found
that this dismemberment of Turkey had not come about on a
crie au nationalisme a outrance. (Nationalism was bitterly de-
nounced.) The non-Turkish peoples enjoyed greater freedom
than the Algerians and East Indians; they were forbidden only
to foment revolution, and to educate their children in an anti-
Turkish spirit. "What barbarism! Better the old regime 1" This
was repeated ad nauseam. Equally grotesque did the reproach
of Pan-Islamism appear to the Turks. The Mohammedans of
Russia, England and France did not enjoy the political rights
to which they were entitled.

'T'he European and American, and even certain Asiastic peo-
ples, have cast off the yoke which deprived them of human rights.
Is it so extraordinary that the Mussulmans have the same ideas
and the same desires? It seems that it is extraordinary, since
as soon as a Mussulman begins to manifest them, to feel himself
the equal of other men and to demand an amelioration of his
social and political condition, this is branded as the crime of
Pan-Islamism. — ^A Caliphate is not tolerated which may become
a symbol of progress for Mussulmans in general If Grerman
diplomacy has been able successfully to undergo severe tests at
Constantinople, this was because the Turks felt that this diplo-
macy was not directed to the disruption of the Ottoman Empire,
nor to an encouragement of disruptive elements, nor that it
was an indication of violent opposition to the renascence and the
progress of the Islam world."

When things were going badly for Turkey, the German press
was the only one which did not join in the joyful acclaim of the
victory of the Balkan States. "It was the Anglo-French joy at
this period which destroyed the political reputation of Kiamil
Pasha, caused his overthrow and the return to power of the
Young Turks."

When, following the war, Turkey strove for internal re-
forms, the prerequisites were an increase in the tariff and the

288 MODERN GERMANY

building of railways. Certain territory had to remain unopened,
because Russia so desired, and the building of the Bagdad Rail-
way, which meant the laying of the foundation for Turkish
prosperity, was deferred and the necessary tariff increase not
permitted, because the Entente Powers did not consider the
welfare of Turkey but desired only to place obstacles in Ger-
many's way. When in future the diplomatic history of this
period is written, "it will be seen what enormous sacrifices
Turkey had consented to in order to enjoy — and that with
restrictions — the rights and advantages which the smallest Chris-
tian state (Montenegro, for example) acquired at its birth."

Plainly perceptible at this time was die influence of Russia,
which blocked all progress, and in the face of which even Eng-
land did not dare to send English police oflBcers to Turkey for
her reform of the provinces.

At this point the war broke out, and Turkey immediately
declared her neutrality. England's first act was to confiscate
the two Turkish dreadnoughts which had already been paid for
and were to have been turned over to Turkey at this time. "The
seizure was made without warning, without the slightest attempt
at courtesy, and no offer was made by the British government
to pay back at least the price of the two ships."

Turkey, then, as is well known, purchased the German ships
Goeben and Breslau, The storm which thereupon broke out
against Turkey in the Entente press, the threats which were
made against her, the plans for dismemberment which were
evolved — this was well calculated to awaken among the Turks
the conviction that their last hour had come, "that the plans
projected in the form of threats had already somewhere been
reduced to writing."

Preparations were, therefore, made for war, but the first
blow was not struck until the French and English fleets already
lay in the Dardanelles, and Russian mine ships were strewing
mines at the entrance to the Bosphorus.

This presentation of the case by a leading Turkish statesman
sounds quite different from the English Blue Book. That at
this time, and after such experiences, Turkey no longer trusted
in the promise of the Entente Powers to observe her integrity
can astonish no one. The same guarantee as to her territory
before the Balkan War, though given by all the Powers, had not
prevented her from losing her European provinces. Could she,
then, now trust to the deceitful promises of her natural enemies,
who had banded together to destroy her sole natural protector
in order themselves to have a free hand in the Orient? For

MODERN GERMANY 289

Russia, this war was admittedly a struggle for G)nstanti-
nople, and as regards England the Bagdad Railway question
played an important role. The Sultan, therefore, unfurled the
standard of the Prophet as a last recourse. If he summoned the
Moslems of the whole world to a Holy War, it was done for
the reasons stated above. He emphatically embraced the cause
of the German Empire; for only from Germany, which has an
interest in her preservation, can Turkey expect help.

BOOK III

OUR ENEMIES' POLICY OF FORCE

CHAPTER I
ENGLAND'S POLICY OF FORCE

PROFESSOR ERICH MARCKS, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH

THE British world empire is the greatest known, not alone
to the history of modern times, but to that of ancient as
well. It has grown to its present proportions through stages
clearly and logically resulting one from the other. In this de-
velopment there have not been lacking pauses and digressions, but
the coherence of the whole is of impressive unity. Likewise, the
means employed are uniform and of constant recurrence; every-
where a policy based on force, a chain of conquests, of life-and-
death struggles, prompted by as bellicose a spirit as that of any
other nation — indeed, one is tempted to say, as that of any
nation save Russia in the world with which we are familiar.

This development does not begin until a late period. The long
conflicts for the conquest of France form an older, independent
series. The modern history of England commences with the
Tudors, the inauguration of her far-aiming foreign policy with
Elizabeth. England had first to free herself, economically and
politically, from the power of other states, before being able
to assume her own position in the world. Of tremendous im-
portance in that connection was her separation from the Catholic
Church; it assigned to England her place in a definite inter-
national group and influenced deeply her internal spiritual devel-
opment It gave an impulse toward independence, both internal
and external. But the most important factor in the develop-
ment of the country was its insular position. This became decisive
after Europe's entrance upon what may be styled the "oceanic''
period: from 1600 on, England influenced the Continent, from
an outside position, in trade and politics, while herself turning
to the sea and the outer world. She seized upon the Baltic, the
North Sea, and then the Atlantic Ocean; gradually she became
the shipbuilder and merchant for the majority of the European
nations. The sea was for her the source of everything: inde-
pendence, security, acquisition of goods and territory; the ocean
protected her and saved her from having powerful neighbors.
Thus, she was able to hold fast in her internal life to parliament,
popular administration and government, avoiding the establish-

293

294 MODERN GERMANY.

ment of a powerful, armed monarchy, such as was necessary on
the Continent. England was able, undisturbed, to develop the
characteristics of her race — ^namely, individual energy, called
forth by contact with the sea; personal freedom, complemented
but not suppressed by a strong government Thanks to the sea,
she was free to turn to the outside world, herself protected in
the rear. But in doing this, without being chained to Europe,
she never lost touch with the Continent — not alone, however, be-
cause Europe remained the field for her commerce. English
politics never ceased to lay hold on and influence the Continent,
at first rather in a defensive manner, then more and more as a
deliberate policy. The division of power on the Continent was
always for England one of the fundamental conditions of her
own existence; it influenced her attitude toward the world be-
yond Europe; but at the same time, owing to a hundred com-
mercial and political ties, she always continued to be a European
Power. Her insular position enabled her to enjoy the tremendous
advantage of being able to exercise her influence on the Continent,
without finding herself forced to tie up her strength in so doing.
The Continent was always involved in its own affairs, in its own
differences and antitheses; England was able to influence it
without being drawn too strongly into the vortex. The country
grew thoroughly accustomed to this untrammeled position, to the
fact that it had no neighbors, and that it would never have any,
not even on the sea — this came to seem more and more a God-
given privilege. The limitations under which other Powers suf-
fered, owing to their geographical position, did not exist for Eng-
land. The security furnished by her girdle of waters challenged
her, as it were, to venture out into limitless space and to regard
every check as an injustice.

The course to be followed by the island people lay plainly indi-
cated; only gradually, however, was it entered upon. England
started out by freeing herself from ancient European bonds, and
by rendering innocuous her neighboring states, Scotland and Ire-
land, which she united to herself. She sought to find a path
midway between the two great Powers of the sixteenth century,
France and Spain, and to maintain her own independence. Her
real entrance onto the stage of modern world history did not begin
until the struggle of Elizabeth against the more powerful of
these two states, namely, the Spain of Philip H. In this con-
flict, political and religious independence went hand in hand
with England's first strong bid for maritime trade, for the
treasures of the New World, for gain and adventure. States-
man and merchant, pirate and admiral united in the effort,

MODERN GERMANY 295

and this union remained characteristic for England's future. A
strong touch of daring and lawlessness marks all of England's
world struggles throughout the centuries down to the present
day. And through it all there was the union of trade and state,
the control of all commercial and colonizing escpansion by the
government of the country; these two forces have worked in-
separably together, trade and maritime enterprise always being
backed by the power of weapons. Already in die struggle against
the Armada (1588), a sturdy feeling of patriotism, a crude
national pride, bound all other motives, noble and ignoble, into
a firm unity. Upon this victory against Spain was founded
the pride and glory of the greatness and culture of the Eliza-
bethan period — the greatness of Shakespeare. But the ambition
of the younger generation, impatient of the aged Queen, was
already eager for extensive enterprises of conquest in the Spanish
and American world.

The first Stuarts brought about a reversal; England sank
back into herself, inglorious and inactive. The Puritans under-
took the colonization of North America in opposition to the
home policy. Not until fifty years after Elizabeth's death —
that is, after the year 1650— did a second impulse for an English
world policy manifest itself out of the confusion of the Puritan
Revolution: Oliver Cromwell renewed the war against Spain
and added that against Holland. He acted as a Protestant,
yet nevertheless attacked the neighboring Protestant state. He
desired to acquire Spanish colonies and gained a footing in the
West Indies, he led England politically and as a warlike state
into the Baltic and the Mediterranean; but his greatest blow
was delivered against the commercial rival across the Channel,
through the sea battles of Robert Blake, which were decisive
not alone for the moment but also for the future. Religious
faith, power and commerce were again as closely bound together
as under Elizabeth, but this time the attack proceeded exclusively
from the English side, and the lust of conquest spread far and
wide. This impulse was directly transmitted to posterity, which
indirectly, despite all resistance, inherited also the spiritual senti-
ments of the Puritans. England was permeated through and
through by their sternness, their self-discipline, their love of work,
their economy, their national and religious ambition. Eng-
land's expansion in the world was due, in no small degree, to
the spirit of Puritanism which she had imbibed. From the
Puritans, also, was derived her claim to play the role of the
people chosen of God from among the nations, singled out with

296 MODERN GERMANY

especial moral right to force her way into the world for the
universal good.

The Restoration of 1660 carried the foreign and colonial policy
of Cromwell's times to further development; it also led to a
continuation of the war against Holland. Then, after Holland
had been rendered innocuous, the struggle against France claimed
first attention. The same causes are again operative : in addition
to religious factors, those of a purely secular nature, as expressed
in the opposition to France's threatening political and military
power, and even more pronounced than in the case of Holland,
to her commercial rivalry. For France under Louis XIV did
not aim alone at the hegemony of the Continent. She rose
rapidly in industry and trade, and under Colbert's leadership
turned her attention to the sea, and even beyond, and became the
first colonial power of the time. London and the Whigs took
up the fight along the whole line and turned the struggle into
a commercial and world war.

This was waged as a gigantic duel with the weapons of force
for the possession of the world, and with power and wealth as
the prize. The battleground was Europe : allied with the French,
England had at first repressed the Netherlands; her policy was
now to proceed against France, hand in hand with the Nether-
lands and Europe. King William III of Orange formed this
union and left it as an inheritance to posterity; in 1688 and
1 701 he led Europe against the French hegemony. More closely
than ever before, England identified herself with the European
coalition: the common enemy bound them together. Spain's
power had long since been broken, and the Austrian branch of
the Hapsburgs inherited from the Spanish not its threatening
greatness, but only its hatred of France.

England announced the principle which she had previously
supported in practice: the principle of the European balance of
power, which she applied against every important European
state. It became England's chief weapon against the French,
and grew into an essentially English theory. Its effect has always
been to create such a balance among the Continental states
that England's accession to any group rendered this '^ne the
strongest; England is the fifth wheel to this wagon; balance
of power means England's dominance of power. From her island
she holds the Continent in suspense and remains the arbiter of
all; she paralyzes the strongest state on the Continent which
might become inconvenient to herself, by means of the other
states, which she organizes and leads. She becomes the ally
of the enemies of her enemy. In this manner she defeated

MODERN GERMANY 297

Spain and Holland; and thus she sought to gain the Emperor
against France. She opposed the greatest military Power by
the second greatest, or if possible by a collection of Continental
states: as Austria, Prussia, German Middle States, Italian
states, Savoy, and occasionally Russia. England herself sent her
armies and her generals across the Channel; or she preferably
employed Continental troops for her service; while paying her
Continental allies, she herself also took part in the struggle, but
her real battlefield remained the sea, her peculiar weapon the fleet.
She fought with France and sought to prevent the union of
France with Spain and with Spain's vast colonial possessions;
she forced her way into the Spanish-American trade, and seized
the slave trade; she finally had to fight the Bourbons in both
Paris and in Madrid. She opposed Spain through her alliance
with Portugal, and through the acquisition of Gibraltar she
assured the entrance into the Mediterranean for her fleet. Time
and again, through wars and peace congresses, she rearranged
Europe according to her own advantage, but always on the plea
that she was doing it for the good of the other states, for the
balancing of their power. In the 126 years since 1688 she brought
about one war after another : according to Sir J. R. Seeley, more
than half the time was spent in war, and even the ''years of
peace" were often enough an open conflict. ^

There were pauses, increases and decreases in warlike activity,
but the guiding impulse was furnished by professional soldiers,
and this impulse was active even in times of truce. The elder
Pitt brought thus, in four short years following 1756, his country
and its future under the control of his stormy ambition, of his
world-embracing policy of power — one of the most imperialistic
of English history. He was consciously an aggressor; he desired
war and gain; he and his like — statesmen, generals, admirals,
controlled the course of events, and were the real leaders of
the great mass of merchants and business men and colonists.
During that century, says Seeley, England's history lies not in
England, but in America and Asia; the expansion of England
becomes the dominant fact of this period. Pitt's saying is familiar
that America was won on German battle fields, indicating the
world-wide significance of the Seven Years' War, when the
dice were really cast for the possession of Canada and for the
future of India. Following 1600 and 1650, the year 1760
indicates a new epoch: the idea of conquest occupies the fore-
ground. By seeking to hold the colonial empire in subjection
to the motherland, England lost the thirteen North American

^The Expansion of England, Sir J. R. Seeley, London, 1901, p. ao.

298 MODERN GERMANY

colonies, it is true. France had her revenge for Canada, by
encouraging this revolt. But on the sea England was successful
against France and her allies. Precisely at this period, about
1780, for the first time a number of seafaring neutrals formed
a union against England's attacks on neutral trade. The loss
of the Thirteen Colonies appeared to have disrupted England's
colonial empire, and in fact, the situation was discouraging:
nevertheless, the younger Pitt again resurrected his country,
and in India the development continued uninterrupted. In l^^l^
India gained something more like a state organization through
a governor general, the country was drawn closer to Parliament
and the central government, and in India English supremacy,
English wealth and English conquest grew uninterruptedly.
Periods of peace, of acquisition, were alwajrs follow^ed by far-
reaching wars, and this possession now for the first time became
internally and externally of real importance for England.

From this point of view, as from every other, the epoch of
the French wars reached its culmination during the last yean
of their duration. Pitt unwillingly entered the war against the
French Revolution; the feeling of the English nation, as repre-
sented by Burke, supported such a policy all the more ardendy,
with a passionate consciousness of old and deep-lying antagonisoL
From 1793 to 181 5 the world war was, in its last analysis, a
war between France and England ; Napoleon accepted the entire
inheritance of four generations and in grandiose manner sought
to realize it. The battle was for everything: for the Continent,
the seas and the colonies, for trade, not alone that of the enemy,
but likewise of his allies and of the neutrals; and in this war
England at last won universal supremacy over trade and colonics.
She crushed the French, Spanish and Dutch shipping trade, and
the Franco-Spanish fleet. She sought, in the same manner as
Napoleon, to cut off the enemy commercially. She secured a
firmer footing in the Mediterranean and in Africa; she assured
the route to India; she robbed the Dutch and French of Cape
Colony and of the islands which controlled this route; she waged
under Wellesley the last decisive war against the French — India
now for the first time assimied its full importance. Canada and
the West Indies had never been lost ; the balancing weight of the
world empire, however, had now definitely been shifted to India-
it continued to develop around the Indian Ocean.

At one and the same time England fought for, and upon the
Continent ; she pursued her old policy of letting the Continental
Powers bear the main burden of the land warfare. There were,
however, years when she appeared to the Continent as die com-

MODERN GERMANY 299

mon enemy, for the reason that she maltreated every state upon
the sea, destroyed all trade and disturbed the existence of all
neutrals. Again, in i8cx>, an alliance of neutrals was formed
against England — she disrupted it by force. The resulting
hatred was great and explicable ; the coup d' etat against Copen-
hagen in 1807, by whidi a possible future rival was ruthlessly
and pitilessly crushed, aroused wide-spread and deep dissatisfac-
tion, and Canning's coolly practical justification of the pretended
necessity by no means pleased the neutrals. The United States,
-with its trade unbearably restricted by France and England,
and long maltreated by England, in 18 12, after long hesitation,
declared war on the unfriendly motherland, and hoped by this
means to acquire Canada. By this time a reversal of feeling
in Europe had already taken place: the pressure exerted by
Napoleon, his universal supremacy, drove all the Continental
states into England's arms, and with their assistance she tri-
umphed in 1 8 14- 1 5 over her deadly enemy, the tyrant of the
world. As the ally and almost the leader of the Continent,
she again regulated in Vienna the affairs of the Continent in her
own interest. The arch enemy was conquered, but it was not
intended to annihilate him. Germany was not to be allowed to
become too great, while Prussia was to be divided into an Eastern
and a Western portion, and Russia's future growth was to be
checked in time. The European balance of power was again
in the foreground — the struggle of 1688 was at an end.

Throughout a long war period England had stood in the fore-
front; for one hundred and twenty-five years every war had in
the last analysis been her war. For fifty years she was now
able to enjoy the fruits thereof in peace. This time she had
protected herself for many years to come. From 181 5 to 1865,
and again to 1874, her attention was carefully fixed on European
politics; she soon withdrew from the group of the conservative
Eastern Powers, and fell back jealously upon herself. Wherever
able, she created counterbalances to these powers, encouraged the
smaller rising states against them, and thereby increased her own
strength. From 1830 she relied upon France, which had grown
liberal, but at the same time remained France's distrustful rival.
Every independent manifestation of strength by France — in the
eastern Mediterranean, in Spain, upon the sea, before and after
1848, was carefully watched and suppressed. Friendship and
enmity alternated under Louis Philippe, and especially under
Napoleon III. Palmerston desired to prevent the latter's alliance
widi Russia — the French fleet aroused suspicion and angry
panic in England. Nevertheless, the antagonism towards Russia

300 MODERN GERMANY

was in the foreground. This had its root in India, and spread
by way of Afghanistan, to the routes to India, Egypt and the
eastern Mediterranean. It early led to rivalry in the Xurkish
question; Russia desired to subdue or annihilate Turkey; oo
that very account England protected her and closed the Mediter-
ranean to Russia — indeed, even the maintenance of a fleet on
the Black Sea was denied to her. This antagonism again burst
forth in the Crimean War in 1854, which, viewed from a broad
standpoint, was primarily England's conflict and England's suc-
cess. The war expelled Russia from the Balkans, but turned
her all the more definitely toward Central Asia. For a long
time this remained England's sole European war. Her diplomacy
was as energetic and belligerent as could be desired, and in Lord
Palmerston (1830 to 1865) there was a strong consciousness of
power which achieved many successes; but on the whole diplo-
matic measures were sufficient.

Thus protected, with the prestige of her former victories, Eng-
land turned during these two generations back to her own peculiar
field — the world beyond Europe. With the exception of Russia
alone she here encountered no rival. She was able to employ
peaceful weapons, and in tHis period, since she was without oppo-
sition, she depended for the conquest of the world upon her trade,
her industry and free colonization. This was the dawn of the
days of her great world-surpassing epoch, which reached its full
glory toward the middle of the century. Freedom of trade cor-
responded to the position of supremacy of British industry, in-
ternally and externally ; the Ubo-al period developed the method
and the doctrine of freedom in every field of human activity,
in commercial policy, as well as in constitutional matters and
those concerning Imperial administration. Conviction and in-
terest went hand in hand. Likewise as regards the Imperial
policy, the state withheld its hand: it gave the widest possible
rule to the great colonies ; it left the settlement of the new terri-
tories, especially of Australia, to economic enterprise alone. It
was inclined to hold the reins of colonial administration as
loosely as possible. While the Conservatives were in favor of
having the state control the colonial policy, the Radicals held
that it would be wisest to grant absolute freedom to the colonies
and to India, that the best thing would be to get rid of them.
In the Colonial Office, there was for a long time, to say the
least, a spirit of negligence, of the most pronounced abstention
from interference. This w^as the characteristic tone of the period.

England on that account, however, did not cease to hold
fast to her traditions of a policy of force. The two tendencies

MODERN GERMANY 301

existed side by side. The conception of a strong goyemmental
policy gained the upper hand in India. Despite all reforms,
conquest and war still remained in full force there. The
possession and the security of the Empire led automatically to
expansion; the governor generals, Lord Hastings and Lord
Dalhousie, continued in a warlike manner down through 1850
the ivork of Wellesley. Finally there came the Sepoy Rebellion
of 1857, and the taking over by the government of the East
Indian Company. Force was here the only possible measure.
Trade spread diis policy further, beyond Farther India and
toward China. The infamous Opium War of 1840, which
was w^aged by official England to uphold the poisoning of China-
men ^vith opium against China's opposition, to protect Anglo-
Indian merchants in their profits from this trade and to increase
it, while strengthening England's position in the Chinese Empire
— this war, which was coolly and with conviction defended by
the Liberal Palmerston, was quite in the spirit of the mercantile
policy of the eighteenth century; trade and power indissolubly
bound together. In i860 there came the aftermath of the war:
wherever England found force necessary for breaking up and
strangling the world she employed it ruthlessly even in these
liberal days.

At the same time, in Europe and America she was the protector
of struggling national states, of their emancipation and of their
freedom. This, like the liberal commercial policy, corresponded
to the sentiments of the new ruling middle class and at the
same time redounded to the profit of British politics. This course,
however, was not everywhere consistently pursued. Where, as in
the case of Turkey and Austria, the old ruling state was needed
by England's interests as against Russia and where it therefore
had to be protected from the young national movements directed
against it, there at times she found herself between two fires
and occasionally in great embarrassment — as in the case of the
Balkan nations, the Poles, and Hungarians, and for a time also
in relation to the Italians. While on the whole she encouraged
Italy's rise, she was all the more opposed to that of Germany.
Thus she supported Denmark, in spite of all national and liberty-
loving claims of Schleswig-Holstein and of the German nation.
She did not desire any Germans between the Baltic and the
North Sea, just as she had looked with disfavor on the German
Customs Union and the economic unity of the nation. England's
encouragement of the principles of freedom and nationality has
always ceased when her own commercial and political advantage
was at stake. Indeed, this encouragement was in great part

302 MODERN GERMANY

inspired by her advantage. Wherever England supported a
nation struggling for freedom, in South America or in Southern
Europe, this was always done in the well-considered interest of
British trade, and English assistance always meant a carefully
placed mine to be sprung against a possible rival among the Great
Powers. The parliamentary freedom to which she generously
helped her proteges by no means always corresponded to their
political maturity and their general welfare. Considerations of
practical British politics were always dominant, seeking to make
capital with the public abroad out of this reputation of English
love of freedom. This does not mean that public opinion among
English Liberals, who took pride in these humane achievements
of their country, was insincere; even English diplomacy was not
necessarily so. But, as in the case of her war against France,
England has always skilfully understood how to make herself
appear as the benefactor of the whole world. Her own interests
at this time corresponded to many humane desires, in which her
own people believed, and she profited by this coincidence to appear
before herself and before the world as liberal, cosmopolitan and
ready to help, when in reality she acted in the main solely for
herself. Her cousins in North America, whom at all times she
sought to impress by these moral means, experienced to their cost
how strong . the prompting of force nevertheless remained in
England. How keenly felt were the disputes in regard to the
Oregon boundary, after the year 1840. How decisively in the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, with a certain matter-of-course air, did
England assume rights regarding the future Panama Canal
(1850). Above all, how puzzling and insultingly one-sided was
the attitude of Liberal England in the American Civil War, her
sympathy for the slave-dealers against the Union springing from
commercial selfishness and political rivalry.

Her political motives remained unchanged. Outwardly, she
was peaceful and liberty-loving; without doubt, this corresponded
to the secret wishes of dominant Liberalism; it corresponded
absolutely to the sentiments of the ideah'stic, radical wing of the
party represented by Cobden, Bright, and Gladstone. The oppo-
site view was supported by Palmerston, but he died in 1865;
internal conflicts and the great Gladstone Reform Ministry forced
foreign measures into the background for a period of ten years.
Liberal England had its fling. But then, from 1874 o^i Benjamin
Disraeli brought about a radical change.

The conditions which were the basis of England's relation
to the world since 18 15 underwent a change between i860 and
1870. The development of the Continent had been completed.

MODERN GERMANY 303

new national states came into existence, and pressed Austria
and France into the background; on the other side of the ocean
the Northern States had been victorious, and the welding of the
Union was complete. In America, as well as in Germany, a
strong competition grew up against England, who had previ-
ously stood alone. Free trade suifered an eclipse, protection
gained the upper hand, new industrial states claimed recognition,
new world Powers began to assert themselves as England's peers.
The world, which had stood empty since 1815, open only to
England, gradually again became filled, and England again
found herself with competitors. In Asia, Russia advanced as
a dominant power; in the Balkans Pan-Slavism sought to gain
a footing. Disraeli was the first to strike a blow against this:
he awoke the spirit of English imperialism, the English sense
of power, the English policy of battle, from the half-slumber of
recent times to a new activity. His conception turned toward
the great world without; he united romanticism and realism,
national tradition and the free fancy of individual genius, and
lo ! England stood among the nations with a sword in her hand.
In 1878 by threats of war she drove Russia back from Constanti-
nople, she resumed with more vigor the older task of protecting
India. Disraeli acquired the Suez Canal shares and the island
of Cyprus; in South Africa, which his predecessors had half
allowed to slip through their fingers, he assumed a firm policy;
here, as in the North, he secured the route to India; he set
the imperial crown upon the head of his Queen. He it was
who announced that England was not a European, but pre-
eminently an Asiatic power. The fresh air of a new period
swept through the land under his leadership (1874 to 1880).

Once more Gladstone and the party of peace gained the
upper hand. But in 1882 Gladstone, much against his will, was
forced to carry out the testament of Beaconsfield and seize
Egypt. He was forced to take up the struggle in regard to
Afghanistan against Russia, who, repulsed from Constantinople,
turned again with renewed energy toward India, and in 1885
he came to the verge of war. Asia thus drew him also into the
current of world politics. Further, Africa always demanded his
attention: on all sides new Powers stretched their hands toward
the Dark Continent — in addition to France — England's old rival
— Italy, Belgium and Germany. In 1884-85 Bismarck gathered
all these threads in his hand, strengthened the Congo State, and
assured freedom of trade in Central Africa against England,
acquired colonies for Germany in Africa and the South Seas,
and by international pressure compelled unwilling England to

304 MODERN GERMANY

recognize her new competitor. The English colonists at the Cape
and in Australia became alarmed; the motherland heard their
cries. The new era was well under way; England, now plainly
deprived of her previous supremacy, returned to the old principles
of her former period of conflicts. Her indifference regarding
the course of events continued precisely as long as she remained
without a competitor: when this was no longer the case, she
changed her system, and imperialism again assiuned the helm, or,
rather, now for the first time really grasped it.

The intellectual work of preparation was of an older date;
as early as 1868 Sir Charles Dilke had referred to the unity of
the Anglo-Saxons and of their world-civilizing power ; his tellii^
reference to "Greater Britain" possessed political power in itself.^
There now began the flood of real imperialistic literature. In
1883 Seeley published his lectures on the British Empire, which
in ''The Expansion of England" celebrated the spirit of English
history. This was a book of immeasurable creative power, com-
parable in its sentiments with Treitschke's writings, but plainly
far more influential as regards future development than the lat-
ter's books have ever been. In his "Oceana" Froude shortly after-
ward depicted South Africa and Australia, attacked the dis-
rupters of the Empire, the Little Englanders, and hoped in the
future for a United British Empire in place of the United King-
dom. ' Seeley's closing chapter (p. 312) in the same spirit called
his country into the ranks of the world states, the greatest growing
Powers, such as North America and Russia — "Will England sink
to the level of Spain?" The new sentiment made its way in
these years. The idealism of Gladstone, which threatened to dis-
rupt the Empire, suffered shipwreck in 1886 in the Irish Ques-
tion; the Unionists came into power. Beaconsfield triumphed
from beyond the grave; from 1885 on Salisbury opposed the ad-
vance of Russia, and did this by means of a strengthened and 'm-
dependent Bulgaria. In this manner, he checkmated his ancient
enemy in the Balkans ; in the conflicts of the following years he
stood behind Austria, Italy and the entire Dreibund in opposition
to Russia and France ; the English fleet played an important role
as a potential factor at the time of the crisis of 1887.

From then on the system of imperialism became more firmly
established, year by year. By it England sought to protect India,
through rounding out its boundaries and extending them, and
through its Balkan policy. Again, after a pause, die conquest

^Greater Britom: a Record of Travel m EngKskSpeaking Countries, by Sir
Charles Dilke, London. 1868.
s Oceana, or England and Her Colonies, by J. A. Froade^ London, 1886.

MODERN GERMANY 305

of the Soudan was resumed and the same system established in
£gypL In South Africa Britain entered upon a series of rapid
conquests, by means of which it was intended to restrict the
Transvaal and to limit the development of the German colonies.
South Africa's importance for the Empire increased as a "way
station" for India, and the connecting of the northern and south-
em portions of the Dark Continent, the ambitious plan for a line
from the Cape to Cairo, took form in men's minds. The new
system was also developed from within ; the problems of imperial-
inn were thought out, solved and carried forward by great
organizations. We shall not at this point trace in detail these
movements during the period from 1885 on. It was a question,
indeed, of holding together the vast Empire, which before had
appeared destined to disruption, and which now, with the rise
of new foreign Powers, for the first time it was sought properly
to strengthen. The problem was to protect English industry
and its export, and to render its millions of workers secure as
regards food and maintenance. It was a question of drawing
together the moral and commercial, as well as the military and
political forces; the unity of the race, of its civilization, commerce
and power were at stake. The problems of the customs union,
of the defense union of the motherland and the outlying posses-
sions came into being, and henceforth remained in the foreground
of British politics; the question arose what organization was to
be given to the vast Empire which was to be created, and also
what share the great colonies were to receive in determining the
Imperial policy. These questions had to be answered by the social
and political powers in England, by her citizenry, by the army of
workers, whose influence was of such recent growth — in short,
by all the industrial classes. In addition, the new money powers
which were rising, together with, and above those of trade, were
concerned in the solution of these problems — the Stock Ex-
change, the "city," the individual capitalists living from in-
comes, all of whom ranged themselves by the side of the indus-
trial North of England, and whose wealth encircles the Empire
and the world. The question of England's foreign policy was in
the hands of these powers. The old Liberalism of Gladstone
had but little understanding for this problem of force, but the
new period rejected the old doctrine; the new Liberals, like
Rosebery, became imperialists; the workers of Birmingham,
with their leader, Joseph Chamberlain, deserted to the camp of
the Unionists, and in their own interest advocated the "will to
world power"; even more emphatic was the approval of the
Stock Exchange. The decision was taken before all else to

3o6 MODERN GERMANY

strengthen the Empire, to render its world position secure
through preparedness, especially as regards the navy, which was
being constantly increased, and to draw closer all inner bonds,
at the same time that an aggressive foreign policy was pursued.

This course of action is quite explicable. As long as no other
Power interfered in those parts of the world on which England
had placed her hand, she abstained from appropriating the land
in its entirety; she was willing to permit peaceful development,
but only under one condition: that no other state should inter-
fere. But other states had now appeared in the arena. Hence,
it was a question of grabbing everything in sight. A mania for
conquest seemed to take hold upon England; the manner in
which she laid hands forcibly upon all within reach was astound-
ing. From 1883 to 1885 Germany had acquired her modest
colonial empire, the most unpretentious of any of the great na-
tions, in West, Southwest and East Africa, and in the South
Seas. There is no need to name the territories and their extent;
their number is insignificant, and they have been but slightly
added to during succeeding years. A long list of British
annexations occurs as early as the seventies, and in 1882 these
are followed by that of Egypt. From 1884 o<^ there was con-
quest upon conquest in Africa, year after year, in north and
south, east and west, Rhodesia and the adjoining territory form-
ing the climax. In addition, there were the South Seas and
East India, Beluchistan and Upper Burma, the Afghanistan
border lands — ^always something new, constant increase in terri-
tory, treaties on all sides, wars everywhere. The conquest of
the Boer States in 1900 marks the culmination, but by no means
the end, of this policy. Certain later occurrences will be men-
tioned as occasion offers. It has been estimated that Eng-
land's colonies are approximately one hundred times the size
of the motherland, and ten times the extent of the colonies
of all other countries together; that Britain rules over about
one-fifth of the world's territory and one-fourth of the inhabi-
tants; that in the quarter-century since the great recrudescence
of the policy of annexation, England has occupied an extent of
territory approximately equal to that occupied in all the preced-
ing centuries. She aimed at being the greatest of Powers, from
every point of view, as regards the strengthening of old
possessions as well as the acquisition of new ones; and the leader
of this policy knew whereof he spoke when he cited the law
according to which ''the great states are constantly becoming
greater and the small states smaller" (Lord Salisbury, 1899).

England had taken from the others whatever she was able

MODERN GERMANY 307

to take. Naturally, this was not done at random; there was a
distinct plan, and the insatiability with which it was followed is
shown by the facts. The plan for Africa has already been
touched upon. It is identified with Cecil Rhodes, the brilliant
financier and statesman, in whose veins flowed the blood of the
first adventurous, piratical conquistadors of Elizabeth's time
— "from Cape to Cairo!" The war against the Boers was
planned by Rhodes, and Chamberlain inherited the policy and
carried it through. It was by no means a battle for gold
and diamonds alone, but for political power, for supremacy in
South Africa, for a universal imperial goal along heroic lines.
One may have an understanding for it, but it is impossible to
deny that it was an aggressive struggle for power. It belongs
to die same order of wars as those on the East Indian frontiers,
which spread uninterruptedly on all sides, toward Asia, Persia,
Arabia and Egypt The ancient English impulse toward power
has remained here in its primitive and unexhausted strength.
In this connection it is plainly to be seen that the Liberal oppo-
sition against this tendency had never gone very deep. The
British nation as a whole has regarded itself for centuries
as a master nation; this feeling constantly drew fresh nourish-
ment from the Indian Empire. The thought of renunciation
did not occur to England. She was fond of justifying her
own desire by the excuse: We dare not withdraw from India
(nor from Egypt now) for the sake of the natives. We have
no desire to deny that this foreign dominance produced beneficial
results as to civilization; but against those blessings are to be
reckoned great and oppressive burdens and drawbacks for the In-
dians and the Egyptians, while both countries have been admin-
istered and ruled over and exploited, commercially and polit-
ically, for the benefit of England, and not for that of their
inhabitants. We may think this natural, but in doing so we
place ourselves in opposition to the attitude which the English
themselves love to assume and with which everyone is familiar —
England's gain is the gain of the whole world. Every nation
and country, they say, which comes under British rule should
rejoice, and the rest of the world must rejoice with them, for
British rule means enlightenment and civilization.

As the result of her history, England is much given to regarding
in a naive and childlike manner her interests as identical with
those of the whole world, her existence as synonymous with
that of humanity. In speaking of "humanity," she means Eng-
land; in uttering the word "cosmopolitan," she thinks of her
own nationality, of her own Empire, which enjoys tlie his-

3o8 MODERN GERMANY

torical advantage of being identical with European civilization
throughout great stretches of the world's territory. She is only
too ready to forget that other national individualities have
grown up in the world by her side, with a longing to press
outward, and that they, too, are conscious of their own worth
and desire to assert their own State and their own Kultur
in addition to the English. She has too great a desire to see
the whole map of the earth painted in one color. The world
to-day demands more pronounced differences. England's claim,
however, and likewise her mania for the annexation of all
unclaimed land, is in opposition to this; her presumption is,
accurately speaking, limitless. The most cultured among the
leaders of the new imperalism, a disciple of Gladstone, as Secre-
tary of State once expressed himself on this point in classical
manner, in the early days of the movement.

'*Thc Little Englanders," said Lord Rosebery in 1893, "hold
that our Empire is lai^e enough. That would be true if the
world were elastic; but since it is not so, we have no choice
but to keep pegging out claims for the future. England has
to consider not only what she wants now, but also what she
will require hereafter. It is our heritage and responsibility
that the world, in so far as we can mould it, be populated by
Anglo-Saxons. We shall grossly fail if we shirk the responsi-
bility laid upon us — ^we must not decline to take our fair
share in the partition of the world which has been forced
upon us." *

It is impossible to speak more clearly or in terms more
exclusive of others. A more unconditional aiming at power
cannot be conceived than is here expressed by the representative
of the state; nor must it be forgotten that the power of the state
stood behind the speaker, with its new weapons in army and fleet,
especially with its fleet, which was uninterruptedly increasing.
This striving was the result of the reaction against the new na-
tions, its growth was logically organic and limitless. It was
incited to increase by the dangers which constantly threatened
the Empire. All the colonies and dominions of the Empire
have that which England herself has not — namely, neighbors.
India has the Russians and the Japanese, Australia the Japanese,
Egypt has Turkey at least and perhaps others as well. South
Africa has the Germans, the West Indies and Canada the
United States. Even if the United States harbors no evil de-
signs, there is a permanent and natural threat simply in the
geographical conditions; the consciousness of certain antitheses

^The Annual Register . . . for the Year 1893, London, 1894, p. 68.

MODERN GERMANY 309

between the two great Anglo-Saxon states has from time to time
made itself felt, and it continues to persist beyond the intention
of individuals and historical periods. The force of progressive
development and growing self-assertion of the individual countries
continues operative, and keeps alive the question as to how long
this "World Venice," with the sea for streets,* will continue to'
exist, and whether the form of a federation offers means for bind-
ing it together permanently.

How narrow is the foundation of the motherland for this
maritime empire! Ireland, in unreconciled opposition, stands
against the main island, and Ulster against Ireland. Classes
struggle against each other within the social bounds of the
motherland and the workers threaten with revolutionary meas-
ures. Discord and anxiety everywhere — ^will the Empire be
able to conquer them? In civilization, trade, race, history and
sentiment England possesses many unifying forces, and the
English political leaders seized upon ^ese and sought to
unify them and strengthen them; in this the colonies assisted
the motherland. But despite the strength of these forces and
of these efforts, heavy clouds have during the last thirty years
continued to hang above the Empire. This has been seen and
realized with increasing anxiety. A final factor entered into the
problem. The Imperial policy was begun imder Disraeli in
the period after 1874, as a foreign policy in the narrow sense;
as such since the heyday of imperialism it has recorded its great-
est achievements. For beside and above all future dangers of a
general nature, was the immediate tangible danger: England
had enemies all over the world who threatened the Empire.

We have seen these enemies; there was Russia; there was
France. The troubles with France in North Africa continued
through the whole of the eighties and nineties of the last cen-
tury. Russia and France formed their Dual Alliance about
1890, directly against Germany and Austria, but indirectly
against Great Britain, who was the common enemy of both.
The nearer the end of the century came, the more clearly was
the Dual Alliance seen to be directed against England. The
movements on the Continent forced England to increasing cau-
tion; her far-famed "splendid isolation'' constantly became
more precarious. She had, however, since the Congress of
Berlin never lost touch, more or less direct, with Germany and
the Dreibund. Through the centuries Germany had hitherto
been her ally, the fighter of her battles on the Continent. Eng-
land's relation to Austria, of ancient date, and her relation to

^ The Expansion of England, Sedey, p. 288.

3IO MODERN GERMANY

Italy, which the new kingdom had inherited from old Savoy,
were continued under Lord Salisbury. In the important crisis
Bismarck had acted with him and with Disraeli, at the same
time always emphatically upholding the independence of the
German Empire. The great Chancellor, from his position at
*the center of Europe, had influenced all the States of the world
and held all the strings in his hands; he had always been incon-
venient to England and not a little disquieting. He remained
unassailable, however, because world interests were not yet pre-
dominant in Germany. But following his fall, Germany took
her place directly in the world arena, and after 1894 she broke
with England and in a manner sought touch with France and
Russia. She defended her position in Africa and acquired a
footing in East Asia. Her economy became part of the great
stream of the world's economy, and the government was thereby
forced to provide in a political and military way for the future
of German industry, for its exports, and for its human masses,
in the same way as England had done under like circumstances.

Germany had no choice. If she was not to languish and
starve, she had to pursue a world policy and to base her power
on a fleet of her own. She forced her elder (iousin on the other
side of the Channel to take notice. The English nation did so
grudgingly, and with evident distrust and displeasure greeted this
new commercial and military Power which was in process of
(formation; expressions were heard that .sounded harsh and
threatening in German ears. The attitude of the British govern-
ment was different Public opinion in Grermany during the
Boer War burst out as threateningly as in the other European
states, especially in France; following the clash which the Kruger
telegram imexpectedly brought about, the German government
maintained an absolutely correct attitude; this neutral support
during the South African struggle was very valuable to Eng-
land. These were England's most diflicult years. Englidi
statesmen between 1900 and 1902 gave expression to their
astonishment that their country was so hated by neighboring
peoples; there was a feeling similar to that of 1800. England
sought Germany's friendship. She desired to win Germany as
l\er protector against Russia. For the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century Russia was for England the successor of Louis
XIV and of Napoleon I; Russia and France were her daily
anxiety during the last ten years of the century. The English
standpoint was primarily dictated by the interests of her world
empire ; but precisely this consideration brought her into opposition
to the Dual Alliance. Her safety or her danger was dependent.

MODERN GERMANY 31 x

as we saw from the beginning, in the narrowest sense on die
division of power on the Continent, and in Europe in general.

Every appearance of a strong Power in Europe was for Eng-
land an innovation which required an immediate explanation,
and nearly always she regarded it as a threat. Such appearance
was watched with jealous eyes. In 1912 an Anglo-American
of passionate English sympathies expressed this fact as an uncon- '
ditional doctrine. He warned England, as an incentive, that
her position in the world depended upon allowing no Great
Power to arise, especially in her neighborhood ; thereby he simply
dogmatized the English custom of centuries.^ Did this system
of suppression and attack drive England to oppose Germany's
development? Not at the start — Russia was for England the
original enemy. Between 1898 and 1903 English politicians
thought that Germany might perhaps become England's ally —
that is to say, her "soldier" against Russia. But Germany could
surrender her freedom, make an enemy of her neighbor in the
East and become dependent on England, only if England
was ready to make corresponding concessions. But such was
not the case. There was no English-German alliance, and
Germany remained untrammeled. Instead, therefore, England
turned to Japan. The military power which England needed
against Russia was set in motion in the East, instead of in the
West. The Japanese thrust, which it was intended should drive
Russia from the Far East, resulted automatically in driving her
forward in the West, which meant against Austria and Ger-
many.

The Japanese War was an English war of attack. Russia
was defeated, and collapsed internally for a while. At the very
start of the campaign (in the spring of 1904) England made
her Morocco Treaty with France. This was the same France
whose African expansion in 1898 had run amuck of England
at Fashoda, on the Upper Nile, and who at that time had
given way pitifully enough before England's threats of war;
since then the two former enemies had drawn together. It
has been asserted that the agreement of 1904, whereby England
was to receive Egypt and France Morocco as a recompense,
was entered into for reasons of imperial policy, and not as a
measure against Germany; England, it is claimed, desired merely
to secure Egypt against France, and only as a result of Ger-
many's opposing France in Morocco did the treaty take on an
anti-German spirit. This explanation seems to me untenable in
every respect. England already held Egypt securely, without

^ Thg Day of the Saxon, General Homer Lea, London and New Yorl^ 19 IJ.

312 MODERN GERMANY

having to recompense France; the retreat from Fashoda had
shown this very clearly. Naturally, it lay within the conception
of the imperialistic policy to obviate any further clain;i of France
in the Nile Valley — to that extent the treaty was a welcome
corroboration. Nevertheless, it was directed from the very
start against Germany; such was its real intent. No one could
doubt that a far-reaching treaty with France, with important
secret provisions, and which brushed Germany aside without
more ado, implied enmity against Germany — indeed, that it was
aimed directly against Germany. France had at bottom ^ways
been inimical to Germany; since 1871 she had never known any
other purpose than revenge; secondary objects in her colonial
policy had gained only a temporary place in her program, and
in a crisis had always been sacrificed to revenge. Whoever placed
his hand in that of France knew the significance of such an act
— knew at least, what France expected. Following Germany's
refusal and the alliance with Japan, the treaty indicated Eng-
land's definite turning against Germany as its fundamental inten-
tion: it inaugurated, after certain preliminaries, the first great
move in the policy of Germany's isolation (Einkreisung) .

The history of this policy does not come within the scope
of the present article. It is our aim only to connect it with
this general review of England's policy of force. The sole
question here is whether England's attitude toward Germany
since 1901 and 1904 is to be understood from this point of view.
This question must be answered affirmatively. England's enmity
does not spring mainly from friction in Africa and the Near East,
as has been stated, from clashes between her imperial policy and
Germany's expansion — although such clashes are naturally not
to be denied; it results primarily from Germany's power in
general, which was objectionable to England, in an especial degree
after Russia had been reduced as desired. At this time Ger-
many created her fleet. To the commercial inconvenience caused
by Germany were now added her military and political power.
Therefore, the old game was played again: England sought
to isolate the new rival, by uniting the latter's enemies into a
league; as she had done for centuries, she turned against the
strongest Continental state and armed the others against it.

There followed the misunderstanding connected with the de-
parture of the Russian Baltic fleet for the Far East and with
the Dogger Bank incident, which must have held a strong
danger of war not yet understood by us; there followed the
complications regarding Morocco, in which from the start, before
and after Delcasse's fall, England pursued a markedly un-

MODERN GERMANY 313

friendly policy toward Germany. I do not propose to relate
here the Morocco Affair; nor the gradual concentration of the
British fleet in home waters as a move against Germany; nor
the history of the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907. I am con-
cerned only with the disclosure, revealed by this second treaty
aimed at Germany's isolation, of the motives of England's policy.
Here again the threat to Germany, it is claimed, was the result,
not the motive of action. England and Russia divided Persia
into three portions: a Russian, an English, and between them a
neutral sphere of influence. England thereby secured the way
to the sea and to India. Did she enter into this treaty for the
sake of India? Incidentally, no doubt: her policy is always
universal, and it must be considered from the Asiatic angle. The
treaty protects India and the routes from Cairo to India. But
was England at that time in need of protecting herself against
Russia? Russia was defeated, and only beginning to rise again;
she was not in a position for the moment to undertake anything
against India. England was strong at this time, not Russia.
The understanding with England closed for Russia the southern
passes, as the Japanese War closed the routes toward the Far
East. The protection of India was desirable, but it was by no
means imperative. The real importance of the treaty lay in the
fact of an agreement having been reached between the two giant
empires and in the course upon which it now definitely forced
Russia — namely, against Turkey, the Balkans, Austria and Ger-
many. It was a truce between die two great World Powers ; this
time again the threat was really intended for Germany. Nor
was this the case merely because the German plan for the Bagdad
railway encroached on the Asiatic territory which England desired
to control for the sake of the connection with India. This im-
perialistic consideration did not later prevent England and Ger-
many from reaching an agreement (to which the latter had
always been open) in regard to the Bagdad railway, in the treaty
of 19 14, the carrying out of which the war prevented.

The true significance of the treaty of 1907 was the shackling
of Germany, from considerations of general policy. The anti-
German spirit in the Russian government and England's jealousy
of Germany joined hands in this effort. Whether the aim of this
policy of isolation was war or the suppression of Germany
need not be discussed here. What, however, England feared
from Germany, using every means in her power to prevent it>
was expressed by Sir Edward Grey in a speech in the House of
Conmions in March, 1909, in a diplomatically negative form,
although quite positive as regards intent. This was after the

314 MODERN GERMANY

first failure in the attempt to isolate Gennany. England feared,
he saidi Germany's attempt to dominate and dictate the policy
of the Continent, and to bring about thereby a complete and
deliberate isolation of England. This intention existed, accord-
ing to English suspicion, and he desired to prevent its realizatian;
therefore, he acted to this end according to tradition.^

The ten years following the Boer War are a history of
increasing English power. Settlement was sought for those
problems of imperialism of which I have spoken. Chamberlain
developed his great agitation for a protective tariff; imperial
reform was ardently striven for, but nowhere were there definite
forms or clear prospects. Success attended England's foreign
policy, but not her imperial policy ; yet her standing in the ^vorld
advanced greatly. Her export trade increased in a corre^xmd-
ing manner; the anxiety regarding commercial retrogressioo
which might have been felt between 1895 and 1900 had long
been overcome. Nevertheless, the King and his diplomats
labored unceasingly on the ring which was to encircle Germany.
Sacrifice on sacrifice was made to Russia, to Japan and to France
for the sake of this ''encircling" policy ; the Mediterranean front
was much weakened. A great system was created for injur-
ing the present enemy at future cost. It was unmistakable that
all this converged against Germany. The danger of the sacri-
fices which were made to the friends of to-day, who were the
probable enemies of to-morrow, was clearly perceived; peace-
loving Liberalism emphasized this strongly, as also its own
desire for peace, basing its arguments on ideal and economic
reasoning. But the voice of the Imperialists drowned out all
others; nor were the crises of 1909 and 191 1 capable of silenc-
ing it.

England was in the throes of a panic at the thought of a
German invasion, as she had been shaken in the seventeenth
century by the "No Popery" outburst, and in the nineteenth cen-
tury by the dread of the French fleet. Lord Roberts carried 00
his agitation for the strengthening of the army, for universal
compulsory service, and he held up the spectre of Germany to
frighten his countrymen. Reference has been made to Homer
Lea's fanciful dissertation. The war-enthusiastic American made
this announcement to the English apodictically and with cold-
blooded fanaticism : In permitting the union of Germany, En^and
lost the citadel of her European power ; she dare not allow any
European state to become too great. Germany desires to destroy
England's power and to erect a German Empire upon the ruins.

^Parliamentary Dtbatas, 1909, Vol. Ill, pw 58.

MODERN GERMANY 315

Cngland must prq;)are to resist, she dare not permit such a
Poivcr to exist; the crisis is at hand, war is unavoidable. Wars
kave created this Empire and wars will lengthen or shorten its
existence. Lea's appeal is dedicated to Field Marshal Roberts.

In the year 19 13, the historian Cramb gave a series of lectures
on Germany and England, which in book-form stirred the entire
Anglo-Saxon world.^ They are a consistent, eloquent exhorta-
tion for preparedness, for compulsory service, for war. Cramb,
also viritfa violent generalization, with forceful deduction, con-
structs a belligerent Germany, a Germany bound to be belligerent.
He ratiocinates the necessity for this war. He, too, glorifies Rob-
erts and war; he desires war for England, for her position of
povcrer. He is a war idealist. His was a thorough-going militar-
istic sermon, and most remarkable was the echo which it later
awakened. This militaristic movement was not the only one,
but success proved that it was the strongest.

Although the Liberal government rejected general compulsory
service, General Hamilton, in a book ' to which Viscount Haldane
contributed an introduction, brought forward his convincing
reason for a paid army. It was a most astounding and instructive
argument for Germans; he maintained that only a paid army
permits of what is an impossibility with a popular army: that is,
wars of offense in far-distant foreign lands, and in keeping with
British traditions and British Imperialism, a strong foreign policy
— in other words, a policy of conquest. The army and the fleet
carry on war, the other classes quietly continue their work and
foot the bills. "The mass of the nation, therefore, does not find
war so terribly tragic." This was the voice of English tradition ;
the nature of England's conquests, even those of the last twenty-
five years, was accurately expressed by it, and there was no inten-
tion of abandoning this policy. Least of all was there any desire
in England to renounce maritime supremacy. An irresistible
wave in favor of such a policy of force, proceeding from the
most diverse sources, swept over England.

Given a sincere desire, it is not difiicult to understand
why England, on account of her imports, if for no other reason,
regards with suspicion the possibility of a strong foreign fleet
in her home waters. As was previously asserted, her history,
her long isolation have spoilt her. Her claims have become
and remain limitless. Wherever a possible rival arises she sum-

^ Germany and England, by J. A. Cramb, late Professor of Modem History,
Queen's College, London; New York, 1914* P- 43 A*

'Compulsory Service. A Study of the Question in the Light of Experience,
bT General Sir Ian Hamilton, with an Introduction by the Right Hon. R. B.
Haldane, London, 19 10.

3i6 MODERN GERMANY

mons the world against the new competitor, and as she has always
done, reproachfully identifies her own interest with that of
mankind in general. She desires once and for all to hold open
for herself and for her world empire the routes to her colonies,
— that is to say, the oceans ; whoever seems even to threaten these
routes is the enemy of England and of humanity; no growth
of power su£Scient for this purpose is to be permitted. The sole
guarantee of this desire of England is seen in the increase of
England's actual maritime supremacy, her absolute dominance
of the seas. England desires also to hold open the overland
routes which lead to her colonies, and she seeks to exclude all
outsiders from them^-the routes from the Nile to South Africa,
and from the Nile to the Indus and the Ganges. She lays her
hand heavily upon the offenders wherever they may be: in each
case it was Germany who felt the weight of her displeasure.

England has united the world against Germany to-day, pri-
marily for the reason that Germany's power was too close at
hand and inconveniently great — she is playing against us the
game of 1689 and *i 81 3. Her procedure and her motives have in
no wise changed, her policy is that of attack and alliance, as
always. Her enemy, to be sure, is no longer the same. Ger-
many's ambitions have never been universal, like those of Na-
poleon I or of Louis XIV, never has she exercised or attempted
a European hegemony ; not even against England did she assume
the offensive. She was content to remain a nation like the
others, striving for her portion of light and air. The universal
policy existed solely in England, in no wise in Germany. Does
England not also block the way of the other Powers? Does
she not with her allies threateningly enclose Italy in the Mediter-
ranean? Do not national states, national fleets arise in all parts
of the world? Does not each one of them, in its effort toward
development, feel the oppressive hand of this ancient ruler of
the world, who lords it over the seas? Does she not embitter
the life of neutrals more than ever by seeking to enforce against
them her own arbitrary rules, as in 1780 and 1800? Where are
the small states, the embryonic nations, which England claims
to protect to-day? Her hand lies heavily upon them all. The
only one which she protects, the pretendedly neutral Bel-
gium, was from the start her ally and accomplice. England has
assumed the offensive not alone toward us. Her imperialism,
her alliance with Russia, her animosity towards Germany have
urged her on for a number of years to a deadly attack against
Austria-Hungary and Turkey, her previous friends — she seeks
to destroy them also. England claims she is fighting for law

MODERN GERMANY 317

and the existing order — ^in truth, she is upholding her ancient
supremacy. For this she sacrifices old and new states, historical
Austria, die last states of Islam, the recently created power of our
Empire. She protects France, because France serves her ends and
has become harmless to her. But an energetic and live state must
force its way against England's claim to rule the world, and fight
to gain the right of existence.

If England really introduces universal compulsory service, then
as regards international politics for the first time will she become
a nation in the fashion of the others — a nation which measures
its political responsibility, the responsibility for war, with terrible
earnestness by the tribute of blood which all of its sons pay; a
nation which through this responsibility learns self<ontrol, order
and patience. The history of England's past, to which she holds
fast to-day and which she has striven to continue in the present,
is a history of wars of conquest, of wars of attack, whose aim
was to protect her growth in the outside world and to destroy
every European rival; it is a history of wars, of aggressive
policy, of aggressive world policy, always and at all points.
It may be regarded as imposing: the cohesion of this world-
nation in respect to population^ territorial possessions, civilization
and power is still impressive. To plead the advancement of the
interest of humanity is possible for British self-assurance and
British cant only owing to hypocrisy or to the infatuation of the
other nations which she seeks to deceive. England is fighting
for herself and for a worn-out, world-supremacy the claims of
which run counter to the national life of the present and of the
future. She is fighting for a universality of power, which in
reality is the narrowest and the most selfish which the modern
world has seen. For this reason she has brought together under
arms, true to her policy of 1904 and 1907, the nations who have
for long been displeased by Germany's new manifestation of
vitality. From the narrow point of view, this was perhaps
clever, as she seeks to weaken one of her enemies by the others;
but it is scarcely wise from the point of view of far-seeing wis-
dom; it was, however, thoroughly in keeping with England's
history. This England has been fond of representing as a
history of peace and benevolence — it has never been such.
English commerce and Kultur have forced their way as roughly
and ruthlessly as in the case of any nation in history; more
deliberate almost than with any other has been her policy from
time immemorial of simply exterminating every rival. Thus
it has been, and thus it is still to-day — ^the freedom of the world
demands that there be a change in the future.

CHAPTER II
FRANCE'S POLICY OF FORCE

PROFESSOR PAUL DARMSTADTER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

GOTTINGEN

OUR greatest historian has said diat in 1870 the Grerman
army was fighting Louis XIV. This statement holds
in fact a great truth ; it means that the foreign poliqr of France
during the last three hundred years has been guided by one
purpose, that its aims have been pursued with absolute consistency
throughout the changing periods of history. These aims consisted
in the expansion of France to the so-called natural boundaries
of the Rhine, Alps and Pyrenees, in her domination in Middle
and Southern Europe, and in the founding of a great overseas
empire. The execution of diese plans naturally aroused the
opposition of other Powers; Spain, the German states under the
leadership of Austria, and especially England saw in these French
efforts a menace to their vital interests. Powerful coalitions be-
tween the Island Kingdom and the Continental Powers brought
about the defeat of the French plans. The great colonial empire
which, in the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth
centuries, had been built up in North America by painful labor,,
was lost in the Seven Years' War, as irretrievably as were the
bold hopes of gaining the upper hand in East India. The
hegemony in Middle and Southern Europe which Napoleon
achieved, could not be maintained; indeed, after his fall the so-
called ''natural boundaries," which had been conquered in the
Revolutionary Wars, had to be surrendered. But it is char-
acteristic of the exceptional tenacity of French policy that even
after the destruction of these plans, after the collapse of her
hopes, France attempted, by new means and new paths, the
achievement of the old ambitions — to extend France's territory
in Europe and to build up a powerful world empire.

The peace treaties of 1814-15 forced France back within the
boundaries which had existed under her old kings, and left her
only a few scant ruins of her colonial possessions: several West
Indian islands, Cayenne, a couple of East Indian cities,, the
Island of Reunion, and the colony of Senegal, which was at
that time quite unimportant — all in all, scarcely ioo,cxx> square
kilometers, with at the most one million inhabitants.

3i«

MODERN GERMANY 319

The terrible state of exhaustion in which the country found
itself after the Napoleonic Wars prevented it for the time being
from contemplating expansion in Europe, but even in the Restora-
tion period there was a beginning made toward the creation of a
new colonial empire. The monarchy of Louis Philippe and
the Second Empire continued to advance along these lines. The
foundations for a new colonial empire were laid in Algiers on
the West African coast, in Madagascar and on the Red Sea, in
the South Seas and Farther India. An attempt was made to
gain influence in the Levant, especially in Syria and Egypt —
indeed, even in America an effort was made to continue the old
tradition, although in a new form. The fact that the French
world policy of this time did not achieve more imposing results
was due to the opposition of England, despite the Entente
Cordiale. It is, however, due also to the fact that France never
entirely abandoned the hope of realizing the old ambitions of
her European policy. In the southwest the "natural" boundary
was won back in i860; in 1870 the hope was entertained of a
similar gain in the northeast. This hope, however, was not
realized : France was driven back from the Rhine to the Vosges
Mountains, and in addition lost a part of her Moselle terri-
tory. Her ambition for supremacy in Middle Europe was shat-
tered by the founding of the German Empire.

The peace of Frankfort in this way destroyed the hopes which
the French had entertained for several hundred years and in
part already realized. No wonder, then, that all their efforts
were devoted to undermining this peace, which many regarded
as only a truce. No measure was spared to keep alive tlie memory
of the lost provinces and hatred of the victor. The lost prov-
inces, whose inhabitants had been an object of contempt on ac-
count of their faulty knowledge of the French language, became
almost a cult and in schools, in newspapers and in literature the
"poor" inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, "who were groaning
under German oppression," were represented as martyrs, and
the recovery of the lost brothers as rfie holiest duty of France.
The legal status created by the Peace of Frankfort was recog-
nized in no school book, on no map, and not even In scientific
books and magazines. With the exception of Jean Jaures, there
was scarcely a leading politician who accepted the state of
affairs resulting from 1871. Sentiment and historical recollec-
tions played their part in this — ^bonds of friendship and relation-
ship, as well as here and there the honest belief that the "lost"
brothers were suffering under German rule. The politico-mili-
lary consideration that Alsace and Lorraine, Strassburg and

320 MODERN GERMANY

Metz represented sally ports against Germany, and diat espe-
cially from Alsace South Germany might be held in continuous
check, was not lost sight of. Immediately following the conclu-
sion of peace, the way was prepared from a military and
diplomatic point of view for the war of revanche. In 1872
universal military duty, after the Prussian model, was legally
introduced into France; later it was still further developed in
the Defense Law of 1889. In no country of the world has
the so-called "Prussian Militarism" been more relentlessly car-
ried through than in the French Republic. Diplomatic prepara-
tions encountered serious obstacles, as no Power indicated a readi-
ness to enter into a treaty with the Republic, whose internal
firmness as yet evoked but little confidence.

As the re-conquest of the lost provinces was out of the
question for the moment, French policy again sought, as it had
done after 181 5, to counter-balance the losses suffered in Europe
by colonial acquisitions. In this it remained true to its old
traditions. But from this endeavor of French policy after 1878
resulted this remarkable situation : France encountered the stub-
born and sometimes bitter opposition of England, while from
Germany she met with the most uncompromising encouragement^
and often with vigorous assistance. In the years 1884-85, when
Jules Ferry directed the destinies of France, and again occasion-
ally during the nineties, when Hanotaux was at the helm on the
Quai d'Orsay, did France and Germany work in harmony in
the field of world politics. Jules Ferry warned his compatriots
against "forever keeping their eyes turned toward the blue line
of the Vosges," and neglecting all else that was happening in
the world.* At this time, and even later, many Germans may
have thought that the old differences would disappear and the
old wounds heal, but those who thought thus — and their num-
ber in Germany was not small — were in sad error as regards
the sentiment of the French nation. French policy, it is true,
gladly accepted German support in order to attain a definite
goal, but never through gratitude did it lose sight of that other
goal which it considered more important. So far-seeing a states-
man as Jules Ferry, who desired no more than to work hand
in hand with Germany in clearly circumscribed fields, encountered
the most bitter opposition from many of his compatriots, and
after his fall (1885), there was a violent revival of the revanche
doctrine; this reached its height in the temporary triumph of
that thoroughly doubtfid character, General Boulanger. It was

^ Jules Ferry, by Rambattd, p. 394.

MODERN GERMANY 321

due only to die great restraint of Germany that war was avoided
at this time (1886-87).

A prominent American historian says in his book regarding
the genesis of the World War in 1914: "The French have
been ready for war with Germany, whenever they saw a good
opportunity, for the last fort}' years."* French diplomacy has
for forty years striven to create such a favorable opportunity. It
was apparent to French statesmen that, in view of the increasing
population of Germany and of the stationary French census,
there was no prospect of success so long as France was de-
pendent upon her own strength. The efforts of French diplo-
macy were, therefore, turned to bringing about the strongest
possible coalition against Germany. As Austria, upon whose
support she had based her expectations after 1870, showed signs
of reaching an understanding with the new German Empire,
Russia presented herself in the first line as a possible ally of
France. As early as 1872 the Temps suggested an alliance with
the Empire of the Czar. German diplomacy early recognized
such a possibility, especially after the Russian Chancellor Gort-
schakov, in 1875, boastfully claimed the credit for having saved
France from a new German attack. After the relation between
Germany and Russia, following the Congress of Berlin, had
become plainly less friendly, and especially after the signing of
the treaty between Germany and Austria, an alliance between
Russia and France was advocated as a countermove by Russian,
as well as by French politicians.

It must not be forgotten that the opposition which existed at
this time between the two Powers and England in regard to
world politics was a further important factor in making the
signing of the treaty seem desirable. Nevertheless, for a long
time there was hesitation on grounds of principle in Petrograd
at entering into an alliance with the Republic. But this scruple
was finally overcome, as many believe, on account of the pro-
English turn which German politics took and on account of the
non-renewal of the so-called Mutual Guaranty Treaty (Riick-
versicherungsvertrag) following Bismarck's fall. There can,
however, be no doubt that had there been a war between Ger-
many and Russia previous to 1890, French muskets would
have "gone off by themselves." In addition to the plainly
existent community of political interests between the two states
at this time, the close financial relations which bound them
together must not be forgotten. As an outward sign of the
agreement, in July, 1891, a French squadron proceeded to

^The War m Europe, by Albert Buahnell Hart, p. 139.

32a MODERN GERMANY

Cronstadt, on which occasion the proud autocrat of Russia
listened, standing, to the Marseillaise. On August 27, 1891,
notes were exchanged between the two governments sealing the
understanding, which was extended by a military convention, and
in 1894 changed to a formal alliance.

The Franco-Russian alliance was, according to the intent
of French politicians, primarily directed against Germany, and
was intended at a favorable moment to lead to war and
to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. It is easy to understand that
Alsace-Lorraine was a matter of entire indifference to Russian
statesmen; they desired to use the alliance for exploiting France
financially and for advancing Russian politics against England
in the Near and Far East — in case of necessity of course also
against Germany. Those French politicians who saw in the
extension of the colonial empire an important task for the
French government, coimted upon making use of Russian sup-
port against England. According to the change in the relation
of France and Russia to England, their own relation to Germany
became now more friendly, now less so. In 1894 France and
Germany together opposed England when she seized upon
a strip of the G)ngo State. In 1895 Germany, Russia
and France joined hands in East Asia. But when the German
Empire, as the result of the telegram which the Kaiser sent to
President Kruger, on the occasion of the repulse of the Jameson
Raid, appeared on the verge of a serious conflict with England,
the French government let it be announced in London that
France had only one enemy, and that was Germany. Thus,
despite all colonial rivalries, France was ready to support Eng-
land in a war against Germany; or, in other words, at that time
also she placed Continental above world politics. This attitude
of France had naturally marked effects on Germany's policy,
while France herself was thereby brought to suffer the greatest
humiliation she had known since 1871 — the "Fashoda" episode.

The improvement in the relations between the two Western
Powers dates from the very same year, 1898, the year of
Fashoda. Delcasse, who directed France's foreign policy after
this year and who doubtless perceived the growing hostility
between Germany and England, made it his main object in life
to bring about a close understanding between England and
France, and to carry through the idea of revanche by means
of this alliance. This plan of the clever Southern Frenchman
gained in probability of realization when, with the* accession of
King Edward VII (1901), a decided shift took place in British
policy — England, like France, now saw in Germany her chief

■\

MODERN GERMANY 323

opponent. Indeed, England was even ready to pay a high price
for French friendship and to fulfill France's dearest wish on the
stage of world politics: in payment for the recognition of her
de facto supremacy in Egypt, England granted a free hand to
France in the greater p<^ion of Morocco. Thus, by the agree-
ment of April 8, 1904, the chief goal of French policy was
achieved, the ancient opposition to England was checked, and
the possibility created of carrying through to realization, in
alliance with Great Britain, French wishes as regards Europe.
It remained only to bring the understanding with England into
agreement with the Russian alliance. The differences which
existed and still exist between England and Russia are undoubt-
edly more fundamental than those between England and France
— ^more so, probably, than those between England and Germany.
Nevertheless, English and French diplomats, working together,
were able in 1907 to bring about an understanding between
Russia and England, which did not remove the antipathy between
the two Powers, it is true, but merely bridged it over. It is
not possible to-day to decide who deserves the greatest credit
for ^e creation of the Triple Entente, but the chief gain from
It undoubtedly accrues to France. The three Powers were held
together by dieir common hatred of Germany. According to
the intention of the French — and with that alone are we con-
cerned at this time — the Triple Entente was to serve for die
realization of the revanche idea^ in the manner of the previous
alliance with Russia. The Entente was still further extended
by military agreements with England, which were primarily
directed against Germany, and through an exchange of notes
(1912) which was not formally a treaty, but which in reality
bound England, as the Military and Naval G>nvention had
done, to support France. French politics had at last been suc-
cessful, after nearly forty years of effort, in bringing about the
powerful coalition with which it was intended to destroy the
German Empire.

There was, however, much more to the European policy of
France than the forming of treaties with Russia and the under-
standing with Great Britain. It was, to be sure, out of the
question for France, after the occurrences of 1870719 to resume
plans for a G>nfederation of the Rhine, such as Napoleon
had undertaken. But ardent encouragement was given to the
anti-German propaganda in Alsace-Lorraine. It is not known
to what extent other disruptive movements within the German
Empire and within the allied Hapsburg Monardiy received

324 MODERN GERMANY

encouragement from French sources. The manner in which
intelligent Frenchmen, even in private conversation, threw
doubt upon the unity of the German princes and races was
astonishing; they were inclined to overestimate the importance
of occasional separatist expressions of individuals and newspapers.
This was still more pronounced in respect to the disagreements
of the peoples of the Monarchy on the Danube, among whom
the Czechs especially enjoyed the sympathy of the French.

The principal aim of French diplomacy, particularly in the
last ten or fifteen years, was at all points to undermine German
policy, to weaken Germany's position in the world, to destroy
her alliances with other states, and to draw the latter within
the sphere of France's influence. French statecraft in these
efforts, in which it was naturally encouraged by Russia and
England, made skilful use of two weapons whose power we
must not underestimate: French Kultur and French capital.

French Kultur, and especially its chief organ of expression^
the French language, has somediing quite irresistible for many
peoples. If it possessed for those of the Germanic race at times
a decisive influence, it is only natural that its attraction was even
stronger for the Romance nations, who not infrequently regard
it as the only Kultur; from the superiority of the French article
to their own they draw the easy conclusion that in the political
sphere also France is entitled to stand as the leading represen-
tative of the Latin peoples. '

Not less important was the extremely adroit use of French
capital for the increase of the political influence of France.
French capital is invested in government loans, railways, indus^
trial undertakings and newspapers of other countries, and thus
made serviceable, not only for the commercial, but for the
political aims of France as well.

The influence of France is naturally greatest in French-speak-
ing countries, such as French Switzerland and Belgium. For
a time it seemed that united Italy would be permanently removed
from the French sphere of influence. The occupation of Tunis
by the French (1881) impaired the political relations between
the Italian kingdom and France and brought about Italy's union
with the Central Powers. Italy was successful also in freeing
herself from the economic tutelage of France, and the hope did
not seem without foundation that Italy would create for herself
a system of Kultur independent of France. In spite of the
unfriendly attitude which for many years France had mani-
fested toward all Italian efforts to achieve power — reference
need be made only to the support which France gave to the

MODERN GERMANY 325

Abyssinian Chief, Menelik — French diplomacy was, nevertheless,
successful in making its influence again strongly felt with the
"Latin sister nation/' Here again Delcasse was the guiding
spirit: in order to make the Italians forget Tunis, he offered
to them the much less valuable Tripoli as recompense. The
minister was seconded in his efforts by the French ambassador
in Rome, Barrere, who understood the art of influencing Italian
public opinion in favor of France. The unremitting emphasis
on the Latin relationship, the encouragement of ''irredentist'' and
republican movements, the activity of the Freemasons, who were
encouraged by France, and the attraction of French Kultur,
which is for many Italians irresistible, caused wide circles in
Italy entirely to mistake the true interests of the country and
to ally themselves politically with France.^

The argument that France was the leading Latin power
was of course made use of in Spain. Although French capital
there plays a much greater role than in Italy, there are in Spain
powerful factors against the dominance of French influence. Old
traditions, as well as recent experiences of the Spaniards in the
Morocco affair, operate against France's propaganda along the
lines of civilization and finance. Catalonia, however, is entirely
under French influence. Portugal is dependent on France cul-
turally, but politically and economically on England.

In the eastern part of the Mediterranean French propaganda
can look back upon a tradition extending over many hundreds
of years. France claims the protectorate over the Roman
Catholics in the Orient. The Alliance Israelite is active in
working for France, and large amounts of French capital are
invested in Turkey in all sorts of undertakings. Although
France has in the Orient very important material and cultural
interests, nevertheless she has made her policy as regards Turkey
quite secondary to the wishes of her Russian ally, and thereby
lost her traditional influence in the Ottoman Empire. Indi-
rectly, the revanche policy stood here in the way of the realiza-
tion of other important French interests. The policy of France
as regards the Balkan States has also of recent years mainly
served Russian purposes. Worthy of mention is the fact that
in Greece and Rumania France has been able to awaken sym-
pathies which in great part are traceable to cultural propaganda ;
and the further fact that Greece is also financially dependent on
France.

France's greatest success since 1871 in the field of world

^ In the meanwhile Italy baa broken with the C^tral Powers and joined the
Triple Entente.

326 MODERN GERMANY

politics has been in the building up of a new colonial empire of
vast extent. Her traditions here lead back to the time of
Richelieu and Louis XIV, The desire to increase France's
power and greatness, to find a recompense for lost territory
and to reap military laurels, have all been determining factors
for the French imperialism of early and modern times; but it
would be unjust were we to fail to give due weight to the fact
that other important considerations of an economic and politico-
military nature also influenced the men who built up the modem
French colonial empire. France possesses no superfluous popula-
tion, and she has therefore no need to-day for settlement colonies.
On the other hand, territorial markets removed from competi-
tion are for France all the more valuable, since in many branches
French industry is no longer able successfully to meet competition
in the free markets of the world. The import of raw materials
and food stuffs from her own colonies is also a matter of moment.
It is very important for a country with so large a capital at
its disposal to be able to invest it advantageously in colonies. A
great colonial empire must be protected by obtaining footholds at
certain points along the important routes of international trade.
Finally, there is a connection between France's world policy
and her revanche policy; the French endeavored more and more
by the enlistment of the inhabitants of their colonies to fill out
the vacancies resulting in the ranks of their army through the
falling birth-rate. New colonies represented, therefore, the
strengthening of France for her European task.

The resumption of the French colonial policy has been in-
fluenced by the general tendency of the times toward colonial
expansion. France, who possessed a chain of colonies on the
Dark Continent, felt naturally the greatest interest in an occur-
rence of such historical importance as the division of Africa.

Although in this manner ancient traditions, sentiment and
important interests forced France to take part in world politics,
public opinion at the start was without enthusiasm for colonial
expansion, in part even inimical to it. Great political parties,
such as the Radicals and the Monarchists, often offered the bit-
terest opposition to a colonial policy, whose supporters numbered
statesmen belonging to the moderate party. The opposition stood
out against this world policy partly on grounds of principle, but
chiefly because the country was thereby turned aside from its
real task, the preparation for the war of revanche. The greatest
successes which France has to show since 1871 were achieved in
conscious opposition to the revanche policy, in cooperation with
Germany and against England.

MODERN GERMANY 327

From the collapse of her American colonial empire, France
had saved certain fragments: the small islands of St. Pierre
and Miquelon» Martinique and Guadeloupe, as well as French
Guiana. The Monroe Doctrine barred the way to an expansion
of the French colonial possessions. It is worthy of remark that
France is the sole European power which has endeavored to
violate the Monroe Doctrine (at the time of Napoleon III).
It is also remarkable that even after 1871 the French colonial
empire in America gained by expansion, although the gain was
unimportant in size: in 1877 France acquired from Sweden
the little Island of St. Barthelemy, without protest from the
United States. Not without justice does an American historian
call attention to the fact that this occurrence is of the same
significance as the sale of St. Thomas to Germany; yet against
such an act, when only suggested, the American press violently
protested.^ In this connection it must also be mentioned that a
French company first undertook the building of the Panama
Canal, an undertaking which, as is known, came to grief, but
which nevertheless shows the ambitious French world policy.
The American journalists and scholars, who are never weary of
talking of the "German danger," which is supposed to threaten
America also, should glance at the map of the West Indies,
and then ask themselves the question from which direction the
United States, and especially the Panama Canal, might have to
expect an attack.

France has been able to awaken for herself in the United
States widespread sympathy, which is in part traceable to the
ancient brotherhood in arms during the American War of Inde-
pendence, in part to the similar republican form of government.
The French have recently undertaken a very active cultural
propaganda both in North and South America. Latin America,
even more perhaps than Latin Europe, regards France as the
leading Latin nation and Paris as the center of culture of the
whole Romance world. South Americans who have gained
wealth delight to spend it on the Seine, where they are honored
by the nickname of "rasta." In addition to the cultural propa-
ganda, we must not overlook the important part played by
French capital in South American undertakings. In the South
Seas, since the thirties of the nineteenth century, France has
controlled a number of islands, of which the most important
is Tahiti; under the Second Empire, New Caledonia was ac-

1 The United States as a World Power, by Archibald Cary Coolidgc, New
York, 1908, p. no.

328 MODERN GERMANY

quired, and under the Third Republic several further groups
of islands, which, however, are of no great importance.

Far more important has been the French expansion in East
Asia. In the face of England's great superiority, the increase
of France's ancient East Indian possessions was not to be thought
of; in compensation, however, she was able to acquire a great
colonial empire in Farther India. Here Napoleon III laid the
foundation through the acquisition of Cochin-China and the
protectorate over Cambodia. Under the Third Republic French
rule was extended, especially through the initiative of Jules
Ferry, over Annam and Tonkin, and from these varied elements
the great and promising colony of Indo-China was formed.
French diplomacy was able to secure "spheres of interest," in the
neighboring countries of Siam and China, which represent far-
reaching opportunities for the capital and industry of France. In
South China France has possessed since 1898 a point of support
in the harbor of Kuang-chow. As for the rest, the Far Eastern
policy of France has had to show the greatest consideration for
the interests of her Russian ally.

France's expansion in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean
stands in close connection with her East Asiatic policy. She
sought to follow England's example in obtaining stations on the
route to East India. On the old route around the Cape of
Good Hope, France possessed, as an inheritance from former
times, the Island of Bourbon or Reunion; from the days of
Louis XIV, she had laid claim to the great Island of Mada-
gascar, and at the time of the Restoration these had been revived
and had led to the acquisition of the small island of St. Marie,
on the east coast of Madagascar. At the time of the July
Monarchy certain islands to the northwest of Madagascar were
occupied. During the eighties of the nineteenth century mem-
ories of the old claims and traditions were awakened. After
a bloody war a protectorate was established over Madagascar in
1885, and after a second war the island was declared a French
colony in 1896. Even before the opening of the Suez Canal,
Napoleon III had laid claim in 1862 to Obok on the Red Sea,
on the new route to India. This small colony was further
extended during the eighties of the nineteenth century; it
acquired considerable importance through the seizure of the
harbor of Djibuti, and especially through the relations which
were established with neighboring Abyssinia.

By far the most important field of French expansion, how-
ever, in recent years was in the northwest of the Dark Continent.

MODERN GERMANY 329

France pursued various aims, all of which were not fully real-
ized. In the Mediterranean, where Algeria and Corsica already
belonged to France, an attempt was made to bring the whole
northern coast line of Africa from the Straits of Gibraltar to
the Suez Canal under her rule.

As an Atlantic power, France, who possessed various col-
onies at the west coast of Africa from Senegal to the Congo,
aimed at occupying the greatest possible extent of territory on
the Atlantic coast-line, at providing as great a hinterland as
feasible for the coast colonies, and then at binding these coast
colonies to each other through the hinterland, where this was
not possible on the coast itself.

Finally, the plan was entertained of effecting a territorial
connection between the Atlantic possessions and those lying on
the Mediterranean. We need not decide the question whether,
and to what extent, the attempt was made to create an empire
through Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.

Ever since the French had gained a firm footing on the soil
of Algeria, their aim had been to win political and economic
influence in the neighboring states, Tunis and Morocco, and
to incorporate these territories at a favorable moment into their
North African empire. The possession of these two commer-
cially valuable countries was, according to the French view, abso-
lutely necessary for the security of Algeria. Tunis, as well
as Morocco, holds a supremely important position as regards
world politics, the latter lying at the Straits of Gibraltar and
the former at the narrow dividing line between the western and
eastern halves of the Mediterranean. But precisely for this
reason England, who had watched with the greatest displeasure
the conquest of Algeria by the French, opposed their occupation
of further territory on the North African coast. Italy also
desired possession of Tunis, to which, aside from geographical and
historical reasons, she thought she possessed just claims, since
great numbers of her sons had emigrated to the country and
were there active in all branches of life. It appears that Eng-
land was at first inclined to support the Italian claims. Offers
of a like nature were made in 1876-77 to the Italians from the
German and Austrian side. But the irresolute Italian govern-
ment failed to take advantage of the opportunity, and Britain
preferred to reach an understanding with France in regard to
the protectorate of Tunis. It may be that it was more to the
advantage of Britain's maritime interests if Tunis, Sardinia and
Sicily were not in possession of the same state; a misunder-
standing between the two sister nations was at that time entirely

330 MODERN GERMANY

in line with Britain's policy. The controlling considerati<m,
however, was the desire to bring France under British influence
and to prevent the threatening alliance with Russia. At the
Congress of Berlin (1878) the British delegate, Lord Salis-
bury, offered to the French delegate, Wadington, Tunis as com-
pensation for Cyprus, which England had at that time received
from Turkey. "How long are you determined to leave Carthage
in the hands of the barbarians?*' the English statesman is de-
clared to have asked. Bismarck also agreed, since he hoped,
but as events proved falsely, that the colonial activity of the
French would draw them away from the revanche idea. The
French government, however, hesitated a number of years before
making use of the authorization, as many statesmen feared a
breach with Italy; moreover, public opinion was unfavorable
to plans of colonial expansion. Meanwhile the Italians sought
to strengthen their economic influence in Tunis by all possible
means, in the manner later characterized as penetration pacifique.
The French government, with Jules Ferry at its head, seized
upon boundary violations by a Tunisian tribe as an excuse for
occupying the country. In April, 1881, French troops entered
Tunis, and on May 12 of the same year the Bardo Treaty
was concluded, whereby the country became practically a French
colony.

It appears that in France in the eighties the project was
entertained of extending French rule to Tripoli, but to these
plans the British government is said to have offered the most
determined opposition. Later (1900, or perhaps earlier) the
decision was reached to surrender Tripoli to Italy, together
perhaps with other concessions, in return for the recognition of
the French claims to Morocco. This decision was all the easier
since France had definitely renounced claims to Egypt.

If France was able to proffer well-founded claims, from a
historical, material or cultural standpoint, to any country in the
world, it was Eg>'pt. As early as the eighteenth century various
statesmen had contemplated the conquest of the country of the
Nile and the cutting of the Suez Strait; the bearing of the tri-
color to the land of the Pharaohs by Napoleon meant only the
carrying out of plans that had long been in incubation. Even
after the failure of the Napoleonic expedition, French influence
had remained dominant in Egypt. The Suez Canal was a French
undertaking. It is not without its tragic side that precisely
this work, which was a triumph of French capital and of French
intelligence, should have destroyed French influence in Eg3^t.
England followed the building of the canal with the greatest

MODERN GERMANY 331

distrust and disapproval; after it was once completed, Great
Britain sought to gain control of the canal and of Egypt. The
history of the occupation of Egypt by the English, which need
not be related at this point in detail, was the result of many
shady intrigues and of a not always consistent policy on the part
of British statesmen. France had several opportunities to main-
tain her old influence, or at least to prevent the one-sided occupa-
tion by the English in 1882. It is possible that an Anglo-
French occupation of Egypt would have had the same results
as the Prusso-Austrian action in Schleswig-Holstein in the years
following 1864. At all events, the French parliament, which
on July 19, 1882, refused by a large majority the credit de-
manded by the Freycinet Ministry for the occupation of the
Suez Canal, missed the last opportunity to secure for France a
voice in determining the destiny of the Nile country. In reach-
ing the decision, for which Clemenceau as leader of the oppo-
sition bears the chief responsibility, the controlling motive was
the fear lest France's military position in Europe be weakened
through sending troops to Egypt. Thus here again the policy
of revanche stood in the way of a world policy: the French
would not have been forced out of Egypt, if they had not placed
greater value upon the possession of Alsace-Lorraine than upon
all territorial acquisitions.

Only with difficulty and most reluctantly did the French
reconcile themselves to the accomplished fact of English su-
premacy in Egypt. The result was a long-continued unfriend-
liness between the two Western Powers. France sought in
other latitudes a recompense for the lost Land of the Pharaohs,
and as England possessed interest in these districts, the an-
tagonism between the two countries grew bitter. It was in this
situation that Germany and France began the cooperation already
referred to, which, it is true, lasted only a short time but which
greatly assisted the expansion of the French colonial empire.

Beside Indo-China and Madagascar, the chief scene of this
expansion was West Africa. From the seventeenth century
France possessed settlements on the Senegal; with the beginning
of the eighteenth century the idea had been broached of penetrat-
ing into the interior by following the course of the Senegal
River and thus founding a great African empire. General
Faidherbe, in the middle of the nineteenth century, revived these
plans and by force of arms subdued the territory drained by the
river; in addition, in the period from 1830 to 1870, the French
acquired a series of settlements on the West African coast, on
the Rivieres du Sud, on the Ivory Coast, in Dahomey and in

332 MODERN GERMANY

Gabun, which, however, were without connection and without
hinterland, and hence of but small worth. The zealously prose-
cuted exploration of the Dark Continent, in which numerous
Frenchmen took part, showed that the interior of Africa was
of much greater value than had previously been assumed. It
was, therefore, quite natural that the Powers possessing colonies
on the African coast should seek to expand them toward the
interior. From the end of the seventies, the French, following
the plans of Faidherbe, sought to extend their rule toward
the Niger.

Gradually, the idea was conceived of conquering the entire
basin of the Niger, of uniting it on the one hand with the
colonies of the Gulf of Guinea, and on the other with Tunis
and Algeria, passing through the Desert of Sahara. Starting
from Gabun, the French explorer, de Brazza, had undertaken
an expedition into the interior and planted the French flag on
the Congo (1880). French expeditions traversed the Desert
of Sahara, the Niger territory and the territory lying north of the
Guinea coast, and the diplomats sought to make use of the results
of these expeditions, which consisted of treaties with native
chieftains covered with the latter's "crosses," as legal titles in
their dealings with other states. For from 1880 competition for
African colonies became very keen. The mysterious "Interna-
tional Association," behind which King Leopold II of Belgium
concealed himself, signed a great number of treaties in the
Congo Basin; in 1884 Germany raised her flag at numerous
points on the West Aifrican coast, and Portugal and Spain re-
vived ancient claims. England, however, opposed French ambi-
tions on the Niger and the Congo. The British were successful
in 1884 in bringing the coast line of the Lower Niger under
their rule and in excluding the French from the extremely
valuable territory along the mouth of that stream. By cun-
ningly recognizing Portugal's historic claims, they sought to
bring the Congo Territory practically under their own control.
But at this point Germany and France, Bismarck and Jules
Ferry, joined in opposing them. Through this united action of
the two Powers the British-Portuguese intrigue was defeated,
and the work of the Belgian king was rescued.

By the treaty of February 5, 1885, France acquired the
broad territory between the coast and the lower stretches of the
Congo, which was later greatly increased. Further, she suc-
ceeded in securing a preemption on the new Congo State. The
boundary division between the German and French colonies
caused no difliculty. Bismarck had impressed on those who

MODERN GERMANY 333

crossed the seas to found colonies the duty of treating the French
claims with the greatest consideration, or, as he once expressed
it, of regarding them as "taboo." If this close understanding
between Germany and France, as it existed in 1884-85, had been
of longer duration, presumably both Powers in their negotiation
with England would have achieved far more favorable results.
But after the fall of Jules Ferry, a marked estrangement occurred
between Germany and France. Germany found herself thus
forced to approach England again and to limit the aims of her
colonial policy far more than would have been necessary had
the pleasant relations of 1884-85 continued. After 1885 there
occurred a marked relaxation in colonial expansion in France
also. The negotiations with England regarding the limitation
of mutual spheres of interest in West Africa led to the agree-
ment of August 5, 1890, which in French colonial-political
literature is regarded in much the same manner as the treaty of
July I, 1890, in German writings. The causes for the two
treaties are probably to be sought in the international grouping
of states, which at that time was very favorable for England —
that is to say, in the unfriendly relation between France and
Germany.

The agreement of August 5, 1890, fulfilled a desire of the
French colonial party: it secured for France the territorial
connection between her possessions on the Senegal and the Niger
and those on the Mediterranean; but on the other hand, it sur-
rendered to England the broad stretch of territory between the
mouth of the Niger and Lake Tschad, to a line corresponding
approximately to the southern boundary of the desert. Reckoned
in square kilometers, France obtained a vast stretch of land, but
most of it was desert. "The Gallic cock," Lord Salisbury is
said to have remarked mockingly, "has obtained a lot of sand
in which to scratch." England gained on the map a much
smaller territory, but it was fertile and thickly settled.

Even after 1890 many boundary questions were still un-
settled; it was still uncertain whether the French Dahomey
district would maintain its territorial connection with the posses-
sions on the Niger, and whether the French Congo district
would obtain a connection with the possessions on Lake Tschad.
Germany, who from her Cameroon colony would have been able
to break the connection between the French Sudan and the
Congo colony, again showed herself most friendly: In the treaty
of February 4 — March 15, she abstained from the extension,
accorded to her by England in 1893, of ^^ Cameroons to the
boundary line of what was then the Egyptian Sudan. In the

334 MODERN GERMANY

treaty of July 23, 1897, Germany regulated the northern bound-
ary of her Togo colony in a manner most favorable to France.
The settlement of the boundary between their mutual posses-
sions at the bend of the Niger led to extremely delicate negotia-
tions between France and England. An understanding was
reached in the treaty of June 14, 1898, by which the Dahomey
colony obtained a union with the possessions in the Sudan. The
West African colonies of the Germans, English and Portuguese
were henceforth merely "enclosures" in the vast French colonial
empire.

The ambition of the French colonial party, however, which
in 1895 in the person of Hanotaux had again won an important
influence in political matters, looked even beyond this. It is
not possible to determine with absolute certainty the extent of
their ambitious plans in detail, whether they aimed merely at the
extension of the French colonial empire to the Upper Nile, or
whether they wished to extend the French sphere of interest as
far as the Red Sea; certain it is that it was desired to open up
"from above" the entire Egyptian question anew. The time
seemed favorable for this: England had serious difficulties in
South Africa, and appeared, moreover, to be at odds with Grer-
many. France had assured herself of aid from the Congo Statfr
and Ab3^inia. In this connection, as a link in the chain of far-
reaching undertakings, is to be considered the Marchand Expe-
dition, to which a much more innocent interpretation was sought
to be given after its failure, and especially after the formation
of the Entente Cordiale with England. England was successful
in her attempt to defeat the whole French plan. The British
government, on March 28, 1895, through Sir Edward Grey,
declared most emphatically that it considered the whole territory
of the Nile as its sphere of interest and that an advance by
France on the Nile territory would be regarded as an "un-
friendly act."

In 1896 England undertook the reconquest of the Egyptian
Sudan; and when in July, 1898, Marchand finally reached the
valley of the Nile at Fashoda, the greater part of the Sudan
was already in the possession of the English. On September 2,
1898, the English entered Khartum, and the victor (Kitchener)
proceeded to Fashoda and ran up the British flag. France's
position thus became untenable. Marchand found himself facing
a greatly superior force. More important still, however, was the
fact that France lacked all support in Europe. As a result of
the policy pursued by France, Germany had again come to an
understanding with England, and Russia was not inclined to

MODERN GERMANY 335

support France in an African dispute. The French govern-
ment, therefore, saw that it would be forced to yield, unless
it was willing, single-handed, to enter on a hopeless war with
England. Marchand was ordered to retire from Fashoda. The
plan of extending the French colonial empire to the Nile had
suffered final shipwreck. In the treaty of March 21, 1899,
which set the seal upon the defeat at Fashoda, France was forced
to renounce those territories which had previously belonged to
the Egyptian Sudan, especially the province of Bahr-el-Ghazal.
In compensation, the territories of Wadai, Borku, Tibesti, Kanem
and Baghirmi were added to the French sphere of interest.

France had thus, it is true, not achieved all the aims of
her African policy, but she had been successful in acquiring a
vast connected territory, which extended from the Mediterranean
to the Congo and to the Gulf of Guinea, from the Atlantic Ocean
to the western border of Egypt.

There was lacking to the great French colonial empire in the
North and West of Africa only the final cornerstone to com-
plete the colonies lying on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic
Ocean — namely, Morocco. Many diplomatic negotiations were
undertaken from 1889 to 1902 in regard to the countries grouped
under this name, but as yet little is known with certainty re-
garding their nature. In 1900 France purchased Italy's agree-
ment to a protectorate over Morocco by granting her a free
hand in Tripoli; she conceded two zones of influence to Spain,
which announced historic claims to North Morocco and new
claims to the coast lying opposite the Canary Islands;^ nego-
tiations are also said to have been undertaken between Ger-
many and France. England's opposition, however, to the com-
plete occupation of Morocco by the French had hitherto been
most stubborn. It was a traditional guiding principle of Eng-
land's policy to allow no foreign colonies in the neighborhood of
the Straits of Gibraltar. But this principle, like many other
maxims and traditions of the older British policy, was sacrificed
to higher considerations — that is to say, to the enmity toward
Germany. The British government decided to permit France
to seize Morocco. This was the essence of the agreement of
April 8, 1904, which in addition regulated a series of other dis-
puted points. In this connection, the recognition by France
of English supremacy in Egypt, which had already been implied
by the agreement of 1899, was not of great importance. Although
the agreement contained the customary phrases, as, for example,

1 In the end, however, the treaty was not ratified by the Spanish Government.

j

336 MODERN GERMANY

"that France has no intention of changing the status quo in
Morocco/' no one could entertain any doubt that France had \

now a free hand there — ^with one important limitation: the
northern part of the Sultanate, the territory lying on the Straits
of Gibraltar, was apportioned to Spain. By the treaty signed
on October 3, 1904, the Spanish sphere of interest was more
clearly defined, and in addition to the district in the north, an-
other in the southwest of Morocco was surrendered to Spain.

The Franco-English agreement of April 8, 1904, contained
provisions regarding Morocco, Egypt and various other parts
of the world ; but it was undoubtedly, according to the intent of
its creators, an attack on the position of the German Empire as
a World Power. The land which lies on the Atlantic Ocean
at the entrance to the Mediterranean is one of the most im-
portant districts of the world from the international point of
view. It is rich in undeveloped natural resources, and if German
trade with the Sultanate was not yet very important, neverthe-
less the future held out glittering prospects. Morocco was, more-
over, one of the few remaining independent Mohammedan king-
doms, and it lay in the interest of German policy as a whole to
maintain them as far as possible. Prince Bismarck, it is true,
had once said: ''We should be glad to see France take posses-
sion of Morocco; she would then have her hands full, and we
should not grudge her the increase of her territory in Africa as
a recompense for Alsace-Lorraine."

This statement, however, was made in the year 1880. France
had since then acquired many districts in Africa, and Bismarck
had not been able to foresee that she would ruthlessly shut o£E
this territory from the free competition of other countries, in
so far as this was not prevented by definite agreements. The
international position of the German Empire had, moreover,
completely changed since 1880. But even if this had not
been the case, the manner in which the agreement of 1894
between France and England, with the approval of Spain,
Italy, and Russia, had disposed of a great country was neces-
sarily calculated to arouse the protest of Germany.^ The Con-
vention of Madrid of 1880, in which Germany as a signatory
Power took part, offered the opportunity for interference. The
German Emperor declared on March 31, 1905, in Tangiers that
he considered the Sultan of Morocco an independent ruler, and

"^Le Conflict Franco-AUemand en 1905, Guilbert and Fcrrette, p. 84: "There
18 nothing so vile and so contrarv to our traditions as that attitude of bluster
and brag in ignoring Germany ana treating her as a negligible quantity."

See also the private utterances made by M. Delcasse as quoted in the same
book, p. 83.

MODERN GERMANY 337

the Imperial Chancellor protested openly against the contem-
plated and already begun "Tunification" of Morocco. As France
at this time — the time of the Russo-Japanese War — ^was de-
prived of Russian support, she declared herself ready, after some
hesitation and following Delcasse's resignation, to discuss the
Morocco question in an international congress. This was held
in January, 1906, at Algeciras. Thanks to the diplomatic sup-
port which the majority of the Powers gave to France, the latter
country was able, despite the formal declaration of Morocco's
independence, to obtain a controlling position in the Sultanate,
which made it possible for her to carry through her program
without directly offending against the decrees of the conference.

In the following years, with various excuses, France con-
tinued to occupy by military force other portions of the Sultanate.
The extremely peaceful procedure of the German government,
which often went too far in the opinion of one portion of the
public, suffered these encroachments with great restraint ; indeed,
in the agreement of February 9, 1909, Germany expressly recog-
nized ^'the special political interests of France" and asked only
for consideration of the economic interests of Germany. The
expectations which were entertained on the German side, and
which did not concern Morocco alone, were not fulfilled. The
French continued to extend their power in the Sultanate, and
finally, in May, 191 1, they occupied Fez. The German govern-
ment therefore dispatched a warship to the harbor of Agadir, in
order to cause France to enter upon new negotiations regarding
Morocco.

The Algeciras Act, which was based upon the sovereignty of
the Sultanate, could no longer be upheld. Morocco was in
complete disorder, and there was nothing left for Germany
but to bring about a reconsideration of the whole Morocco
question. It has always been alleged by the French and Eng-
lish that Germany desired to obtain a portion of Morocco for
herself. This view has been at all times categorically denied by
those in authority in Germany. It was the intention of the
German imperial government to obtain a compensation, after
the precedent set by the other Powers, for the surrender of
Morocco to France — such a compensation was sought for and
obtained in Central Africa. France was forced by the agreement
of November 4, 191 1, which moreover guaranteed the free com-
petition of all nations in Morocco, to surrender a portion of her
Congo colony to Germany. In return, Germany recognized the
French protectorate in Morocco. The final demarcation of
the two Spanish spheres of interest, which were considerably re-

338 MODERN GERMANY

duced, took place in the treaty of November 27, 1912. So far
as is known, no agreement has up to the present been reached
regarding the city of Tangiers.

Thus, in these long drawn out negotiations, France has in
the main been successful in enforcing her will. She was com-
pelled, it is true, to agree to the surrender of considerable terri-
tory, which, moreover, divided her Congo colony at two points, 1
but she obtained what was far more important — namely, su- '
premacy over the greater part of Morocco. France's African !
empire was now complete.

The French world policy of the last generation has been
extremely successful. A territory of over ten million square
kilometers, with a population of about forty million, is to-day
subject to France; by far the greater part of this territory has
been acquired since 1880. The Sahara Desert, it is true, occupies
a very large portion of the French colonial empire; the number
of Europeans in this entire empire amounts to a million at the
most, and many of these are not of French nationality. But broad
districts in North Africa, on the Niger, on the Guinea Coast,
in Madagascar and in Indo-China are fertile, rich in resources,
already valuable to-day, and capable of great development. The
commerce of the French colonies has recently advanced with
great strides. France's own trade with them in recent years has
been estimated at one and one-half to two billion francs. France
manifests the desire to exclude the trade of other nations from
her colonies, and indeed in such a manner, according to the
view of clear-sighted Frenchmen, as to have done serious eco-
nomic harm not only to the colonies but also to France herself.
Is France, with her stationary number of inhabitants and her
industries, backward in many branches, in a position to develop
along all lines so great a colonial empire?

The hopes which Bismarck once entertained from his encour-
agement of France's world policy have been in no sense fulfilled.
Despite this world-political success, the French have not ceased
to keep their eyes fixed on "the blue line of the Vosges Moun-
tains." On the contrary, the revanche idea has become more
pronounced, especially of late years. The Morocco question
revived the animosity toward Germany, and the manner of its
settlement, which brought about a surrender of French territory,
left a sting in the minds of many Frenchmen; but there were
other important factors which led to the resumption of France's
Continental policy. The alliance with Russia and the entente
with England set narrow limits to French policy in all parts of

MODERN GERMANY 339

the world. There was neither in the Near nor in the Far East,
nor in Africa, further territory in which France could undertake
conquests without trespassing on British or Russian interests.
The union of the "Bear" and the "Whale" in common hatred of
Germany seemed to offer the most favorable, and perhaps the
last opportunity for the recovery of the lost provinces on the
eastern border; for it was plain to be seen that this union
promised to be of short duration. All the more important
was it, therefore, to make the best of the opportunity.

It is extremely difficult to-day to lay the responsibility on any
one individual or group of individuals, but there is no doubt that
from 1 91 2 on public opinion in France was systematically incited.
Much of this may be ascribed to the agitation for the revival
of the three-year period of service; but this measure itself was,
we may assume with certainty, a preparation for war. The feel-
ing of France, as reflected in her press and literature, became
pronouncedly more warlike than it had been since 1887. Glori-
fication of war, descriptions of alleged oppression of the Alsace-
Lorraine inhabitants, venomous attacks on leading German citi-
zens, contemptuous references to German conditions and institu-
tions, especially as regards the German army — these comprised
the daily reading of the French. The future wiU have to deter-
mine to what extent this policy of inciting feeling against Grer-
many practised by the French press was influenced by Russian and
English efforts, and by English money, and whether the English
and Russian press received their inspiration from French sources.
It would be unjust to deny that there were currents opposed to
this excess of jingoism. Up to the time immediately preceding
the war, men were not lacking who raised a warning voice and
urged an understanding with Germany. The essentially un-
important occurrences in Luneville ^nd Nancy showed how
thoroughly unfriendly the feeling of the nation had become, as
the result of the conscienceless campaign of the press. The
belief in France's great superiority in aviation intensified the
self-confidence of many to an extreme point ; numerous pamphlets
were already busy with the "destruction of Germany"; the
leading men were entirely in the grip of the new nationalistic
tendency, which was celebrated by word and pen as the "new
spirit." And when Russia prepared to seize the sword in an
affair quite foreign to French interests, France did not hesitate
a single moment to begin the war of revenge against Germany.

CHAPTER III
BELGIUM AND THE GREAT POWERS

PROFESSOR KARL HAMPE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

HEIDELBERG

BELGIUM is, according to the opinion of her first king,
Leopold I, ''the most tibreatened country in the world" ; she
has, as Banning, the clever henchman of Leopold II, writes,
"nowhere political or military boundaries/* She turns the sides
of her triangle directly toward the Great Powers, who from
time immemorial have disputed with each other for predominance
within her boundaries. Nor does she contain within herself the
firm kernel of ethnological unity. Were her fate to be decided
according to the rule by which our enemies seek to dazzle the
whole world — namely, freedom and independence of even the
small nationalities^ — Belgium, like Switzerland, would inune-
diately be broken up into fragments, for, in the oft-quoted words
of a Belgian, Pol de Mont, director of the Antwerp Museum,
"there is no Belgian nationality." The Flemish-Germanic
majority and the Walloon-Romance minority stand in such sharp
contrast that one can scarcely speak of cultural unity; even
this "artificial" nation seemed recently seriously threatened with
disintegration. Thus in the Belgian microcosm the great Euro-
pean contrasts have for a long time met in conflict.

Under such conditions, how was the continuance of an inde-
pendent small state in any wise possible? As is known, the
state, together with its neutrality and its "antiquarian" name,
is mainly the creation of the Great Powers at the Conference of
London in 1831 — an "experiment," as it was styled by its first
king and again by a Belgian minister at the national celebration
of 1880, an experiment to which at first scarcely greater vitality
was ascribed than in our own days to Albania, that creature of
the Great Powers called into being in a moment of desperation.
If, nevertheless, Belgium did not only continue to exist for more
than eighty years but developed in an astoundingly successful
manner, are we justified in assuming that in this she was protected
exclusively by the continuing force of the treaty which called

^This rule, of course, maj by no means be applied to Ireland, India, French
Flanders^ Savoy, Nice, Corsica, Finland, Russian Poland, the Uloidne, etc.

340

MODERN GERMANY 341

her into being? To think thus would be to exaggerate the im-
portance of such an agreement. Rather did the Belgian state
show unexpected powers of life, in the first place, because its
roots struck more deeply into the past; and in the second, be-
cause the same conditions continued as had called it into exist-
ence. In other words, the nature of the Belgian state is to be
understood only historically, and in order to grasp many mani-
festations of the most recent time one must go far back into the
past.

The Southern Netherlands have from time immemorial been
a frontier territory, important in war and for the spread of
civilization. When from the third to the fifth century, A.D.,
the Salic Franks pressed forward at this point against the
Romanized Celtic-Germanic Walloons, the manner of their set-
tlement determined for all time the destiny of the country.
For it was in the great northern marsh districts, and in a por-
tion of the neighboring hilly land, that the invaders advanced
without serious .opposition into the neighborhood of Boulogne.
Meanwhile, as the southerly forests and hilly districts offered
protection to the aborigines, the latter maintained themselves in
the main unmixed. Thus at this period those ethnographic and
linguistic divisions became marked which for almost fifteen hun-
dred years, with unexampled tenacity, have maintained them-
selves without material changes. A line from west to east,
running somewhat north of Armentieres to a point south of
Maastricht, divides the Flemish-Low-German district in the
north from the Walloon-French district in the south.* With
passionate stubbornness, the struggle has been carried on for
many hundreds of years about this ethnological and linguistic
boundary; the Germanic portion, it is true, has suffered some
losses, even in addition to the capital city of Brussels. If we
Germans of the Empire have been guilty of any mistake, it is
that we have remained too unsympathetic, in justifiable consid-
eration for national susceptibility, while in France there has
been absolutely no reserve on this account.

The World War has torn the bandage from our eyes and
relaxed this unduly great restraint. The struggle of our Ger-
manic brothers, although they may at times manifest distrust

^ It is generally believed that Bdgium is more French than anjrthinff cl8&
btit statistics show that at the close ox the year 1910 the population was cuYided
according to the languages spoken as follows:

Flemish (Low German) 3f83^f i93 or 54-05 per cent

High German 77t39S or 1. 1 per cent

Wuloon-French 3,180,003 or 44.85 per cent

In round numben^ of 100 Belgians 55 qieak the Germanic, 45 the Romancft
or Latin tongue.

342 MODERN GERMANY

toward us, is from now on our struggle; the Flemish speedi,
which seems rustic and unpolished to the Celt, sounds, at least
to such of us as are accustomed to the Platt-Deutsch of North
Grermany, homely and familiar, refreshing in its unspoiled pic-
turesqueness and expressiveness, and in its vital force that springs
from the depths of the popular soul. It deserves protection
against being engulfed by other languages.

The older history of the Belgian Netherlands has little to
say of such linguistic struggles; undoubtedly, this peculiar
north-and-south division, which left the Romance districts in I

the East bordering on die German Rhine country and carried '

the Germans to the extreme West, was an element' in prevent- ;

ing the complete absorption of these national remnants by Ger- r

many and France, respectively, and in giving to them at an '

early date a certain individuality; this rendered them valuable
cultural intermediaries between the two great nations. This
individuality, however, down to the year 1830 never developed '

into complete political independence; never, despite notable !

struggles, were these Southern Netherlanders able, like the Dutch
and the Swiss, to maintain themselves permanently against a
world in arms — their position did not render this possible. De-
pendence was the historical form of their existence.

When the central kernel in the world empire of Charle-
magne, through the discord of his grandsons and the unfortu-
nate Treaty of Verdun, had shrunk to the small disorganized
Frankish Middle Kingdom, which was destined in rapid disin-
tegration to be swallowed up by its eastern or western neigh-
bor and which became for both of these neighbors a source of
endless disputes down to the present World War — at this early
date the attempts to maintain an independent buffer state could
not possibly prove a permanent success. As soon as Germany
overcame her internal disunion, her established strength acted
upon the Belgian Netherlands like a strong magnet on loose
pieces of iron: from 925 on they became, together with the
whole of Lothar's state, a settled German possession. The
Grerman imperial boundary included from that time on the
greater part of present-day Belgium, extended in the south with
the Bishopric of Cambrai even far into French territory, fol-
lowed the Scheldt to Ghent, and from that point turned north-
ward toward the coast, leaving the purely German Flanders on the
west of the Scheldt in French possession. German rule was
here quite dependent on the destinies of the German Emperors.
As long as the latter remained in full power, German sovereignty
was energetically upheld. With the weakening of the Imperial

MODERN GERMANY 34i

authority, from the beginning of the thirteenth century on, the
Imperial administration began to disintegrate and to become a
mere over-lordship. When in the sixteenth century the Im-
perial power and sovereign authority over the Netherlands were
united in the House of Hapsburg, it appeared at the start as
if in the Burgundian County (15 12) the reins were once more
to be drawn tighter. But the dynastic interests of the Haps-
burgs ran counter to those of the Empire, and in the final reg-
ulation of Charles V, in 1548, the separation from the Em-
pire was continued in favor of sovereign independence. Never-
theless, the fact that those parts legally belonged within the
Empire remained for the future unchallenged. The archbish-
opric of Liege, which was in the Westphalian district and was
generally ruled by Bavarian princes, remained as strong a mem-
ber of the Empire as the other principalities. Not until the
period of the Revolutionary Wars, in the years from 1792 to
I794i was the separation of the Belgian Netherlands from Ger-
many completed.

These facts are only too likely to be left out of consideration.
Certainly, we do not pine for a return to the Holy Roman Em-
pire of the German Nation. Nevertheless, it would be foolish
were we to seek to underestimate, in our relations to our Ger-
manic relatives on the other side of the present-day boundaries
of the Empire, the strong ideal value of a common past and a
one-time common governmental allegiance. What, then, would
become of the Belgian people without the tie of historical mem-
ories? It was discovered in the recent Balkan Wars that in the
case of Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs, modern claims to power
were based upon, and inspired by, causes lying far in the past.
We, for our part, have refrained at all times from attempting
to press such historical rights, but when the Frenchman treats
it as a matter of course that he should found the boundary
claims of his country on ancient Gaul, surely, our nearly nine-
hundred-year-old possession may also count for something in
our favor.

These memories touch the Belgian but little, it is true. For
him, at least in former times, local autonomy has always pos-
sessed more value than independence as a state. Subordination
to a higher state power, if not all too oppressive, has been
generally held by him as quite bearable, if only local independ-
ence, traditional customs and freedom were protected, and his
commercial prosperity secured. When these possessions were at-
tacked, he protested stubbornly and energetically; but the heroic
period of his history, which was also the epoch of splendor of

344 MODERN GERMANY

liis cultural development, did not begin until the German im-
perial power was already on the decline. The independence of
his state was a matter of little moment to the Belgian ; he found
himself in the midst of the great world conflicts, dependent in
the main entirely on himself, and like the hero of his ancient
popular epic, Reineke Fox, in dealing with the Bear and Wolf,
he was forced frequently to maintain himself with cunning and
prudence against superior enemies, against France's desire of
conquest, and against England's selfish interference. Since he
was always able to profit by the rivalry of these two nations,
their hundred-year struggle, together with the complete paraly-
sis of the German imperial power, was the basis for the up-
growth and bloom of the quasi-independent neo-Burgundian
state, which united for the first time the separate territories of
the Netherlands. The present-day Belgian proudly looks back
to this state, despite the character stamped upon it by foreign
dominance, as the precursor of the modern state. As soon as
the condition of impotence had been overcome, both in the East
and West, Burgundy's neutral position, it is true, was at an end.
In the titanic struggles of the Hapsburgs with the Valois kings,
in the presence of the immediate French danger, Burgundy suc-
cumbed to the superior powers of attraction of the Hapsburg
state. For a small state, which was not in a position to pro-
tect itself by its own strength against superior enemies, this con-
nection was by no means the worst imaginable condition, pro-
vided the protecting Great Power was not too far distant nor
too different in spirit, and provided it did not make its motto
the suppression of justifiable individuality and the exploitation
for its own purposes. This was not to be feared from the closely
related German Empire, in which there was always more than
enough readiness to respect individuality. Unfortunately, the
union took place at first with the absolutely foreign and uncom-
prehending, stiff-necked and intolerant World Power represented
by the Spanish branch of the Hapsburgs. The Southern Neth-
erlands, after brave attempts at independence, let slip, under
the pressure of religious disagreement, the final opportunity of
the year 1579, and withdrew from the heroic struggle of their
northern Protestant brothers. They, therefore, remained bound
to the Spanish Empire, and the coldness and rigidity of this
moribund organism soon penetrated their inner being. The
sombrest period of their history followed the Peace of West-
phalia. Belgium, paralyzed by the closing of the Scheldt and
the cutting off of her sea trade, was henceforth, to use the ex-
pression of Pirenne, "a body without a soul, a cause for dis-

MODERN GERMANY 345

pute in connection with treaties, a barrier, a battlefield." Fi-
nally the reversion to the German line of the Hapsburgs (1713)
slowly brought to the exhausted country once more peaceful re-
cuperation.

Meanwhile France had taken up again with great energy the
expansion toward the Rhine boundary which she had system-
atically begun as early as the thirteenth century. For two
hundred and fifty years she kept the Belgian Netherlands in
a state of uncertainty. There lies before me a recent book
by the Flemish historian, Josson, which I should like to see
widely disseminated.^ France's aim is pictured vividly on the
title-page: La France places her foot triumphantly on Belgian
soil and plants the blue-red-white tricolor in Brussels. This,
indeed, has always been France's aim. Time and again, under
the self-delusion of a natural right to the Rhine boundary,
has France sought to conquer the country. During the two
hundred years following the Peace of Westphalia, Josson
counts not less than fifty-two French invasions — ^an average of
one every four years I The intermissions were filled out by
an ardent propaganda for French civilization, which prepared
the ground for the inevitably following military attack. This
aggressive tendency survived every change in the form of
government. It manifested itself under Louis XIV, violent,
lawless and destructive; only the united strength of affrighted
Europe, under England's leadership, was able in the end to
check it. Under the feeble rule of Louis XV the lust of con-
quest was only suppressed, not extinguished ; and in the epoch of
die Revolutionary Wars and of the Napoleonic Empire it
reached its highest imaginable point. Far more dangerously
even than a century before was the balance of power on the
Continent threatened, and once more England, for her own
advantage, sprang into the breach.

British interest in the opposite coast line of Flanders had been
very keen even toward the end of the Middle Ages, and had
led to the Hundred Years* War with France. Flanders was
the centre in the great struggle between Philip II and Eliza-
beth. Cromwell's policy was governed by opposition to Catho-
lic Spain and to the rival sea power of Holland, and this led to
the occupation of Dunkirk (1658). Following the uncertain-
ties of the British policy under die last Stuarts, William III of
Orange finally turned back to the historical straight line in
recognizing the attacks of France against the Netherlands as

^Fronkrvk de efuweno»de vifond vtm Vlaanderen tn Wattonie (843-x9X3)ft
by Josson, Breda, 1913.

346 MODERN GERMANY

the chief danger for England as well as for Holland; through

his action the European balance was re-established. This was

the grouping for one hundred and fifty years: England allied

with the eastern enemies of France, generally with a small

personal stake in the Continental wars, for even at that time

she preferred to fight her battles with foreign troops. Her gain j

was on that account all the greater, since frequently at the

eleventh hour she left her allies in the lurch, in order to make

sure of her booty without loss of time.

While France's attacks were again and again repulsed, steps
were taken to prevent any other Great Power from gaining a
dangerous hold on the Flanders coast, or even from developing
peacefully its maritime strength. When, therefore, Austria's
claims to the Spanish inheritance in the Netherlands could not
very well be disputed, England took measures not alone for a
permanent suppression of Belgium's sea trade, but also crippled
the Hapsburg supremacy in a military sense through a provision
made in the Boundary Treaty granting Holland the right of occu-
pation of important fortresses on the Belgian southern frontier and
on the sea coast. According to the expression of Ed. Descamps,
"Belgium was between the Dutch anvil and the English ham-
mer." This was the first attempt to transform this part of the
Netherlands, for British purposes, into a species of neutral bul-
wark against France's desire for expansion. This attempt
failed miserably within a generation, for, in 1745, neither the
Dutch garrisons nor English assistance were able to protect the
country against the attack of French troops. Subsequently the
fortresses, which were occupied only as a matter of form by the
Dutch, fell to ruins, until finally Joseph H forced their evacua-
tion. All protection was lacking when the French Revolution
threw all diplomatic safeguards to the winds. Shortly before,
England, as well as Prussia and Holland, had guaranteed to the
House of Hapsburg its Belgian possessions "in eternity." Eng-
land, however, did not enter the world war on account of this
paper treaty, but because the danger threatening the Nether-
lands and the opening up of the Scheldt River imperilled her
own military and commercial interests. Despite her active par-
ticipation with her Continental troops, she was not able to pre-
vent the incorporation of Belgium in the French Republic, nor
later in the Napoleonic Empire.

The foreign dominance, continuing for twenty years, which
now began for the country, did not fail to leave its imprint on
Belgium, although the oppression was deeply resented. The
definitive breach with the past of the Middle Ages, the central-

1

MODERN GERMANY 347

izing tendencies and democratic ideals, French law, civilization
and feeling for the state, exercised a deep and lasting influence,
especially on the kindred Walloon portion of the population,
ivhich explains their later actions.

Outwardly, the violent enmity of France and England con-
tinued to control the destiny of Belgium. While thirty for-
tresses on the southern border were finally dismantled, Napo-
leon devoted unremitting attention to safeguarding the sea coast
and the Scheldt. We are familiar with the gigantic plans which
aimed at making Antwerp the strongest fortress and the great-
est naval port of the Continent, the most powerful arsenal of
the French fleet — "a pistol leveled at the heart of England."
We are also familiar with the counter-measures of England:
The ill-fated Walcheren Expedition in the summer of 1809,
and the siege of Antwerp (1814), which was so brilliantly con-
ducted by Carnot. At this period, when the Emperor's star
was already in decline, all peace negotiations came to naught
principally owing to England's demand for the abandonment of
Belgium, which Napoleon stubbornly refused; nor was it due
to chance that during the Hundred Days the last great decision
was fought out on these battlefields.

It was now necessary to find a new solution for the security
of the Belgian territory, without allowing it to fall into the
hands of a Great Power inimical to British interests. England
believed that she would best meet both conditions of the prob-
lem by advocating the country's union with Holland, under the
monarchy of William I of Orange. She insisted all the more
emphatically upon Holland's gaining Belgium, since she herself
appropriated the valuable Dutch colonies of Ceylon and Cape
Colony, and despite this fact reckoned upon the compliance of
her one-time rival. The new English creation, however, was
destined speedily to show itself as incapable of life. Adequately
to protect Belgium against France was far beyond the power of
the little Dutch army, which was not even able to garrison the
fortresses which had been developed on the southern frontier
under Wellington's direction with the so-called French "con-
tributions," and which were intended to transform the country
into an immense bulwark against France. The Powers were
forced to hold themselves ready for any emergency, and in the
secret treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, of November 15, 1818, they
apportioned, for the event of war, the occupation of Belgian
frontier fortresses between England and Prussia.

The old Boundary Treaty was thus in a sense revived under
a new form. But the boundary was that of a state at odds with

348 MODERN GERMANY

itself. The religious and economic differences of the north
and the south were irreconcilable. Serious mistakes of the intol-
erant Dutch Protestant government led to neglect of the favor-
able opportunity for throwing the balance permanently in favor
of the Germanic element and the native Netherland speech
throughout the entire state, and drove the Flemish clericals and
the Walloon Liberals into each others' arms. The downfall of
the Dutch rule came about through the influence of the July
Revolution of 1830. The rebels, it is true, would never have
been able to maintain themselves by their own strength. France
stood behind them. Napoleonic memories had become stronger
from year to year; "revenge for Waterloo," reestablishment of
the "natural boundaries" — such was the violent demand. French
agents encouraged the Belgian revolt; French volunteers by
the thousands filled the ranks; France threatened invasion with
her troops; a French prince, Louis Philippe's second son, the
Duke of Nemours, was chosen by the Belgian Congress as king,
which meant a younger French branch on the throne, as in the
Wars of the Spanish and Austrian Successions; and this
amounted to nothing less than a disguised annexation. Only
owing to fear of a threatening European war did the Citizen
King refuse his consent. But the French army marched twice
into Belgium, nevertheless, rescued the defeated revolutionists
from the Dutch troops (1831), and forced the surrender of
Antwerp (1832). It is plain that under the mask of European
politics the Belgian revolt was a new phase of French expansion
toward the Rhine; but in keeping with the bourgeois-capitalistic
character of the Orleans monarchy, it was carried out with
milder methods, according to the principle announced at that
time in the Journal des Debats, that there is another way of
destroying states than by war — ^namely, by protecting them.
Under such circumstances France, it is true, had to be content
with a partial success; for the opposition of Europe, which was
still united, was too pronounced against a new expansionist
move by France.

That Power which had created the kingdom of the United
Netherlands as a bulwark against the southwest could, least of
all, calmly contemplate its destruction. Wellington had at one
time thought of throwing English troops into the reconstructed
frontier fortresses, but Lord Palmerston, in unison with the
representatives of the three Eastern Great Powers, at the Con-
ference of London, in 1831, preferred another solution. On
that occasion, for the first time in the whole course of history,
the attempt was made to place the Belgian Netherlands on their

MODERN GERMANY 349

c ofwn feet, free of all connection with any otber power. With-

^ out the creation of some new method of protection, this would

of course have been tantamount to surrendering the country to
France. For Belgium was entirely incapable of defending her
numerous fortresses. The decision was therefore taken at the
i Conference of London to raze a part of them at once, so that

at least the remainder might be kept up. Even of these Talley-
rand remarked: *'If peace continues, the Belgian fortresses
will fall of themselves, since no one will repair them; in case
of war we shall take them." The new protection which was
to render them superfluous was the neutralization of the coun-
try. The dependence on any single state was to be replaced by
dependence on the five European Great Powers, in the form of a
guarantee of neutrality. To continue our previous figure, the
country was no longer to be subjected to the irresistible attrac-
tion of any one magnet, but was to be kept under equal influ-
ences from all sides, in a state of apparent freedom and inde-
pendence. This was a pis alter for the sake of avoiding, or at
least deferring, a settlement by arms with France; for ''all pre-
requisites were at the time lacking for a final settlement of the
thousand-year-old War of Succession between the Gauls and the
Germans for the ruins of the ancient Middle Kingdom of Lo-
thar, the grandson of Charles the Great." The attempt was
watched on all sides with mixed feelings and with but slight
confidence; in the Belgian National Congress the neutraliza-
tion was attacked as prejudicing the independence of the state,
as reducing it to the condition of a hermaphrodite; even Well-
ington in the House of Lords declared that it was absurd to
regard this guarantee of the Powers as sufficient protection.
Twenty-five years later (June 8, 1855), Lord Palmerston, the
real father of this neutrality, and who benevolently character-
ized Belgium as a "daughter," was not inclined ''to attribute
great importance to that kind of obligation." After long and
difficult negotiations, the Belgian state was thus called into being,
and finally recognized by the Dutch King, as the one most, con-
cerned, following stubborn opposition and renewed explanations.
What was the reason that this "experiment," in spite of all
doubts, succeeded beyond expectations? It was primarily owing
to the fact that the system of balance of power on the Euro-
pean continent, which allowed no single state to advance its
boundaries into the Belgian territory, was so important from a
military point of view. England, which was the strongest World
Power at the time, would merely have robbed herself of her
insular impregnability by occupying the coast of Flanders, and

I

350 MODERN GERMANY

she was able to carry out her plan of excluding every Conti-
nental Great Power from the country in no more convenient man-
ner than by maintaining Belgium's neutrality. The smoothing
of the course of the young state was, moreover, greatly helped
by the personality of the first king, the cautious, far-sighted
Leopold I, of Coburg, despite the limitations placed upon him
by the constitution. In a certain sense, one may even declare
that it was owing to him that Belgium immediately succeeded
in emerging again from the state of isolation which so little
corresponded to her position and past. For the extremely active i

house of Coburg, which was scattered throughout nearly all the
European countries, was, in itself, a little World Power. Leo-
pold I was from the start England's candidate, owing to his
tendencies and connections. Accordingly, he continued to strive
to preserve the closest touch with the great Sea Power across
the Channel, and chiefly by this means did he save Belgium
from entire submersion by French influence, at a period when
the middle European states were entirely occupied with their
own internal affairs and their mutual relations. Under the
pressure of the four Great Powers, he even agreed to renew with
them the secret treaty once entered into with the King of the
Netherlands against France (December 14, 1841), with the
result that measures were taken against a possible threatening
of the fortresses, Prussia, for example, obtaining the right of
entering and garrisoning them. There have been disputes as
to the interpretation, the legal and practical significance of this
treaty, for which the constitutionally provided approval of the
Chambers was never obtained. This, however, is certain, and is
admitted by Descamps, who so ardently represents the Belgian
point of view, that in its intent it was a breach of the neutrality
that had been so recently solemnly announced.^ The Belgian
delegate at that time likewise designated it as "compromising."

France, nevertheless, had no need to be dissatisfied with the
course of events. She had gained all that was to be gained
without fighting. While the Eastern Powers had made no secret
of favoring the rights of the Dutch King, France repeatedly
assumed the attitude of the seemingly disinterested and noble
rescuer of the new independent Power, thereby arousing long-
continuing sympathies, which gave birth to a legend directly
counter to the truth. The inordinately praised Belgian consti-
tution was thoroughly French in spirit; the language of the
government, of the administration and of the army, trained by
French officers, was that of France. "Every endeavor of our

^La neutrality dg la Belgique, 1902, p. 2S2 ff.

MODERN GERMANY 351

government/' the influential leader Rogier, a man of French
extraction, ventured to write to Lord Palmerston, "must look
to the destruction of the Flemish race, in order to prepare the
way for Belgium's union with our great fatherland, France."
King 'Leopold himself, through his marriage with Louise, the
daughter of Louis Philippe, protected himself against any future
attacks of the Orleans Court; but by so doing he further
strengthened the French influence. Nor did he hesitate on one
occasion to make use of the threat against the Eastern Powers
that he did not fear war with them, as in such an event he
would throw himself unreservedly into the anus of France — a
course which was plainly irreconcilable with his duties of neu-
trality.

In France, which was weakened in a military way, a period
of quieter and more peaceful propaganda had followed upon
the determined attacks made by the Revolution and Bonapart-
ism. He who possessed patience might well, with Guizot, call
the new order of affairs "a brilliant solution for France of the
Belgian question," or with Talleyrand give expression to the
conviction that the future would bring about union, at a
cheaper price than seemed possible at the moment. On Novem-
ber 16, 1834, however, Le National of Paris said: "The day
will come when, in case of a European war, Belgium's neutral-
ity will disappear, at the desire of the Belgian people them-
selves. Belgium will as a matter of course place herself at
France's side."

The year 1840 threatened to involve France in the whirlpool
of war, when, as compensation for her diminished prestige in the
Orient, she sought to obtain the Rhine boundary, and her states-
man, Thiers, let it be understood that France "would not allow
herself to be blockaded by neutral powers." At this time the
French government had already informed itself as to the de-
fensive strength of Belgium. In case that was not sufficient, it
was said, to prevent the passing of an army corps through her
territory for the purpose of threatening the French border,
France would regretfully see herself forced to send troops into
the country for this purpose. The "bourgeois monarch," however,
did not in the end venture on this occasion to carry his words
to a military conclusion. This lack of a boldly expanding policy
was undoubtedly no small factor in his final fall.

As regards the Second Republic, the aged Prince Metternich
was of the opinion that from France, shaken as she was, her
neighbor need not fear a political war, but only a war of propa-
ganda. The two kinds of warfare were scarcely to be distin-

I

352 MODERN GERMANY !

guished, however, when in the Spring of 1848 hundreds of
armed volunteers pressed across the Belgian frontier, in order
to stir up the population and to enforce incorporation with
France. Only through the cautious measures of the Belgian
government, and through the bold act of an engineer ivho
drove the railway train of the revolutionists directly into the
midst of Belgian troops, was it possible to stifle the movement
by the trifling skirmish known as that of Risquons-Tout,

Scarcely was the sky cleared of this and similar clouds when
the situation was completely changed by the coup ietat of Na-
poleon III — for the moment to Belgium's advantage. It w^as
the universal belief that the country, to use the expression of
King Frederick William IV, "would be the next victim of
the crowned bird of prey." In fact, Napoleon III, according to
the testimony of Ollivier, considered Belgium "as an artificial
creation erected in the path of France's greatness, which had
no right to inviolability." If, at the start, despite many signs
of unfriendliness and threats, he held himself in restraint,
this was in the main due to consideration for England, whose
friendship, so long as he did not feel himself firm upon the
throne, could not fail to seem more valuable to him than a pre-
mature gain of territory. During the Crimean War the Belgian
government, in the same manner as Sardinia, properly refused
the invitation of England and France to enter the war on their
side against Russia, basing its refusal on Belgium's duty as a
neutral. But the more fortune smiled upon Napoleon and the
more France again raised herself to the position of arbiter of
Europe, the more plainly in speeches, newspapers and pamphlets
was the French desire for annexation expressed. Leopold I, it
was said, was merely "a sentinel of the Holy Alliance against
France," "a kind of English prefect," who prevented Belgium
"from returning to the motherland"; neutrality was "a chimera
and an impossibility"; "France would not feel herself freed
from the stain of Waterloo until Waterloo itself should have
become French."

To reconcile the annexation of Belgium with the freedom
and independence of the various nationalities, which he had
found it to "his ^advantage to advocate, was for Napoleon evi-
dently not a difficult task, since in a note found among his
secret papers he "proved" that there was no such thing as Bel-
gian neutrality. In his^^ircular of September 16, 1866, he an-
nounced: "An irresistible power • . . forces the nations to
unite into great bodies and causes states of the second class to
disappear. ... The Imperial French Government ... has

MODERN GERMANY 353

recognized annexation as demanded by an absolute necessity."
Since the historical opposition of Great Britain had to be
reckoned with, Napoleon hoped to seize his prey in union with
Prussia. After the annexation of Savoy and Nice, the English
Prince Consort Albert remarked (October 6, 1861) that in the
same manner Belgium would soon be the price for German
unity. As early as 1862, the secret negotiations with Bismarck
began, in which the latter, despite apparent agreement with the
Emperor's longing for annexation, nevertheless in the end left
him in the lurch. Anyone familiar with the course of events
can only smile at the statement that Bismarck treacherously sug-
gested the annexation plan to Napoleon, in 1865, in Biarritz.
He did not, however, wish to lose the benevolent neutrality of
the Emperor before he had made a reality of German union;
therefore, on August 20, 1866, he made Benedetti draw up
under his own eyes and give to him the proposition for an
alliance which was to bind Prussia to assist in France's assault
on Belgium and her conquest of Luxemburg. He then pro-
ceeded to systematic delay in the matter.

While the Central Powers of Europe continued to grow
stronger year by year, without France's receiving the hoped-for
compensation, the old cry of "revenge for Waterloo" was
changed into the new demand, "revenge for Sadowa"; and Na-
poleon in, whom his early luck seemed completely to have
deserted, saw himself compelled, almost against his will, in or-
der to maintain his throne, to continue the pursuit of the elusive
prey, stealthily, by paths which promised to lead him to success
without danger of war. Owing to this, Belgium in the suc-
ceeding years was repeatedly brought to the verge of destruc-
tion. The first route led through Luxemburg. "Once there,"
said Benedetti, on January 7, 1867, to Ollivier, "we shall be on
the road to Brussels ; we shall arrive there all the sooner." We
are familiar with the plan of purchase which was negotiated with
the King of Holland, and also with the masterly skill with
which Bismarck succeeded in frustrating it, so that the Emperor
was forced to be content with a scant apparent victory — the
Prussian evacuation of the federal fortress of Luxemburg and
the declaration of the little country's neutrality, under the united
guarantee of the Powers. This guarantee, however, according
to the construction put upon it by the British government in
Parliament, at the most gave to the individual guarantor the
right of interference in the case of a breach of the neutrality,
but did not impose this as a duty; moreover, it automatically
ceased when one of the guarantors violated the neutrality.

354 MODERN GERMANY

The second attempt bore an even more friendly appearance.
This was the resumption of former plans to unite Belgium with
France in a customs union, by way of preparation for a later
political union. Informed by Bismarck concerning Napoleon's
intentions, the British government despatched a confidential note
to Paris, in which it declared a customs union or a military con-
vention as irreconcilable with Belgium's neutrality.* Thereupon
the Emperor sought to obtain the end which he tenaciously held
in view by a third course, which was to place the world face to
face with an accomplished fact. This was the purchase of the
railways of the Grand Luxembourg Company by the French
Eastern Railway Company, immediately behind which stood the
imperial government. This was not conceived as a means
merely for enforcing a customs union: the aim, above all, was
the military control of these important railways leading to
Brussels, Liege and the Dutch boundary. When the Belgian
government, determined to defend its independence, through
an emergency ordinance made any such disposal of the railways
conditional on its approval, thereby voiding the contracts of sale
which had already been perfected, for a while the most serious
consequences seemed unavoidable. "Belgium opens the gate-
ways into Germany for us," wrote Napoleon to War Minister
Niel, on February 19, 1869, "we can advance from there over
the lower Rhine to any point desired."

Le Moniteur Diplomatique wrote on March li: "It is a
mistake to believe that the neutrality of Belgium would be
irreconcilable with the passing of a French army through her
territory. The most authoritative publicists admit that neutral
states may permit the passing of the army of a foreign state."

Niel drew up a plan of mobilization for the conquest of Bel-
gium. Despite all this, extreme measures were again avoided
and a compromise brought about in no slight degree through the
skill of the Belgian Minister, Frere-Orban, and as a result of
the political situation, which portended an interference on the
part of England.

If one reviews these constant attacks by Napoleon in the
sixties, there can be no doubt that the Franco-German war was
destined to decide the question of Belgium's existence. For only
the fear of an alliance between Prussia and England had hith-
erto caused Napoleon to hesitate. If the Continental enemy
had been disposed of, England would never have checked the

^ This recalls the "Conventions an^o-belKcs" of 1906 and 19 12, discovered
by the German authorities in the archives of the city of Brussels. The/ would
li'ave constituted a breach of Belfnum's neutrality, according to the opinion of
the British government of 18O8.

MODERN GERMANY 355

victorious French advance into Belgium. The most dear-sighted
observers of the events of those days agreed on this point. "Were
Germany defeated," said Bismarck to Moritz Busch — **sl catas-
trophe I pray to Grod to prevent — the English could be of no
assistance to the Belgians; they themselves would be glad to
remain safe in their own country." And in the House of Com-
mons, Disraeli referred to the Rhinelands, which had been guar-
anteed to the Prussian state in 181 5, as if to indicate that
through their conquest by France, Belgium's independence would
be irrevocably lost.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Franco-German war,
"while the strength of the enemies may have seemed approximately
equal, England, outside the scene of action, was able to play the
pleasant role of casting the decisive vote in favor of preserving
Belgium's neutrality. Gladstone's attitude, it is true, betrayed
great fear of being drawn into the whirlpool of war. He ap-
peared at first to be satisfied with the declaration of both Pow-
ers that Belgian neutrality would be respected until violated by
the enemy. When finally Bismarck published Benedetti's treaty
offer of 1866, Gladstone took a further step, as the result of
aroused public opinion in England, and doubtless also because he
feared lest the two enemies, following an indecisive battle, might
reach an understanding at Belgium's expense.^ He denied ex-
pressly in the House of Commons, on August 10, England's com-
pelling duty to protect Belgian neutrality, irrespective of exist-
ing circumstances, and declared this view, referring to Lord
Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, to be "a rigid, impracticable
construction of the guarantee." In the interest of England,
however, he had on the day before considered it necessary to
effect a separate agreement with each of the two belligerent
governments to continue for twelve months after the end of the
war; according to these agreements, in case of violation of Bel-
gian neutrality by either France or Germany alone, England's
military forces were to proceed on Belgium's soil against the
offending Power, together with the troops of the other state. *
Although the revival of the guarantee of 1839 was contemplated
at the expiration of the specified period, nevertheless a diminu-
tion of its importance was inevitable, since such separate agree-
ments were considered to be necessary in extreme circumstances;

^This fear existed among the better claases in England, according to Sir
Robert Morier. See his statement of August 9, 1870: "Do they not see that

actiyity of the only yaluable factor, viz., Britain's nayal forces, and be calls
it a ''monstrously absurd treaty."

356 MODERN GERMANY

important personages, such as the French historian Sorel and the
oft-mentioned Belgian Major and later Chief of Staff, General
Ducame, considered the treaty of 1839 as entirely abrogated in
consequence.

Without her own mobilization and frontier guard, Belgium,
it is true, would have been the scene of bloody battles, despite
the treaty. In the French council of war, before the battle of
Sedan, it was earnestly debated whether the surrounded army
should not force a passage into the Departement du Nord
through Belgian territory; fear of the seventy thousand Belgian
troops on the frontier alone caused the plan to be abandoned.

''I can assure you," declared General Chazal, who was Bel-
gian Commander-in-Chief in the military commission of 1871,
''that General Wimpffen and the officers of his staff, who came
to my camp after the battle of Sedan, made no secret of the
fact that this plan would have been carried out if our frontier
had not been well guarded and if they had not considered us
strong enough to resist every attempt of this kind." ^

The few thousands who nevertheless fled over the frontier
after the capitulation of Sedan were easily disarmed.

As regards the preservation of her neutrality, Belgium owed
most to the German victories. This was clearly appreciated in
the country, especially in Flemish circles, in which a feeling pre-
vailed as if an evil dream had been dispelled. At this time the
Flemish poet, Emanuel Hiels, sang thus:

How shall we, German brothers, our gratitude express
To you, whose bravery saved us when sore was our distress
From Prankish bands of robbers, who came with this desi^:
O'er Meuse and Scheldt to lord it, and o'er the German Rhine?—
How shall we prove we're grateful? Your death heroic saves
Our Flanders, too, from danger, from peril's rushing waves.

King Leopold II, who in the dangers of 1867 had sought to
secure support in the east by the marriage of his brother with a
Hohenzollern princess, declared, on September 18, 1870, in a
letter to Crown Prince Friedrich, that he expected great things
of the new German Empire, which he regarded as representing
the revival of order and justice in Europe; and in the Crown
Prince's reply, written under Bismarck's influence, attention was
called to the guarantee which Belgium gained through a strong
Germany; the country had nothing to fear either from Ger-
many, he declared, or from France, so long as the former re-
mained strong.

^La neutraiitS beige, Woeste, Paris, 1891, p. 58; La defense de la Belgique,
Bru88ela» i907> P< ^00 ff.

MODERN GERMANY 357

The history of more than forty years has proved the truth
of these words. The period of unceasing danger to her existence
was followed by an epoch of peaceful security for Belgium, in
ivhich she was able to develop her strength, in the main in close
connection with Germany's economic rise. During this long
period there seems to be only one moment mentioned in the enemy
>var literature when Belgium's existence is claimed to have been
threatened by Germany. In the spring of 1875, Bismarck, in
the warlike state of mind attributed to him in view of France's
increasing military strength, is said to have been determined
upon the destruction of Belgium and ready to divide the country
between Holland and France. As a matter of fact, conditions
were quite the reverse. As I have been able to convince myself
by documentary proof, France was the state in which plans for
such a division as a compensation for Alsace-Lorraine were en-
tertained, not alone in the peace negotiations of 1871 : in the
following years the French minister repeatedly suggested to
Prince Bismarck that such an equivalent might be found in Bel-
gium. The Third Republic, then, by no means abandoned the
historically consistent French tendency toward expansion; weak-
ness and isolation imposed merely a temporary restraint upon
her. From time to time, however, the old desires gained defi-
nite expression. Nor are we dealing here only with the words of
irresponsible writers like Victor Hugo, Girardin, Lepelletier,
Cassagnac, Jouet, who demanded as compensation for Alsace-
Lorraine the advance of the northern boundary to the Rhine
and the annexation at least of the Walloon provinces of Bel-
gium, but also with the utterances of generals and ministers of
war, like Zurlinden (1887) and Etienne (1906), who have un-
reservedly proclaimed such ideals.^

The more France pushed her preparations for carrying out
the revanche idea, the more threatening became the danger
to Belgium of being again surrounded by the waves of the titanic
struggle and perhaps of being drawn into the maelstrom. So
long as weakened France, single-handed, faced a powerful, sati-
ated and indisputably peaceful Germany, this danger was small;
it grew when in the eighties the Republic acquired increasingly
strong support from the Russian Empire. Belief in the efficacy
of neutral guarantees has never been very great in the minds of
serious politicians and officers of Belgium; on the contrary, the
vital needs and the relentlessness of military necessities control-

^For details see Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van VUumderen en Wallonie
(843-I9I3), by Josson, Breda, 1913, p. 650 ff.

358 MODERN GERMANY

ling a Great Power met with an understanding that to-day
suddenly to have been lost.

"We are convinced," for example, says the military writer,
Navez, "that the states guaranteeing our independence fully in-
tend to stand by their obligations. But this intention does not
bind them very strongly. Their leaders consider, not without
justice, that their primary duty is to their own nation, which has
placed its destinies in their hands. The law of self-preservation,
the fear of becoming the helpless prey and victim of another
Power — this overrides for a state all other considerations: solus
populi supreme lex esto,"

And the Belgian general, Dejardin, remarks: "In war situa-
tions occur the demands of which are more imperative than the
most solemn treaties." ^ Again and again, clear-sighted men
have emphasized the fact that for her complete security Belgium
could depend only on her own strength. During the German-
French crisis of 1887 the Belgian system of defense was sub-
jected to new examination and reform.

It had already at that time deteriorated far enough from its
original purpose. For a long time nothing had been left of the
bulwark created by the Great Powers against France. The nu-
merous fortresses on the southern frontier, which required more
than a small mercenary army to hold them, had fallen to ruin
at the middle of the century and become useless. Although dur-
ing the time of the weak and isolated monarchy of Louis Phi-
lippe, reliance could be placed, for lack of better help, on the
counter-efforts of other Powers, in the fifties there was need of
taking measures in keeping with the new conditions resulting
from the rise of Napoleon III. At this time the plan of making
Antwerp a strongly fortified military camp, which would offer
the army in case of foreign invasion a place of refuge and the
chance to maintain itself until the coming of outside help (espe-
cially from England), was adopted after long preparations and
disputes (1859). Compared to the previous neglect of all pro-
tection, this was a definite step forward for Belgium; and that
was the reason why France, where it was customary to regard
the little neighboring state as certain prey, viewed the change
with highly unfavorable eyes and attributed it to British or
Prussian influence. Napoleon III even resented the razing
of the fortresses on the French frontier, and had the audacity
to protest to the Belgian minister, Rogier, at the dismantling of
some of them, on the ground that in the event of an invasion of
the imperial troops becoming necessary they might have served as

^La defense de la Belgique, by Navez, pp. 285-287.

MODERN GERMANY 359

points of support.^ The French protests at the strengthening of
Antwerp must be viewed in the light of such pretensions. As a
matter of fact, the absolute stripping of the extensive southern
frontier represented a considerable yielding to France compared
with previous times.

In the sixties the first construction of the Antwerp fortifica-
tions was undertaken, and after the Franco-German War fur-
ther improvements were carried out in the light of these experi-
ences, and again extended after 1906 on a still greater scale, in
keeping with the development of technical knowledge. This
system of defense, it is true, was the merest minimum with
which to maintain independence: it was not sufficient in case of
a new European conflict to prevent the passage of an enemy
army from either direction, an eventuality which was becoming
constantly more probable on account of the mutual strengthen-
ing of the Franco-German border. The plans of Brialmont,
proposed in the period after 1882, had that eventuality in view
and were therefore directed towards perfecting the Meuse for-
tresses. Liege and Namur were intended as main bridgeheads
to serve as points of support of the field army and to form, to-
gether with Antwerp, the great protective triangle which, it
was hoped, would close the country on both sides. At the time
of the war alarm of 1887, sanction was obtained for the im-
mediate carrying out of these plans, advocated with especial
warmth in an anonymous memoir later attributed to C. Ban-
ning, director of the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, who stood very close to the King.

Again we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the
outcry raised in the French camp. In the succeeding years a
press campaign was carried on systematically against the Belgian
throne and government, based on some genuine documents stolen
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels, Banning*s
memorial among them, and on spurious and counterfeited pa-
pers. This culminated in the direct accusation against King
Leopold II of having violated the obligations of Belgium's neu-
trality by entering into a military convention with Germany,
which was represented as providing in certain eventualities —
namely, a threat from the French side — for the entrance and
occupation by German troops, in a manner similar to the
secret treaty of 1831. The strengthening, of the Meuse fort-
resses, it was claimed, had been in the interest of Germany and
Belgium, which, according to an article in the Figaro, was now
to be regarded merely as a German province. The accusation

^ Frkre-Orhan, II, by Hymans, pp. 7 and 71.

36o MODERN GERMANY

was false. It was emphatically denied in Belgium by those per-
sons best in a position to know, such as Woeste and Beemaert. In
a sitting of the Chamber on February 5, 1890, de Chimay, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that the Belgian g:overn-
ment appreciated its obligations of neutrality: ''to assert that
it has violated these obligations by treaties, that it has bound
itself to one or the other of its neighbors — ^this is to invent a
ridiculous fable."

What is interesting to-day in these happenings is that the
existence of a one-sided military convention on Belgium's part,
as protection against a threat to her neutrality, was regarded,
not alone by French complainants, as an inexcusable breach of
her obligations of neutrality, but also by authoritative representa-
tives of the Belgian government as well.^ The attitude which
in 1887 was taken in England as regards the possibility of a
German (or French) passage through the Belgian territory is
also remarkable. In The Standard, the official organ of the
government at this time, on February 4, 1887, * sharp distinc-
tion was made, in the letter of an unnamed diplomat and in the
leading article, between "the merely temporary exercise of the
right of way and the permanent illegal occupation of territory.^
Only in the last case, not in the former "trifling breach of law,'
it was said, did England's honor and interest call for interfer-
ence.

The leading article, which is, of course, more important, says:
**If one or the other were to say to England, 'All the military
approaches to France and Germany have been closed; and only
neutral approaches lie open to us. This state of things is not
only detrimental, but fatal to our military success, and it has
arisen since the Treaty guaranteed the sacredness of the only
roads of which we can now avail ourselves. We will, as a fact,
respect the independence of Belgium, and we will give you the
most solemn and binding guarantees, that at the end of the
conflict, Belgium shall be as free and as independent as before.'
If Germany (and, of course, our hypothesis applies also to
France) were to use this language — though we trust there will
be no occasion for it — ^we cannot doubt what would be the
wise and proper course for England to pursue, and what would
be the answer of the English government. England does not
wish to shirk its true responsibilities. But it would be madness
for us to incur or assume responsibilities unnecessarily, when

^ See "La neutrality beige viol^ par rAllemagne," by Juliette Adam, Nouvelh
Revue, 54 (1888).

9>

I

MODERN GERMANY 361

V.

to do so would manifestly involve our participation in a tre-
mendous war."

The similarity with the occurrences of 19 14 is striking. The
German Empire acted at the latter date precisely according to
the English suggestion of 1887; but that which was previously

^ a ''trifling/' and hence bearable breach of law, now became

I (since England desired a break and welcomed a cause of war

that would lend itself to propaganda) a crime, to suffer which
would have besmirched England's honor.

r An unprejudiced appreciation of the Meuse fortresses shows

that far from representing a threat to France, they amounted to
a further strengthening of the defense system against Germany.
This resulted rather from the geographical conditions than from

L the intention of the Belgian government, which at that time

undoubtedly earnestly desired protection on both sides. For
Liege, which was not only stronger but also nearer the outer

t circle, could not but be regarded as a more efficient check on

the short German border line than the weaker Namur, which
was situated further inland and commanded only the angle be-
tween the Sambre and the Meuse. Moltke declared in 1890 that
at least a part of the fortifications on the Meuse seemed to be
directed against Germany. In view of her thoroughly peaceful
intentions, Germany might, nevertheless, have been satisfied
with the new system, if this had offered genuine protection
against a French advance. But, according to the opinion of all
Belgian and foreign experts, it possessed one great weakness:
after deducting the garrison forces necessary for the extensive
fortifications, the remaining field army was much too feeble to
be able to operate successfully.

"The fortifications on the Meuse," declared Moltke further,
"will be a burden to Belgium as long as she cannot mobilize
70,CXX) additional men, and this she will be able to do only
with a system of recruiting which meets the demands of our
epoch."

Neither the Crown nor the military leaders in Belgium were
lacking during the following years in correct appreciation of the
situation.^ This was especially true of the War Ministry. Laws

^ From among the numerous Belgian writers, I quote only Navez. La difens€
de la Belgique, p. 288: "After the war the victorious state would say to us:
'Since you nave proven incapable of protecting my frontiers by an adequate
defense of your own territory, as you were bound by the treaties to do, I
shall henceforth take care of the matter myself, and therefore I shall occupy
your country. Your carelessness in the question of national defense entitles
me to do ao.' ** A similar standpoint was taken by M. Lebeau. ex-Minister
of State, a man who was instrumental in the foundation of the Belgian state,
in a speech delivered before the Brussels Chamber on February x6, 1855. He
•aid: '^'History teaches us what becomes of neutralities which are supposed to
> be sufficiently guaranteed by what is sometimes termed 'a scrap ot paper.'

362 MODERN GERMANY

were constantly proposed which were intended to lead by gentle
degrees from the antiquated mercenary system to the universal
duty of bearing arms. The clerical legislative majority, by its
determined opposition, was guilty of the crime of serious pro-
crastination, and the government was also frequently weak
enough to leave its own party in the lurch.

Might not this evil condition easily lead to a secret under-
standing with a foreign Power, in violation of neutrality, in
order to provide in case of necessity the protection clearly recog-
nized as needful but hitherto neglected? Germany did not fail
frequently to urge Belgium to strengthen herself defensively.
From Bismarck's much-discussed saying in 1887 that Belgium's
neutrality would be best protected if she provided herself with
a good army, there is a chain of similar opinions down to the
statement of Emperor William II, when in 191 2 he was able
personally to convince himself of the admirable reorganization
of the Swiss army: "I wish that I were as well protected on
my right flank as I am on my left.'' These are plain warnings,
which give the lie to the long-contemplated plans of conquest
that our enemies attribute to us. When at last by the adoption
of the military program of 1909, and especially that of 191 3,
the desired goal seemed nearly attained, it was too late for the
events of 19 14, since the last military law would not have been
fully enforced until three years later.

During the armed peace of the nineties between die Dual
Entente and the Dreibund, as long as on both sides there was
still hesitation in bringing about changes in the actual con-
dition of Europe, and while Russia acted as a restraint on
France, Belgium had reason to feel safe to a certain degree ; in-
deed, so strong was this feeling that a remarkable capitalistic
and imperialistic development took place at that very time in
the little state.

The man who for his own advantage guided the country into
these new paths was its King, Leopold II. He united in him-
self the business sense of the Coburgs and Orleans in an un-
canny manner — indeed, in the end, this degenerated almost into

Undoubtedly, owing to the power of public opinion, such neutralities exert
in our present day a much greater force than in former times. However,
we should not commit the error of believing that no duties are connected with
this neutrality, or can grow out of it. We must be able to safeguard our-
selves, at least to a certain degree; and if ever we were to neglect such an
important interest and forget so great a dutv, we should thereby expose our-
selves to the eventuality of the other side declaring to us what the First Consul
of the French Republic declared to^ the Republic of Venice: 'If vou bad
known how to protect yourselves against a coup de main, if you haa known
that the enemy could so easily gain entrance to you and that he was on the
point of occupying a stratetric position detrimental to my army, I would not
have entered your territory.' " See also Frire-Orban, II, by Hymans, p. 27 ff.

MODERN GERMANY 363

monomania. He was through and through a ruler of the great
merchant type, with a world-embracing outlook, a cool, calcu-
lating imagination and ruthless determination, of absolutely
worldly disposition — in the one-sided development of his char-
acter a peculiarly striking figure, who in many respects gave to
Belgium her modern stamp. It is sufficient at this point merely
to recall the manner in which, in the face of British opposition
but with Bismarck's benevolent encouragement, he developed the
Congo State in the eighties as his exclusive, personal creation;
how, since 1890, already involving the state in his undertakings,
he carried through that extreme capitalistic system which com-
bined the most successful financial exploitation with the darkest
social defects; how the desire for Belgium's greatness was
strangely mixed in him with the most arrant selfishness, so that
finally his own people were forced to take the Q)ngo from him
as a Belgian colony, as the result of painful and costly negotia-
tions. The final result is of importance: The Belgium of 1908,
who ruled over an immense colonial empire eighty times as large
as herself, was no longer that little state which had once
been created as a European bulwark against France and which
later, in the system of the balance of power, with difficulty main-
tained its place in the scale. Whatever her writers on constitu-
tional law may say in theoretical justification of her colonial
acquisitions, the fact remains that the basis of the neutrality
treaty of 1839 had been thereby seriously disturbed.

Permanently guaranteed neutrality demands in return a self-
denying regard for the prescribed limitations. This smaU state,
however, without a merchant fleet or vessels of war, had en-
tered the field of broad world politics. Able to maintain her-
self only by the guarantee of her creators, not by her own
strength, she had adopted in Africa the imperialistic policy of a
Great Power, in the last analysis at the expense of others. Her
neutrality, which was always a delicate and fragile thing, through
the connection with the vast African empire, was subjected to a
test of strength to which, in jhe long run, it was scarcely likely
to prove equal. The position is not tenable that this colonial
empire, together with the entire Basin of the Congo, has been
neutralized since the Berlin Act of 1885, that only peaceful cul-
tural tasks here came into question, and that for the settlement
of differences of opinion there were other than warlike means.
For a colonial policy always remains a policy of force, and the
policy in the Congo State was of this nature in an especially
marked degree, despite the humanitarian mantle which was at
first so readily used as a disguise. In view of the primitive

364 MODERN GERMANY

stage of civilization in the colonies, misunderstandings and
clashes were inevitable, as experience had already amply taught
under the rule of Leopold II. Even if, as was of course possible,
they did not lead to armed conflict, there nevertheless resulted
manifold questions of common interest, of dependence and dis-
pute which could not fail to have a prejudicial effect upon the
neutral position of the motherland. Did not France's right of
preemption, guaranteed by the separate treaties of 1884, 1894
and 1908, contain the germ of favoritism which, as the Franco-
German negotiations of 191 1 have shown, might become a
source of serious inconvenience for Belgium? In addition to
Portugal, England for the first time had become the immediate
and deeply interested African neighbor of the Belgian territory
{Katanga) y a neighbor upon whose favor or disfavor the de-
velopment of the Congo colony depended to an important de-
gree. It is not yet possible to determine to what extent the
outburst of indignation in England over the Congo atrocities,
which in its essence was no doubt sincere, was made use of by
the British government, which took a hand in the affair and
long deferred the recognition of the Belgian colony, as a means
of political pressure to support counter-demands in Europe.
That in Belgium serious fears were entertained along this line
is undoubtedly shown by an article in the influential clerical
publication, Bien Publique, of November 20, 1907, which char-
acterized the British consular agents who were gathering ma-
terial in the Congo State for new accusations as heralds of a
future annexation, and declared that the independence of Be)^
gium herself might be endangered through such occurrences.
The Brussels Socialist, C. Huysmans, was not so far wrong
when he declared at the Socialist Congress in Nuremberg in
1908: ''Belgium has not annexed the Congo State; it is the
Congo State which is annexing Belgium. Belgium has become
involved in the Anglo-German dispute, and our happy neutrality
has thereby been seriously impaired." ^

Finally the far-reaching concessions for exploitation of the
country and for railroads in the interior of the Congo colony,
which Leopold II had granted as late as 1906 to English, French

^A similar opinion was uttered immediately before the war by the Belgian
deputy, de Brouckere iNeue Zeit, July 31* 19 14): '*The annexation of the
Congo State was decided on and it was believed tfaAt we would rule the colony.
To-oay, it is recognized that the colony is ruling us. We have entered the
circle of the World Powers without expanding our little territory, and the
great ones will not let go of us again. . . . To-morrow perhaps England, who
considers military duty a burden only within her own oounaaries, will Sfsin
call on us to observe our obligations. What will the Government do? Will
our big money interests permit the Government to offer a resistance which
sooner or later must lead to our renunciation of the Congo?"

MODERN GERMANY 365

and American syndicates, involved manifestations of favoritism
which were apt, in certain circumstances, to involve the govern-
ments in question. On the other hand, Belgian capitalism,
which had waxed fat on the temporarily unheard-of Congo earn-
ings, had long since expanded beyond the boundaries of the
state, and everywhere, in European foreign countries, had built
railroads and street railways, exploited mines and called num-
berless other commercial undertakings into being, without, in
time, taking precautionary measures to insure the financial sta-
bility of the great banks.

A capitalistic expansion of this kind, of course, could not be
forbidden to the business men of a neutral state. Nevertheless,
die vast scope of these international activities, which King Leo-
pold continued to encourage by example and precept, were not
without their serious aspects. They created a large number of
connections and opportunities for disputes, and in view of the
interlocking of modern economic and political affairs, this might
easily lead the Belgian state into an attitude of partiality among
the groups of Great Powers. In truth, Belgian capital was more
and more used in ways advantageous to France and members of
the Triple Entente: her investments, for example, in Russia,
exceeded by nearly a half-billion francs those in other countries,
and the number of joint-stock undertakings preponderatingly
financed in Belgium was exceeded only by those capitalized in
France.^ This fact could scarcely fail to be of influence on the
policy of the state as a whole in critical times, and was apt to
lead to an internal jeopardizing of its neutrality, which, as the
Belgian statesman, Frere-Orban, once declared ^'demands a cer-
tain balance of influence in the field of material afiEairs."

Belgium's neutrality in Europe had for a long time found its
strongest support in England. Not, however, that this state
regarded the sanctity of treaties with especially great respect I
This pretence, which the article in The Times of March 8, I9i5i
frankly abandoned, was industriously made use of in Eng-
land only during the first months of the war for purposes of
propaganda. Previously such pretenses had by no means always
been regarded as necessary; on neither side of the Channel was
it considered possible to disguise the fact that England's attitude
toward Belgium was determined not by noble, unselfish feelings,
but by pure self-interest. In a speech recently rescued from
oblivion by A. Schulte, the former Minister of Foreign A£Eair8y

^ See Annuaire de la Vie beige d I'Hranger, 19 la, p. 3x3 ff. Belgian capital
invested in Russia is given as amounting to 441,000,000 francs, and the Belgian
companies in France are said to number 173, as against 112 in Russia and
50 m Germany.

366 MODERN GERMANY

de Favereau, declared in the Senate, on December 8, 1909, in
speaking of the guarantor Powers in general:

''You see, gentlemen, that if one weighs the value of this
guarantee, one becomes convinced that it was not dictated by
magnanimous feelings toward Belgium, but by considerations
which affect the Powers personally. And one comes to the con-
clusion that their intervention in our favor, when the moment
comes, will be controlled by the demands of their own interests."

An article in The Times of January 29, 1906, had raised
this question with special reference to England. Voices, ho^^-
ever, were to be heard which spoke in quite a different key.
In his strange book, "The Day of the Anglo-Saxon" (1912),
which is dedicated to Field Marshal Lord Roberts, the Ameri-
can Anglo-Saxon, Homer Lea, declares (p. 226) English oppo-
sition to the violation of neutral territory to be wrong, "for the
British Empire is not moved by the sanctity of neutrality. It is
only a means of evading responsibility and shifting it upon those
nations which delude themselves with the belief that such decla-
rations are inviolable; whereas no nation has violated neutral
territory and denied their obligations more frequently than the
Saxon." Let us read, in addition, how the Englishman, Major
Stewart Murray, speaks in his essay, "The Future Peace of the
Anglo-Saxons" (p. 40), of Britain's breach of neutrality against
Denmark in the year 1807, which George Canning also sought
to justify on the ground of necessity: "Nothing has ever been
done by any other nation more utterly in defiance of the agree-
ments of so-called international law; we considered it advisable
and necessary and expedient, and we had the power to do it;
therefore we did it. Are we ashamed of having done so?
No, certainly not ; we are proud of it — for people of this country
to talk of the sanctity of international law is nothing but hy-
pocrisy or ignorance."

As far as the Belgian state is concerned, it is immaterial
whether England was impelled to protect its neutrality through
respect for the treaty or through selfish interests. But an effec-
tive protection was to be expected only as long as in Europe's dis-
cordant camps Great Britain maintained an impartial, isolated
position, enabling her to prevent either side from a violation of
Belgian neutrality, for fear of arousing her enmity. As soon as
she made an end of her isolation and took sides, this barrier was
removed, for if all the guarantor Powers fell to fighting
among themselves, whose interference was then to be feared?
It may, therefore, be stated that the decision as to Belgium's
neutrality was reached ten years before the entrance of the

MODERN GERMANY 367

German troops, at the time when England, through her treaty
with France (1904), established connection with the Dual Alli-
ance and soon thereafter managed to overcome her natural aver-
sion to Russia. The neutrality of Belgium in effect ceased to
exist when it was realized that in a future world war the British
power would be thrown to the side of France; when the con-
ference of Algeciras (1906) proclaimed the new alignment of
states to the whole world, and plans were hinted at regarding a'
military cooperation of England and France, and the landing o|
a British expeditionary force; when a saying of Lord Kitchener
was going the rounds: "The boundary of the British Empire
in Europe is not the English Channel, but the line of the
Meuse''; and when Lord Roberts let it be known that in August,
191 1, the fleet and the army had stood ready to interfere in
Flanders. It began to be realized in Belgium that the war of
the future would not halt at the boundary of the country, like
that of 1870. "Will the new policy which England appears to
have adopted," inquired Favereau, in the above-mentioned speech
in the Senate in support of the army bill of 1909, "allow her to
play in future the benevolent role the benefits of which we have
hitherto enjoyed? Will she not, in the moment of danger, find
herself bound by ties which, as regards one of the combatants,
will deprive her of that complete independence that is essential
to her activity in our behalf?" And he suggested the disquiet-
ing possibility of a permanent occupation of Antwerp by Great
Britain. The army bill of 191 3 was even officially based on the
consideration that England had abandoned her position of isola-
tion and joined one of the two groups of Powers; henceforth,
it was claimed, she would no longer be in a position, as in the
past, to protect Belgian neutrality.^

It is thus all the more to be lamented that Belgium still clung
to the British power. "They would protect us even against our
will," says the Brussels senator, Hanrez, in a speech on Septem-
ber 2, 1908. This led, as many signs indicated, but as could
not be proved until the Anglo-Qelgian Conventions of 1906
and 19 1 2 were found, to a secret abandonment of the obligatory
impartiality, to an important military surrender to the Western
Powers, and to a premature decision regarding action in a future
war. The warning of the Belgian minister, Woeste, was disre-
garded: "For us to become the ally of one of our neighbors, to
permit ourselves to be involved in an adventure as its follower

^ In this connection we the remarkable pamphlet of the French sodaliit,
Francis Delaisi, La guerre qui vient, Paris, 191 1, P< ^S* (American edition.
The Future War, Boston, 191 5, p. 56.)

368 MODERN GERMANY

— this would te to transform Belgium into a battlefield, and to
bring down upon us the fate of the conquered, and perhaps con-
demn us to be devoured by the victor."

The Belgian government is not the only one to bear the
blame for thus taking sides in a manner which its position for-
bade ; it was fully supported in this step by the influential classes
of the country. Although many an individual German may have
had cause to appreciate friendly assistance, and although on
occasion there may have been an oflicial exchange of courtesies,
nevertheless the latest attempts at Belgian justification picturing
the relationship as quite undisturbed until the war upset things
in an entirely unexpected manner, give an absolutely false impres-
sion. Undoubtedly, the commercial and industrial superiority of
Germany, especially as manifested since the nineties, and her
great abundance of strength were not precisely pleasant for a
weaker neighbor; but in the presence of the envy, distrust and
hatred thereby created, it was far too often forgotten in Bel-
gium to what extent the country was by nature dependent on
this hinterland, which in the commercial treaties of 1892 and
1905 had made much appreciated concessions to Belgium. It was
likewise forgotten that among the purchasers of Belgian export
goods Germany stood first on the list, with the yearly expendi-
ture of a billion francs, and that Antwerp had grown to be
one of the most important harbors in the world solely through
its German connections, without which it would be a city of
the dead. Instead of appreciating these and further facts, the
Belgians let themselves be more and more deceived by an inimi-
cal press campaign, which claimed to see in every German mer-
chant the pioneer, or even the spy, of the Prussian military in-
vasion. In the end the Belgians threw themselves so unre-
servedly into France's arms, "the true fatherland," ^ that in 19x3
a Walloon ofiicial of calm judgment recognized the danger for
Belgium, and in a pamphlet that is well worth reading sought to
give his compatriots a clear understanding of German methods
and ambitions — without finding great response, it is true. *

On the French side, of course, no stone was left unturned
since the beginning of our century to push the "peaceful penetra-
tion" which the Third Republic had set itself as its immediate
goal. In this field it enjoyed great advantage over the German
competitor, through the adoption of the French language by the
Walloons, while the separation of High and Low German had

1 See Frankriik de eewvenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-
19 14), Josson, Breda, 19 13, p. 677.
*Delg%qut et I'Allemagne, published under the pseudonym "Integer/* 19x3-

MODERN GERMANY 369

made the German-speaking part of the Netherlands an isolated
linguistic island. There was in France full appreciation of the
powerful weapon which the language represented; it was the
medium of an ancient, refined, fascinating Kultur, which for
hundreds of years had held the ruling classes of the Belgian
people captivated. "We desire to annex the free intelligence/'
announced the French consul, Crozier, in Antwerp, in 1909, and
on the Flemish side at least it was well understood what this
meant. The statement of the former burgomaster of Brussels,
Karel Buls, sounds like the commentary to this: "The Bel-
gians who assist in the annexation of their brains are paving the
way for the annexation of their native soil."

Only in this connection can the tremendous expenditure be
understood which government and society in France, year in,
year out, devoted to propaganda in Belgium. Of primary con-
sideration was die press, for which, in addition to a flood of
honors and "ribbons," a secret fund of 200,000 francs was pro-
vided for in the yearly budget of the Republic. It was, there-
fore, not surprising that the hearts and pockets of the Belgian
editors opened in sympathy to the "great nation." Another
easy method of winning their adherence was to employ them
as paid reporters for French newspapers, whereby they were
in a measure reconciled to the unpleasant competition of Pari-
sian newspapers, which were sold in enormous quantities in
the streets of Belgium. The convenience of the paper-shears
(which played no part in the case of German newspapers, owing
to linguistic reasons) finally set the seal on this Franco-Belgian
press alliance. It is an old story, the manner in which L'ln-
dependance Beige, according to the saying, was for many years
only La Dependance Franqaise. During the first Morocco
crisis the semi-official Journal de Bruxelles itself had to ad-
mit, on August 7, 1906, that a portion of the Belgian press re-
peated in a parrotlike manner every accusation made on the
French or English side. During the second Morocco crisis of
191 1 these occurrences were repeated in an even more flagrant
manner. Evidently on this occasion anxiety as to the fate of the
Belgian Congo was also a factor. Although it was finally estab-
lished in the press that the proposal to use this territory as a
compensation had emanated from France, but had been rejected
by Germany, distrust of Germany nevertheless continued to un-
dermine public confidence. The intention of economic conquest,
at least, was ascribed to the Empire, and it sounded like a voice
in the wilderness when occasionally the fact was justly appre-

370 MODERN GERMANY

ciated that in the Morocco Treaty, Germany, by safeguarding
international commercial interests, had benefited Belgium also.^

The expression, the ''Moroccanization" of Belgium, ivhicfa
was coined at that time, was not exactly a compliment to the
independence of the little state. As a matter of fact, the -wayt
of French infliience was not limited to the press alone. The
next important field was that of the schools. In contrast to the
few German schools in Belgium, there were a large number of
institutions directly supported by France, which in their text-
books proclaimed the fact that the ''Rhine throughout the
whole of its course" is the natural boundary of France. In
addition, there was theatrical propaganda in its various forms —
performances by the Comidie Franqaise (at the instigation of
the French government), variety theatres, music halls, mo\'ii^
pictures. Furthermore, there were lecture courses in the Vtu-
vernte des Annales, which was founded in Brussels in 1909 00
the French model; the united propaganda of the Jssociations
pour la vulgarisation de la langue franqmse, which was am-
nected with the Alliance Franqmse; the congresses which
brought together all those of Gallic sympathies at Liege (1905).
Brussels (1910) and Mons (1911); numberless visits from ooe
side to the other, and fraternization feasts, especially at the in-
ternational exhibitions of Brussels (1910) and Ghent (1913).
French participation in the latter was undisguisedly admitted by
the Minister of Commerce, David, in the Parisian Chamber of
Deputies, as being a demonstration against the plan of founding
a Flemish university; Belgian protests, which were published
against such an interference, complained that France was show-
ing clearly that she already considered Belgium as conquered
territory.

In view of all this, it is not without its tragi-comic side to
notice how these Walloons and the Franskiljons, forgetting
their German extraction, outdid each other in their addresses of
welcome, their grateful homage to French power, civilization
and language, while the Parisian guests, accepting the trib-
utes with offhanded politeness, met these Belgian parvenus
with an air of cool scorn, expressive of their secret disgust. If
the burgomaster of the metropolis, Max, imagined that he was
making an especially happy remark in calling "the Brussels
boulevards a continuation of those at Paris," the name "Brus-
sels" indicated in French mouths merely a "district" of Paris,
the whole of Belgium an "appendage," a "corner" of Francx.
"Ideas, land, inhabitants, everything is miserable in Belgium,"

^Belgique et VAllemagnt, p. 59.

J

MODERN GERMANY 371

was the opinion of Taine; and Beaudelaire held the people to
be "the most stupid in the world." When Octave Mirbeau
poured the vials of his contemptuous and derisive wit over the
Belgians, it was too much even for his victims, despite their
long-suffering tolerance of all that proceeded from the south-
western quarter of the Continent.

The propaganda extended also to the military field. In
France the Dual Alliance and the Entente had greatly increased
the army's confidence in its strength. In Belgium this feeling
vras given most emphatic expression by the defiant French monu-
ments which were erected in Waterloo (1904), Antwerp
(1905), Fleurus (1906) and finally even in Jemappes (1911),
where now at the top of an obelisk a golden Gallic cock recalls
the Austrian defeat of 1792, which led to the annexation of
Belgium by the First Republic. ''Another monument in honor
of France/' said one of the Belgian newspapers at the time;
"if things continue in this fashion, in the end we shall have to
present Belgium to them in gratitude for the monuments. '* The
Walloon author, Dumont-Wilden, together with his friend, Leon
Souguenet, were present at the unveiling ceremony. They had
just returned from a trip through Alsace-Lorraine, the impre^
sions of which they described in a book, "The Victory of the
Conquered" (1912), in the most anti-German manner, employ-
ing the vocabulary that has since become so popular of "Attila,"
"barbarians," "brutality," etc.

The sight of German troops in the two provinces had awak-
ened in their minds only one thought, "The enemy 1 Belgium's
enemy also!" They were now taking delight in the great
demonstration at Jemappes. "Here likewise in Belgium a new
feeling had been born; the eyes of the people were opened to
the danger from the East, and it was not an idle act devoid of
courage when ten thousand coal miners began to sing the Mar-
seillaise." They realized that "danger threatened exclusively
from the East, and it occasioned a feeling of relief among the
Belgians to know that in the worst event they would not have
to fight against the French Republic, the liberator of Belgium
and of the Scheldt."

When in 19 12 funds were to be gathered for increasing the
French air fleet, Belgium contributed by entertainments given
to this end.

It looked as if a large portion of the Belgian population,
chiefly the politically most influential part, were coming to share
more and more the views of the monthly magazine, Les Marches
de L'Est, which had been started in Paris in 1908, and accord-

372 MODERN GERMANY

ing to which Belgium was reckoned as part of the Eastern prov-
inces of France, together with Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine and
French Switzerland. The Belgian newspaper, Reveil fVallon,
founded in 1907, already developed a regular program for Bel-
gium's union with France, first of all in customs, post, mutual
recognition of citizenship, etc., and closed with the words: "Wc
are enemies of Prussia, and all our sympathies are with good
and kind France, whose misfortune has only increased our love.
We remain thoroughly Walloon when we defend French civi-
lization." In view of such feelings, the deafening cries of ''Vive
la France r even in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, may be
understood, when in the sitting of February 6, 191 3, a clerical
member ventured to describe the French election laws as rotten.
At this period the Walloon state official who has already been
mentioned, wrotfc: "As things are now progressing with us, we
are steering automatically in piping times of peace directly toward
French annexation.'' *

Viewing all this together, one is justified in doubting whether
this was an attitude suitable to the inhabitants of a neutralized
state. In view of so one-sided an attitude, is it surprising from
a social, economic, political and military standpoint if in Ger-
many there grew up a deep distrust of the fairness of her "neu-
tral" neighbor?

The Flemish were not partners in these acts, at least not
such as were conscious of their racial bonds and who had not,
like Maeterlinck and Verhaeren, long before the war, taken up
their position in the Gallic camp. All who sympathized with
the Flemish movement had, it is true, carefully avoided all con-
nection with Germany, but they had nevertheless been forced
constantly to repel the attacks of the French propagandists and
their Belgian adherents. The movement was on the whole
purely Belgian, yet it doubtless deserves the most whole-hearted
S3rmpathy, and in its invisible connections with the political par-
ties, the most thorough study by Germans; but at this point it
claims attention only in its ultimate aims, as affecting the nature
of the Belgian state. Whoever regards this as merely a linguis-
tic and literary movement is familiar only with its beginnings
in the forties and fifties of the last century. The language was
merely the most obvious expression of national individuality.
To bring the language again into repute after long suppression
and obscurity, to win for it a favorable position in the general
cultural devdopment — ^this was the chief object. To attain
this end was possible only by overcoming the dominance of the

^Belgique et VAUemagne, p. 134.

.-'

MODERN GERMANY 373

Gallic party and by giving to the Belgian state, according to
the relative strength of its races, a predominantly German char-
acter, or at least one of racial equality. The continuing democ-
ratization of political life, resulting from the extension of the
franchise and the proportional system, caused this phase of the
movement to be constantly more strongly emphasized, and
brought about from the early seventies in the legal, administra-
tive and military fields notable legislative successes looking
toward equality. In the educational field, however, the strug-
gle continued with varying successes and defeats up to recent
times; if, as regards die public and secondary schools, some
results at least were achieved, although with slight guarantee
of permanence, this was doomed to remain miserable patch-work
unless the Flemish population were enabled to secure national
university education. For in the last analysis everything de-
pended on the attitude of the upper classes. As long as ad-
vanced education was to be obtained only with a French stamp
and was valued only from that point of view, and such educa-
tion alone guaranteed vocational advance; as long as the higher
official positions were almost exclusively open to Walloons and
FranskUjons, all legal successes were deceptive, for there was
an absolute lack of impartial administration of the laws. In
the main, although with certain enforced concessions, the ruling
class stood upon the principle of government which had once
been laid down by Rogier:

''An effective administration demands a single recognized lan-
guage. For Belgium this can only be French, and to attain the
desired end it is necessary that all positions in the civil and mili-
tary administration of the country be intrusted to Walloons or
men from Luxemburg; in this manner the Flemish will tempo-
rarily be deprived of die advantages appertaining to these posi-
tions and thereby be forced to learn French. The Germanic ele-
ment in Belgiimi will thus gradually be eliminated."

To overturn this principle was the real significance of the de-
mand for a Flemish metamorphosis of the University of Ghent;
therein lies the decisive importance which this institution gained
in the struggle of nationalities during recent years. The nearer
success seemed along this line, the more violent became the coun-
ter-efforts. On the Walloon side this was taken to indicate the
end of their supremacy, and if this result was really unavoidable,
at least there was no desire to be tyrannized over by the Flemish
in future as the Walloons themselves had tyrannized over the
Flemish up to that time. If they could no longer be the ruling
party in this somewhat stormy union, in which serious frays

374 MODERN GERMANY

were not infrequent, then preferably separation from bed and
board. The idea of administrative separation along Walloon-
Flemish lines, which had been proclaimed for the first time in
1897 ^^<1 originally opposed as a dangerous vagary, gained
strength perceptibly after the cry of Emile Dupont in the Senate '

sitting of March 9, 1910, "Long live administrative separation!"
.When the general elections of 191 2 again brought disappoint-
ment to the extreme Radicals and left them without the means of '
breaking the power of the clerical majority, who for over a quar-
ter of a century had been at the helm, the Liberal Walloons de-
clared in favor of the principle of a separation at the G)ngress of |
Liege, on July 7, 191 2, thus hoping to obtain supremacy at least
in their part of the country. Shortly thereafter in the Hainault 1
provincial council, the proposer of the reform, Andre, declared
that Belgium was suffering from Jacobin centralization. She
would have to return to local autonomy.^ Reference was made to
the relation of the German Federal States to each other; there
was discussed a sort of imperial parliament, perhaps after the
model of the Austro-Hungarian "delegations," standing over the
two districts with Brussels as neutral territory between them. *
While Hainault and Liege had already been won over to the idea,
the clerical provinces of Namur and Luxemburg opposed it for
fear of a liberal majority in the future "Wallonia." The Flem-
ish members maintained an attitude of expectant disapproval,
but at the end they were not entirely irreconcilable. In both
camps there were, it is true, warning voices, which characterized
separation in administration as "a disastrous rending of the na-
tional unity." Nevertheless, the idea seemed to gain support
and Belgium to be on the verge of dissolution. For, in the light
of the whole situation, there cannot be the slightest doubt that
a Wallonia with an administration of her own was merely a prep-
aration for French annexation. Did not Jules Desiree, one of
the chief protagonists of the idea, describe Wallonia as "a por-
tion of reconstructed France," and did not the newspaper,
Flandre Liberale, say, in its issue of June 26, 191 2: "An enor-
mous number of Walloons would at the present moment be de-
lighted to be united to France. One needs only to have friends
and relatives in Wallonia to be absolutely convinced of this."
But in such a case would the little Flemish nation, overrun by
French partisans, have been able to maintain its independence?

^Belgique et VAlletnagne, p. 133: The author maintains that German deces*
tralization, which serves to multiply intellectual and artistic centres within the
Empire, corresponds better with our traditions than the centralization of the
French capital. See also Prankrijk de eeuwenoMde vijand van Vhondertn «•
iVaUonie (843-1913). Josson. Breda, 1913. p. 835.

*See Ponr la siparai*on, Jennissen, 191 x-

— 1

MODERN GERMANY 375

The future seemed to hold the most serious internal dis-
turbances for Belgium, when suddenly the World War changed
all this and drove the quarrelling factions temporarily together.
But, looking beyond the natural bitterness and grief of the
present, the Flemish should realize the importance of this hour
of destiny which has rung for them. For those whp wish to
hear, the voices of all who hope for a victory of the Western
Powers arc clearly revealing a secret joy: "This is the end of
the Flemish movement!" In the Petit Journal of Paris, on De-
cember 21, 1914, Gerard Harry, the friend of the Walloons,
declared that the Flemish had now realized the uselessness of
their dialect, that it was without value, like a vitiated coin, and
that they would henceforth be advocates of the supremacy of the
French language in Belgium. Will they be ready for suicide in
this manner, or will they remember one of the co-founders of.
their national movement, the poet Hendrik Conscience, who
called them "the advance guard of the German race"? Will
they take to heart the words of one of their noblest, the historian
Leon Vanderkindere, who, in comparing France with Germany,
exclaimed: "Here a dying civilization, yonder a civilization
full of strength and glory! Are we then condemned always to
follow France and to turn our back upon the future? The
Flemish population is also Germanic. Will not this poor little
branch, which has been separated so long from the parent stem,
at last begin to flourish anew?"

However the final decision of the Flemish may turn, the
German Empire should not allow itself to be deceived in the
slightest degree by a temporarily unfriendly attitude; for it is
greatly to its own interest, by carefully considering racial pecu-
liarities and religious leanings, to maintain and strengthen a
Germanic bulwark against the ever-renewed Gallic attacks.

What guarantee in the world conflagration of 191 4 could this
inwardly disrupted state, with its insuflicient army, its one-sided
government, and the overwhelming French sentiment of the
strategically more important southern part of the country, offer
to the German Empire? During recent years talk of the
coming war had constantly become more frequent and disturb-
ing. The writings of high-placed, mostly French officers, which
sought to depict its probable course, were numerous. All those
which have come under my observation have assumed, as a mat-
ter of course, that Belgium would be drawn into the struggle,
fighting always on the side of France, never on that of Germany.
As a matter of fact, on both sides of the border strategic prepa-
rations for war had for years been under way. It is a one-

376 MODERN GERMANY

sided, partial view in the current military writings of our ene-
mies, and occasionally also in those of neutral foreign countries,
to attribute an exclusively offensive character to the German
preparations, and to them alone.^ The camp at Elsenborn had
been for a long time the object of continual anxiety in Belgium,
just as truly as the double-tracking of the few German railway
lines leading to the Belgian border. The aim of these lines was
undoubtedly mainly strategic, and the German General Staff
would have neglected its duty if it had not taken all possibilities
into consideration. Why defensive considerations, such as the
need of quickly throwing an army to the border against a Franco-
English thrust, should have played a decisive role in this connec-
tion must be seen by every one except such as desire at any price
to find proof of a long-prepared and deliberate German con-
quest of Belgium. How untenable such one-sided accusations are
cannot be better shown than by the printed words of a Walloon
in 1913.

The German invasion, he says, is regarded "as certain, as
inevitable, without any one apparently pausing to consider how
insulting this matter-of-fact assumption is for Germany and her
leaders. As regards the contrary case, namely a French invasion,
it is hardly mentioned except as a matter of form. The con-
struction of the railway lines is spiritedly discussed, without the
question being asked what part, in case of a conflict, would be
played by the French railway company whose line runs to the
fortress of Namur. However this may be, can one doubt that if
the French (and we, of course, in their train) are fully pre-
pared to see the Germans break through into Belgium, the Ger-
mans on their side are not less convinced that their possible
enemies have the same intention? They assert — and not with-
out reason — that the French are already familiar with the way.
If the Eiffel railway lines, as they declare, possess a strategic
character, it is due to the above fact. And if the French pene-
trate from one side, will not the Germans enter from the other ?" *

In this connection we must hold before our mind's eye the
map of the south and west. Corresponding to the encampment
of Elsenborn (47 km. from Liege), there were on the French
border: Givet (35 km. from Namur); Maubeuge (67 km.
from the capital city of Brussels), for which during the last ten
years expenditures had been made and which, as was commonly
known, contained vast stores of English munitions;' Lille (65

^ See America and the World War, Theodore Roosevelt, 19 15, p. ai.
' See Belgique et VAllemagne, p. 28.

* See Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-X9i3)>
Joflson, Breda, 19 13, p. 860.

MODERN GERMANY 377

km. from Ghent), and Dunkirk (60 km. from Bruges). In
addition, there were the forts of Valenciennes, Hirson, Mezieres
and Longwy.^ The network of railways was naturally, in view
of the active traffic on some portions, far more highly developed
and provided the amplest facilities for the speedy transport of
troops. "Within a few hours after the beginning of hostilities,"
says the Belgian general, Dejardin, "the enemy would be able
to occupy Courtrai, Toumai, Ath, Mons, Manage, Charleroi
and Namur," *

The seacoast facing England was absolutely unprotected.
The German public was acquainted with the military arrange-
ments between France and England, and with the intention in
case of war immediately to land a strong British expeditionary
force. Further evidence of this was given by the indignation of
the French and British press at the proposition which was made
in the summer of 1 910 in the Lower Dutch Chamber for the for-
tification of Flushing. It appears that English attempts were
made to bring Holland also into the military system aimed at
Germany. But this state knew better than Belgium how to pre-
serve its neutrality, and sought to provide in Flushing a new
and firm support, which, by controlling the southern branch of
the Scheldt, might prevent the sending of English troops to Ant-
werp through Dutch waters. By adopting the proposal, despite
the interference of the French government, after some delays
and changes, in June, 191 3 (just in time), and by immediately
putting it into operation, Holland acted not alone for her own
interest, but within her rights. Nevertheless, the Entente press
and its Belgium imitators accused Holland of favoring Ger-
many, and tried to show by constitutional law that Holland had
at least no right to refuse passage to forces which were intended
for the preservation of Belgian neutrality.

During this entire dispute the entrance of the troops of the
Entente Powers into Belgian territory was treated by French
and English military writers as a matter of course. An article
of a military attache in the Echo de Paris, copied without com-
ment on January 3, 19 12, in the Independance Beige, esti-
mated the British troops which could be landed in Antwerp,
Bruges and Ostende within from eight to ten days to reinforce
the Franco-Belgian forces guarding the district around Namur,
at 100,000 men; it demanded a definite military understanding
between France and Belgium. Arnold White, the writer for
the British Admiralty, spoke of the cavalry forces which General

^ See Frankrifk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-1913),
Joflson, Breda, I9i3f P* 859; La defense de la Belgique, Navez, p. 242 ff.
*Cf. La difense de la Belgique, Navez, p. 245.

378 MODERN GERMANY

French was to lead against the Rhine. ^ On October 9, 191 2,
the semi-official newspaper, La Metropole, was able to announce :

"The government is aware that even those states among the
guarantors of our neutrality upon whom we have hitherto
thought we could most firmly count, consider our protection as
only relatively sufficient; nor do they conceal this fact, but on
the contrary they have let it be known that in case of an inter-
national conflict in which Belgium was the battlefield, foreign
bodies of troops would enter the country for the purpose of
Krengthening our insufficient defense."

How could the German General Staff have failed to consider
most earnestly the probability of an enemy attack through Bel-
gium? Oceans of ink have been wasted in foreign countries in
the effort to twist the unauthoritative strategic schemes of Ger-
man military writers, in which Belgium figured as a factor, into
proof of German longing for conquests. Does not justice at
least demand that the far more numerous plans of a like nature
on the other side be not entirely disregarded? Reference has
already been made to them, and at this point only a few espe-
cially characteristic utterances need still be cited. "The best
means for the military conquest of a country," writes the French
major, Boucher, "is to flood it beforehand in times of peace
with one's adherents." * That which is here attributed to Ger-
many had been amply provided for, as we know, by France, espe-
cially in the Walloon provinces. .r

The corroboration is scarcely needed which is found in Jen-
nissen: "Reputable Walloons have, in addition to the duty of
protecting the country against German imperialism, the further
duty of guarding France against a rear attack, the renown and
happiness of that country being an object of their desire, as the
health of the whole tree is desirable to the individual branch." '

"We might," says Major Chenet, "content ourselves with
dragging out the conflict in Lorraine, while the main attack was
made through Belgium with the united French, English and
Belgian forces. This plan seems the wisest if we are really de-
termined to take the offensive. We gain touch in this manner
with our allies, and a successful battle brings us within a few
days across the Rhine, with the result that the German forces
would be driven to a hasty retreat from Lorraine." *

Even La France Miiitairej the organ of the French Gen-

^Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijand van Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843- 191 3) >
Josflon, pp. 818-819.

*La Belgique dk lamais indipendante, Boucher, 1913, p. 10.

*Powr la siparatton, Jennisscn, 191 1, p. 16.

^ NeutraliU beige et invasion allemande. Lecomte and L^i, Paris and Brn^
selSy X9i4> P- 583.

MODERN GERMANY 379

eral Staff, said on January 14-15, 1906, without any thought of
a German violation of Bdgian neutrality: "It may well be
that for reasons of strategic interest, which are undeniable, a
portion of the German army will seek to reach the French north-
ern boundary by passing through Luxemburg, just as It may also
be that a French army, for equally strong strategic reasons, may
seek to operate on Belgian soil." ^

We need only mention the fact that such a thrust would have
been a risk of the most serious sort for Germany, at a moment
when she needed all of her forces without exception for repelling
the Franco-Russian attack and when she saw herself threatened
by the greatest naval Power in the world. One additional fact
must be mentioned: the Krupp works lie scarely one hundred
kilometers from the Belgian border, in the poorly guarded in-
dustrial territory of the Ruhr district. One need only imagine
a similar position for Creusot near the Franco-Belgian border —
at Noyon, for example — in order to estimate the danger for
Germany.

Protection in this direction was absolutely necessary. When
on August 2, 191 4, Germany demanded the right of passage
through Belgian territory, with the promise of full indemnifi-
cation, she asked only for that which had been regarded by Eng-
land as admissible in 1887 ^^^ which was not plainly forbidden
by Belgian neutrality. In the case of Belgium's benevolent neu-
trality, the German government was ready to pledge itself in
addition ''to guarantee after the war the territorial interests
and the independence of the kingdom," and "to withdraw from
the country immediately following the signing of peace." This
offer was even repeated on August 10, after the storming of
Liege.

The Belgian government, however, bound as it was by inclina-
tion, agreements and completely one-sided military subservience,
refused the offer on both occasions. Incited to resistance by
England, for her own advantage, and trusting to the supposedly
superior strength of the Triple Entente, it preferred war — in-
deed, it allowed the struggle in part to degenerate into an irregu-
lar guerrilla conflict, and thereby brought the miseries of such
a war upon the land.

There is a strong touch of antique tragedy in Belgium's fate,
for which the Belgians have to diank the perverted policy of
their ruling classes. As if deceived by an ambiguous, misleading

^ See La difenst de la Belgique, NaTcz, y. 203. It surely is no mere coin-
cidence that at the very same time (the middle of January, 1906) Lieutenant-
Colonel Bamardiston had his first interview with the BHgian General Ducarne.

38o MODERN GERMANY

and yet in the end true oracle, they thought (wrongly) to see
the danger exclusively in the East ; but only the one-sided hostile
measures which they took to meet it and which involved them in
guilt, transformed into reality that which they had mistakenl7
feared.

CHAPTER IV
RUSSIA AND PAN-SLAVISM

PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

VIENNA

SINCE the time of Catharine II, Russia's foreign policy has
been based primarily on the fomenting of a spirit of an-
tagonism between Prussia and Austria. Martens, the Russian
writer on constitutional law, remarked that Catharine II, with
wonderful foresight and political tact, had made use of the
irreconcilable difference between Prussia and Austria to enforce
her will against both. Although Frederick II and Joseph II
recognized the danger of the enormous increase of Russia's power
owing to the mutual antagonism of the two countries, they were
both prevented, partly by circumstances and partly by their ad-
visers, from directing their own policy in such a manner as to
counteract it For a whole century Russian diplomacy was able
to make use first of one and then of the other of these two mu-
tually opposed states to further Russian interests, whether in
Polish, Oriental, or other questions, to advance Russia's boun-
daries constantly further westward, and to secure for her a
decisive position as arbiter even in Germany's internal affairs.
Both Austria and Prussia, through distrust of each other, and
often for the sake of momentary success, have deliberately ren-
dered aid to the Russian power. Russia, however, was all the
time most careful to see that neither of the rivals should be-
come too strong, and then, in the consciousness of victory, render
impossible the policy that Russia had previously pursued with
such success.

It was an axiom of Russian diplomacy to permit German
unity neither under Austrian nor Prussian leadership. Nicho-
las I, who regarded himself as the bulwark of European "legiti-
macy" and who was never weary of urging Austria and Prussia
to suppress with armed force every movement in Western Eur-
<^e directed against such legitimacy, immediately abandoned this
principle when he became frightened by the possibility of German
unity and strength. When the Parliament at Frankfort, at the
beginning of its activities, seemed to promise the union of Ger-
many, the Czar immediately overcame his hatred of the Febru-

381

382 MODERN GERMANY

ary Revolution and of the new French government. On August
30, 1848, the Imperial Russian Chancellor, Nesselrode, wrote to
Count KiseleVy who had formerly been Russian Minister at the
French court, but was then in Paris merely as unofficial repre-
sentative of Russia, that an absolute solidarity of interest ex-
isted between Russia and France, in regard to Germany, for the
union of which the Parliament of Frankfort was laboring.

"It is unquestionably true," wrote Count Nesselrodc, "that
matters for serious consideration will arise, for Russia and
France, if these dreams take on any degree of reality, through
the creation of a strong united Power at the center of Europe
—of a Power which is not provided for by existing treaties,
which represents a nation of forty-five million people, which
is obedient to only one central authority and which disturbs
every balance, at least in the form in which it has previously
existed." *

The government of Nicholas I showed by this that, in order
to keep Germany weak and hence internally disunited, it was will-
ing even to act hand in hand with a government owing its exist-
ence to a revolution. That the Czar also was more than ready
to renounce his attitude of opposition to the revolution, if to the
interest of Russia, may be shown by still another fact, which
has become of special, almost pragmatic interest to the policy of
Russia as regards Austria down to the present day. Under his
government and with his approval, there began again that under-
mining work of Russia which aimed to incite the Austrian Slavs
against their own empire and to corrupt them to this end by
rich stipends. The first one to furnish this weapon to Russian
diplomacy was Michael Pogodin, professor at the University of
Moscow. He was the chief supporter of the official nationalism
approved by the Czar, with its trinity of doctrines: autocracy,
orthodoxy and Russian nationality. At the beginning of 1840,
on his return from a trip to Austria, he rendered a report of
his journey to the Minister of Instruction, Count Uvarov. The
tenor of his deduction is that Austria resembles an aged tree
rotten at the core, which is doomed to destruction by the Slavs
who are constantly growing more conscious of their own strength.
Austria, he said, feared Russia more than any other Power, be-
cause all her own Slavs down to the Adriatic Sea sympathized
with Russia and looked to her for their freedom. Just as Fate
seemed to offer to Poland under Sigismund III and to Sweden
from the time of Gustavus Adolphus down to Charles XII the
possibility of creating a world monarchy, so now the time had

^RecueU des TraUis et Conventions, Martens, 15, p. 337.

MODERN GERMANY 383

come for Nicholas I, since two empires, Turkey and Austria,
were at the same moment given into his hand. Pogodin did
not content himself with foretelling the impending disintegra-
tion of Austria; he also indicated the means by which this
process might be hastened, through modest expenditures of money
and support of the various scholars and declared supporters of
Russia, as well as by flooding the Slavic provinces of Austria
writh Russian literature and orthodox propaganda. And Czar
Nicholas I, the unyielding autocrat, the incarnation of legiti-
macy, was so much pleased with this report of Pogodin that he
caused his approval to be expressed to the writer and made him
a present of two thousand rubles.

Pogodin's impressions of his travels found the proper soil for
their dissemination and philosophic justification in the circles of
Slavophiles which were at that time springing up in Moscow.
The year 1848 aroused the wildest expectations. "Before the
dawn of another day," wrote Ivan Kireevskij, on May 2, 1848,
"Austria will fall to pieces. Slavic states are beginning to crys-
tallize out of her." ^ The greatest satisfaction was aroused in
Russia by the Slavic Congress at Prague, and especially by the
mass publicly celebrated in Prague according to the orthodox
ritual by the ex-priest, Stamatovich, from Neusatz ; in his sermon
he glorified Peter the Great, Stephen Dusan of Serbia, and the
Hussite leader, Zizka. Even before this historical occurrence,
Fedor Tjutczev, the celebrated poet of Slavophile circles, whose
influence on Alexander II was especially great, had called atten-
tion in his memorial, "Russia and the Revolution," to the Hus-
site traditions of the Czechs and to their importance for the fu-
ture union of the Austrian Slavs with Russia. The revival of
the Hussite religion and its union with orthodoxy would natur-
ally greatly have simplified the problem of the incorporation of
the Austrian Slavs with Russia. In his memorial Tjutczev
calls Russia and the Revolution the two sole real powers of
Europe, although standing in sharpest opposition to each
other. It is indicative of his lack of scruple that he nevertheless
finds it reconcilable with his strictly conservative and anti-revo-
lutionary principles with regard to the future of Bohemia, to
declare in the year 1841, in referring to a statement of Hanka,
the Czech scholar and Russian pensioner of unsavory memory:
^'Bohemia will not be free, independent and absolute master in
her own house until the day when Russia again enters into
possession of Galicia." ^

^Lift and Works of Pogodin, BarsukoT, 9, p. j64.
'RiUBian ArduTC, 1873, p. 925 ff.

384 MODERN GERMANY

In view of this attitude of influential Russian circles toward
Austria, it is no wonder that Nicholas I regarded himself as
Austria's special protector and assumed this role likewise toward
Prussia. This "protectorate" was oppressive for Austria, espe-
cially after the death of Emperor Francis. At his accession to
the throne, Emperor Francis Joseph found himself facing a
difficult situation in this respect. The Russian assistance in
Hungary, which the Czar had in a certain sense given to himself
in order to prevent the spread of a successful revolution in Po-
land, had served so to strengthen his pretensions to a protectorate
over Austria that a break could not be avoided. Nicholas now
considered that the moment had come to realize Russia's desires
in the Orient, regardless of Austria. He was so sure of himself
that he did not even consider it necessary to inform the Austrian
Court, and to inquire whether, without serious injury to its
vital interests, it could render the assistance which the Czar held
to be a matter of course. Austria herself was expected to assist
in the establishment of Russian supremacy in the Danube princi-
palities, in the Balkans and on the Bosphorus. The breach,
therefore, was inevitable. The Crimean War showed for the
first time what power Austria and Prussia possess as against the
rest of Europe, and what influence the two may exercise on the
configuration of Europe if they act together. But the time had
not yet come to give to this union a permanent and settled char-
acter. The old differences seemed likely to be settled by an
appeal to arms, and this appeal was made. Russia's hatred of
Austria rendered this manner of settlement possible; Bismarck's
genius, however, looking far ahead, by the manner in which he
settled the conflict, laid the foundation for the later alliance
and for the present loyal brotherhood in arms between Prussia-
Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The Crimean War was, therefore, the cause of Russia's aban-
doning her system of balance between Prussia and Austria and
of her violent hostility towards Austria. The result of the war
did not permit Russia, it is true, to take immediate vengeance
on Austria; but she made no secret of her enmity. Only the
pressing need for the solution of a number of great problems,
such as the emancipation of the serfs, diverted her attention from
Austria. In addition, there was the Polish rebellion of 1863,
which served in a measure to cool the sympathies of the other
Slavs for Russia. Characteristic, however, of the real aims of
the Russian policy is the well-known memorial of 1864, La Po-
litique du Present, which was written probably for Alexander II,
at the command of the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Gorczakov.

MODERN GERMANY 385

Peace must be preserved, it was argued, because Russia was
in need of it in order, through the development of her com-
merce, her system of communication and her military strength,
to become better prepared for the solution of her future prob-
lems. The Slavic peoples of Austria were urged to remain
quiet until they had acquired the power to disrupt the Aus-
trian state, and the same admonition was given to the Slavs
of Turkey. The danger of the Austrian Slavs becoming Ger-
manized was represented as passed. In 1858 the so-called Slavic
Charity Committee had been founded in Moscow under Im-
perial auspices, and its activities soon spread to the Austrian ter-
ritories. This organization had been made directly dependent
on the so-called Asiatic Department of the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, which had entrusted it with the unofficial Pan-Slavic agi-
tation in Austria. A number of distinguished personages, such as
the ex-Minister of Instruction, Count Uvarov, the Curator of the
Moscow Educational District, A. N. Bachmetev, Secretary of
State, Count Bludov, indeed even the Empress Maria Alexan-
drovna, who in this was acting under the influence of Countess
Antonina Dmitrievna, Bludov and the poet Tjutczev and his
daughter, were either active in the management or else supported
the committee annually by large contributions. The Russian
government acted from this motive when, contrary to its usual
custom, it permitted on the occasion of the Pan-Russian ethno-
graphic exhibition in Moscow not only a Pan-Slavic section to
be attached to it but also the holding of a political congress,
although this plan had given occasion for violent press attacks.
The large number of Czechs who appeared were no doubt an
especially pleasing sight for the Russian ruling classes. Precisely
from this quarter, however, an unpleasant incident was to arise.
The leader of the Czech deputation, Rieger, had given his prom-
ise to the Parisian Polish Committee to speak at the congress for
the Polish cause. When he did this at the banquet at Sokol-
niki, in a manner calculated not to offend the Russians, and then
proceeded to say that efforts must be made to grant rights to the
Poles and thereby to close the circle of all the Slavs, his speech
was received not only with murmurs of disapproval and whis-
tling, but Prince Czerkasskij gave him a sharp reprimand by
referring meaningly to the manner in which the Poles were
acting toward the Galician Ruthenians. With ruthless frank-
ness, unusual for an official personage such as he was. Prince
Czerkasskij called attention to the oppression of the Ruthe-
nians in Galicia by the Poles, and urged these to grant to the
Kuthenians that which the Russian government in the King-

386 MODERN GERMANY

dom of Poland had granted to the Poles. He did not even hesi-
tate to remind his hearers that East Galicia was not Russian
territory, and to imply indirectly how painful it was that it was
not then united with Russia, as it had been from 1809 to 1814.
The Slav Congress ended with this dissonance.

Shortly after the Moscow Slav Congress, there appeared — in
the winter of 1869-70 — in the magazine Zarja that sensational
series of articles by Nikolai Jakovlevich Danilevskij, which in
1871 was published under the title, "Russia and Europe,'* and
which since then has run through a number of editions and be-
come the gospel of wide circles of Russian intellectuals. Its in-
fluence has remained remarkably strong down to the most recent
times and in the most influential circles. Danilevskij was the
first to state and develop in a systematic manner the policy of
the destruction of Austria and Turkey. The Oriental question
is, according to him, a question of all Slavdom, and it therefore
concerns Austria and Turkey in like degree. It can be solved
satisfactorily only through the splitting up of both empires.
Austria, to whom at one time had fallen the duty of protect-
ing Europe against the Turks, had fulfilled her mission, he
says, as early as 1740, and since that time had lost all justi-
fication for her existence. The existence of Turkey had
ceased to be justified the moment that Russia became strong
enough to take the Balkan States under her wing. Turkey's
mission was to keep these Slavs from being Europeanized. In
place of these empires, according to Danilevskij, there must be a
Slavic Federation, with Russia in control, and with a Russian
Constantinople at the centre; in addition, there must be joined
to Russia the whole of Galicia and a portion of North Hungary^
styled in Russian terminology "Hungarian Russia." Included
in this federation was to be reckoned, moreover, a Bohemian-
Moravian-Slovak kingdom, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia and
Northwest Hungary; a Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian kingdom,
consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old
Serbia, North Albania, the so-called Vojevodina and the Banat
of South Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Carniola, Tri-
este, Goricia, Gradiska and Istria, two-thirds of Carinthia and
a fifth of Styria as far as the Drau; a kingdom of Hungary,
formed from the remaining portions of Hungary and that part
of Transylvania inhabited by Magyars; a kingdom of Rumania,
consisting of Moldavia, Wallachia, parts of Bukovina, half of
Transylvania, etc. The numerous plans for dividing Austria-
Hungary, as discussed in Russia in newspapers, magazines and
public meetings immediately following the outbreak of the war>

MODERN GERMANY 387

were mainly along the lines laid down by Danilevskij. One
point must be emphasized: Danilevskij was more honest than
the present generation.^ He frankly admitted that Europe
and Russia have nothing in common, and that they must stand
opposed to each other throughout all the future.

At the same time, but independently of Danilevskij, the dis-
tinguished Russian military writer, General Rostislav Fadeev,
published a brochure animated by the same hatred of Austria-
Hungary; in this he argued that the Oriental question was to
be solved in the Russian manner, but only after the destruction
of Austria-Hungary. For Fadcev also the Oriental question is
a Pan-Slavic question, the solution of which, in accordance with
Russia's desires, can be permitted by Austria-Hungary only at
the risk of her own existence. Hence, as Field Marshal Paskie-
vich declared, the road to Constantinople leads through Vienna.
Fadeev did not hesitate to state plainly that in the conflict with
Austria-Hungary reliance might be placed on the Austrian Slavs.
It was only needful to gain their confidence ; but this Russia could
do by freeing Galicia. Fadeev said that were one to ask any non-
Russian Slav, he would reply: "What confidence can Russia's
cousins have in her when her very brothers, who sigh and pine on
her borders, can hope for no help from her?'' In 1849, 1859 and
1866 the "unhappy" Galician Russians might have been freed
without trouble. When this six-hundred-year-old captivity of Red
Russia was ended, continues Fadeev, the West Slavs would be
ready to listen to Russia. She would then stand geographically in
the midst of the West Slavs, and in addition, by the reclaiming of
Bessarabia, the connection with the South Slavs would be rees-
tablished. Although more cautious than Danilevskij, Fadeev
intimated the final goal to be a Pan-Slavic Federation on the
ruins of Austria and Turkey, with the Czar at the head as the
successor of Constantine the Great, and with the Grand Dukes
as federal princes.^

While Fadcev believed that Prussia could not permit the
destruction of Austria, and that on this account the former's
enmity was to be reckoned with — in which circumstance he esti-
mated at its true value the united military strength of the previous
rivals — Danilevskij was of a different opinion down to the time
of the Franco-Prussian War. Till that time he was still in-
clined to regard Prussia as the sole ally of Russia in the solution
of the Oriental question — that is to say, in the destruction of
Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Impressed by the German vic-

^ Russia and Europe, DanilevaldL p. 423 ti.

*Mn€nig o vostocnom voprost, radeer, at. PetenburK, 1870.

388 MODERN GERMANY

tories, however, and regardless of the fact that Russia reaped
immediate advantage from them, he revised his previous opinion
even before the capture of Paris and declared France to be the
future ally of Russia and the possible coming German Empire
to be Russia's most dangerous potential enemy in the matter of the
partition of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. With Machiavellian
perspicacity, Danilevskij demonstrated that it did not lie in
Russia's interest immediately to interfere in the conflict and to
save France from the imposition of severe terms of peace. Such
a peace as seemed probable would create a permanent breach
between Germany and France and prevent the two Powers from
uniting against Slavdom in Russia on the basis of European or
Latin-German interests. Nor was a victorious France, in Dani-
levskij's opinion, even with a renewal gf the friendship of the days
of Tilsit for Russia, desirable from the Russian point of view,
since the latter country could not support France's ambitious
plans which might easily lead to conflicts, causing France to renew
her previous Polish intrigues. Russia, also, would follow a
strongly conservative policy along German lines, in view of the
expected danger of revolutionary or democratic propaganda.

"On the other hand, in case of Germany's victory and the
temporary weakening or even humiliation of France, all these
prejudices and influences will lose their force. France, whom
only Russia can support in the recovery of her political position,
will, even though reluctantly, have to abandon her encourage-
ment of supposed Polish interests, if these run counter to her
own vital interests. Russia, willy-nilly, will cease to support
Prussia and Germany, if they venture boldly and undisguisedly
to pursue aims of their own which are opposed to the evident
interests of Russia." ^

Further, through the defeat of France, Russia, he claimed,
would regain the affection of the so-called Slavic intellectuals
outside of Russia who, as the result of the French Revolution
and of France's services for the national unity of Italy, as
well as because of the liberal expressions of French authors,
politicians and statesmen and of many really sympathetic traits
of the French national character, had hitherto been devoted to
France and had hoped to win her support; this hope, however,
had proved deceptive, since in the belief of the French, as of
other Europeans, the fruits of freedom were not to grow and ripen
for the Slavs. Russia, he said, would appear as the sole libera-

^Rossija i franko-germanskaja Vojna, Zarja, 1871; reprinted in Sbomich
polfHceskich % tkonomtsceskich slatej, N. J. Danilevskago, St Petersburg, x^»o,
p. a;.

MODERN GERMANY 389

tor of all the Slavs, in view of the opposing interests of Germans
and Slavs, of their century-long struggle and of the antipathy
with which the German character was viewed by the Slavs and
Latins, as well as in view of the fact that France after her de-
feat would be fully occupied in healing her wounds and looking
after herself.

''No one except Russia can save the Slavs from being en-
gulfed by Germany; no one except the Slavs can be Russia's
permanent guard against the ambitions which will not delay in
manifesting themselves with such clearness that only those born
blind can continue not to see them." ^

Danilevskij closes this remarkable exposition by calling atten-
tion to the fact that Russia at that moment (that is to say, be-
fore the proclamation of the German Empire in Versailles)
found herself in this dilemma: "All our S3rmpathies are with
France, but political interests compel us to wish for Germany's
complete victory and the weakening of France."

Thus, just as the Crimean War was a turning-point in the
Austro-Russian relations, the Franco-German War of 1870-71
became a turning-point for those of Russia and Prussia. Yet it
was owing to the German victories that Russia, at the most criti-
cal moment of the western struggle, was enabled to free herself
from the most humiliating condition of the Peace of Paris, viz.,
the inhibition against Russia's building and maintaining a naval
fleet in the Black Sea. ''The success of the Prussian arms was
likewise a victory for us," says a Russian diplomat in a memorial
published a few years ago.* With the very first German victories,
which seemed to proclaim the possibility of a powerful German
empire at the Russian frontier, the most influential Russian pub-
licist of all times, M. N. Katkov, began in his Moskovskiya
Vedomosti a press campaign, aiming to arouse widespread patri-
otic disquietude at the German victories. In this effort he was
successful. Although Czar Alexander II, even after the peace
of Frankfort, continued faithful to the ideas expressed in the
famous telegraphic exchange with his uncle. Emperor William I,,
expressions of discontent to the effect that Russia had unre-
servedly allowed herself to become Prussia's tool were not in-
frequent.

"This statement," says Saburov, "was repeated times without
number and finally became a historical truth for the Moscow^
patriots, although there was not a grain of truth in it; if there

^ Rossi ja i franko-germanskaja Vojna, ZmtjSj i87x; reprinted in Sbomick
politiceskich % ekonowusctskich slat€j, N. J. Danilevslcago, SL Peteribiirg, 1890^

'Zapiska P. A. Sabiirova, RoMian ArduTe, 191a, p. 470.

390 MODERN GERMANY

were advantages, these were undoubtedly mutual. For begin-
ning with this period, Emperor Alexander II no longer felt him-
self politically restrained in Europe; he was freed from hamper-
ing ties and in a position to give to Russia her previous standing
as a World Power." ^

The visit of Emperor William I and Bismarck in 1873 seemed
to strengthen this bond.

"For us," says Saburov, "this revived the memory of our posi-
tion at Tilsit, but without the defeats of Austerlitz and Fried-
land. And our lord and master, the Czar, had only to Em-
phasize our political understanding with Prussia in order to
attain a brilliant position, without drawing the sword from the
scabbard. It is not to be wondered at, in view of so important
a political success, that the thought of a closer and permanent
alliance awoke in the minds of the monarchs. The system had
brought forth rich fruits. It would have borne still more in
the future. The indicated political course would probably have
served to solve the difficulties in the Oriental question, which
soon thereafter came into prominence, if Czar Alexander II
had been an autocrat not alone by reason of his rights but also
by personal disposition." *

But while the Czar held fast to the alliance with Prussia,
the anti-German sentiment grew stronger in Russian society
and affected the leader of Russia's foreign policy. Chancellor
Prince Gorczakov, whose most prominent characteristic was
boundless vanity. He had sensed the anti-German wave in
Russian society and hastened to adapt Russia's foreign policy
to it. The Czar was too weak-willed to force his conviction
upon the Chancellor, or, as would have been the most natural
course in the case of such a difference of opinion, to dismiss
him. And so 1875 arrived and with it the comedy of France's
rescue from an alleged German attack, which Prince Gorczakov
brilliantly staged. This was an unmistakable indication for
Bismarck that doubt was beginning to be felt in Petrograd as
to whether a mistake had not been made in 1870-71 in not
interfering in favor of France. Czar Alexander II, to whom
Bismarck complained about the dishonorable attitude of Grorcza-
kov, "admitted the state of affairs, but contented himself, while
laughing and smoking, with remarking that Bismarck should
not take this vanite senile seriously."* As Bismarck observes,
it was a remarkable fact that Alexander II, despite his con-

^ZapidcR P. A. SaburoTa, Rusman Archiye, 19 x a, p. 470.

* Ibid., p. 470 ff.

* Gedanken und Ermntrungen, Bismardc, 2, Chi4>. a6.

MODERN GERMANY 391

tempt for the minister, nevertheless intrusted him with the
entire machinery of the foreign office. This lack of character
manifested itself ever more clearly by his instability as regards
the Pan-Slavic movement, which continued to grow in violence
after the outbreak of the revolt in Herzegovina.

Although the Czar, on July 8, 1876, at a meeting with Em-
peror Francis Joseph in Reichstadt, had concluded an agree-
ment concerning the Oriental question, and in August, before
his departure for Warsaw and Livadia, had spoken to Reutern^
the Minister of Finance, with bitterness in regard to the Pan-
Slavic agitation, his feelings underwent a complete change in
Livadia as the result of his surroundings. Even the Russian
Ambassador at Constantinople, Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ig*
natiev, the exponent of the Pan-Slavists, was astonished on the
occasion of his visit to Livadia to see how the Czar and Chan-
cellor had fallen under the influence of one of the members of
the Slav Charity Committee of Moscow, Porochovczikov by
name, who had gone thither on his own authority and in flam-
ing words had pictured the warlike sentiments "of the whole
of Orthodox Russia"; he had frightened the Czar by telling^
him that the Russian people would make war against the will!
of the government and without awaiting its decision. Under'
the influence of this feeling and without awaiting the result of'
the mission of his Adjutant-General, Count Sumarokov-EIston^ ;
the Czar inquired in Berlin, through General von Werder, •
whether, in the event of an Austro-Russian war, Germany;
would remain neutral, an insinuation which Bismarck rejected |
politely, but firmly.*

In view of this answer, the thought of a settlement of the-
Oriental question by a war with Austria had to be temporarily
abandoned. But this original plan continued to exert so strong
an influence that war was begun against Turkey with insuffi-
cient forces. For only four army corps were left in European |
Turkey in the event of a war with Austria. It is Prince Nikolai
Nikelaievitch, the elder, to whom we owe this knowledge. Pub-
lic sentiment in all camps, among the liberals as well as among
the Pan-Slavs, was in equal degree inimical to Austria. All
circles of society were in favor of the war, at least against
Turkey; the radicals because, following the successful battles
against the "outer" Turks, they hoped for a settlement with the
"inner" Turks, whereby they meant especially the government.
Despite the Treaty of Of en-Pest of January, 1877, the Czar,
who had been forced again into closer relationship with Austria-

^G^danktn und Erinnerungen, Bismarck, 2, Chap. 28.

392 MODERN GERMANY

Hungary, because of Berlin's refusal, disregarded these treaty
obligations in the peace negotiations of San Stefano. The conse-
quence for Russia was the Congress of Berlin, the results of
which, naturally, did not agree with those of San Stefano.

These results were received with bitterness by the Russian
public. Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov made his celebrated Moscow
speech (July 4, 1878), with its violent attacks upon Russian
<liplomacy and its unmistakable reflection on the Czar. As
neither the Czar nor the Chancellor, Prince Gorczakov, had
the courage to admit that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been
surrendered to Austria-Hungary by a treaty long before the
war — indeed, that without this concession Russia would not
have been in a position to carry on the war — the entire weight
of the public's anger turned against Austria-Hungary and
Prince Bismarck, to whom Russia's discomfiture at the Con-
•gress of Berlin was" unjustly ascribed. As a measure of pro-
tection against Russia, influenced by this popular movement
which Alexander II with his customary weakness did not dare
oppose, Bismarck and Andrassy signed the Austro-German
alliance, which we have seen to-day so brilliantly justified by the
severe tests of war. The increasing movement of terrorism in
Russia, however, to which on February 13, 1881, Alexander fell a
victim, served somewhat to distract the attention of the coun-
try from foreign politics.

The new Czar, Alexander III, whose palace on the Anitchkov
Bridge, even before his accession, had been the center of anti-
German intrigues and who had had no small share in bringing
on the Turkish War, had seen on the field of battle the weak-
nesses of the Russian army organization too clearly not to
desire a more or less extended period of rest and military re-
organization for the country. The nihilist movement, with
the numerous outrages and the danger threatening the dynasty,
also compelled him to seek support from the two Emperors
against this internal danger. This was the reason that the
so-called Tri-Emperor Alliance continued in force, and that in
1 88 1 and 1884 Russia even agreed anew by treaty to the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this Russia, it
is true, was still influenced by the hope of keeping Bulgaria in
a state of absolute dependence, indeed, despite its own ruler,
of turning the country into a sort of Russian satrapy. When
these plans miscarried, and when, in the matter of the annex-
ation of East Rumelia, which Russia now energetically opposed
despite the peace of San Stefano, a definite break with Prince
Alexander of Bulgaria occurred, leading to the abduction of

MODERN GERMANY 39J

the Prince by Russophile oiEcers and finally to his abdication
against the will of the Bulgarian nation, Russia's role in Bul-
garia was at an end. The regency under Stambulov found
its chief support in England and Austria-Hungary, and a
world conflagration seemed likely to result from the Bulgarian
question. But Russia still lacked allies for a war against
Austria-Hungary and Germany, and the danger again passed.
It is worthy of note that the fact was established by Russians
that in the country's conflict with Bulgaria an important part
was played by the Russian iron industry greedy for foreign
markets, and by Russians interested in railroad building. It
was on their account that the Russian government sought to
influence Bulgaria to turn over the building of her railroads
to Russians, in which operation it naturally strove to have
those lines built which in the war of 1877 had shown themselves
to be the chief lines of operation for the Russian army — that
is to say, the lines from the Danube toward the South. It
was construed as a betrayal of Russia on the part of Prince
Alexander of Battenberg that he insisted on developing the
Bulgarian railways in a westerly direction, which would con-
nect them, not with the Russian, but with the Austrian sys-
tem; all the more was this so regarded since the execution of
such a plan involved but half the expenditure necessary for the
southern lines. This railway question was the cause of the
Prince's unpopularity in Petrograd. For according to the
plan supported by the Russian general, Sobolev, who was the
premier of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian railways were to be built
not only by Russian entrepreneurs and Russian engineers, but
even by Russian workmen, whom it was planned to bring from
Russia for this purpose. Naturally, Russia was to receive the
contract for the entire rolling stock.^

The conflict with Bulgaria gave the final impetus in bring*
ing about the Franco-Russian Alliance. Efforts in this direc-
tion had been made on the French side as early as the seven-
ties. The dissolution of the Tri-Emperor Alliance (although
it is not correct to speak of a formal alliance) opened up a
more favorable outlook for the French government. The re-
fusal which the French Foreign Minister, Flourens, gave to
the Bulgarian deputation that had come to Paris in January,
1887, to seek the assistance of the, European Cabinets against
Russia, reconciled the Russian government with the French
Republic, which had once refused to surrender the revolutionist

^ See Vnesnaja Politika Rossij v Konc9, PokrovBldj, XIX veka, Granat, Istorija.
Roflsii T XIX yeke, p. J04 ff.

394 MODERN GERMANY

Hartmann after he had made an attempt on the life of Alex-
ander 11. When, as a result of the alarming military prepara-
tions of the French Minister of War, Boulanger, a conflict
with Germany seemed most probable, Russia ranged herself
on the side of France and in the "Schnabele" case her action was
inimical to Germany. This happened in April, 1887, that is
to say, four months after the rebuff to the Bulgarian deputation
in Paris. The decisive factor, however, in bringing about the
Franco-Russian alliance was the offer of the Republic to
place its capital at the disposal of Russia, especially as the
German government, in view of the official enmity of the Rus-
sian government and of Russian public opinion, could not pos-
sibly continue to assist Russia financially. "From the year
1888 on," says Pokrovskij, "French capital was closely con-
nected with the destiny of the Russian autocracy." ^ Although
Katkov (regarding whom a foreign diplomat stated that he
did not know who was the Russian Foreign Minister, Katkov
or Giers) openly declared in the columns of his Moscow news-
paper that Russia could be the ally only of a monarchic France,
this bitter pill was swallowed in Paris. The rejection by the
Russian Ambassador, Baron Mohrenheim, of Floquet as French
premier, because he had once joined in a Polish demonstration
against Alexander II, was coolly accepted by the leading circles
of France; and Floquet himself later renounced the portfolio
of Foreign Affairs as the price of Russia's pardon. The arrest
of the Russian Nihilists by the energetic Minister of the In-
terior, Constans, in June, 1890, gave the final proof of the
French Republic's good behavior. At the close of 1890 the
President of the French Republic and the Ministers of War
and of the Interior were the recipients of high Russian decora-
tions; and in July, 1891, the alliance was publicly sealed by
the reception of Admiral Gervais' squadron at Kronstadt, for
which France had long ardently hoped. In August, 1891, took
place the first formal conclusion of the defensive and offensive
alliance. In the autumn of 1892, this was supplemented by a
military convention signed by the Chiefs of the General Staff
of the two armies, Boisdeffre and Obruczev. In the autumn of
1893 the return visit was made by the Russian fleet to Toulon,
and in the spring of 1894 ^^ definitive treaty of alliance was
finally signed, simultaneously in Paris and Petrograd, by the two
Foreign Ministers, Casimir Perier and Giers.

In the meanwhile, however, Russia's attention had been to

■

^ See Vntsncia Poliiika Rossij v Konce, XIX vdo, Granat, Istorija Roaii t
XIX Teke, by Pokrovakij, p. 174 ff.

MODERN GERMANY 395

a great degree distracted from Europe and turned toward the
East by the development of her Asiatic policy, which in the
spring of 1891 found its symbolic expression in the laying of
the corner stone of the great Siberian fortress in Vladivostock.
Witte himself in the autumn of 1892 characterized the build-
ing of the Siberian Railway as an event of world importance,
such as mark the beginning of new epochs in the history of^
the nations and not infrequently call forth an entire change
in the existing economic relations of the various states to each
other.* The defeat of China in the Chino-Japanese War of
1894-95 offered an opportunity to Russia of forcing on China
her friendship and her protection against Japan. Russia's ex-
pansion toward the Far East was bound to encounter the oppo-
sition of England and Japan. A free hand, therefore, was
needed in Europe. This was the reason why the ruling cir-
cles in Russia modified their plans in the Near East. Accord-
ing to the saying of Prince Lubanow-Rostowskij, Ambassador
to Vienna and later Minister of Foreign Affairs under Nicholas
II, it was necessary ''to place the Balkans in cold storage until
we have finished with other pressing affairs." * This purpose
was served by the Austro-Russian agreement of 1897, which
aimed to preserve the status quo in the Balkans and which, in
the same manner as the Miirzsteger agreement of 1903, pro-
tected Russia's rear in view of the threatening complications in
the East. This object was completely attained, thanks to the
loyalty of Austria, who, by conscientious observance of the
treaty, even sacrificed her own interests in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Austria-Hungary and Germany, during the unfortu-
nate war with Japan and the resulting internal disturbances,
strove to uphold the tottering throne and the threatened soli-
darity of the Russian state. Indeed, it is the opinion of Rus-
sian radical parties, especially of the Social Democrats and the
Social Revolutionists, that the Russian revolution was defeated
primarily through Germany's attitude. The Russian Minister
of War, Kuropatkin, in his final report emphasized the loyal
attitude of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the following
words: "The recent war has given to us the consoling convic-
tion that our western neighbors (Germany and Austria-Hun-
gary) entertain no plans of conquest as regards Russia, for
the years 1905-6 would have been most favorable for a change
in the present boundaries of the Empire in the West." ■

^See Vnftnaja PoKtika Rossij v Konce, XIX veka, Granat, Istorija RoaH r
XIX, veke, by Pokrovskij, p. 220.

* Balkanskij Krisis i Politika Izvolskago, P. Miljukov, p. 3 ff-

* Zapiski generaHa Kuropatkma o russko-japonskoj vojfu, Berlin, 191 1, p. 555*

396 MODERN GERMANY

This loyalty had very unfortunate results. A great change
was brought about in Russian politics through the defeat in
East Asia. The Russian intellectuals had absolutely no sym-
pathy for the East Asiatic policy of the government; Slavophile
influences and traditions were much stronger in all Russian
parties. In order to win these sympathies, it was necessary
only to direct the attention of the foreign office toward Europe
and to blow into a flame the embers of Balkan hatred against
the Porte, which were glimmering under the ashes. Conserva-
tive and radical parties of the newly created Russian parliament
agreed that the treaties with Austria-Hungary were harmful
for Russia, since the maintenance of the status quo in the Bal-
kans was not in the interests of Russia, if only because the main
object of Russia's Oriental policy for two hundred years —
namely the acquisition of the Dardanelles — ^was as little likely
to be achieved in this manner as its secondary object, the libera-
tion of the racially related* coreligionists in the Balkans and
their inclusion in the Russian sphere of influence.

The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. P. Izvolskij, who
«ven as a diplomatic representative had believed in the Pan-
Slavic spirit, was able to adapt himself quickly to this dominant
sentiment. Through the understanding with England in Au-
gust, 1907, concerning the division of the spheres of interest in
Central Asia and especially in Persia, the way was opened for
joint action with England in other questions as well. The
anti-German turn which British policy had taken since the ac-
cession of Edward VII to the throne made a Russian alliance
5eem desirable. Conversely, it was in Russia's interest to draw
England, the hitherto bitter enemy of her Oriental aims, to
her side, in order, in the unavoidable conflict with Austria-
Hungary in the Near East, to isolate the latter state and fur-
ther to liold Austria's ally, Germany, in check by another enemy
in addition to France. Besides, the two most influential po-
litical parties of Russia at that time, the Octobrists and the
Cadets, were in favor of a rapprochement with England, which
they hoped would result in a more liberal internal policy on
the part of the Russian government. Both parties were, more-
over, strongly influenced by Russian, and especially Moscow
business interests, which, on account of the dangerous competi-
tion of the far more capable and highly trained German in-
dustry, had long demanded that the government assume an
anti-German attitude.

When in January, 1908, Aehrenthal announced in the par-
liamentary 'delegations" the plan for an active economic policy

MODERN GERMANY 397

by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, and the building of the
Sandjak railway, the authorities in Petrograd considered it a
timely moment to make public the long contemplated change
in Russian politics. Too weak, as the result of the defeats in
Manchuria and of the disorganization called forth by the revo-
lution, to be able successfully to oppose the policy of Vienna,
Petrograd sought to accomplish this in two other ways: first,
by an agreement with England concerning questions in the Near
East (an object which was attained through the meeting of the
Czar with King Edward VII in Reval) ; and secondly, through
the encouragement of the Pan-Slavic agitation among the Slavs of
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The failure in the Far East and the revolution, which
brought Russia to the verge of destruction and almost com-
pletely put an end to her influence in European questions
{U absence de la Russie) was felt especially keenly by the West
Slavs as a strengthening of German influence and as a detri-
ment to their political standing. As a result of this feeling,
there began as early as 1906 a movement, the object of which
was the establishment of Slavic solidarity. The Russo-Polish
di£Ferences were felt as a hindrance to this solidarity, and hence
to the strengthening of Russia. As a consequence, the efforts
of the publicists were directed toward bringing about a recon-
ciliation. A division of the Poles themselves declared the rec-
onciliation possible under certain conditions, above all the au-
tonomy of Congressional Poland. The Cracow monthly re-
view, Stviat Slowianskij was the first openly to advocate this
idea. In Russia this movement was well received. The Con-
servatives, who had been frightened by the revolution, saw
Russia's salvation in Pan-Slavism. The Slavophile wing of
the Russian Liberals, however, inspired by the general disap-
proval of the educated Russian circles of the East Asiatic policy,
regarded this as a strengthening of Russia's position in Europe.
The speech of Aehrenthal regarding the Sandjak railway, as
indicated, caused the leaders of Russia's foreign policy seri-
ously to take under consideration this movement both within and
without the boundaries of the Empire.

"The especially self-confident tone" (of Aehrenthal), says
an article in the January number, 1909 (p. 386), of the in-
fluential Petrograd review, Vestnik Evropy, which is published
by a member of the Imperial Council, "in which this new
Austrian program was announced caused marked anxiety in the
Slavic states, and could not fail to make an unfavorable impres-
sion in Russia also; all the more was this the case since diplo-

398 MODERN GERMANY

msLcy still regarded the fiction of the Austro-Russian agreement
in the Macedonian question as existing. As a matter of fact,
Russian policy in the Balkans had long since lost all independence
and become transformed into a passive tool (?) of the exclu-
sively Austrian influence. Hence, it was no longer taken into
consideration in Aehrenthal's plans. The Austrian minister,
who was once ambassador in Petrograd, where he maintained
intimate relations with the most influential personages of our
reactionary parties, made use of his observations to draw the
corresponding practical deductions, but he failed to consider the
fact that reliance can be placed upon the feelings of court cir-
cles only with great caution, as they are in their very nature
extremely changeable and subject to the influence of those familiar
social elements which unite complacency with loudly proclaimed
patriotism. It is not always advisable publicly to announce
things which may without hindrance be accomplished by ac-
tions. The gradual expansion of the Austrian sphere of in-
terest in the Balkans called forth a protest from no one, so
long as it was not openly formulated as an official principle
which implied the direct denial or ignoring of foreign inter-
ests, Slavic and Russian. This unexpected action gave a strong
impulse to the Slavic movement, and the new Slavic cult found
ardent adepts among us, due in part to the arrival in Russia
of several prominent Czech and Serb politicians. The Slavic
question in Austria herself has become extremely acute; vio-
lent street fights between Germans and Czechs take place con-
stantly at various places, and frequently rise to the plane of san-
guinary battles. Perhaps the aggressive (?) policy against the
Turko-Slavic provinces was undertaken in order to distract at-
tention from these internal conflicts and to open up new per-
spectives to the Slavs. The strengthening of the Slavic ele-
ment, at the cost of the neighboring Balkan countries, pre-
pares the way for the transformation of the monarchy into a
federation, in which the Slavs will occupy their proper posi-
tion."

However wrong this exposition is in so far as it regards
Russian policy, and however maliciously it misrepresents con-
ditions in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, it nevertheless gives
an excellent picture of the character of the congress to which
the three Austrian parliamentarians, a Czech, a Liberal Slo-
vene and a Russophile Ruthenian, were bound on their journey
to Petrograd in May, 1908. That the National Democratic or
Pan-Polish wing of the Polish Club in the Imperial Council
favored this step, even though not openly, is subject to no

l^ODERN GERMANY 399

doubt. The Petxograd discussion took place too much as if
by program to allow of any assumption but that a previous
arrangement existed. It was really intended to prepare the
way for a Pan-Slavic Congress. The tenor of the negotia-
tions, however, was that the practical prerequisite of such a con-
gress as well as of Pan-Slavic solidarity must be the reconcilia-
tion of the Poles and the Russians. Suddenly during the dis-
cussion the Polish leader in the third Duma, Roman Dmowski,
arose and declared that this reconciliation was quite possible,
that the Poles were ready to do their part toward it, for Ger-
man civilization was the common enemy of all Poles and Slavs,
and that in order to resist it, all other considerations must be put
aside. Shortly after the Petrograd meeting, Dmowski an-
nounced this new program of the Poles in a small book,
"Ntemcy, Rosya i kwestya polskaf'

As a result of universal franchise, the Ruthenians, who had
hitherto been almost completely deprived of political rights,
were sent to the Vienna Parliament in relatively large num-
bers. The general suffrage right, however, had also had the
effect on the Polish side of bringing new and especially Pan-
Polish elements into the hitherto uniform and exclusive Polish
Club. The appearance of the Ruthenians on the political stage
was made use of by the Pan-Polish Party for a violent agita-
tion, under the plea that the Polish landed class in East Galicia
was threatened. This agitation was successful. A Pan-Polish
partisan became leader of the hitherto all-powerful Kolo Pol-
skie in the Vienna Parliament. Their program was openly
Russophile in three of the component states of former Poland.
Their first duty they considered to be the crushing of the Ger-
man Empire in order to free their brothers in Posen. Until
the accomplishment of this task they were ready to defer their
final aim, namely the rehabilitation of Poland with her boundaries
of 1772, and loyally to fulfill the duties of Austrian or Rus-
sian subjects — in which connection, Dmowski said, it must be
a matter of indifference to the Russian or Austrian government
what ideals they seek to realize in the future. In order to
attain this first goal they were ready temporarily to abandon
their claims as against Russia to Lithuania and Little Russia; they
demanded in these countries for their compatriots only a status
of equality; in Congressional Poland, on the other hand, they
asked full autonomy and the use of the Polish language in the
administration, courts and schools.

As a compensation for this, they offered the Russian govern-
ment the following: Wherever the Ukrainian language was

400 MODERN GERMANY

recognized in administration, courts and schools, the Russian
language was to enjoy the same standing. Frankly expressed,
loyalty toward Austria ceased at the point where the existence
of the state or the security of a boundary clashed with the oppor-
tunity to gain a ruble. The Russian government, however,
which had always checked the Ukrainian movement in the
sharpest manner, as representing a threat to the unity of the
Russian race and hence to the supremacy of the Great-Russians,
was now, after its experiences with the various nationalities
in their efforts to obtain autonomy and with the strong Ukrainian
Club of the first and second Dumas, all the more eager to sup-
press such a movement even beyond its own borders. This
Ukrainian danger was thus the bond which united the Poles
of the Pan-Polish movement and the Russian government.
Shortly before the Petrograd meeting the weapon of a Ukrai-
nian student had put an end to the career of the Governor of
Galicia, Count Potoczki, who, failing to realize the essential
interests of the state which he served, had encouraged the Russo-
phile movement and its advocates.

In addition to the ancient antagonism between Russia and
Austria-Hungary in the Oriental question, there was now a
second dangerous cause for dispute, namely that in regard to
the Ukrainian question. As much as the Russian government
was interested in hindering, even beyond its own borders, the
cultural growth of the Ukrainian people, just so much was it
in Austria's interest to encourage the intellectual and economic
development of those Ukrainians who were loyal to Emperor
aqd state. Without scruple as to its means, as it has always
been, the Russian government did not hesitate to carry its cam-
paign against the Ukrainian movement into Austrian territory.
With Russian money and supported by the Pan-Polish Podolian
group, which was all-powerful in the Polish Club, the Russophile
movement now took up work in Galicia with redoubled strength,
and prepared the way, especially through a wide-spread spy sys-
tem, for a military attack by Russia.

The Slavic Congress in Petrograd in May, 1908, had brought
together the radical and conservative parties in the field of Pan-
Slavic politics. Soon after, it even came to a certain distribu-
tion of work between the two groups. The Conservatives,
whose center of agitation lay in the old Pan-Slavic Charity As-
sociation and in the new Galician-Russian Society, prepared the
way for a Russian invasion of Galicia by means of treasonable
corruption through generously expended money and agitators
and in the portions of Moravia adjoining Galicia by means

MODERN GERMANY 401

of Russian farmers (?) sent thither ostensibly for learning in-
tensive agriculture. The radical parties, on the other hand,
whose center was the Moscow Society for Slavic Civilizaticm
and whose mouthpiece was the Moskovskij Jezenedelnik of
Prince Eugene Trubeczkoi, operated more discreetly. Their aim
was, by satisfying Polish desires in Russia, to win over to the
side of Russia, through Pan-Polish influence, the Austrian Poles,
and especially the latter's representatives in the Austrian Par-
liament and in the Austro-Hungarian "delegation," in order
that these, together with those Czechish and South-Slavic par-
liamentarians already "bagged" by Russia, might cripple Austria-
Hungary. It was hoped in this manner to disrupt the alliance
between Austria- Hungary and Germany, and to render diffi-
cult and to delay Austria's military preparations, if not, indeed,
to defeat them. These final aims are clearly revealed in the
controversy between Prince Eugene Trubeczkoi and the feuille*
toniste Mensikov in the Novoje Vremja, in the course of which
Trubeczkoi made this noteworthy remark :

"Publicists of the stamp of Mensikov regard the rapproche-
ment of Russia and the Poles as a sentimental dream. In re-
ality it is the only practical policy. It is the sole means for par-
alyzing our most dangerous enemy in Europe — namely, Austria
— and for rendering a conflict with her impossible. To make
friends with the Poles means for Russia to draw all the Slavic
races of Austria over to her side and to transform them all into
allies."*

The Russo-Polish reconciliation was planned to take place
on neutral territory, in Prague, at a Pan-Slavic preliminary
congress held in July, 1908. This result, however, was not
achieved. Even the Pan-Polish partisans left the Prague Con-
gress disillusioned. Austria's hospitality, however, was taken
advantage of by one of the participants, Count Vladmir Bob-
rinskij, a member of the Duma, to agitate in East Galicia on
the journey home against the Monarchy and to form connec-
tions for a system of military espionage. The first chilling frost
soon fell upon the young Pan-Slavic movement, which its prime
movers in the Liberal camp were fond of calling the "Neo-
Slavic" movement, since the old Pan-Slavic movement was too
much discredited among the West and South Slavs as being
Pan-Russian, and perhaps also because in this way it was hoped
to mislead the Austrian government.

The outbreak of the Young Turk revolution was hastened
by the meeting in Reval in May, 1908. In July, 1908, the

"*- Moskovskij Jesenedetnik, 19 lo. Number 27, Column 4.

402 MODERN GERMANY

Young Turks obtained the revival of the Turkish Constitution
of the year 1876. Induced by false friends, they sought also
to renew Bosnia's relation as vassal to the Porte, by calling rep-
resentatives of that country to the Turkish parliament. The
result of this was Austria's annexation policy in the autumn of
1908. Public opinion in Russia became greatly excited, as the fact
had never been made known that in previous years Russia herself
had several times given her consent to this purely formal act.
The Serbian agitation in Russia occurred at this moment, and
was an added cause of excitement. True to the principles of
Neo-Slavism, the Czechs, the Pan-Poles and the Slovenes should
have opposed this declaration of annexation in the legislative
bodies. But some members lacked the necessary courage, and
they contented themselves with discordant declarations, while
others, such as the Pan-Poles, supported the Crown. This dis-
appointment may also have been a factor in the conciliatory atti-
tude of Russia's Foreign Minister, P. A. Izvolskij, at the end
of the annexation crisis.

Although Aehrenthal, on the occasion of the meeting in Buch-
lau as early as September, 1908, had gained Izvolskij 's consent
to the annexation, in return for which Austria was to agree to
the opening of the Dardanelles for Russia's warships, Izvolskij
kept this secret on account of the high tide of the Pan-Slavic
movement, and he immediately assumed the leading part in the
diplomatic action of England, France and Russia against the
annexation. His ambition was painfully disappointed by Eng-
land's refusal to agree to the opening of the Dardanelles; he
thus saw himself robbed of the important compensation which
Aehrenthal had promised him, while the Austro-Hungarian
Minister threatened to make sure of his share in the deal. De»
spite the fact that the director of the archives of his ministry, Gor-
jainow, had published in 1907 the chief points of the Reichstadt
Agreement (1870) and that of Ofen-Pest (1877), >" his book
"Bosphorus and Dardanelles," Izvolskij went to Buchlau without
knowing anything of these treaties and their contents.^ Al-
though later he learned of this obligation of Russia toward
Austria-Hungary in connection with the possession of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, nevertheless he encouraged the defiant atti-
tude of Serbia and Montenegro, which lacked all justification,
and demanded the surrender of certain portions of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to these two states. But since Russia was not in
the position to back up with the sword the policy which Izvolskij
had inaugurated against the Dual Monarchy, mainly in com-

^Zapiski Ignatjeva, Historischer Bote, February, 19x4, p. 456.

MODERN GERMANY 403

mon with England but partly also with Italy, Petrograd found
itself forced to draw in its horns following a plain hint from
Berlin. At the end of March, 1909, the diplomatic campaign
which Izvolskij had begun in October, 1908, ended with a
painful defeat for Russian prestige. But since it was only a
diplomatic defeat and the military inferiority of Russia, Serbia
and Montenegro was not taken advantage of by the other side
in order once and for all to render the existence of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy safe in the South, Russia gave full reign
to her enmity toward Austria-Hungary.

The great uproar caused in Italy by the annexation and the
ambiguous attitude of the Italian government, which had made
secret preparations for war against Austria-Hungary for the
spring of 1909, drew Russia's attention to this ally. In the late
autumn of 1909 the Czar paid his return visit in Racconigi, on
which occasion he ostentatiously made a wide detour in order
to avoid Austrian soil. A secret understanding seems to have
been reached at this time between Russia and Italy against
Austria-Hungary, which inaugurated Russia's betrayal of the
South Slavs, whom she surrendered to Italy, and Italy's dire
treachery toward her ally. Italy's open breach with her previ-
ous friends, however, was not desired, for, according to the view
of a French diplomat which Prince Tnibeczkoi quotes with
praise, "Italy, in case she openly joined the Triple Entente,
might, without becoming more useful, make demands on her
new associates to which at present she has no right." ^

Russia was angry, and was ready in any possible manner to
make up for the blow to her prestige as the guardian power of
the Slavs and for her failure in the Dardanelles question. The
Pan-Slavic movement, secretly encouraged by the Russian gov-
ernment, continued its accustomed activity. Meetings in Petro-
grad alternated with meetings in Sofia and Prague. The Rus-
sian government even allowed itself to be officially represented
in the Pan-Slavic Sokol Congress in Prague, in the spring of
1912, by Sebjakov, assistant to the Minister of Public Instruc-
tion. So certain was it of itself that on Austrian soil and in
the presence of representatives of the Austrian government, it
gave this support to the Sokols, who were determined to help ruin
the Austrian Monarchy, internally and externally. Although
warnings enough were heard even at that time, yet the world
war of 19 1 4 first revealed the importance of these organizations
in the plans of Russia and Serbia. For the rest, Czech, Pan-

^ Russia as a Grsat Power, Prince S. Trubeczkoi, p. xaa ff.

404 MODERN GERMANY

Polish and Russophile members of the Austrian Parliament saw
to Russia's interests in the name of Pan-Slavic brotherhood.

In order to advance Russian aims in the Balkans, Izvolskij
made another attempt to found a Balkan League, with Turkey
in the lead, as the latter country at the time played a part in
his calculations owing to the unfriendly attitude of the Young
Turks toward Austria. This Balkan League was intended as
a wall against the Dual Monarchy. In order to render the
combination possible, Izvolskij demanded that Serbia and Bul-
garia inform the Porte of their disinterestedness in Macedonia.
As the Bulgarian government neither could nor would give such
an assurance, the plan came to naught. But the idea, in an-
other form, was taken up again two years later (1911) by
Czarykov, the Russian Ambassador at the Golden Horn. In
return for the opening of the straits to Russian men-of-war,
Russia oftered to assume, single-handed, the protection of the
Porte against her own greedy proteges in the Balkans (Serbia
and Bulgaria) and to guarantee the safety of the Dardanelles
against a coup on the part of Italy.

Encouraged by the signs of internal disintegration in Turkey,
as manifested in the Albanian revolt and in dissensions among
the Turkish officers, Italy had considered the moment oppor-
tune for seizing Tripoli in time of peace, as the country was
stripped of troops. Since the Turks could not possibly acqui-
esce in this act of piracy, Italy declared war on the Porte at the
end of September, 191 1. Czarykov considered the moment fa-
vorable for putting through a new edition of the Hunkiar-
Iskelessi treaty of 1833, the acceptance of which would have
been tantamount to the setting up of a Russian protectorate
over Turkey. The resistance of Turkey and the disapproval
manifested in Bulgaria brought about the failure of Czary-
kov's plans and caused their disavowal by Petrograd.

Russian politicians, however, were in no way embarrassed.
The opportunity was all too favorable for Turkey's enemies
to profit by the Turko-Italian War for their own purposes.
Thanks to the war, Russian diplomacy was at last successful in
bringing about a union of the previous rivals and enemies,
Serbia and Bulgaria, which was directed equally against Austria-
Hungary, Turkey and Rumania, and which was soon joined
by Montenegro and Greece. The 13th of March, 19 12, was
for Russian diplomacy a day full of promise, as it was then
successful, against all the efforts of its enemies, in creating a
weapon which permitted its politicians and army leaders to
await in the background the moment favorable for interfer-

MODERN GERMANY 405

ence. It was, perhaps, not the intention of Russian diplomaqr
to turn this weapon in the first instance against the Porte. But
the fear on the part of the Balkan states, lusting for the
Turkish possessions, lest the favorable moment pass without
being utilized, drove them to declare war against Turkey in
the autumn of 191 2. The Russian diplomats were most skill-
ful in denying all responsibility for this war and in protecting
the Balkan League in the rear, on the pretext of maintaining
the status quo and the territorial disinterestedness of the Great
Powers — that is to say, primarily Austria-Hungary. The main
object, of course, was to secure freedom of movement for Rus-
sia's vassal, Serbia, so as to enable her to expand freely and
strengthen herself for her future task: participation in the de-
struction of Austria-Hungary. This part of the Russo-Serb
program suffered defeat, it is true, owing to the determination
of Austria-Hungary not to grant to Serbia access to the Ad-
riatic by annexing Albania, in which determination she was
upheld not alone by her loyal ally, Germany, but also by Italy,
who had long had her eyes fixed on Valona and South Albania.

As Serbia now looked for compensation in Macedonia, quar-
rels arose between the allies in regard to the booty which they
had taken from the Porte. The task of Russian diplomacy was
like that of squaring the circle. It was a question of satisfy-
ing Bulgaria and Serbia at the same time. The Russian min-
ister in Belgrade, Hartwig, knowing that thus only could he
hold Serbia to her allegiance to Russia, had made promises to
her a long time before which Sassonov was forced to ratify, willy-
nilly. The Czar strove to preserve the Balkan League through
the exercise of his personal influence, and on May 26, 19 13 (O.
S.), he sent a telegram proclaiming Russia as the only court
of last resort for the whole of Slavdom. Austria- Hungary
saw herself compelled to announce through the Hungarian
Premier, Count Tisza, that she was not prepared to recognize
this protectorate. Neither was this appeal of the Czar well
received in Sofia or in Belgrade. At the end of June, 191 3,
war broke out between Bulgaria and her previous allies, Serbia
and Montenegro, putting a final end to the Balkan League.
This was an even worse defeat for Russia than her failure in
the Albanian and Scutari questions, and one which deprived her
of a weapon that she had prepared primarily only against
Austria-Hungary. The effect was most evident in the violent
attack which Pan-Slavic circles in Russia made on Russian
diplomacy.

Right at the start of the Balkan War, in the autumn of

4o6 MODERN GERMANY

19 1 2, the Pan-Slavic movement had begun in Russia with re-
newed force. The peculiar attitude of the parliamentarian rep-
resentatives of the Czechs and Slovenes in the Austrian and fed-
eral administrative bodies — not to speak of the South Slavs —
appeared to these circles as a sign that the moment had ar-
rived to destroy Austria-Hungary. At this very time treatises
were published by Russian military writers which sought to
prove that half the Austro-Hungarian army might be regarded
as negligible, since it consisted of Slavs who had no interest in
fighting against Russia. Austria-Hungary, they said, was the
most helpless state next to Turkey. Russian diplomacy, there-
fore, need not show the least consideration for Austria-Hun-
gary.* Even before this the Russian senator, Grigorij Evreinov,
had prophesied in a brochure the early disintegration of the
Dual Monarchy as an anti-national state, and had demanded
that Russia announce, in addition to her unshakable solidarity
with the great Slavic world, her intention to utilize every op-
portunity of an international nature to unite Bosnia, Herze-
govina and the Sandjak with Serbia and Montenegro.'

"For the removal of the anti-national state, Austria-Hun-
gary," says Evreinov obscurely, "there are at work for Russia
the providential forces of the progressive evolution toward a
union of racially related people."

He becomes clearer when he says that he cannot enter into
details as to how Russia can hasten this process by clever
policy. Evreinov seeks also to prove that the Triple Entente
is from a material standpoint stronger than the Dreihund, quite
irrespective of the position of Italy, which in case of armed
conflict intends to play the part of a tertius gaudens. The
most violent instigation against Austria- Hungary was indulged
in at the Slavish banquets in Petrograd, which were presided
over in person by General Skugarevskij and at which the editor
of the Government Messenger, Basmakov, an official personage,
played a prominent part. The government, however, did not
lose sight of its own interest on account of this Pan-Slavic
movement, which outwardly pretended to be so altruistic. The
Galician Russian Society, with Count Vladimir Bobrinskij, one
of the most prominent nationalist leaders of the Duma, at its
head, with the assistance of certain dignitaries of the Russian
church, such as Archbishop Antonij of Volh5mia, who were

^"The Military-Political Po«ition of RoMia," by General Parensov, in
StavttHskij'a Igvestija. No. 8, of January 6-i^, 1910; "The Atiatro-Hitngarian
Army," by Colonel Potoddj, in Okrainy Rossij, No. 45, November 10-33, I9I3»
p. 640.

*Jd€olog%ja hliMneuottocntgo voprosa, Petrograd, 19x1.

MODERN GERMANY 407

eager to proselyte, began to speak of the oppressed condition of
"Russian Macedonia" — that is to say, Galicia — in which the
non-existent Russians were alleged to be exposed to the greatest
maltreatment.

The real reason was, as a matter of fact, that the Rus-
sian government and nationalistic circles had for years noted
with disapproval the Ukrainian population of Austria making
notable advance and the Austrian government aiding its ef-
forts, although not adequately or consistently. If the unity of
the Russian race in Russia, which was outwardly maintained
only through the most ruthless oppression of the White Rus-
sians and the Little Russians (Ukrainians) as regards their na-
tional characteristics, was threatened with destruction through
the upgrowth of a powerful cultural Ukrainian nucleus on
Austrian soil, there was only one way in which to stamp out
this danger, and that was through the annexation of this ter-
ritory by Russia. More than once during the course of the
Balkan crisis it appeared as if Russia was about to declare war
on Austria under the pressure of this movement. But, although
Russia, before the outbreak of the Balkan War, under the pre-
tense of a trial mobilization, had drawn together large masses
of troops on the Galician frontier, she nevertheless did not feel
herself well enough prepared for this difficult task. Moreover,
France and England did not yet seem ready to cooperate in the
task. Russian preparation for so serious an undertaking was
probably not considered sufficient in Paris and London. In
Pan-Slavic circles, however, this abstention of Russia was re-
garded as cowardice on the part of Russian diplomacy.

Under these circumstances, it is explicable that the peace
which came to Europe late in the summer of 19 13 through
the Treaty of Bucharest, proved only a preparation for war.
Although Russian diplomacy — that is to say, Sassonov — had
sought as early as 19 10 in the Potsdam agreement to renew
the friendly relations with Berlin which Izvolskij had scorned,
the efforts were soon abandoned. Perhaps this was only a hint
to London and Berlin, and at the same time a paying out of
France for her attitude during the annexation crisis, which may
not have sufficiently met Russia's expectations of what was
incumbent on an ally. Sassonov changed his attitude toward
Germany, however, when the latter country called a halt on
Russian diplomacy, which, with its customary willful inter-
pretation of the Peace of San Stefano and of the Congress of
Berlin, sought to secure a firm footing in Armenia, or at least

4o8 MODERN GERMANY

to make use of the Armenian question as an excuse for inter-
ference at any time, as in Macedonia.

The mission of Liman von Sanders, late in the autumn of
19 1 3) gave Russia the opportunity to let loose all the latent
anti-German animosity of the Russian press. Any strength-
ening of the Porte, and especially of the defenses of the Straits,
ran counter to the plans of Russian statesmen. It was well
known that the English Naval Commission would take no
measures to improve the Turkish fleet, but on the contrary was
-expected to serve as a check and procrastinating force as re-
gards Turkish naval preparedness. Therefore, the recall of
von Sanders and the German officers was demanded, and as
Russia's wishes did not meet with the proper response, the de-
cision was taken, probably before the completion of the strategic
railways, to attack Austria- Hungary and Germany. At all
events, the preparations for mobilization in Russia began very
early in the year 19 14. Time was an important question, also,
as France was not in condition and did not intend long to bear
the burden of the three-year service. The most important
consideration, however, was that England — that is to say, pri-
marily Sir Edward Grey — expressed a readiness to fight on the
side of Russia and France. One of the chief promoters of the
present World War, the Russian ex-diplomat, Branczaninov,
who encouraged the war sentiment in Russia through a daily
newspaper and who belonged to the Liberal wing of the Pan-
Slavist party, intimated in his weekly paper, after a visit to Grey,
that England was ready to fight by Russia's side.

War, he said, offered for England (that is for the British
government) a way of escape from the internal difficulties of
the Home Rule question; a victory of the fleet under the Lib-
eral government would secure its position for a long time to
come.

"They know this, but with the peculiar hypocrisy of English-
men they mention it only in friendly intercourse, secretly as it
were, and not as naive people like M. Sassonov might desire,
officially in black and white, with their signatures and seals at-
tached. Is it not strange to think that, on account of the Irish
question, within a month and a half to two months Europe
will be involved in a general way ?" ^

This was written on March 18, 1914 — three months before
the outrage in Serajevo. It is explicable that Russia, follow-
ing this assurance of English assistance, hastened to bring on
the conflict, if for no other reason than on account of her own

^Novoyt Zt/eno, X9X4, No. 13, p. 407.

MODERN GERMANY 409

inteinal complications that threatened a revolution, as Miljukov
informs us. That the projected attack on the Austrian Crown
Prince was known in Russia's official circles cannot be
absolutely proved. But there are many indications that this
occurrence did not find Russia's leading men entirely unpre-
pared. In this manner it was intended to bring Austria-Hun-
gary into a critical position, and either force her into war
against Serbia, or, if she drew back, to cause her to be crushed
by universal contempt. The attitude of the Serbian govern-
ment and of the Serbian press immediately following the out-
rage showed that Russia had quieted Serbia's fears as to the
results of the awful crime. When Austria-Hungary finally de-
cided, after a display of too great patience, energetically to put
an end with armed force to the Serbian intrigues on her soil,
Russia had the excuse for war which she had so long sought.
Her aim was, to be sure, not the protection of Serbia, but
the destruction of the Dual Monarchy and the weakening and
humiliating of Germany. But it was important to act quickly
so as not again to miss the favorable opportunity.

England and France must not be given too long a time for
consideration, nor must there be a possibility of localizing the
struggle and of diplomatic settlement. This is to be read in
every line of the Russian Orange Book, despite its falsity. The
English, too, jealous of Germany's growing commercial and
naval power, believed that the moment had come to crush Ger-
many and Austria- Hungary. Instead of checking the Russian
desire for war, as they had done before. Sir Edward Grey and
his immediate cooperator stimulated it, not only in Petrograd
directly but also by way of Paris. Encouraged in this manner,
Russia proceeded to general mobilization, without awaiting the
result of the Austro-Russian negotiations in Petrograd, and
although Austria-Hungary had only eight corps mobilized
against Serbia.

That this meant war with Germany had long been clearly
known in Petrograd. The British Ambassador, Buchanan, had
so informed Sassonov at the beginning of the crisis. But war
was desired in Petrograd, because success was thought to be
certain. And so the war came about. The Russian govern-
ment will before long have to answer for this to its own people,
beyond the circle of the Pan-Slavist fanatics, when it fails to
accomplish the destruction of Austria-Hungary and Turkey.
But in the consciousness of the justice of their cause, Germany,
Austria-Hungary and Turkey will emerge with increased
strength from the conflict forced upon them.

CHAPTER V
SERBIA'S ROLE

PROFESSOR HANS UEBERSBERGER, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

VIENNA

WHEN in 1690 the Patriarch, Arsenije HI, Crnojevich of
Ipek, with 100,000 Serbs, placed himself under the
protection of Emperor Leopold I, it might reasonably have been
expected that the destiny of the whole Serbian nation was for-
ever united with Austria. That this did not prove to be the
case was due in part to mistakes made by the Vienna govern-
ment in the religious field, but the principal reason was that
before many years had passed Russia had begun her undermin-
ing work among the Austrian Serbs. Vienna drove the Serbs
into the arms of Peter the Great, and the Czar immediately
seized the opportunity of creating a firm basis for Russian influ-
ence in the interior of Austria. Since the use of the Cyrillic, or
Slavic, alphabet in printing was forbidden, as constituting a
dangerous threat to the Catholic Church, the Serbian bishops
turned to Russia for teachers and books, and during the last
years of his reign Peter the Great sought to satisfy their de-
mands. Russian teachers began to work among the popula-
tion in the Hungarian-Slavonian borderland. Aside from the
fact that previous to Lomonosov, the Slavonian-Russian lan-
guage which now began to spread by books and teachers among
the Serbs, was adapted to its task neither from a linguistic nor
literary point of view, this influence was deleterious in other
ways to the spiritual development of the Serbs. There arose
that Slavonic-Serbian literary language which, under Russian
influence, became further and further separated from the living
speech of the people and which created a chasm between the
educated and the uneducated classes of the Serbian population.
As permission for founding a Serbian printing establishment
in Austria was not to be obtained, one was set up in Venice
in 1758, thanks to Russian assistance. Unfortunately, the dis-
approval with which Vienna regarded the sending of books
from Russia did not lead it to draw the proper conclusions re-
garding its own acts. It continued to consider the furnish-
ing of intellectual nourishment to its Serbian subjects as be-
yond the province of the state, and not until the end of the

410

MODERN GERMANY 411

eighteenth century was a printing establishment founded in
Vienna for "Illyrian" books.

A further factor was the peculiar position of the Serb immi-
grants. The rest of the population assumed toward them the
unfriendly attitude of a privileged, exclusive class. Previous
to the Peace of Belgrade (1739), when the Pashalik of Bel-
grade belonged to Austria, a systematic policy in the highest
court circles regarding the Serbs was altogether lacking. As a
consequence, the Serbs generally succeeded only through cunning
and tenacity in obtaining their desires. When, however, under
Maria Theresa, as the result of political developments, Hun-
garian influence gained in strength, dissatisfaction increased
among the Serbian population, especially among the officers of
the frontier regiments formed from Serbs.

Russia, which since the accession of the Czarina Elizabeth
had been notably active in the role of protector of the Greek
Oriental peoples, and especially of the Serbs, made an e£Fort in
the early fifties — through discontented officers of the border
regiments to whom the most enticing promises were held out
— to induce the Serbs in Hungary to emigrate into Russia.
They were to settle between the Bug and the Dnieper, in so-
called New Serbia, as an advance guard against Turkey. This
plan was partly successful. But as the Vienna government put
a prompt stop to the emigration in the interest of the Empire's
protection and as furthermore the settlers in Russia suffered
bitterly, the movement came to a sudden end.

Of great importance, however, was the affection felt by the
Austrian Serbs for Russia, and the strong influence of Russian
teachers, Russian literature and the Slavonic-Serbian literary
language. And yet to Austrian weapons alone was due Serbian
freedom and the creation of a national center. The foundation
of present-day Serbia was laid by the Austrian administration
of the Pashalik of Belgrade from 1718 to 1739, without which
the revolt of 1804 would have been impossible. When Kara-
george and the other leaders of the revolt sought to place them-
selves under Austria's protection, only to find the door closed
against them owing to Vienna's attitude on the question of Tur-
key's sovereign rights, the spiritual head of the Austrian Serbs,
the Metropolitan Stratmirovich, turned to Czar Alexander in his
celebrated appeal, in which he proposed the formation of a
Serbian Turkish vassal state under a Russian Grand Duke,
Austria to surrender her Serbian possessions against indemnifica-
tion at some other point.

In Petrograd, despite the friendly relations with the Porte

412 MODERN GERMANY

and the treaty which was still in force, less consideration was
shown for the Sultan's government than was the case in Vienna.
The revolutionists received encouragement in the form of money,
and when, two years later, a breach occurred with Constanti-
nople, a military convention was entered into with them which
demanded greater sacrifices from the Serbs than was consonant
with the aid which they received from Russia. In addition,
the Imperial Councilor, Rodofinikin, appeared in Belgrade as
chief Russian agent, and soon revealed to the leaders of the
Serbians, as well as to the people themselves, the most unpleas-
ant side of the Russian protectorate. In a short time he had
gained universal hatred for himself, through his ruthless ad-
vancement of Russian interests, without regard for the suffer-
ings and dangers of the Serbian nation. Rodofinikin was the
type of the majority of Russian agents in Serbia. He also was
the first, in his memorial of November, 1808, to lay down the
lines of Russian policy for the future.

Russia, he said, must strengthen her position as sole domi-
nant power in Serbia for all time to come, in order, in case of
attack by Austria, to strike the Dual Monarchy in the flank
through Serbia and through the revolutionary element in the
adjoining South Slavic Austrian districts. The representatives
of Russian policy in Serbia, from Rodofinikin to Hartwig, have
held true to this principle, quite independently of the relations
between Austria and Russia at any given moment.

Serbia, however, was betrayed and sacrificed by Russia when-
ever Russian interests demanded it. This happened in the Peace
of Bukharest in 18 12, when Karageorge was forced to flee from
Turkish vengeance. When two years later (181 5) Milos Ob-
renovich again unfurled the standard of revolt and national
defense that Karageorge had been forced to abandon, he turned
for help to Vienna. The Congress was then in session, and
Czar Alexander present. Emperor Francis received the depu-
tation, and one of the Serbian delegates, the High Priest Mat-
thias Nenadovich, relates in his memoirs the following charac-
teristic dialogue:

"Have you seen the Czar?" suddenly demanded Emperor
Francis.

"We have requested an audience, but have not yet been re-
ceived," replied Nenadovich.

"Ah, that diabolic policy!" sighed the Emperor. "He be-
lieves that no one knows the Russian government's activity
among the Serbs! And why will the Czar not receive you?

MODERN GERMANY 413

Perhaps because he Is a guest in my castle? That would make
no difference to me." ^

When Milos Obrenovich, by his own strength and without
foreign help, defeated the Turks, and the grateful nation pro-
claimed him hereditary Prince of Serbia, the Russian Minister
at the Porte, Baron Stroganov, immediately protested. Russia
was decidedly opposed to the creation of a hereditary princi-
pality in Serbia, since such a form of government might more
easily escape from Russian influence. Indeed, Russia, the proto-
type of autocratic power, after the principle of hereditary sov-
ereignty had become an accomplished fact in Serbia, aimed
through the creation of a senate to limit the ruler's power. At
the request of Russia, the Porte agreed in the Constitution of
1830 that the members of this senate could not be removed
from their office by the Prince unless it was proved that they
were involved in guilty actions against the Turkish govern-
ment. Russia had calculated cleverly; it was clear from the
beginning that a senate whose members enjoyed such rights
could not fail to live in constant conflict with the Prince. With
the help of the senate, Russia has always been able to enforce
her will in Serbia. As Petrograd never forgave Milos for ac-
quiring the hereditary princely power, everything was done to
destroy his standing with the Serbian people. Russia created
her own party by means of gold, and constantly sought, through
intrigues and force, to have the senate made up of men who
were her unquestioning tools. She did not even hestiate to
stir up the Serbian people against their ruler by means of a Rus-
sian Consul, Vasczenko, who traveled throughout the country,
carrying on his work of instigation. The new Constitution of
1839, which deprived the Prince of all power and gave it into
the hands of the seventeen senators, was Russia's work. There
was no other course for Milos Obrenovich than to abdicate in
favor of his eldest son, Michail (June 13, 1839), and to leave
the country. Nor did Russia rest content until the Obrenovich
dynasty had been entirely driven out.

When the Serbian senate elected Alexander Karageorgevich,
Russia did not recognize the election because it had not taken
place in the presence of the Russian representative, and it had,
therefore, to be repeated in the presence of this representative.
The new dynasty, however, could not meet Russia's constant
demands and soon lost the Czar's favor. When through the
Treaty of Paris (Article 28) Serbia, as a vassal state of Turkey,
was placed under the collective protection of the European

* The Serbian Que^ion, by Vladan Gcorgevitch, p. 19.

414 MODERN GERMANY

Powers, Russia's reply was to expel Prince Alexander Kara-
georgevich. The Serbian National Assembly again placed the
dynasty of the Obrenovichi on the Serbian throne, and Prince
Milos returned from exile. After his death, which soon oc-
curred, his son Michail succeeded him. But Michail, like-
wise, did not long enjoy Russia's favor. On June 3, 1868,
the Petrograd newspaper Golos said:

"The Obrenovichi dynasty is incapable of carrying out the
plans for a Slavic future in the peninsula. There is only one
candidate who is worthy of mounting Serbia's throne, namely
Peter Karageorgevich, the son of Alexander Karageorgevich.
He must be elevated to the throne of Serbia for the sake of the
Serbs and of the unhappy inhabitants of Bosnia, Herzegovina
and Montenegro."

A week later, on June 10, 1868, Prince Michail was mur-
dered in the park of Topchider.

Thanks to the presence of mind of the ex-President of the
Council of Ministers, Ilja Garasanin, and the other Serbian
officials, Russia this time did not enjoy the fruits of the murder.
Michail's nephew, Milan, not yet of age, was proclaimed Prince
by the Serbian National Assembly. From the very beginning
of his reign he had to reckon on Russia's ill will. The memoirs
of General Georji Ivanovich Bobrikov, who as Russian mili-
tary plenipotentiary was active at Milan's side in 1877, give a
clear impression of the manner in which Russia ventured to use
Milan, when, as a result of the disasters at Plevna, Serbian
assistance against Turkey was badly needed. At this time Rus-
sia formed her connection with the Serbian Radical party, which
since Milan's time has remained the representative of Russian
interests. Only on Andrassy's intercession did Serbia receive
Nish and the district of Pirot from the Congress of Berlin,
Russia not concerning herself either about her Serbian or her
Montenegrin ally.

Petrograd's tactics, however, soon after led to directing Ser-
bia's attention toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, which since
1876 had so often been offered to Austria-Hungary by Russia
and with the occupation of which, on the basis of the Congress
of Berlin, Russia had been thoroughly satisfied. As Milan
sought support from Austria-Hungary, Russia incited against
him the politicians of his own party, and they brought about
a series of revolts. Like his uncle, Michail, Milan up to 1878
was in favor of the idea of a Serbian Piedmont, but his experi-
ences with Russia forced him to abandon this idea, as only
Austria-Hungary supported him and his house. When King

MODERN GERMANY 415

Milan, after the unfortunate day of Slivnitza, saw himself
forced to abdicate in favor of his minor son Alexander, Russia
had reached the goal for which she had so long striven. King
Alexander lost favor with his people through his marriage with
Draga Mashin, which was engineered by Russia. The Rus-
sian legation was undoubtedly not without responsibility for
those terrible murders during the night of June 11, 1903. The
bloodstained throne was now occupied by that Peter Kara-
georgevich, who had been Russia's candidate in the year 1868.
With him the Radical party, which was the Russian party,
gained full power. The chief aim of Serbian politics since that
June day has been the national liberation of the "unredeemed"
Serbs in Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

"To quiet the unattainable demands of social freedom pro-
claimed by Serbian Radicalism and in the interest of order in
the course of internal politics, the government saw itself prac-
tically forced to make use of the national liberation of the
'unredeemed' Serbs as a political narcotic" *

In a memorial which the Minister of Foreign Affairs caused
to be written for King Peter after his accession in March, 1904,
by the then head of the Propaganda Section of the Ministry,
Sveta Simich, the program of the immediate future was outlined
in the following manner:

1. Alliance with Montenegro. The Prince must undertake
to carry out a common foreign policy directed by Belgrade.

2. Agreement with Bulgaria in regard to reforms in Mace-
donia and Old Serbia. Formation of a customs union for the
purpose of extending the Serbian economic area.

3. Economic emancipation from Austro-Hungarian markets;
definite advancement of the commercial-political interests of
the Western powers, Russia and Italy, as the best means for
rendering the Greater Serbian idea popular in Europe.

4. Advancement of the coalition idea of the small Serbian
and pro-Serbian parties in Croatia, for the purpose of support-
ing ^e Hungarian party of independence in its battle against
the Throne and Dualism.

5. Agitation in Bosnia for a union with Serbia. Discredit-
ing the Austro-Hungarian administration through systematic
propaganda and encouragement of the discontent of the Ortho-
dox and Mohammedan population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.'

This program meant open warfare with Austria-Hungary.
The fact that at the moment Russia was involved in the Far

^ Oesterrtich-Vngarn und SerbUn, by Leopold Mandl, Vienna, 1912, p. 12.
*Ibid., p. 15 ff.

41 6 MODERN GERMANY

East was a cause of serious disquietude. As the result of the
loyal attitude of Austria-Hungary, however, that which Peter's
Prime Minister, General Sawa Gruich, had feared before the
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War did not come to pass.

"The relations between Russia and Japan have grown so
strained recently," he wrote on December 27, 1903, "that war
is now inevitable. I hope, nevertheless, that the Czar, in his
love of peace, will avoid war, for it would be a disaster not
only for Russia but also for us Slavs of the Balkans, whose sole
hope is in Russia's help. There is something disastrous in your
foreign policy! We fear that Austria, as soon as Russia is
seriously engaged in the Far East, will finally annex Bosnia and
Herzegovina and proceed to absorb Old Serbia — ^beyond the
Mitrovitze."

Meanwhile, especially after the tariflE war with Austria-Hun-
gary, an active campaign had been started from Belgrade to stir
up dissatisfaction in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the other South
Slavic territories. The Young Turk Revolution (1908) seemed
to simplify the problem. On the ground of its transformation
into a constitutional state, the Porte might demand the return
of Bosnia and Herzegovina; that would later offer the possi-
bility of taking these states more easily from Turkey than they
could be taken from Austria-Hungary. This was the opinion in
Belgrade circles. But when T^mperor Francis Joseph announced
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian hopes suf-
fered a collapse, and indignation ran high. Not for an in-
stant was it admitted either by Serbia or by Russia, the lat-
ter's protector, that Serbia had no right to interfere in this act,
and that in any event only the Porte and the signatory powers
of the Treaty of Berlin were in a position to protest. Through
his reception of the Serbian Crown Prince George, the Czar
gave the Serbians plainly to understand that he was on their
side and that they might rely on him. Only in the light of this
encouragement can one understand the following speech in the
Skupshtina by Stojan Protich:

"As long as Austria-Hungary remains what she is to-day, it
will be impossible to entertain friendly relations with her. Au-
stria-Hungary desires to remain a Great Power, but her compo-
sition renders her the fatherland of a whole series of different
nationalities with pronounced individuality. Peace and neigh-
borly relations can exist between us and Austria-Hungary only
if Austria-Hungary gives up her claim to be a Great Power and
resigns herself to the role of an Eastern Switzerland." ^

* Oesterreich-Ungarn und Serhien, by Leopold Mandl, Vienna, 191a, p. x$.

MODERN GERMANY 417

The Minister of Foreign AfiFairs at that time, Mflovanovich,
indulged in no less unsuitable language in regard to the Dual
Monarchy :

''The freedom which the Balkan peoples gained from 181 2 to
1876 was achieved through Russia, while Austria-Hungary's first
act in the Balkans was to make slaves of the people of two
Serbian countries. Danger for the Balkan countries is to be
apprehended only from Austria-Hungary, and the balance must
be maintained against Austria-Hungary. The road to the iEgean
Sea must be blocked for Austria-Hungary. She must cease to
be a Balkan state."^

The tone which the Serbian press permitted itself toward the
Monarchy may be guessed after these attacks by responsible
men.

Since Russia was not in a position to protect her protege
against well-deserved punishment, Serbia was forced to beat a
retreat and to admit in an official declaration, first, that her
rights were not affected by the annexation, and second, that she
pledged herself to change the course of her present policy to-
ward Austria-Hungary, and that in the future she would main-
tain a friendly attitude. This was on March 13, 1909. But
this act of penitence was forced and purely outward. As
Serbia was sure of the support of Russia, who, as Rodofinikin
had often said, stood in need of her for the destruction of
Austria-Hungary, she was able quietly to carry out her former
plans. The Serbian Prime Minister, Stojan Novakovich, dur-
ing the last weeks of the annexation crisis did not hesitate to
say in a brochure that the Serbian state "must reach from
Timok to the Adriatic Sea and from Vardar to Grain among
the Alps.'* ^ Russia was the godfather of the Balkan League,
the foundation of which was laid on March 13, 1912, in the
Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. According to Russian plans, this Balkan
League was to give proof of its efficacy in the struggle against
Austria-Hungary and by severing the South Slavic districts
from the Monarchy. It happened otherwise, however. Bul-
garian interests demanded war against the Porte on account of
Macedonia, out of which she was later so disgracefully cheated
by her allies.

The conflict was still raging; the first disillusionment had
been experienced through the refusal of Austria-Hungary and
Italy to grant Serbia access to the Adriatic Sea, in which act
Russia acquiesced. P. Miljukov, certainly an unimpeachable

^ Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns seii 1866, by Sosnovskv, 2, p. 205.
*Najnovija Balkanska Kriaa i Srpsko Pitanje, by Stojan Novakovich, 1910.

4i8 MODERN GERMANY

witness, after a visit to Serbia, wrote that there was no need
to fear that Serbia would turn to Austria-Hungary as the result
of Russian acquiescence in the question of the Adriatic harbor.
The Serbian peasants, who controlled seventy-three seats in
the Skupshtina, were all Russophile, since the love of Russia
had not been tested so severely among the Serbian people as in
Bulgaria. Serbian intellectuals realized that they could do
nothing but remain Russophile, largely because of their inerad-
icable hatred of Austria. Logically and politically, Serbian pol-
iticians regarded a rapprochement with Austria as possible, but,
psychologically, for the Serbian democracy to side with Austria
was quite out of the question. No one was afraid of a war
against Austria, as the Serbs were conscious of their own
strength. War was not desired at the moment only because
time was wished for in which to complete the preparations which
had been successfully begun after 1909. Encouraged by success,
the Serbs would proceed to even bolder schemes. No one could
tell when this struggle with Austria would come, whether in
five or fifteen years, but that it would come every one was con-
vinced. The question of "war or peace" was answered for
Serbia by "Peace for a new war." *

The restive forces of Belgrade gathered around the Crown
Prince and in the "Narodna Obrana" precipitated this war.
The outrage of June 28, 191 4, against the Austrian heir ap-
parent and his consort was intended to furnish the prerequisite
for the favorable outcome of the struggle, toward which Rus-
sia, well prepared for war, lent her influence. In 19 10 the
Russian ex-Minister of War, Kuropatkin, in his work, "Tasks
for the Russian Army," had written the prophetic words:

"On the basis of the estimate of Austria's interests in the
Balkan Peninsula, in Chapter XV the conclusion was reached
that, as early as the second half of the eighteenth century, it
became apparent as regards Russia's plans in the Balkans that
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Russian
sphere of action and influence must be limited to the eastern
half of the Peninsula; this was tantamount to an acknowl-
edgment that the western half of the Peninsula, which is in-
habited by the Serbian race, belonged to the Austrian sphere
of influence.

"These lessons of history, however, were quickly forgotten
by the Russian government, and in the early years of the
nineteenth century Russia's interference began in the affairs of
the Serbian inhabitants of Turkey, which has not ceased even

"^Retschj, No. 5, January 6-19, 1913.

MODERN GERMANY 419

>-ilay. rFhis interference in the course of the nineteenth and
le first years of the twentieth century is the chief cause of the
istrustful and at times inimical relations between Russia and
Lustria. If Russia does not cease this interference in a mat-
:r foreign to her and which at the same time touches Austria's
ital interests, a war may be expected between Russia and
lustria in the twentieth century on account of the Serbian
[uestion.** ^

Kuropatkin has been proved to be right. Since the Czar did
lot think it necessary to condemn the infamous outrage, re-
ponsibility for which in Belgrade was laid by the judicial in-
vestigation on circles near Crown Prince Alexander, it cannot be
surprising, in view of this attitude, that he considered the repara-
Lion "disgraceful" which Austria-Hungary found herself forced
to demand, sword in hand. He held his protecting hand over
the Belgrade ruling classes, who were implicated in the royal
muxderSy and prepared for die attack on the Dual Monarchy.

^Zadacmi russkoj armij, VoL 2, p. 334 ff.

CHAPTER VI
THE GREAT POWERS IN EAST ASIA

PROFESSOR OTTO FRANKE, OF THE COLONIAL INSTITCTIE

OF HAMBURG

IN order to understand rightly the position of the Great Pow-
ers in East Asia before and during the war, it is necessary to
study them in connection with the developments of the last
twenty years. The year 1894, the beginning of the Japanese-
Chinese War, is the natural starting-point, for this date maib
the opening of the latest period in the history of the interna-
tional relations of the countries of the Far East among theno-
selves and of other countries to them. Up to that time the
interests of the Occidental Powers in China had been regarded
as directed toward one identical aim of commercial policy and
had consequently been handled in common. But from that
period on, there is a parting of the ways by which the Powers,
singly or in groups, tried to attain their goals. These gpak
were as divergent as were the nature and extent of the posses-
sions of the various Powers from which they had resulted.
England's sole colonial possession on the East Asiatic coast was
the island of Hongkong, which she had acquired, together with
the desired control of die opium trade, by the Peace of Nan-
king in 1842, but in addition she possessed in all the more im-
portant cities of China, national settlements in which her offi-
cials not only conducted the administration but exercised, in a
limited degree, legal jurisdiction over the Chinese. Further,
thanks to her dominant position, she avowedly regarded herself
in East Asia, more even than elsewhere, as the real arbiter of
nations.^ Although in China proper up to that time England
had given no hint of other plans than such as concerned her
commercial interests, in the Chinese vassal states toward the
west she had operated all the more energetically from India as a
base.

In the year 1885, the Viceroy of India sent a military force
to Burmah, which was under Chinese suzerainty. In reply to
her protest, China received the customary answer that her rights
would be fully respected ; yet at the same time the King of Bur-

^ See The Far Western Question, Valentine Cfairol, p. 3 ff.

420

MODERN GERMANY 411

mah Tvas sent as a prisoner to Calcutta and the country de-
clared by the Viceroy as "incorporated into the possessions of
Her Britannic Majesty." In the Agreement of Peking, 1886,
England undertook to see that the embassy bearing tribute due
to China every ten years be regularly sent. The members of the^
embassy ^were all to be Burmese I Yet a considerable time pre-
viously the Anglo-Indian government had stretched out its feel-
ers toward the north, in order to bring the border states of the
Himalayas under its control and thus gain possession of the
Thibet plateau, which, as Lord Curzon later characterized it,
is "the glacis of the Indian fortress." Every step here was an
encroachment on the undeniable sovereign rights of China; this
was done with less hesitation, as China's military weakness pre-
vented her from defending her possessions.

Nepal — ^the home of the Gurkhas — had become a dependency
of India since the war of 181 4, although, in order to preserve
a semblance of China's suzerainty, embassies were still allowed
to proceed thence to Peking to pay tribute — the last of these
embassies from Nepal appeared in China in 1887. In the year
1835 the Indian government had taken over the district of Dar-
}eeUng, east of Nepal, by pensioning the prince; and in 186I9
Sikkim, which adjoined it on the east, was incorporated, partly
at first, into the Indian possessions, since ''the fact of British
ascendency and the situation of Sikkim in a direct line between
Calcutta and Lhassa could not but suggest its adaptability as a
highway for trade between the two regions." ^ Not until the Cal-
cutta Agreement of 1890 was the British protectorate over Sik-
kim recognized, but the regulation of the Indo-Thibetan "trade"
— and this was the important point for the Indian government in
the development of its further designs on Thibet — ^was reserved
for later negotiation. For the time being Bhutan, a depend-
ency of Thibet and hence of China, and which adjoins Sikkim
and controls the passes to the highlands, was left undisturbed.

In the manner of England in the southwestern borderlands of
China, France, in the course of the nineteenth century, had
formed in the southern districts on the peninsula of Farther
India a broad foundation for her policy of force. As early as
1787, under the stimulus and with the assistance of the Catholic
Mission at Versailles, a treaty had been made with Annam, ac-
cording to which certain strongholds in Cochin-China were to
be ceded to France for assistance given. From this point as a
basis, although seventy years later, the expansion of the French
power toward the north was made, "in the interest" of the king-

^Chma and Her Neighbours, R. S. Gundry, p. 395.

422 MODERN GERMANY

dom of Annam and of its "rights" — after the territory of Saigon
had been conquered in 1862 and Annam thereby reduced to the
position of a helpless tool. In 1867 Cambodia, ostensibly a vas-
sal state of Annam, was ''protected" against the claims of Siam
and placed under French protection; in 1874 a treaty was made
with Annam itself in which the French protectorate was not yet
clearly announced, it is true, but at least foreshadowed. These
measures called forth energetic protests, not only from China,
to which country Annam stood in a tributary relation, but they
also caused a great outcry in England, who then as now con-
sidered the disregard o{ the rights of others as her exclusive
privilege.^ The relations with China became more critical in
the year 1882, when France proceeded with military force
against Tonkin, in the extreme north of Annam, and took pos-
session of the country. The following year the entire kingdom
of Annam was declared under the protection of France. In
order to put an end once and for all to China's resistance to
these infringements of her rights, France decided on military
measures: in 1884 war resulted, and in the peace of 1885 China
gave the assurance that she would withdraw her troops from
Tonkin and recognize all French treaties with Annam. France
in return promised "to respect the southern boundaries between
China and Tonkin and to protect them against the attack of any
other nation and under all conditions." ^

Therewith France had created for herself the desired great
colonial empire, which left Siam as the only independent state
on the peninsula of Farther India. But at the same time
France had become the immediate neighbor of China proper,
and this fact may not have been without influence on the deci-
sion which the Indian government reached at this time in regard
to Burmah. Both European Powers had now a Chinese fron-
tier, in each case in the Province of Yunnan, and they were
neighbors; both saw the possibility of advancing their interest at
this point, in the same direction toward the rich district of the
upper Yangtse, and thence farther east; and both were aware
that their ambitions might lead to dangerous clashes.

The American minister, Colonel Denby, who in 1889, soon
after these events, undertook a journey through southern Man-
churia, declared after his return that "the extensive borderlands
in the north and west of the Chinese Empire would some day

^Histoire des Relations de la Chine avee Us Puissances Ocddeniaits, H.
Cordier, VoL II, p. 299: "Lea criaillcries du gouvememcnt an^aU."
* Ibid., pp. 435 and 523.

MODERN GERMANY 423.

in all likelihood suffer the same fate as Burmah and Tonkin.'^
Russia was at that time the cause of such fears.

Russia's desire for expansion into Chinese territory was also
of ancient date. The conqueror of Siberia had pressed forward
in the seventeenth century into the Amur regions and northern
Manchuria, till through the treaty of Nerchinsk, in the year
1689, ^n end was put to further conquests. Not until one hun*
dred and seventy years later did a new active policy begin at
this point. In 1858 advantage was taken of the Franco-English
war against China to bring the northern bank of the Amur
River, and in i860 the entire coast district as far as the Tumen
River and to the borders of Corea, into Russian possession ; thus
entire northern and middle Manchuria was surrounded by the
territory of the Czar. In 1872 the Russian naval port was
transferred from Nicolaievsk to the more southerly Vladivostock.
But Russian activity was not limited to the Amur territories.
The great Mohammedan revolt under Yakub Beg in Turkestan
at the middle of the nineteenth century induced Russia in 1871
to occupy the so-called Hi district, together with Kuldja. In
the treaty of Livadia in 1879 Russia took advantage of the in-
capacity of the Chinese negotiators in order to gain possession,
not alone of the entire Hi Basin, but in addition to obtain extraor-
dinary commercial privileges, such as absolutely free trade in the
whole of Mongolia. The treaty was, in fact, a monstrosity, and
was rejected by Peking, as was to be expected; in 1881 it was re-
placed by another treaty, by which the greater part of Turkestan,
inclusive of Kuldja, was given back to China, but extensive rights
of a commercial nature were nevertheless left to Russia, such as
free trade in Mongolia and certain parts of East Turkestan,
consular representation in a great number of cities in this terri-
tory, which were otherwise closed to trade, etc. By this treaty
Russia obtained a highly favored and unique position in the
northern and northwestern outlying districts of China, from
which she was in a position at any time to make her influence
felt in the adjoining provinces of Kansu and Shensi.

While thus in the second half of the nineteenth century,
France, England and Russia had laid a foundation in the
southern, western and northern outlying districts of the Chinese
Empire for their political power, reaching as far as the border
of China proper, and which at any suitable time might be ex-
tended beyond these limits, Japan, the only other Asiatic
state concerned beside supine China, was forced for the moment
to remain without a share in this development, as she was en-
tirely occupied in strengthening herself internally and did not

424 MODERN GERMANY

yet understand the far-reaching ambitions of the European Pow-
ers. In Japan, too, however, the impulse toward expansion 'w^s
soon felt in the interest of strengthening her internal oonditioo.
In order to give occupation to the Samurai (the noble wsLrrior
class), who were in a state of unrest, the government undertook
in the year 1874 ^ military expedition against the Island of
Formosa, whose savage inhabitants, it was claimed, had murdered
Japanese merchants in the previous year. The island belonged
to China, and had been settled by Chinese in the seventeenth
century. The government at PeUng, therefore, protested, and
the result was that the families of those murdered received an
indemnity from China, and Japan's occupation of the island was
not carried out. Japan then turned to the Liu-Kiu Islands, of
which she took possession in 1879, on the basis of a pretended
tributary understanding dating from the year 1609, although the
islands acknowledged themselves to be vassals of China. China s
protest remained unnoticed. The real object, however, of Japan's
desires was now, as it had been for centuries, Corea, a tributary
state of China by its own acknowledgment. The Chinese govern-
ment, it is true, had acted in a degree contrary to its own con-
struction of the situation by allowing Corea to conclude commer-
cial treaties with several foreign Powers, among others in 1876
with Japan, who had obtained this end by military pressure.

According to occidental legal principles, the inevitable logical
conclusion was that Corea was an independent state and that
it had been tacitly recognized as such by China ; the latter coun-
try, however, persistently refused to allow such an inference to
be drawn from these treaties. At all events, in the treaty of
1876, Japan succeeded in having Corea designated as an "inde-
pendent state" which "enjoys the same sovereign rights as does
Japan." As the result of Japanese intrigues, a series of murders
and disturbances took place in the Corean capital in 1884, so
that iinally Chinese and Japanese troops had to interfere. In
ihc following year, in a special treaty of Japan with Corea, nor-
mal relations were reestablished, and a few months later (1885)
an agreement was reached with China, according to which in
future disturbances neither China nor Japan was to send
troops to Corea without a previous mutual understanding. The
question of China's legal relationship to Corea was not de-
cussed and remained open to dispute as before. Japan's plans,
however, in regard to the Asiatic Continent, which were an in-
heritance from the past, became more ambitious as the empire
grew stronger and more conscious of its position in the political
development of the East.

MODERN GERMANY 425

Matters stood thus in the year 1894, when Japan, in further-
ance of these plans, took advantage of the outbreak of new dis-
orders in Corea, and of the sending thither of Chinese troops, in
order to declare war on China. The entire question of the
division of power and the aspirations of the foreign states in
'Kast Asia was hereby opened up; the revelation by the war of
Ohina's absolute helplessness hastened the march of events.
£ngland, who at first underestimated Japan's strength, openly
took the side of assaulted China, and her aversion to the vic-
torious Island Empire led her at the beginning of October, 1894,
to make an appeal to the European Great Powers to unite in a
protest and to check Japan's victorious course. The proposal
^vas refused as untimely. But when, in the further course of
the war, it became clear that in the peace negotiations Japan
intended to make extensive territorial acquisitions in China
proper, and thereby to go far beyond her original goal, which
^was the recognition of Corea's independence, the European Pow-
ers became seriously disturbed, lest in this manner the seed of
permanent disturbance be planted in East Asia. That these
fears were only too well founded was proved by the results —
one needs only to ask British merchants in East Asia. When,
therefore, in the spring of 1895 Russia revived the English
proposition, France and Germany this time showed themselves
to be receptive; whereas England at first hesitated, and finally,
to every one's surprise, declared that she saw no cause for ob-
jection to the Japanese conquests. The French historian, H.
Cordier, says in regard to England's action: ''The attitude of
the British Cabinet led to the belief that it was bound by a
secret treaty with the Tokio Cabinet. This, however, was a
mistake, as events later showed ; but it is certain that Albion at
that time was already seeking to win the gratitude of the con-
queror, who, however, did not allow himself to be at all deceived
by England's change of front." *

Germany, who regretted this first serious breach in the Euro-
pean solidarity of action in East Asia, made an effort, after
Russia and France had decided upon a protest against Japan's
peace conditions, to make use of her participation in the inter-
ests of restraint and moderation. Almost two months before the
protest was made, in March, 1895, she confidentially informed
the Japanese Foreign Minister, Count Mutsu, of what was about
to occur, and advised him, since opposition to the three Powers
was out of the question, to forestall the whole proceeding by a

^Histowe d€s Relations de la Chine avec des Puissances Occidentales, Vol.
Ill, p. 2S9.

426 MODERN GERMANY

voluntary modification of Japan's conditions of peace and thus
to avoid even the semblance of any humiliation of the victorious
country. Unfortunately, Count Mutsu did not follow this
friendly advice — ^indeed, it even appeared as if he had not brought
it to the knowledge of his colleagues in the cabinet; at
all events, it has remained unknown to the Japanese down to
the present day. When in May, following the Peace of Shi-
monoseki, protest was actually made, it was again Germany who
(at the request of Japan) insisted that China should first of all
ratify the treaty as had been originally agreed; afterward, the
Chinese government was given to understand, China might make
the proposition to Japan of substituting an increase in the war
indemnity in place of territorial cessions on the Asiatic conti-
nent China was assured that Japan would be ready to accept
the proposal. In this course Germany's sole aim was to save
Japan from all appearance of submitting to force. It is evident
that, when once the protest had become unavoidable, Japan had
every cause to be thankful that Germany took part in the inter-
vention in the interest of moderation. Unfortunately, the
malevolent British press, systematically copied by that of Japan,
kept the Japanese nation from understanding the real situation.

In the Peace of Shimonoseki, Japan obtained the final recogni-
tion by China of Corea's independence and the surrender of the
Island of Formosa, as well as of the Pescadores Islands, lying
between Formosa and the continent, while the Peninsula of Liao-
tung, which had also been ceded, was given back to China, to-
gether with Port Arthur, according to agreement, in return for
a money indemnity. If Europe had believed that through this
restitution the dangers which might result from the Japanese
conquests in China proper were obviated, such a supposition could
not fail even at this time to be recognized as unjustified by any
one familiar with political conditions in Corea and with the
history of Japan's relations to that country. For centuries Co-
rea had enjoyed no independent existence, and under the politi-
cal conditions of the nineteenth century she was less capable
than ever of attaining such a pos[tion. The "independence" of
this entirely unorganized state which Japan had fought for,
could have no other meaning for the initiated than as being the
first step toward the incorporation into the empire of the victor.
This aim was thenceforth systematically pursued by Japan and
quickly achieved.

The whole political development in East Asia, however, now
struck into paths which in no wise suited German aims. In
view of Germany's European position, it was self-evident that

MODERN GERMANY 427

she could never hope to obtain territorial acquisitions in the
Far East, such as England, France, Russia and Japan possessed.
She was, however, determined to develop to the limit of her
ability her already important commercial interests in China,
which clearly offered great possibilities for the future. Such
aims required that Chinese territory remain open to free com-
petition in trade and that a strong, enlightened native govern-
ment preserve order and repel illegitimate interference from out-
side. The German manufacturer and merchant need never fear
an honest competitor, although they do fear the political oppressor
and conqueror. The inviolability of China's territory, tibie open
door for trade and the firm establishment of the Chinese govern-
ment have therefore formed the guiding principles of Germany's
policy during the last twenty years — not from disinterested mo-
tives, but from proper appreciation of her own interests. If
there was a time when doubts were entertained in Germany as
to the practicability of this policy, this was due primarily to
the greed for power of the four other Great Powers, in contrast
to whose gigantic plans the German aims sank into utter insig-
nificance. The following exposition will make this clearer; it
will also show that this greed for power, despite vociferations to
the contrary, was irreconcilable with the principle of the open
door and with China's inviolability; in addition, it will furnish
proof that England, France and Japan, as the result of a com-
mon plan, sought to prevent all further development of Ger-
many's position in the Far East and to exclude German compe-
tition.

Immediately following the Peace of Shimonoseki, Russia and
France began to advance their broad front in the north and
south on China's borders in such a manner that Germany (and
England in even more marked manner) was filled with increas-
ing apprehension. In June, 1895, France, despite her promise
of 1885, succeeded in securing from China, not alone the advance^
ment of her Annam boundary into Yunnan, but also the opening
up to French trade of several places in Yunnan and Kuangsi.
But especially valuable was China's agreement to the extension
of the Annam railways into Chinese territory, and the exclusive
privilege of mining undertakings in the provinces of Yunnan,
Kuangsi and Kuangtung ; as a result of this, these three provinces
were practically transformed into an exclusive sphere of French
influence. These agreements were extended in 1897 ^^^ 1^9^
by concessions for the building of certain railway lines through
Yunnan and Kuangsi.

Similar steps were taken in the north by Russia. In the year

428 MODERN GERMANY

1 89 1 the building of the great Siberian Railway had been b^^n.
It was originally planned to pass exclusively through Russian
territory. For this reason it would have been forced to make a
wide detour in order to reach Vladivostock, and would have had
to traverse the wild, uninhabited mountain districts on the north-
ern shore of the Amur River, instead of tapping the fruitful
plains and prosperous cities of Manchuria. A way out of the dif-
ficulty, however, was gained by an agreement with China in the
year 1896. According to this, Russia obtained the right to build
the road from a point in southern Transbaikalia, through northern
and middle Manchuria in a straight line toward Vladivostock. In
addition, another line was to be built with Russian capital from a
point on the Manchurian line in a southerly direction, reaching
the sea at the harbors of Ta-licn-wan (Dalni, Dairen), Port
Arthur and Newchwang, and connecting with a further line to
Tientsin and Peking. For general purposes of safety, Russia
was to be allowed to protect her railways by military guards;
further, she acquired the right to adopt certain military measures
in Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, the conditional surrender of the
Bay of Kiaochow, on the coast of Shantung, as a base for the
Russian fleet, and concessions for the exploitation of mines in
Manchuria. Russia thus obtained an important extension of her
northern sphere of power throughout the whole of Manchuria,
and if we regard the Bay of Kiaochow as marking the southern
boundary, far into the territory of China proper as well. In this
manner Russia acquired the much-coveted possession of ice-free
harbors on the Pacific Ocean. There remained only the inclu-
sion of "independent" Corea to round out the immense territory.
Here, however, Russia's plans came into conflict with Japan's
well-advanced interests.

It was self-evident that such concessions on the part of China
had been obtained by Russia and France only through the exer*
cise of strong political pressure, and the helplessness exhibited
by the Chinese government filled Germany with anxiety con-
cerning her own interests. It was no longer possible to count
on protection against the encircling and constricting efforts of the
politically more favorably placed oppressors of China; the divi-
sion of China into "spheres of influence" seemed on the point of
becoming an actuality, and whoever did not undertake to pro-
tect his own position ran the risk of being smothered. It was
these considerations which decided Germany, in the year 1897,
after having repeatedly called China's attention to the situa-
tion and after an especially marked slight by the officials of
Shantung, to occupy the Kiaochow Bay district, in order to

MODERN GERMANY 4^9

make it a base for her fleet and trade, without regard for the
pretended Russian claims, of which she had not been notified.
England, who, as we have remarked, was much more disturbed
than Germany, compensated herself for the French increase of
territory by a corresponding frontier adjustment between Bur-
mah and Yunnan, which she obtained from China in the year

1897. The acquisition of Kiaochow by Germany was not re-
garded by England at the moment with unfriendly eyes ; for one
reason, because, as Lord Salisbury remarked to the German
Ambassador in London, on January 12, 1898, he "thought it
probable that no great injury had been inflicted upon England,'' ^
and further because Russian interests were seemingly impaired,
and the probability was thus increased of gaining Germany's
help against Russia. There was still another consideration. Af-
ter Germany had acquired certain rights to particular railway
lines and mining undertakings, and was thus, in the English
view, definitely indemnified in China, England determined to
carve out for herself the "spheres of interests" which she thought
were due to her.

On February 9, 1898, the British Minister in Peking handed
a note to the Chinese government, in which he demanded the
assurance that "China would never alienate any territories of
the provinces adjoining the Yang-tsze to any other Power."
The government, which was doubtless somewhat astonished by
this strange demand, of course gave the desired assurance with-
out delay, especially as the expression "any other Power" natu-
rally included England also.^ In this remarkably simple manner,
England brought the "Yang-tsze valley" into her sphere of in-
fluence, and a telegram from Lord Salisbury, of September 24,

1898, to the British Ambassador in Petrograd, shows what we
must understand by this somewhat indefinite expression. Ac-
cording to this, it includes "the provinces adjoining the Yang-
tsze River, as well as Honan and Chekiang" * — that is to say,
not less than nine of the eighteen provinces of China, precisely the
largest and most fertile, a territory which extends from the fron-
tiers of Burmah and Thibet to the Pacific Ocean. This action
is characteristic of the way in which England acquires "inter-
ests." It is self-evident that a claim of this kind to the **Yang-
tsze valley," which rests purely on a one-sided declaration by
England, has been recognized neither by Germany nor, so far
as known, by any other Power, nor can it be recognized. An

^British Blue Book: 1898, China, I, No. 49.

' Ibid., China II, Nos. i and 2.

"British Blue Book, 1899, China II, No. 46.

430 MODERN GERMANY

explanation to that effect by the German Ambassador to Lord
Salisbury, on May 13, 1898, leaves no doubt on this point.^

Through this advancement of their political interests by the
Great Powers in the territory of China, the points of possible
conflict were naturally multiplied in the south and the south-
west between England and France, in the north and northeast
between Russia and Japan, in a slight degree also between Russia
and Germany. Even America, who had hitherto held quite
aloof, but who after the war with Spain in 1898 had acquired
the Philippines (in which consideration for the developments in
East Asia had doubtless not been the least important factor),
was thereby drawn into the larger Japanese sphere of interest
in the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Germany and Russia
soon came to an understanding, as the claims of the latter state
did not extend beyond Manchuria. This was a disappointment
to England, who felt, despite her vast sphere of interest, that she
was interfered with on all sides, as she was unable to free herself
of the delusion that any overseas success of another Power is a
derogation of her rights. She seemed temporarily uncertain as
to her plans, but considerations of general policy were finally
decisive for her attitude in East Asia. Russia appeared for the
moment the most annoying opponent, first because she cut off
from England's exploitation long stretches of territory running
to the sea, and second because her activity in the East precluded
her from similar activity in the West, where it was more desired
by England. The latter country's uneasiness had been increased
following the leasing by Russia, in the spring of 1898, of the har-
bors of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan (Dalni) from China,
When England decided to occupy the harbor of Wei-hai-wei,
lying opposite on the coast of Shantung, for so long a time as
Port Arthur should remain Russian, the British government ex-
plained that the sole object of this action was to maintain the
balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili, menaced by Russia's
occupation of Port Arthur.^ Immediately thereafter France took
possession of the Bay of Kuang-chow wan on the south coast of
the Province of Kuangtung.

Once more, during the Boxer troubles (i9(X)-oi), the com-
mon danger drove the Powers to concerted action, but their
rival interests quickly brought them again into opposition. Al-
most does it appear as if the critical state of affairs in 1900 had
temporarily moved England to accept the condition of things in
China as they had shaped themselves, and earnestly to devote

^Britifth Blue Book, 1S99. China I, Na 96.

* Ibid., No. 2, I

MODERN GERMANY 431

her strength to preserving the further inviolability of Chinese
territory and to securing the open door for trade. Only thus
can the fact be explained that on October 16, 1900, she made
an agreement in London with Germany, the Power most inter-
ested in both of these principles, whereby the two states pro-
claimed their firm intention to uphold the above maxims "for all
Chinese territory, in so far as their influence extended." All
the Powers were to be invited to join in the agreement, and as
a matter of fact, all of them — including Russia, France and
Japan — did so, with the proviso that the status quo should re-
main unchanged in the future.

But the hope proved to be vain; the decisive factors in Eng-
land's European policy soon crowded all consideration of indi-
vidual East Asiatic questions into the background. The most
important among these factors was the conviction that the Ger-
man sea trade and the German fleet were increasing in an undue
manner, and should therefore be suppressed. The oft-quoted
articles in the English newspapers and magazines, such as The
Spectator, The Saturday Review, The National Review, etc.,
in many cases written by naval officers, and dating back to the
year 1896, reveal this growing enmity toward Germany, which
finally overshadowed all else. The gradually developing idea of
encircling and isolating Germany made it necessary that Russia's
energy be turned back toward the West, especially, as she was
beginning to become dangerous in the East. While down to
1898 it had been thought necessary to weaken Russia, on ac-
count of her Asiatic policy, and that to this end German assist-
ance might be enlisted, the ultimate aim now changed, and with
it the method of procedure. Russia was to be forced out of East
Asia, but without thereby having her usefulness against Ger-
many permanently decreased — ^that is to say, her strength must
not be unduly weakened, and her expectations in West Asia,
in Turkey and in the Balkans were to be increased.

For the solution of this new problem England made use of
the Russo-Japanese antagonism which, as explained above, ha3
grown up in Corca. At the beginning of the year 1902 she
concluded for five years the alliance with Japan, regarding which
negotiations had been carried on since 1898, and which had
been first conceived of as a triple alliance to include Germany.
In the treaty the contracting parties mutually recognized "the
independence of China and of Corea," and furthermore the spe-
cial interest of Japan in Corea was acknowledged, and pro-
tection against "the aggressive action of any other Power" agreed
upon. The casus foederis was not to arise in case of war with

432 MODERN GERMANY

a single Power. By unduly extending her undertakings, which
included not only the whole of Manchuria but had also en-
croached on Corea, by contemptuously repelling the Japanese
efforts toward compromise, and by overestimating her own ca-
pacity, Russia substantially aided England in promoting her
plans.

In the year 1904 war broke out with the well-known results:
Japan obtained a free hand in G)rea; Russian rights in South
Manchuria, especially as regards the harbors of Port Arthur
and Dalni (Dairen), as well as the corresponding portion of the
Manchurian Railway, were transferred to Japan. But — and
this was important in its results for Japan's internal economy
and hence for the independence of her policy — ^she received no
indemnity for the cost of the war. England's first goal had been
attained ; Russia was excluded from the sea coast south of Vladivo-
stock, while her possibilities of development remained untouched
at other points, and ample room was provided for them in the
West by England's Persian and Turkish policy. In addition,
Japan, owing to her need of money, remained chained to Eng-
land for further undertakings.

But this was not all which the year 1904-5 brought to British
politics in the way of success. Advantage was taken of Rus-
sia's war — ^perhaps more in response to the pressure of the "go
ahead" Indian party than from the voluntary decision of the
government at London — to carry the plans for the acquisition
of the "Indian glacis," namely Thibet, a step nearer to develop-
ment; especially as there was reason for fearing that Russia
might forestall England by putting herself in possession. On
the plea that the Lama authorities had failed to carry out the
agreement of 1890 in regard to the India-Thibet trade, a mili-
tary expedition was undertaken in the autumn of 1904 to
Lhassa, and a treaty extorted which made the position of Thibet,
to say the least, very like that of a British protectorate. This
treaty, moreover, entirely put an end to China's sovereign rights,
since it dealt with Thibet as an "independent" state. The case
of Corea had shown the advantage of recognizing the "inde-
pendence" of such states for purposes of more ambitious under-
takings.

The aroused Chinese government, however, brought about the
repudiation of the treaty of Lhassa, and in 1906 on its own
initiative entered into a new one with England. The provisions
of this latter treaty, however, are so elastic and ambiguous that
England is in a position at any time to open up the Thibet
question when conditions seem favorable for so doing. Later

MODERN GERMANY 433

developments — the action of China against Thibet, the flight of
the Dalai Lama to India, the fall of the Chinese dynasty, and
the effort of the Lama hierarchy to obtain independence — ^would
repeatedly have been taken advantage of by England as an
excuse for interference, had not once more considerations of gen-
eral policy (above all in regard to Russia) dictated ''watchful
waiting." In the great settlement with Russia in 1907, in re-
gard to Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet, both Powers pledged
^emselves for the present to withhold their hands from the
Thibetan booty, to acknowledge China's sovereign rights, and,
further, to respect her interests. But in order to hold the door
open for the future, in any event, England declared in Peking
in 1 9 10 that she found herself compelled to insist upon the
maintenance of an effective Thibetan government, since the
fact of Thibet having its own government was a prerequisite for
the security of future English plans.^

For the same purpose, in the year 1910, England bought from
the little Himalaya state, Bhutan, for a yearly payment of 100,-
000 rupees, the right to direct its external relations.^ Bhutan
has "external relations" only with Thibet, whose vassal state
it is, and with China, under whose mediate suzerainty it stands.*
The following is from the pen of an English authority on East
Asiatic affairs : " *Devant ces suzerainetes-la/ wrote a witty
Frenchman, speaking of Chinese pretensions in Annam ; 'on salue
et on passe/ (One salutes and passes on in the presence of
such rights of suzerainty.) Before contradictions such as these,
one might exclaim, we can only hold our peace dumbfounded." *
In place of Annam, Thibet may be substituted.

In tracing this particular course of England's struggle for
power, we have meanwhile anticipated developments in China,
and we must again retrace our steps to the year 1905. From
this period on British politics had no further need of primary or
secondary aims, there was but one task for the World Empire:
the destruction of Germany, of her fleet, of her colonies and of
her overseas commerce. The accomplishment of this task drove
England to that feverish activity in East Asia by which she
sought to influence the course of events to her own advantage.
Patiently, she laid all her usual interests aside in order to press
into her service all the Great Powers for her great European
stroke; they follow the promptings of the strings which she ma-

^ British Blue Book, 19x0. "Further Papers Relating to Thibet," Not. ziS
and 347.
■ Ibid., No. 346.

> See China and Her Neighbours^ R. S. Gundry, p. 350.
* Ibid., p. 95.

434 MODERN GERMANY

nipulates, in part without being conscious of what they are do-
ing. A criss-cross of agreements extending in all directions,
binds the different Powers; they have all been entered into at
England's instigation, or at least under English supervision, and
are intended to eliminate the possibility of clashes in the East,
in order that the collective strength may remain unimpaired and
free to be used in the West. China has to bear the costs of this
policy, for the wishes of each one of the states concerned must
find fulfilment in the great empire in order to prevent its defec-
tion. Each such fulfilment, however, costs China a part of her
possessions, either in land or in sovereign rights. And while
each of those interested grabs all that is within reach, each agree-
ment proclaims its aim to be the "inviolability of China" and
the "open door for the trade of the world." There is scarcely a
chapter in the history of international relations which bears so
plainly the stamp of untruth.

In order to understand in the following discussion the lengths
to which the English plans against the German Empire had gone
in Europe, it is well to recall the agreements which were made
in 1906 between the British military attache in Brussels and the
Belgian Chief of the General Staff, in regard to the landing of
British troops in case of conflict with Germany. In the year 1912
these were further developed.

Even before the signing of the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth,
in August, 1905, England and Japan substituted for their treaty
of alliance that would not have expired until 1907 a new one
for ten years; by this, Japan gained an absolutely free hand in
Corea to secure her interests, while a like privilege was granted
to England "in the proximity of the Indian frontier for safe-
guarding her Indian possessions." The first of these points was
a concession to Japan, in return for which the alliance was to
be extended to India, and if necessary, to Thibet and Afghanistan
— an extension which in the year 1902, according to a statement
of Count Hayashi, had been denied by Japan. This protective
measure was necessary, as it was not yet certain how Russia
would act in the unsettled Thibetan question. In 1907, when
the provisional Asiatic understanding with Russia had been ef-
fected, and Russia had thereby become a link in the chain which
was being forged about Germany, the alliance with Japan had
become superfluous also in the revised form. A substitute for it
could be only a question of time.

The agreement with Russia, which was perhaps the hardest to
bring about, was an important step forward in the preliminary
work of eliminating delicate points of friction and possibilities of

MODERN GERMANY 435

conflict, at least for a number of years. A scarcely less impor-
tant factor in this connection was the proper conduct of the
restless and uncertain Japanese policy. Through the. "Pan-Asi-
atic" movement in Japan, which began with the year 1899, and
whose fantastic aim was the freeing of the Asiatic peoples from
the yoke of Europe, especially the elimination of Western influ-
ence in East Asia, it was realized that the new Great Power
might become a very disturbing element in the British plans, if
that movement were to achieve serious influence on the attitude
and decisions of the Japanese government. This danger un-
doubtedly existed after the war with Russia, and not only Eng-
land but even France was uneasy regarding her East Asiatic
possessions. It was, therefore, a not unimportant result of Eng-
land's efforts that at the time (1907) the Russo-English treaty
was made, agreements were brought about between Japan and
France, as well as between Japan and Russia, in which the con-
tracting parties pledged the preservation of the status quo and
mutually guaranteed each other's possessions, together with all
the rights thereto appertaining. This, truly, was in strange
agreement with the maintenance of the "inviolability" of China
and of the "open door," which both treaties solemnly guaranteed
in the preamble I

A treaty between England and France was not necessary in
1907 — they had long been in agreement as to the ultimate end
of all their actions. This is clearly shown by a remark of Paul
Deschanel, President of the French Chamber, when on January
22, 1909, after eulogizing the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907
in the course of a speech on "Asia in International Politics," he
said : "This treaty is of more value in its European results than
its Asiatic, as it permits both Powers to concentrate their main
strength in Europe and thereby to work more effectively for the
maintenance of the European balance of power and of peace."

The expression "peace" in the secret language of English-
French-Russian-Japanese diplomacy is a catch-word of import
similar to that of the "inviolability of China" — the initiated ut-
ters neither of them without a knowing smile. For the sake
of more important interests, England conveniently turned her
eyes away from the danger point in the southwest, of which
mention has several times been made, while the French built
their great Tonkinese railway Haiphong-Laokai into the Prov-
ince of Yunnan. In 19 10 they reached the capital city as a
temporary terminus. They made great efforts to obtain a fur-
ther concession toward the north to the Upper Yangtsze, in
order to gain the rich western territory in Ssechuan; they ap-

436 MODERN GERMANY

peared to be deciding in their own favor the oft-discussed ques-
tion whether trade with these promising districts and with those
beyond would follow the route down the Yangtsze through the
British sphere of influence, through English-controlled Burmah»
or toward the south through the French colonial empire. But
England noticed nothing. The previous bickerings had ceased,
in spite of the warnings from British mercantile circles; there
was no more talk of the much-discussed railway from Burmah
to Yunnan, and thence to Yangtsze.

The unasked-for assurances of her "inviolability" and of her
"independence" — ^which was threatened by no one except the
Powers pledging it — ^was a source of serious anxiety to China;
she saw that Japan and Russia acted in Manchuria more and
more in the manner of rulers; she had before her eyes the un-
mistakable fate of "independent" Corea with a Japanese Resident
General in control, and in consequence she drew her own deduc-
tions as to the meaning of the expression "inviolability" in the
language of the treaty Powers. A further factor was that in the
agreements of 1907, treating of China's inviolability, strange to
say, precisely those two Powers had abstained from joining for
which the inviolability of China and the open door were an
absolutely vital necessity — namely, Germany and the United
States. China may, therefore, have felt a certain relief when
the United States, too, in November, 1908, signed an agreement
with Japan in which both contracting parties pledged themselves
to maintain the independence and inviolability of China, the
open door and the status quo. The aim of this agreement is
apparent. The question, however, may remain unanswered
whether America, fearing for the safety of the Philippines, had
suggested the treaty, or whether — and this is more likely — ^Eng-
land and Japan, or both, desired it in order to preclude the
possibility of a clash between the two rivals in the Pacific Ocean
(at this time regarded as highly undesirable) and in order to be
able all the more effectively to make Germany appear in the
eyes of the Chinese as the sole enemy of their independence.

It was soon to be made plain to the United States that it
ascribed an undeserved importance to that part of the treaties
meant for advertising purposes, in which the words "inviola-
bility of China" and the "open door" played such a prominent
part. Toward the end of 1909 the American Secretary of State,
Knox, proposed to the Powers the "neutralization" of the rail-
ways in Manchuria, especially of the great north and south
line, which had been divided between Russia and Japan in the
Peace of Portsmouth; this meant the formation of an interna-

MODERN GERMANY 437

tional syndicate for the purchase of the Russian and Japanese
railway interests in order to maintain Manchuria as Chinese
territory open to the trade of alL The result was, as might
have been expected, the reverse of what had been aimed at.
Russia and Japan repelled this interference with their proceed-
ings in the most emphatic manner; the common danger, more-
over, induced them to a union which otherwise could scarcely
have come, about. Again "inviolate" China footed the bilL

In July, 19 10, the two Powers entered into a treaty whereby
they mutually guaranteed the status quo in Manchuria against
the attacks of all third parties. At the same time, according to
French newspaper dispatches, it was agreed in a supplementary
clause that Japan should have a free hand in Corea and that
Russia should be equally free in Mongolia, which belonged to
China. Events proved the correctness of the statements. A
few weeks after the signing of the treaty, "independent" Corea
was annexed by Japan. In the spring of 191 1, quite independ-
ently of China, Russia, through an ultimatum, forced an im-
portant extension of her special political and commercial privi-
leges in East Turkestan and Northern Mongolia as compared
to those granted by the treaty of 1881. Japan and Russia entered
a joint protest, and with success, against the projected loan to
China by an international S3mdicate for the reorganization of the
administration in Manchuria. It is doubtful whether this under-
standing between the two Powers "operating" in the North, with
its surprising results— especially the resumption of Russian activ-
ity in the East — ^was according to the English programme; but
official England, unswerving in its aims, abstained from all pro-
test, and in 191 1, Sir Edward Grey declared in Parliament that
the British government must recognize the fact that "Russia and
Japan have special interests in Mongolia and Manchuria." Thus,
as far as England was concerned, the fate of China's Mongolian
territory had been sealed.

Toward the end of 191 1, in the midst of the Chinese revolu-
tionary disturbances, the northern part of Mongolia announced its
independence — scarcely to the surprise of Russia — ^under the
Lama High Priest of Urga, and at the beginning of 19 12 Rus-
sia informed Peking that she recognized this "independence"
and desired to render "assistance" to the new state; that she
was going to build a railway from the Baikal Lake on
the Siberian line to Urga, which would later be continued
toward the south as far as Kalgan and connect there for
Peking. The system of "independence" in the manner of Corea
and Thibet had brought forth imitators. The projected railway

438 MODERN GERMANY

line, Kiachta-Urga-Kalgan, is of such importance for Russiia
politics and trade that negotiations in regard to it have not been
allowed to come to a standstill even during the war. According
to newspaper dispatches, on September 17, 19 14, Russia entered
into a treaty with the Mongolian "government" in regard to the
building of railways, granting of a non-interest-bearing loan and
carrying through of administrative reforms, which transforaied
Mongolia practically into a Russian protectorate. In the sitting
of the Duma, at the beginning of February, 191 5, Minister Sas-
sonov gave promise of the early announcement of "the signioR of
the three-cornered Russian-Chinese-Mongolian treaty."

As a result of this development, which had grown ever more
pronounced since 19 10 and which from year to year excluded
greater portions of the Chinese Empire from general trade, Ger-
many turned to America, at the beginning of 19 12, with the
request for an expression of the views of that govcmment. The
reply of Secretary of State Knox, with an optimism scarcely to
be understood even to-day, expressed the opinion that all the
Powers had hitherto acted in accordance with their mutual
pledges to respect the inviolability and sovereignty of China. On
the motion of Germany, the document was printed in the news-
papers in February, 191 2. It is easy to imagine the impression
which it must have produced in the circle of the "knowing ones."

Even more emphatic than in the case of Russia was the oppo-
sition which the American plan of neutralization of 1909 aroused
in Japan. It served to sharpen the already existing animosity
against America, due to the attitude of the Western States r^
garding Asiatic emigration. At times, the relations between the
two Powers became so strained that England was seriously con-
cerned, not only regarding the general effect on her alliance
plans in Europe, but especially as to the possibility of herself
being drawn into a conflict between Japan and America through
her treaty obligations. There was pressing need of a correspond-
ing change in the treaty of alliance of 1905. In 191 1, the sane
year in which the Belgian Minister to Berlin called the atten-
tion of his government to the danger of its understanding with
England, Sir Edward Grey and Baron Kato, at that time Japa-
nese Ambassador to London and now Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, agreed upon a new treaty, four years before the termina-
tion of the old one; it was to run to 1921. The paragraph in
regard to safeguarding English rights ''in the neighborhood of
the frontiers of India" was omitted — ^thc treaty with Russia of
1907 had rendered this superfluous. In its place was substituted
a new paragraph, according to which neither of the two Powen

MODERN GERMANY 439

^w^as required to aid its ally in a war against a third Power vnA
ijvhich the state not fighting had signed a treaty of arbitration.
There existed such a treaty between England and America-
England was therefore relieved of her duty to Japan as regards

N^aturally, this new treaty, that had apparently become quite!
meaningless, called forth extremely sharp criticism in Japan;
and in fact the question calls for an answer : By means of what
other concessions did England gain relief from the obligation of
aiding against America, a relief which was especially important
at that time? There can be no further doubt to-day, after
Minister Kato's speech on September 5, 19 14, in the Japanese
Diet and in view of the whole conduct of Japan since the out-
break of war, that these concessions were made at Germany's cost.
Japan had received carte blanche as regards the German protec-
torate at Kiaochow, German commercial privileges in Shantung,
probably also the German possessions in the South Seas, and as
regards China proper — in the last case to an extent of which
vre have no knowledge. Immediately after the outbreak of the
war, Japan seized upon the more or less unprotected German
possessions; moreover, according to a Peking dispatch to The
Times (London), in the middle of February, 191 5, she de-
manded from China, in addition to various other far-reaching
concessions, special rights in Eastern Mongolia, in Southern
Manchuria, in the provinces of Shantung and Fukien (opposite
Japanized Formosa), as well as in certain parts of the district
of the Middle Yangtzse — demands, the granting of which by
China would bring her into a relation with Japan similar to
that which existed in Corea before the annexation in 19 10.
These demands, it is explained, were brought to the knowledge
of England, France, Russia and America, although in modified
form, in January, 1915, and The Times found them, according to
agreement, "quite justified." Whether the rest of the world
will join in this view will be shown in the future.

The preceding exposition gives an incomplete idea of the far-
reaching policy of force of England, France, Russia and Japan,
in East Asia, as well as of the systematic effort of England, even
with considerable sacrifices and denial of precisely those princi-
ples the upholder of which she otherwise claims to be, to isolate
Germany in these regions also and to destroy her politically as
well as commercially. To this end she brought about a chain
of agreements, the pretext for which was the inviolability of
China and the open door, and from which Grermany alone was
excluded on principle. By this means it was intended to create

440 MODERN GERMANY

the impression in China that Germany alone entertained desig;iis
against the territory and the political independence of China,
and was therefore to be regarded as dangerous for the latter state,
an enemy of the Allied Powers, and a menace to peace. The
press of England, as well as that of China, Japan, France and
Russia, to which it supplied material, prostituted itself to this
end uninterruptedly for years by insults, slanders and suspicions
of Germany and the Germans, of Germany's official representa-
tives and of her merchants, in order to rob the modest but all-
too-successful commercial rival of reputation and standing.

As a matter of fact, Germany and America were the only
ones who honorably upheld the principle of China's inviolability
and of the open door, and who never strove for territorial gains
at the cost of China; they desired nothing but freedom for their
trade under peaceful conditions. In view of these facts, the
speech of the Japanese Minister, Klato, of September 5, quoted
above, sounds strangely grotesque. According to this, it was not
in revenge for the protest against the Treaty of Shimonoseki that
Japan declared war on Germany, as the European world had
been taught to believe, but ''in response to England's request for
Japan's assistance," because ''the trade with East Asia, which
Japan and England regard as among their particular interests,
is subject to continual menace (from Germany) ; because fur-
thermore, according to the view of the (Japanese) government,
it constitutes a serious obstacle to the maintenance of permanent
peace in East Asia for Germany, whose interests run counter to
those of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, to possess in a comer of
the Far East a basis for her powerful activity, and, finally, be-
cause this is opposed to the more mediate interests of our own
(Japanese) Empire."

Even Minister Kato would scarcely dare seriously to assert
that Japan's participation was rendered obligatory, under the
Anglo-Japanese Treaty, by England's attack on Germany. In
Article II of this Treaty occur the words, "unprovoked attack or
agressive action" against one of the signatory Powers. No
answer was given by Japan to Germany's offer to exclude the
East Asiatic territory from the field of war operations, nor did
she reply to a similar motion by China, For the rest, Kato's
speech contains its own refutation.

BOOK IV

THE CAUSES AND THE OUT-
BREAK OF THE WAR

CHAPTER I
THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE WORLD WAR

PROFESSOR HERMANN ONCKEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

HEIDELBERG

IN the vast mass of controversial literature regarding the
World War, chief place is usually given to those causes
which are close at hand and easily apprehended. Even among
those authorities who desire to give more than an ex parte ex-
position there are many who confuse discussion of the final causes
with an understanding of the more deep-lying ones; especially
among neutrals is the superficial belief encountered that through
diligent study of the Blue Books alone may the question be satis-
factorily answered: What is the truth? As a matter of fact,
the sequence of events leading up to the beginning of the World
War stretches far back into the past, and the deeper one delves
in this tangled mass the more convinced does one become that
great world-historical forces must long since have been set in
motion to bring about this outcome as it were in the nature of
an inexorable fate. Only he who appreciates them to their full
extent is able to perceive at what points those forces destructive
of peace have prevailed, and, operating together, have led to
such terrible results. During the years previous to the outbreak
of the war, the plain meaning of many occurrences was not rec-
ognized, because we desired not to disturb the maintenance of
peace by premature alarms; but now, when all these possibilities
have been swept aside, the chief lines of development of the last
decades stand forth so clearly that the attempt may be made to
outline from a comprehensive point of view a history of the
events preliminary to the war.

The central position of the German Empire results in bring-
ing it into many-sided relations to all the Powers and in making
it at all times dependent on their political grouping.

Inter-dependence and mutual consideration as regards other
states, its own interests and those antagonistic thereto subject it to
constant anxieties ; it is forced to maintain its position under the
most complicated conditions of competition operative in the case
of any state. On this account, the leaders of Germany have never
been able to expound their aims so clearly as the statesmen of
those countries who, thanks to a more independent position, could

443

444 MODERN GERMANY

ioUow a more direct line of policy. One result of this is that
serious political writing has not been developed as independently
among us as was to be desired ; foreign countries, therefore, owing
to the necessary reserve of responsible organs on the one hand
and of the absolute unrestraint of unauthoritative voices on the
other, have not always been able to gain a correct impression.

As a matter of course, I shall seek to estimate the cross-cur-
rents and interplay of the policies of other nations as measured
by the standard of Germanic policies. Although surrounded by
an army of inimical writers of pamphlets who, in blind passion,
disdain no weapon and in their ignorance eagerly seize upon
every argument, I shall nevertheless maintain a dignified manner
of speech, despite the difficulty at times for a German to do 90
in these days. Above all, it is my aim to fulfill the duties of
the objective historian and to do justice to a broad, universalistic
grasp of the problem, as has been most notably done among all
the historians of the world by a German, Leopold von Ranke.
In his spirit, I shall seek to straighten out the threads of this con-
fused tangle and to pave the way, to the best of my ability, for
an understanding of events which, although no deduction can be
final to-day, may at least be traced in outline as leading to the
war.

I. PRELIMINARY

French Revanche, The Dual Alliance, Beginnings of Anglo^German

Rivalry

The two basic facts to which the origin of the world war
is to be traced are the formation of the German Empire
in 1870-71, and the vengeful determination of the French some
day to overturn by force the condition of things established at
that time in Europe.

The entrance of Germany into the circle of the Great Powers,
which looked upon her advent with disfavor, was followed by
a period of peaceful policy on her part which sternly held aloof
from all Continental ambitions. Bismarck studiously observed
the rule of the conqueror, not "to bend the bow too far," and
took up a defensive attitude toward French revanche. The for-
mation of the Dreibund, as the world has repeatedly had to ac-
knowledge during the last generation, served exclusively this aim
of peaceful maintenance of the existing order. Opposed to this,
French revanche, although the result of patriotic motives and
testifying to the inexhaustible vitality of the French oatioo*

MODERN GERMANY 44s

aimed at the recovery of France's dominating position on the
Upper Rhine and of the resulting command over South Ger-
many— the key to France's former hegemony. This ambition,
whether openly expressed or veiled in cautious and ambiguous
diplomatic language, was of a distinctly offensive character. The
sentiment of revanche was not always the same in its expres-
sion— ^in peaceful times it resigned itself to a manifestation of
patience, but its intensity invariably flared up with the appear-
ance anywhere in the world of a possibility of gaining assistance.
Most significant of this spirit was the fact that death was
threatened to any French statesman who had the courage seri-
ously to oppose its demands.

Revenge thus became the invisible regulator of the whole
internal French party life, and inspired the leading men during
these forty-four years with such an uncompromising hostility that
all the other Powers had to reckon with it as an unalterable fact.
Bismarck's policy, therefore, contented itself with isolating French
ambition in Europe without provoking it, and with encouraging
it in friendly fashion to occupy itself with colonial expansion.
This manner of meeting the danger was successful as long as
Germany, fully occupied with her own problems, limited herself
to a Continental policy; the situation immediately became more
delicate when the modest colonial acquisitions which Bismarck
had made led to tension with England, and when soon there-
after aggressive Pan-Slavism likewise raised its head in the
Bulgarian question. Immediately with the mere suggestion of a
new grouping of the Powers, Jules Ferry's effort toward a
Franco-German rapprochement, on the basis of a colonial under-
standing, was nullified ; in an instant and without inherent cause,
its place was taken by General Boulanger's agitation, and many
Frenchmen appeared unable to resist the propaganda of an ad-
venturer who — for the first time since 1871 — seemed to hold
out hopes for the gratifying of their desires. Although Bis-
marck, who even then had great difficulty in holding Russia and
France apart despite his gifts as a statesman, succeeded once
more in checking this recrudescence of revanche, it was never-
theless the Boulanger episode which — even in the opinion of our
enemies — gave the deciding impulse toward an era of increased
military preparation in the world.

With the retirement of Bismarck, the situation, whidi had
become more and more tense and which was now only arti-
ficially maintained, became even more delicate. Despite the
friendly advances and diplomatic efforts which Bismarck had
Diade during the last years, there was a renewal of pressure

446 MODERN GERMANY

from Russia, whose efforts to form an alliance with Austria*
Hungary he had once blocked. Although we succeeded, it is
true, in improving our relations with England, and in the treaty
of 1890 gained certain things which were for us of vital neces-
sity (peaceful compromise in Africa, and above all the acquisi-
tion of Heligoland), yet the unavoidable took place: our rwo
Continental neighbors no longer allowed themselves to be held
apart, but began to approach each other. That which in Bis-
marck's time had loomed up as a possibility, the avoidance of
which had called for one political sacrifice after the other, be-
came soon after the accession of Emperor William Ha stern re-
ality which had to be reckoned with.

Through the formation of the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1891,
Germany's existence became subject to a permanent and heavy-
burden. The immediate revival of th<; French idea of revanche
showed that any one in Paris who wished to rise politically would
now have to make himself completely subservient to the secretly
cherished aims of the national ambition. If in the year 1871 a man
like Renan had declared that the only possible future programme
for France was "to strengthen the growing hatred of the Slavs
for the Germans, to encourage Pan-Slavism and without reserve
to advance all Russian ambitions," it was now believed that the
key had been obtained which would once and for all open the
gates to the promised land of revenge. The German Empire was
from now on permanently exposed to the possibility of a war
on two fronts, and in view of the nature of its open borders^
was able only through an increase of its defensive strength to-
ward the east and west to adapt itself to a geographic and mili-
tary situation such as no Great Power in the world has to meet.
Even so, in the quarter of a century during which Emperor
William II has stood at the Empire's helm, our militarism has
consisted in the fact that, although the German nation willingly
undertook increased burdens, our policy was, nevertheless, ' the
maintenance of peace.

The responsible leaders of this policy did not allow themselves
to be betrayed into seeking alleviation of the pressure under
which Germany was laboring by an appeal to arms ; they did not
allow themselves to be tempted into war either by favorable
opportunities, which repeatedly offered themselves, or by con-
sideration of advantages which might be gained by a "preven-
tive war," against which Bismarck, too, had consistently raised
his voice.

The condition of coercion created by the Dual Alliance was
bearable at the beginning, since the Russian rulers, once they had

MODERN GERMANY 447

the treaty safely in hand, turned their attention toward Asia
and began to exploit the European situation for far-reaching
plans of world conquest. During the next decade, the French
had to admit to themselves with bitter disappointment that their
beloved ally, instead of helping them to realize their dreams of
revenge, had "deserted" to the Far East, with his military forces
and their capital. A further development was that Russia en-
tered into an agreement with Austria-Hungary in 1897 — the
«cope of which was widened in 1903 — regarding the status quo
in the Near East; this sealed for a long time the greatest source
of danger for Europe and eliminated the pressure to which Ger-
many's policy had been constantly subjected.

Although as a result Germany was able to sustain the imme-
diate pressure of the Dual Alliance on the Continent, the Em-
pire found itself henceforth, through the mere existence of the
combination, in a difficult position as soon as it desired to extend
its activity overseas. Germany was not driven into transoceanic
enterprise, however, by arbitrary desire or in the effort to gain
prestige, but by economic necessity and the rapid colonial expan-
sion of the old World Powers. The last Great Power to arrive
on the scene saw that if it desired to secure for itself even a
modest and purely economic share in the possibilities of the fu-
ture, before the world was divided forever, it would have to
take part in some manner in this competition. We were at times
blamed for a too- noisy and a too great zeal in our new course, but
it must not be forgotten that this was only the outward expres-
sion in the turning of the nation's thoughts to new tasks of
inner, practical reality.

Germany's position offered no natural sphere of expansion and
her past no traditions on which we could build ; it was necessary
at every point where we desired a place in the sun to lay the
foundations on fresh ground. One need not be in all respects
in agreement with the methods of this policy to admit that it
remained free from the capitalistic corruption which in other
countries has almost invariably accompanied imperialistic expan-
sion; that it did not seek the conquest and destruction of small
nations, and finally that it did not imperil the present peace of
Europe for the sake of the future aims which it pursued. We
might, it is true, have avoided all the dangers which are bound
up with that which is called world politics, but only at the price
of a renunciation which no virile growing people with faith in
Its own future would submit to. While this was out of the ques-
tion, we realized that this new policy was only possible on the
basis and within the limits of the restricted Continental position

448 MODERN GERMANY

of our Empire. In England this was understood — ^here from die
start was the key to the new situation.

English statesmen boasted during the nineties of the ''splen-
did isolation" of their Empire, and they regarded this position
with equanimity, since a balance of the Continental Powers in
which the Dreibund and the Dual Alliance mutually held each
other, corresponded exactly to the traditional condition in which
England had always endeavored to keep Europe, in order mean-
while to carry out undisturbed the completion of the greatest
of all colonial empires. At the beginning of the nineties, Eng-
land had drawn a step nearer to Germany, and was united
by treaty with the other two members of the Dreibund in r^;ard
to common interests in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. She
had even gone so far as to proclaim in a protocol "the identity
of the interests of the Dreibund and those of England." But
on that account there was no inclination to make the least sac-
rifice for the sake of pleasant relations with Germany. On the
contrary, she considered Germany to be too securely held in
check for England to see any necessity for showing great con-
sideration for our interests; Germany's power was valued only
to the extent that it was serviceable as a check to the Dual Al-
liance and only so long as it was subservient to England's insular
policy. British statesmanship of this decade aimed, therefore,
at the exploitation of Germany's hemmed-in position in the in-
terest of England's world aims. As a Continental Power, we
found ourselves called upon to avoid deadly quarrels with the
members of the Dual Alliance for what were, after all, secondary
colonial interests ; as the latest comer among the Colonial Powers,
it was to our interest to see that independent and promising
trade territory was neither divided up politically nor shut off
commercially, but that it remained an independent unit with an
open door. England's policy, however, was the reverse in both
respects.

Thus, the course of England and Germany in the world began
to diverge more and more, not as regards actual claims, which
at no point seriously clashed, but in the matter of future possi-
bilities and of considerations of policy on a broad scale. We
were frequently forced to oppose England's actions and to refuse
our cooperation in cases of projected intervention. A difference
of views became constantly more pronounced. Opportunities
were welcomed by Grerman statesmen to demonstrate the possi-
bility of cooperation with the Dual Alliance. Thus it was
chiefly from this European point of view that Germany joined
in the Franco-Russian protest against the Treaty of Shimonoseki,

MODERN GERMANY 449

in order to preserve China's integrity. This step seemed to be
evidence of a certain emancipation of German policies from those
of England. Moreover, the Germans carried through their part
in this intervention (which was later much criticized) in a man-
ner especially mild and considerate for Japan; it remained for
the English, who originally had desired the same thing, later
to place upon Germany (in the eyes of the Japanese) all the
odium of being the originators of this movement.

At this time the British Liberal cabinet resigned, and Lord
Salisbury, the leader of the G)nservatives, undertook the direc-
tion of affairs. In view of the friendly words with which in
1879 he greeted the formation of the Austro-German Alliance,
it seems to have been forgotten that in the year 1864, while he
was still Sir Robert Cecil, he had opposed the mere possibility
of a strong Germany more violently than any one of his com-
patriots; as regards his attitude in later years, one may venture
to say that the beginnings of a German world policy met only
with opposition or misunderstanding from him. His principal
object now was to prevent joint action of Germany and the
Dual Alliance in world politics. With this in mind, soon after
his accession to office (the occurrence did not at that time be-
come public) he personally made to Emperor William II, con-
trary to all English traditions, the proposal to divide Turkey.
The Emperor, however, resisted the temptation to make our policy
subservient to that of England. It was to Germany's interest
to uphold the political and commercial preservation of Turkey
as one of the few open fields of promising actfvity — in other
words, to carry out the program which a few years later we
officially announced and which to-day we are defending as far
as this is still possible, with our weapons against the greed of
the Great Powers. Any pronounced cooperation of Germany in
such a scheme of division would have caused Russia's interfer-
ence and have thrown on us all the burdens of a resulting war.
Such an endangering of world peace on the Continent was, no
doubt, highly welcome to Salisbury's policy, which a German
statesman of those days was fond of describing as ''the chestnut
policy," but it was in no sense in the interest of a Power such as
Germany, which first of all had to consider its Continental posi-
tion. If from this failure of Salisbury's attempt to lead Ger-
many on, there remained a personal feeling of pique, the follow-
ing year was destined to bring about a further increase in the
tension. Unmistakable antagonism became apparent in respect
to the future of the non-English portions of South Africa.

In South Africa, as elsewhere, the guiding principle of Ger-

450 MODERN GERMANY

man policy was not to allow a further portion of the globe to
be swallowed whole by the giants. For this reason, even before
the Jameson raid, Germany had declared that she would not
permit a departure from the treaties of 1884 which formed the
basis for the Boer Republics at that time. Several days before-
hand the German Ambassador had warned the Foreign Office
of the projected filibustering expedition, but a pretense had been
made of absolute ignorance and, instead of taking timely pre-
cautions, there was an evident desire to profit by the accomplished
fact. Hence, the congratulatory telegram of the Emperor to
President Kruger was not so much a world-political act of of-
fense from the German Empire as a world-political act of de-
fense, for the sake of the status quo and of the rights Qf small
nations. Moreover, the step was not taken against official Eng-
land, which repudiated all share in Jameson's undertaking and
was compelled to place the ring-leaders on trial, but against a
predatory attack in connection with which English statesmen
were later proved to be connected in a compromising manner*
That the outraged sense of right throughout the civilized world
found expression through the authority of the German Emperor
was resented all the more strongly in London. As early as 1894
The Saturday Review, which was closely connected with South
African interests, had taken an emphatic stand against the Ger-
man Empire and had dismissed with disdain all thought of an
alliance ; ^ now for the first time its columns gave voice to the
indignant cry : "Germania est delenda!' * It was at this same
time that we came to realize that in no question of world
politics should we be able to count even on France's formal ob-
servation of neutrality toward us, while England knew from this
moment that she could have an alliance with France at any time
she seriously desired it.

Disputes and differences in the field of colonial politics alone
would not have been sufficient to disturb the relation between two
nations which had been bound for centuries by a comradeship
in arms and by tradition, and which had never met as enemies.

^ The Saturday Revietv of Au^st 8, 1895, while acknowledging the con-
venience ofTered b^ an alliance with Germany, objects to it for the following
reason, which has its root in the century-old tradition of British policy: "First
of all, we English have always made war hitherto upon our rivals in trade and
commerce; and our chief rival in trade and commerce to-day is not France, but
Germany. In case of a war with Germany, we should stand to win much and
to lose nothing; whereas, in case of a war with France, no matter what the
issue might be, we stand to lose heavily."

* The Saturday Rernew of February i, 1896: "The biological view of ^ foreign
policy is plain. First, federate our colonics and prevent geographical isolation
turning tne Anglo-Saxon race against itself. Second, be ready to fight Ger-
many, as Germania est delenda. Third, be ready to fight America when the
time comes. Lastly, engage in no wasting wars against peoples from whom.
we have nothing to fear."

MODERN GERMANY 451

But for a number of years a new cause for antagonism had
come into existence, a trade rivalry, which in England was at
first regarded with astonishment, then with growing anxiety, and
finally with resentment. This rivalry was felt all the more
keenly, as precisely at this time there began a series of unfavor-
able years for England economically. The per capita figures of
the English export trade, which for some time had been on the
decrease, began to fall more noticeably, in the period following
1895, while the German figures advanced strikingly. From year
to year German competition was regarded more suspiciously in
England, from year to year comparative statistics became more
imfavorable, until finally in 1903 German production of pig iron
for the first time exceeded that of England, and the value of
German exports to England was higher than the value of Eng-
lish exports to Germany.

The anxiety caused by these events, whidi doubtless was a
factor in the above-mentioned reserve of the English govern-
ment, furnished froip the year 1895 on a constantly stronger
reason for diplomatic coolness. Under the first sting of the
new trade rivalry, the provocative articles of The Satur-
day Review were not without effect; in circles naturally
by no means anti-German they fostered the thought that Eng-
land's general policy called for ''a new taking of bearings." Ar-
guments were ready to hand which were familiar to the mind
and the interest of every Englishman, and which the history of
centuries had shown to be the basis of all political calculation.
Once launched upon such a line of argument, with English con-
sistency, there was no drawing back from the most extreme de-
ductions. In an article in the issue of September 11, 1897,
which has become celebrated. The Saturday Review said re-
garding the two irreconcilably opposed nations who had taken
the whole world for their province and who demanded commer-
cial tribute from it:

''England, with her long history of successful aggression, with
her marvellous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she
is spreading light amongst nations dwelling in darkness, and Ger-
many, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a
lesser will-force but, perhaps, with a keener intelligence, com-
pete in every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the
Cape, in Central Africa, in India, and the East, in the islands
of the Southern Seas, and in the far North- West, wherever —
and where has it not? — the flag has followed the Bible and trade
has followed the flag, the German bagman is struggling with the
English pedlar. Is there a mine to exploit, a railway to build,

45a MODERN GERMANY

a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from tem-
perance to trade gin — there the German and the Englishman are
struggling to be the first. A million petty disputes build up the
greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. If Germany
were to be extinguished to-morrow, there is not an Englishman
in the world who would not be the richer the day after to-
morrow. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right
of succession — must they not fight for two hundred and fifty
million pounds of yearly commerce?"

This calm toying with a war of prevention is carried on all
the more cold-bloodedly since the mad idea is believed to be not
only practicable but even easily so and without danger.

"England is the only Great Power who could fight Germany
without tremendous risk and without doubt of the issue — the
growth of Germany's fleet has had no other result than to bring
down England's hand on her all the more heavily. The German
ships would soon be at the bottom of the sea or in convoy toward
English ports; Hamburg and Bremen, the Kiel Canal and the
Baltic ports would lie under the guns of England, waiting until
the war indemnity was paid. Our work over, we should not
even need to take the trouble to alter Bismarck's words to Ferry,
and to say to France and Russia: 'Seek your compensation.
Take from German land whatever you like! You can have it.' "

One link after the other is forged, until the chain is complete
which, as the result of shop-keepers' considerations, leads to the
world war; it is the first conception of the Triple Entente, in
the overheated brain of a journalist. With such unspeakable
logic and frivolity did they dare to speak before the German
fleet had become important and before political instinct had taught
the necessity of modifying the language of passion and preserv-
ing appearances before the world. It was, to be sure, only an
individual voice, unauthoritative and without immediate in-
fluence, but the chorus of similar voices was increased in these
years by The National Review and The Spectator, and it re-
vealed a growing sentiment, calculated to become irresistible to
the "man in the street" and in the counting-house if some day,
for reasons of a general political nature, England's world policy
would have to be settled anew. It represented a rising wave in
the country where public opinion rules which might easily be-
come unpleasant for those statesmen who sought to oppose it,
but which would quickly bear aloft the one who knew how to
take advantage of it.

We touch here, it is true, on something ^hidi cannot without
more ado be called an immediate cause of War. Such considera-

MODERN GERMANY 453

tions are subject to the general political aim of a government —
that aim is decisive and still unweakened. It must even be
admitted that the argument as regards trade rivalry had lost
weight in the course of the last decade before the war, and had
given way at many places to a clearer insight. It was not pos-
sible to advance it in the same sweeping manner as in the early
years, since the bases for such an argument had again shifted
considerably. Above all, the notable rise in English export
statistics following the period of stagnation could not fail to
calm the most timid spirits, and the wiser heads with time rec-
ognized the fact that in the relations of the two countries com-
mercial interdependence held too important a place for them ta
bend their energies on mutual destruction. It may perhaps be
stated that trade rivalry leading to the verge of war could no
longer be used as an argument with such evident success by Eng-
lish publicists as at the start. When, however, the war broke
out, the elemental forces of this abyss were perceived to be of an
extent and provocative violence which was surprising.

In the latter half of the nineties, however, the forces which
were gradually gathering momentum were as yet by no means
strong enough to determine the attitude of the leading statesmen.
Even had they desired to listen to such promptings, they would
not yet have been able to accede to them, in view of the marked
opposition which England faced at all points. The actual an-
tagonism, then existing, of Russia in Asia and France in North
Africa represented far greater dangers than the anxious suspi-
cions regarding Germany.

II. THE PRELUDE
English Offers of Alliance. Boer War, The German Fleet

The impression is created that England, before definitely lay-
ing down her policy along lines opposed to Germany, had made
certain attempts to solve the many-sided world problems with
which she was confronted by means of more friendly relations
with Germany. The further course of events and the political
development of the men who took part in the pourparlers seem
to-day to speak with unmistakable clearness as regards the mean-
ing which was at the bottom of this tentative sounding by Eng-
land. In any event, one must admit that the determination of
the English to abandon their position of "splendid isolation" be-
tween the Dual Alliance and the Dreibund was not destined
inevitably and at once and by a single possible path to lead to a

454 MODERN GERMANY

dearly recognized goal. While the great British world interests
of the past and present were opposed only by the Powers of the
Dual Alliance, anxiety as to the future pointed to Germany. At
the period of Fashoda, of the Chinese Revolution and of the Boer
War, there was doubtless, in the interplay and complexity of
political interests, more than one possibility in case it was de-
sired to exchange the unstable political condition for that of a
firmer union.

Although Lord Salisbury had always replied evasively to the
German tentative questionings of the eighties and nineties, it ap-
peared as if in the later years of his leadership he was inclined
to a different view. It was the opposition to Russia in East Asia
(early in 1898) and the threatened conflict with France in Africa
which first gave rise in the British Cabinet to the thought of a
more intimate connection with Germany, or, more correctly ex-
pressed, of a treaty acting as a counterpoise to the far-reaching
political influence of the Dual Alliance. At the end of March,
1898, the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, for the first
time sounded the German Ambassador. The tendency of his
question was revealed by his speech on May 13, 1898, in which,
in the midst of a sharp attack upon Russia, he called for an alli-
ance with England's American ''cousins," and declared any war
well worth the price which would lead to an alliance of the
Anglo-Saxons ; he laid his cards openly on the table :

"Great Britain might have declared war on Russia, but with-
out an ally we are not in a position seriously to harm her."

An ally against Russia — that was the part which Germany was
expected to play.' After the matter had been touched upon several
times in interviews of Count Hatzfeldt with Salisbury, Balfour
and Chamberlain, in the summer of 1898 England made a move
in Berlin in this connection. On July 10, 1898, Major Mar-
chand's company occupied Fashoda, and the Franco-English crisis
seemed to be leading toward war. In the ensuing negotiations the
fact was not concealed from the English that Russia, for her part,
entertained no desire and felt no need of supporting the French
revanche idea so long as Germany upheld Russia's position in
Asia. If, however, it was urged in Berlin, an Anglo-German
alliance directed against Russia were to be formed, reaction on
the Russo-German relations could not be avoided. What could
England offer in the way of protecting our rear ? By emphasizing
the fact, moreover, that Russia had shown a more conciliatory
spirit in Asia, the principle "to live and let live" was indicated as
the one that would lead to a permanent improvement of the rela-
tions. In any case, assurance would have to be given that the

MODERN GERMANY 455

entire British government and Parliament would ratify such an
alliance. For as soon as something of Chamberlain's plans became
known, public opinion grew unsettled. The Saturday Review
stormed against this worst of all madnesses and this bitterest of
all humiliations, and repeated that as long as the economic strug-
gle continued,^ ''a sincere understanding between the two nations
would be impossible ; if we have need for an alliance, why do we
not make overtures to France ?" Obsessed with this one idea, and
ivith a cunning appreciation of the popular mind, the article at-
tacked the Court influences which were behind this alliance, and
even ventured to "remind the Court and Mr. Chamberlain
that a nation that has dethroned dynasties before will deal harshly
ivith the party which betrays English interests now." Even
though German statesmen were willing to pass over outbreaks of
this nature, they could not but ask themselves whether they were
willing to lay the foundations for a new German Continental
policy on such uncertain ground, which shifted with every change
of party, and whether they could dare lightly to disregard the
situation created by the Dual Alliance.

There thus remained only the possibility of an agreement as to
individual questions which might prepare the way for a general
understanding. A great deal, it is true, was not to be expected
from the British Prime Minister, who on a previous occasion had
declared that Germany asked too much, although absolutely no
demand had yet been made by Berlin. The sole result of all
the negotiations, therefore, was an agreement made in October,
1898, looking to economic exploitation of the Portuguese colonies
by Glermany and England, in case Portugal failed to meet her
loan obligations. This was an understanding the subject of which
lay beyond the real world political danger zone and which did
not involve our relations with other Powers. From the English
point of view it foreshadowed preparations for the Boer War,
and in this respect it may have been intended to bind Germany's
hands for the future as regards this question. In any case, it was
for Germany a contingent agreement, in which the question
whether the contingency was to arise or not, in the nature of
things, depended on the good will and loyalty of the other side —
that is to say, on assumptions which proved to have been unjus-
tified.

Was this to be the prelude to a closer union ? If Germany had
no intention of being drawn into an alliance without a quid pro

J[T^ Saturday Review of September lo, iSoS: "We do not love Emperor
WiUuBD, neither do we love the German people. And the reason is that we
yg to fiffht the German trader, with his cheap and nasty merchandise, iv
t»try market of every country ox the world,"

456 MODERN GERMANY

quo, she had even less desire for a return which would have
involved her, not in an understanding, but in a war with a third
nation. After the outbreak of the Boer War, England continued
to act according to her customary methods, which position and
traditional experience had necessarily developed. We, however,
were called upon to realize that we were expected simply to play
the part of a Continental sentry in the Boer War, and that if we
consented to assume this part at England's command, we should
find ourselves threatened by the war on two fronts, which we had
hitherto avoided. At this time, less than ever, could we afford
frivolously to extend the antagonism with France to the colonial
iield (from which Bismarck had always managed to exclude it),
in order, in the words of Frederick the Great, to play the Don
Quixote to English trade.

In the Boer War, Germany could not have taken any other
course than she did. G)mpelled before the war to limit herself
to advising President Kruger most earnestly to yield, after the
outbreak of hostilities neutrality was imperative. Public opin-
ion in Germany, as in France and America, was in the main pas-
sionately with the Boers; for sentimental reasons, it took sides
in this most heroic of struggles which a small and free people
has ever carried on against a giant World Power, nor did it hesi-
tate to call by their right name such things as the horrors of
the concentration camps, which aroused indignation in all civi-
lized countries and which brought the blush of shame to the
cheek of many Englishmen. That in England this German at-
titude produced a painful impression is explicable; that the re-
sulting resentment was directed solely against the Germans was
due to the later basic change in the country's policy. The Ger-
man Empire, despite the efforts of the Pan-Germans, main-
tained neutrality. Chamberlain's siren calls during the disas-
trous week of the Boer War, and the bait of a new triple alli-
ance between the German race and the two great branches of
the Anglo-Saxons were taken only at their real worth ; emphatic
protest was successfully made against the excesses and violence
of the British maritime policy, and the sale of weapons to Eng-
land by Gfermans was prohibited as contrary to the spirit of
neutrality. But just as Germany wished to avoid becoming an
accomplice in the strangling of the Boer Republics, she was also
careful not to let herself be made use of by England's old ene-
mies. At the most intense period of the war, perhaps with the
desire to disrupt the Anglo-German tentative understanding,
France and Russia approached Germany with the proposal to
bring about in connection with them the end of the war, in

MODERN GERMANY 457

order to save the Boers and to humiliate England. Emperor
William II, however, who was not guided by Machiavellian
considerations as regards England, rejected the proposal, since
Germany, as he said, must always abstain from a policy which
might bring her into conflict with a sea power like England..
In order to appreciate this action, one needs only to ask him*
self whether, after the experiences of January, 1896, Germany
could seriously have counted on fighting shoulder to shoulder
with the nation of the revanche against England. The Em-
peror more than once took steps to modify the strong current of
German public opinion.

Meanwhile German statesmen profited to the full by the les*
sons of the Boer War. These were the years during which
the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution placed the fate of the
greatest empires in question, when old Powers broke like rotten
reeds, and the world seemed about to be divided up among a
few states ; we were still under the fresh impression of what the
absolute rule of the seas meant and what military capacity Eng>
land, together with her great colonial white territories, was
able to develop overseas by means of her fleet, in defiance of all
other Powers. Germany could not close her eyes to the fact
that the previous policy of freedom of action, of the open door»
and of peaceful development, could not be carried through with-
out the possession of a fleet — indeed, that even a neutral position
in great crises could not be maintained save with loss; that our
colonial and trade interests, which were increasing in value»
were without defense in the world; that in view of our con-
stricted Continental position, without a fleet we were exposed
to being forced weakly to trim our sails to every wind and to
yield unquestioningly. Moved by the course of events of the
Spanish-American War, Prince Hohenlohe, the Imperial Chan-
cellor, emphasized the fact that we must not risk exposing our-
selves to the danger of suffering at the hands of England the fate
imposed by the United States on Spain — for the British press
evermore haughtily threatened against the youngest Colonial
Power a fate such as had for good and all excluded the oldest
Colonial Power from the field of competition. And during the
Boer War we also learned through the stopping of Imperial
German mail ships that in a naval war there is for Eng-
land no limit to aggressions against neutrals, that in critical
moments the lacuna in maritime law are filled out by naval
power — that is, to say, by England's dominance of the sea. The
policy of the free hand was practicable in future only in case
this hand was not powerless on the seas. The German Empire^

458 MODERN GERMANY

therefore, determined upon a new far-seeing program for the
development of the fleet, which had already been strengthened
in 1898, in order to gain the same undisputed guarantee of
peace in the world in general that we were able to uphold on
land toward the East and West — not for the sake of a future
offensive, but in order to deter an enemy from deliberately as-
suming such an offensive by precipitating a war of prevention at
a moment devoid of danger. The Secretary of the Navy, von
Tirpitz, proclaimed the object of the fleet thus: The stronger
it is, the more difficult and the more dangerous will it be for an
enemy to defeat it.

''An enemy will find himself faced by the question, in begin-
ning a war against Germany, whether such an undertaking will
pay for the costs — ^that is to say, whether it is worth the risk.
He will probably make a compromise with us, if we possess a
strong battle fleet. Therein lies the strong guarantee of peace
which is given by a powerful fleet, and this is the best protec-
tion which we can provide for our commerce."

Immediately thereafter, the outbreak of the troubles in China
(the murder of the German Minister, in July, 1904) led to
renewed cooperation with England, whereby we obtained a clear
and illuminating perception of the limitation of possible united
action with this Power. As soon as the Anglo-German Yangtsze
Agreement no longer seemed capable of being used for the pur-
pose of disrupting the German-Russian relations, London lost
all interest in it and sought to becloud its meaning with a
mass of misunderstanding, a proceeding which brought with it
a clear interpretation in the German Reichstag and correspond-
ing disclosures in Petrograd. The wind soon veered around
so sharply — presumably as the result of the change of rulers
— that the Under-Secretary of State, Cranboume, in March,
1 901, ventured openly to deny any curtailment of the treaty,
while the new Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Lansdowne,
officially asserted the correctness of the interpretation by the Ger-
man Ambassador. The Daily Nezcrs, however, admitted with
refreshing frankness that the agreement was worthless to Eng-
land, since Germany could not be counted on against Russia —
this was and remained for London the crucial consideration if it
was to act in concert with Berlin.

The uncertainty as regards Anglo-German relations was still
pending when the change of rulers finally prepared the way
for the new aims of England's foreign policy. The personal
influence of King Edward on the policy of his country has been
variously estimated ; the French, who really knew, enthusiastioil-

MODERN GERMANY 459

ly praised him to the skies, while the English, in keq>ing with
their manner of political thought, preferred to attribute to him a
much smaller influence in their parliamentary life. At all
events, a new factor of extraordinary energy and individuality
made itself felt in the control of England's destinies: a man
who was determined personally to become the sponsor for the
unbroken course of foreign policy, independent of changes in
party rule and beyond the limits fixed by tradition. Whether
in the determination of his course, personal rivalry and sensi-
tiveness on one side or sympathies on the other were a factor, is
perhaps not so important as the repressed ambition of a per-
sonality which had so long stood in the shadow of power; now,
when the close of the Boer War had prepared the way, this
personality was all eagerness to assume the lead in the change
that had long been seen to be gathering, and he was confident
of being able to direct it into new lines.

Though King Edward may have been determined from the
start to make an end of England's splendid isolation in another
direction than that of Grermany, the previous negotiations with
the latter country were not yet on that account discontinued.
The English statesmen who held the real power in their hands
were not prepared for or inclined to a sudden change of atti-
tude. But the last episode of the Anglo-German discussion re-
garding an alliance which began with the obsequies of Queen
Victoria, revealed at the start a different atmosphere. The ne-
gotiations demonstrated anew that England was most ready to
bind us with heavy obligations, and in addition to handicap us
with the odium of these obligations in Russian eyes, but that for
her own part she intended to maintain the understanding with
Russia touching world-political questions, which had now be-
come less difficult, and at the same time to make use of the Ger-
man sword on the Continent, where more strongly marked an-
tagonisms were again rampant. That, even in this position, we
should not have been able to expect much from the British states-
men is clear — they were the same politicians who shortly after-
wards decided upon the policy of isolation against Gfermany. We
were, after the experiences of the previous years, all the less in
doubt regarding England's secret intentions, as at this very time
Germany's Bagdad Railway plans encountered more strongly
marked opposition in London, as soon as the change of this
project from a purely German into an international German-
French-Russian undertaking seemed to render impossible the out-
break of Continental disputes.

If the pourparlers were still kept up for some time after the

46o MODERN GERMANY

close of the Boer War, this was only the shield which England
used to cover her defection for the purpose of forming another
alliance. The definiteness of the change which began at this
time rendered it improbable that this last move toward a rap-
prochement was at all seriously meant. An indication of the
coming shift was seen in Chamberlain's speech in October, in
which, by way of justifying the concentration camps for the
Boers, he called attention deliberately to the German conduct of
war in the year 1870. This speech called forth a well-merited
and sharp reply by the Imperial Chancellor. During the next
months England admitted that, in view of the feeling of the
Lower House, it would be hard to put the projected treaty with
Germany into acceptable form. Immediately after this formal
withdrawal, on January 30, 1902, the alliance with Japan was
consummated, and soon thereafter the way was open for negotia-
tions with France. The weapon against Russia which it had
not been possible to gain from Germany's policy of peace had
been found in East Asia.

Following this prelude of Anglo-German negotiations for an
alliance, was developed the main drama of an alliance directed
against Germany, the course of which did not permit of im-
mediate determination in detail, but which could not fail soon
to reveal its final aim. There began one of those great diplo-
matic actions which only a state of the far-reaching world con-
nections of Great Britain can undertake, and even such a state
only for the sake of a positive and dominant ultimate purpose.
Unswervingly, England carried out her policy in clear percep-
tion of the goal to be attained and without scruple as to her
methods.

III. PREPARATION

Steps in the British Policy of Isolation from igo2 to IQ08

The Anglo- Japanese alliance of January, 1902 — an unheard-
of step by a European Power — did not yet form according to its
wording and meaning part of the program of isolating Ger«
many, but was directed solely against Russia's East Asiatic posi-
tion. But in its effects, and especially in its extension through
the negotiations with France which were entered into immedi-
ately afterwards, it was a step leading toward the conception of
the "encircling" policy. Whoever with the eye of an historian
views the causal connections of these twelve years is impelled to
regard the decision of the British Cabinet of August, 1914, as
the unavoidable outcome of a long and logical development. As

MODERN GERMANY 461

compared to the German Empire, which in its constricted Con-
tinental position must reach its decisions as each case presents
itself, England enjoys the tremendous advantage of being able
to operate according to a uniform and far-seeing plan prepared
long in advance. This does not mean that every single step is
henceforward to be explained as consciously taken as the r^ult
of a single motive and with a single end in view; such cannot
be the case, since, owing to the uncertainty of many factors and
to the multiplicity of the commingling interests, things do not
develop in the manner in which human calculation would fain
have them develop. But the new course is entered upon, and the
underlying tendencies become more and more dominant at each
forward step.

It is meet at this moment, before the fundamental change in
the grouping of the states is discussed, to analyze the inner-
European situation and the feeling of the nations toward each
other. The Dual Alliance, it is true, existed in full strength,
but it lacked an offensive character against the Dreibund.
Undoubtedly, in France there was still the undercurrent of
revanche, but in the years following Fashoda it seemed more
than ever under the control of reason, and even leading men in
Paris dared to dream of the possibility of permanent European
peace. In the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies of January
23, 1903, Jaures openly declared that the Dreibund had been
called into being without a distinctly offensive character as re-
gards France, and that it was only intended to render irrevoca-
ble the results of the war of 1870, which were so painful for
France; he no longer believed, he said, that any plan of attack
against France had been entertained by Germany for thirty-one
3'ears. There existed on the Continent, even in the minds of
those who had once been defeated, a state of relaxation; to
this state England, with a single definite purpose in view,
aimed to put an end. That her motive for doing so — namely,
German growth and Grerman ambition — held in fact at this
time no menace for England, was later openly admitted by a
leading publicist, who said: "Indeed, during the fifteen years,
1 890- 1 904, we added to our own colonial dominions more than
twice the whole area of Germany's colonies." ^ But the fact was
that this new policy was not dictated by the realities of the
present, but aimed to free itself in advance from future anxieties
by preventive measures, for which its own past offered more
than one example.

^ Robert Crozier Long, "Germany and the Entente," Fortnightly Reviiw,
October, 1909.

462 MODERN GERMANY

As soon as Great Britain was safely in possession of the
Japanese alliance, her ultimate aims were more clearly revealed.
Characteristic was the course of the last joint action of England
and Germany, which was undertaken for enforcing the German
and English claims for debt against Venezuela and which cul-
minated in the blockade of December, 1902. Accompanying
developments threw an illuminating light on the seriousness of
the last alliance offer in 190 1, for as if at a pre-arranged signal
there burst forth a storm of disapproval from leading politicians
at the cooperation of the two countries. This disapproval was
voiced most strongly by the opposition, who were already eagerly
expectant of the Conservative inheritance and who, moreover,
were close to the King. All sensitiveness dating from the time
of the Boer War, which had long since vanished as regards
Frenchmen and Americans, was industriously nourished as re-
gards Germany, and the mere thought of having to bear in
Washington in common with this Power the odium of an inter-
vention made even the most sensible men completely lose their
heads.

After this prelude, the official policy of England was more
clearly revealed with the opening of the battle against the Bag-
dad Railway, a project which, although it was encouraged by
German statesmen, was intended to serve purely commercial
ends. At the time of the Boer War and the efforts toward an
alliance, even The Times paid us the grudging compliment of
saying that there was no Power to which England would more
willingly entrust such an undertaking. Public opinion, which
had been carefully manipulated, now burst forth against the
plan without a dissenting voice, incited by practical interests and
vague instincts. According to trustworthy information, Balfour
and Lansdowne had been ready to come to an understanding
with Germany in regard to the last section of the railway in
Mesopotamia, and as late as April 8, 1903, Balfour advocated,
although meeting with general disapproval, the cooperation of
English capital in this international undertaking under German
leadership. On April 23, however, he had changed his mind,
and he asserted that in no event would England join in the
work, as she had no guarantee that she would stand on a footing
of equality in the management. With the demonstrative ap-
proval of the whole country, the volteface was made — a week
before King Edward undertook his memorable trip to Paris.
After the King's return, Lansdowne declared even more em-
phatically that the creation of a maritime base or of a fortified
harbor on the Persian Gulf, as the terminus of the railway.

MODERN GERMANY 463

must be regarded as a serious menace to British interests, and
would be opposed in every possible way. This put a temporary
end to the continuation of the line beyond the first section, and
from this undertaking, which had been started not even as a
purely German commercial scheme, we learned what we must
be prepared for in the world henceforward from the other side
of the Channel.

At the same time the new policy was put into play on the
Continent for the first time. The more unavoidable the war
desired by England between Russia and Japan became, the more
important was it to seek an understanding with Russia's ally, in
order to avoid possible bad counter-effects. It was King Ed-
ward who, letting his hand be more plainly seen, in the spring
of 1903 sought new connections in the familiar atmosphere of
Paris. There is no question from which side the initiative came.
The Daily Graphic later denied the "legend" that the minister,
Delcasse, was the main originator of the Entente Cordiale.
"The truth is that Delcasse became a convert to the idea of the
Entente with hesitation and against his will. The credit for it
belongs exclusively to King Edward and Lord Lansdowne."
And on the other side, Le Temps proclaimed the truth by rap-
turously exclaiming: "For he (King Edward) acted alone.
The trip to Paris in 1903, which started the Anglo-French
movement, was his individual work. It was announced to Mon-
sieur Loubet before the two Governments were informed." In
his toast on May 3 to the ties of friendship which were to be
drawn still closer, the King assumed the fervent tone which
was still further intensified on the occasion of President Loubet's
return visit to London; while at the time a German-Canadian
tariif dispute increased in intensity, in October, 1903, a Franco-
English arbitration treaty smoothed the way for the extremely
complicated negotiations — the course of the Russian-Japanese
War more than anything else made France desire to grasp the
hand which was extended to her from across the Channel.

From the purely German standpoint, our policy has been
blamed for not taking advantage of Russia being fully occupied
with Japan in order to deal with Russia's ally at our door, who
would never peacefully reconcile herself to the loss of Alsace-
Lorraine. The Emperor's deep feeling of responsibility led him
rightly, as in the Boer War, in the interest of the world's peace,
to reject a war of prevention (such as England is waging against
us to-day), and in this he acted in keeping with Bismarck's
testament. While England permitted the humiliation by Japan
of France's ally (and openly admitted that she would not

464 MODERN GERMANY

quietly acquiesce in a Japanese defeat), she earned as the result
of Russia's discomfiture the unconditional readiness of the
French nation to accept the English proposals. The legend
which soon made its appearance that Russia had been driven hy
Germany into the East Asiatic undertaking was nowhere so
lovingly nursed as in that country whose statesmen had been the
sole instigators of the war.

The result of one year's negotiations was the Anglo-Frcncii
agreement of April 8, 1904, which put a definite end to the
previous differences between the two Powers in all parts of the
world. The agreement is undoubtedly not to be judged ex-
clusively as an offensive measure against Germany ; its realization
was made easier through the need of the two Powers to re-in-
sure themselves, as it were, while the struggle in East Asia was
still in the balance; nor was it less to the interest of England's
imperial policy to remove all causes for possible friction in New
Foundland and Senegambia, in Siam, Madagascar, and the New-
Hebrides, and above all to bring about the ultimate acknowledg-
ment by France of England's position in Egypt — this meant the
breaking of the last tie which had bound England to the Drei-
bund for twenty years. The unique feature of the agreement,
however, was to be seen in the return made by England to her
partner for recognizing the British position in Egypt — ^namely,
the surrender of Morocco, and even more so in the double deal-
ing with which she sought to cover up the future indemnifica-
tion of France.

While France acquiesced on the Nile in the inevitable, she
received in compensation an object of future value which in
every respect accorded with England's world-political schemes.
England had certain interests in Morocco, it is true, which she
might sacrifice, but she possessed no definite rights; she had
hitherto rather stood out against France for the principle of the
independence and integrity of the Sultanate. France, who un-
der Delcasse had sought to approach her prey for a number of
years through treaties with Spain and Italy, had repeatedly in
official manner recognized this principle; she had known as
early as 1901 that Germany also was determined to uphold it,
for the sake of her important trade interests, if for no other
reason. Morocco could thus develop into an object of Franco-
German dispute only if the ultimate object of the policy in view
was carefully concealed. As a matter of fact, there was in addi-
tion to the public agreement of April 8, which ostensibly pro-
claimed Morocco's independence, a secret understanding which

MODERN GERMANY 465

provided under certain conditions for the division of the Sultanate
between France and Spain.^

Thus, the t^'o Powers, quite without authority, took steps not
only for shutting off a further portion of the earth commercially
for an indefinite period, but for bringing it into a relation of
absolute dependence. Delcasse, who dared not reveal the secret
game, neither formally consulted German diplomats nor asked
for Germany's approval or even for her opinion of the public
agreement. It was a double-faced treaty, a dishonest game — for
this very reason its intellectual instigators in England were mor-
ally bound, in view of the obligations which they had under-
taken, to guarantee the fulfilment of French hopes at any price,
even in the event of a clash with Germany ; they were, indeed,
called upon to make the inviolability of France the chief con-
sideration in their calculation. This they were determined to
do. Precisely for the sake of such possibilities had these states-
men, who had failed in their attempt to impress Germany's
$word into their service, made use of the French desire for
revenge; for the same reason they made the North Sea instead
of the Mediterranean the chief seat of naval power. The ball
had been set rolling.

For the time being Germany maintained an attitude of watch-
ful waiting. As Delcasse, however, continued to avoid all dis-
cussion of the Morocco question with Germany, it became clear
that there was more at stake than merely Morocco. Unless we
were ready to surrender unconditionally to the new combination,
it was imperative to seek from the start to prevent the strength-
ening of England's world policy by the additional element of
French desire for revanche. As soon, however, as we made a
motion to protest in the matter of Morocco, England, unscrupu-
lously taking advantage of every incident, assumed the haughti-
est tone in order to strengthen the knees of her hesitating part-
ner. With this end in view, no doubt, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, Lee, made the oft-cited speech which, as regards
words at least, was one of the most arrogant cases of playing
with the idea of a war of prevention which the world has ever
seen. England, he said, must forbid the further growth of the

^The secret clauses of the Anglo-French agreement were revealed by the
Temps of November ii» 191 1, and subsequently in Parliament admitted by Sir
Edward Grey. Of their meaning E. D. Morel, in his Morocco in Diplomacy
{London, 191a), says that the^ tend to involve this country in approval and
-diplomatic support of a partition of Morocco between France and Spain, and
thereby to ineviuble conflict with Germany." The French Baron d'Estournellea
de Constant admits, in his speech in the Senate on February 6, 191s, that
France was pursuing two irreconcilable policies, a public pohcv of integrity
which was not the true one, and a policy of secret agreements which was aiming
at a protectorate and at the partition of Morocco. iDebati Pariementmrgs,
Stanot dtt 6 fevrier, 19 u, p. 161.)

466 MODERN GERMANY

German fleet; following the declaration of the naval war the
British fleet would have destroyed the German before the
enemy would have had time to read of the declaration of war
in the newspapers (February 3, 1905). This was a well-calcu-
lated outburst in the genuine English manner, which the govern-
ment did not repudiate and which was intended as encourage-
ment for Paris, in order to make capital of Gallic excitability
by means of tempting pictures at the time of the Russian defeats.
If this was intended at the same time as an intimidation of
Germany, it did not, of course, cause us to swerve from our
course. The protest against the fate intended for Morocco,
which found expression in the Emperor's trip to Tangiers, may
to outsiders have had the appearance of a move of diplomatic
offensive: as a matter of fact, the provocation was to be sought
in the camp of the opponents, who, while ready to spring, con-
cealed the secret treaty even from the parliaments of their own
countries and thereby completely confused public opinion. The
object of our tactics was to manoeuvre our opponents, who had
silently disregarded our rights, out of their position and to find
out whether Delcasse's aim of turning the suppressed revariche
idea into an element of offense had already taken hold of the
whole French nation.

As soon as the seriousness and the justice of our procedure
was recognized in Paris, the majority of Rouvier's ministry be-
came filled with anxiety, and despite the efforts of the British
press to stiffen their resistance, they seemed on the point of
yielding. England then went a step further. Toward the end
of May, 1905, she made an oral promise to place the British
forces in the field beside those of the French, to mobilize her
fleet in case of a German attack, seize the Kaiser-Wilhelm Ca-
nal, and to land one hundred thousand men in Schleswig-Hol-
stein; in addition, she declared her readiness at an early date to
draw up a treaty in regard to these military obligations.^ The
motive which had led to the treaty of 1904 was here revealed
in its true significance, and Delcasse was so enchanted by this
possibility that he was ready to agree to any condition. But
common sense did not entirely desert the French statesmen at
the decisive moment. A wave of dismay swept over the country
when it learned that Germany was prepared to consider the
formation of this alliance, the offer of which had not remained
concealed from her, as a cause for war. The cabinet meeting of
June 4, 1905, forced Delcasse, who had placed his cards on the

^ See the revelations by the Matin, October, 1904; De la paix d€ Francfort
6 la conference d'Algisiras, by Andre Mevil, Paris, 1909.

MODERN GERMANY 467

table, to resign. It was not Germany alone who had brought
about the downfall of this most uncompromising advocate of
revanche since Boulanger; in even greater degree it was the
indignation of all conscientious Frenchmen. "This is not how we
understood the agreement with England," wrote Jaures. "Del-
casse gave the British government the impression that he was
ready for any step, and the British government played the part
of tempter to this vain man." The question was whether
this newly revived spirit of revanche would sink to rest after
the fall of its propagandist, as in the case of the Boulanger epi-
sode, or whether the government, which now declared its readi-
ness to bring the Morocco question before an international con-
ference, would nevertheless continue along the same dangerous
path.

England now proceeded with more caution in her policy of
encircling Germany by a concentric attack, after the shipwreck
of this first indiscreet attempt. It is characteristic of Eng-
land's tenacity in this connection that King Edward, immedi-
ately following the conclusion of peace between Russia and
Japan, ventured to sound Russia, who had been rendered harm-
less in the Far East, on the proposition for a rapprochement,
which the London press had approvingly discussed even during
the war. When Count Witte, in September, 1904, returned
from the peace negotiations in Portsmouth, he found waiting for
him in Paris an invitation from King Edward, together with
the written draft of a treaty between the two Powers drawn up
by the King and Count Benckendorff, of somewhat the same
nature as that which two years later formed the basis of the
Anglo-Russian agreement regarding Central Asia.^ The Rus-
sian was without authority (and personally would scarcely have
been inclined) to respond in any manner to this offer, but
the first attempt to provide defeated Russia with a new footing
for an attack against Europe had been made by London; well-
informed Russian papers received the suggestion with favor, with
the reservation that some years of peace would be required for
recuperation and preparation; but they already began indus-
triously to spread the doctrine of Pan-Slavism. The hour, how-
ever, had not yet struck; they contented themselves with a
promissory note for the future, with the redemption of which
Sir Arthur Nicolson, the new Ambassador to Petrograd and one
of the most active diplomats in the school of King Edward, was
intrusted.

1 DiflckMed \gf Couitt Witte in tlie Petrognd RitUdk, the organ of the Cwlct
party.

468 MODERN GERMANY

Meanwhile the nearer the time came for the Conference of
Algeciras, the closer touch France sought with the Po^wer upon
whose diplomatic and, in the last analysis, military support as
well (in view of the continuation of Russian weakness) she
had been dependent since April, 1904. In the autumn of I905i
Rouvier, upon whom the disclosure in the press of the alliance
offer exercised a certain moral pressure, sounded London, in
his turn. Whether the Balfour-Lansdowne Cabinet ever an-
swered the inquiry cannot be positively stated. Its retirement
was imminent, but with an eye to the future, it took pains
openly to announce as a new principle the necessary continuity
of the whole foreign policy. The essence of this new continuity
was the program of King Edward, which both parties had now
adopted as their own. The Liberal Cabinet, dierefore, ivhicfa
was formed on December 10, 1905, entered upon the unre-
stricted inheritance of its predecessor, especially as regards all
the consequences of the agreement of 1904. But the attitude
is characteristic which the new incumbent oif the Foreign Office,
Sir Edward Grey, took toward the French offer. He wished
to avoid binding himself by a formal promise, and therefore
did not renew the alliance offer of the Conservatives. Instead,
he approved the French suggestion to hold confidential pour-
parlers of military and naval specialists. What importance be
attributed to them is shown by the fact that he did not let the
whole Cabinet into the secret, but only a small inner coterie.
Thus, before the conference of Algeciras, the '^conversations
itordre militaire" were started, which, periodically repeated,
gradually became a fixed institution of increasing secrecy and
of more binding effect than political treaties. They grew into
a military convention with a view to a certain definite eventual-
ity, which could any day be brought about by continuing the
policy of encircling Germany. From the first moment, Grey
entered upon the course which in July, 191 4, morally involved
the policy and, as he said, the honor of his country — this policy
of the seemingly free hand, which, while pretending always to
require ratification by Cabinet and Parliament and the appeal to
public opinion, was in reality prostituted to the secret ambitions
of a small circle and to the accompanying military influences.
It may be that the instigator of this step, who was at that time
still unknown to the Continent, was himself deceived as to the
freedom of his decision and that he believed himself to be oper-
ating more cautiously than the Conservatives; but, as a matter
of fact, the Liberals now entered upon the downward course, on
which it is difficult to turn back, and the French were well

MODERN GERMANY 469

aware why they owed "eternal gratitude" to the new Premier,
In addition to all this, the military result of the first conver-
sations (in the last days of 1905 or the first of 1906) gave to
the French more valuable guarantees than contained in the offer
in May. The plan of a landing in Schleswig-Holstein, which
was exclusively in England's interest, was abandoned, and for it
was substituted the landing in Northern France, which was
more important for the French. As a necessary corollary of a
joint Anglo-French action, the cooperation of the Belgian army
was forthwith included in the plan of campaign by the two
General Staffs. Immediately thereafter, at the moment when
the Conference of Algeciras met (the middle of January, 1906)
and when there was no immediate danger of war, the British
military attache, Barnardiston, began in Brussels (in conjunction
with diplomatic overtures in the same city) those confidential
discussions with the Belgian General Staff, on the basis of the
Anglo-French conversations authorized by his government,
which his responsible superiors now falsely describe as "academic
discussions"; the Belgian diplomat. Baron Greindl, has more
appropriately characterized them as "equally naive and per-
fidious." It is in keeping with Grey's guiding principle, that
these negotiations, too, were declared not to be formally binding.
While discussing the sending of English troops in the event of
a German attack on Belgium — for the probability of which he
offered absolutely no proofs — the military attache went deeply
into the question of the closest cooperation with Belgium's mili-
tary forces; and the Belgian military authorities unconditionally
entered into his plans, although they could have been as little
in doubt as their government in regard to the unacademic char-
acter of these discussions. Thus the encircling policy of the
"free hand" began from the very start to involve in its mili-
tary and political snares a neutralized state whose inviolability
the English had hitherto upheld as a dogma.

The Conference of Algeciras began its labors following this
new grouping of the Powers. As events showed, the German
Emperor and his advisors contented themselves with upholding
the principle of the integrity of Morocco and of the open door,
and decided to wait and see whether the formal, rather than
practically valuable paper inhibition would prevent the "Tunifi-
cation" of Morocco by France. Certain German critics have
later regretted that we missed our opportunity, since in view
of the openly revealed policy of isolation against us, a settlement
by arms would have been the proper course, the result of which,
at a moment when Russia was incapable of fighting and France

470 MODERN GERMANY

was unprepared, could scarcely have been doubtful, despite the
undeveloped state of the German fleet. But it is explicable
that a conscientious government nevertheless answered in the
negative the question whether Morocco was worth a war, which
means something else to the German nation than to Brit-
ish diplomats; and if one disregarded the special, to contemplate
the general situation, from which the former had resulted, there
was always the possibility that after the temporary solution of
the Morocco question — through which she had purchased
France's recognition of her position in Egypt — England would
again return to more peaceful paths.

In the future, therefore, it was a question not so much as to
the fate of Morocco and the results of the Conference, but
rather as to whether England intended to persist in her plan of
isolating Germany and to develop the forces which had been
set in motion into a regular machine that would finally close
about its prey. If such an intention really existed, Germany
had cause to fear the worst from the unavoidable power of at«
traction of the new grouping of Powers and from the reaction
on French revanche, as soon as Russia's eagerness for the of-
fensive should have revived again. For in such a case it was a
question of whether in an open or disguised system of isolation
tfiere would be room for more or less friendly Anglo-German
relations. With this in mind, a German statesman, in July,
1906, frankly asked Sir Edward Grey whether he believed that
openly admitted friendly relations to Germany would be com-
patible with England's new friendship for France. The Eng-
lishman coolly avoided the question by saying:

"That depends on German politics."

The German thereupon replied, hitting the nail on the head:

"No, it rather seems to depend on French interpretation of
German politics."

From that time on England considered the unconditional up-
holding of France to be the best guarantee for the existence of
her own world empire, and left Germany to think as she might
of the fact that the Anglo-German relations in future were to
be determined by the revanche idea. That was the new basis
of the policy which, in July, 19 14, was put into practice. This
kind of a political community of interest inevitably creates mu-
tual dependence, which in the long run increases in intensity
and finally gets beyond control.

It became apparent that it was a question of one of the most
fundamental changes of front in English history. This is seen
from the answer which King Edward, in August, 1906, gave

MODERN GERMANY 471

to another German statesman who broached the question of
eliminating any possible causes of friction: '^There are no fric-
tions between us; there exists only rivalry." The father of
the encircling policy herewith avowed the fundamental thought
which he had absorbed from the obscure instincts and the public
opinion of his people and which he had made the guide of his
whole policy. Causes of friction and disagreement may be over-
come; rivalry has its permanent source in the nature of things
themselves. It would disappear only in case Germany were
voluntarily to withdraw and quietly watch England's future
game, or else bring the question to a decision in open conflict.

England was prepared for either alternative. The first dread-
naught was launched during the Algeciras Conference, and
England triumphed in the thought that she had checkmated
Germany with this new type of vessel. But the exultation
changed to depression when Germany, as she could not avoid
doing, began to build the new type of ships and when it was
seen that England had really dealt herself a serious blow. This
competition on which the German fleet entered under almost
even conditions, served markedly to increase the sense of rivalry.
England pressed her preparations on land with equal energy.
In July, 1906, Minister of War Haldane brought in a plan for
the reorganization of the army, which was the result of the new
military situation and which called for the creation of an expe-
ditionary force of 160,000 men. In keeping with the purpose
for which this force was intended, the Belgian 'Vassals" were
immediately informed of the increased efficiency. The ultimate
aims of this policy became so clear that the German Im-
perial Chancellor found himself, on November 15, 1906, called
upon openly to say that the Entente Cordiale would be a men-
ace to the peace of Europe unless its relations to Germany were
friendly.

"A policy which aimed to encircle Germany — to form a ring
of Powers around us, in order to isolate and paralyze us — this
would be a dangerous policy for European peace. The forma-
tion of such a ring is not possible without the exercise of a cer-
tain pressure. Action creates reaction. From action and reac-
tion there may finally result an explosion."

Despite this prophetic warning, England proceeded to an un-
derstanding with Russia along the lines which King Edward
had long since marked out. New elements for the moral isolation
of Germany were gathering. While the British Prime Minister
greeted the Duma with well-calculated homage, the British
press began a campaign of provocative attacks against Germi^'

472 MODERN GERMANY

Kultur, which were intended to create sentiment and to call
forth echoes throughout the world. They seem like an anticipa-
tion of the tone of the present-day war literature. And ivhen
Russia, who required time for recuperation after the defeat in
the East, proceeded to call the Hague Conference, the air ivas
filled in all countries with projects of disarmament. This was
followed by unctuous denunciations of Germany for refusing to
meet an offensive policy of isolation with her own disarmament,
and the odium of endangering peace was thus placed on the one
who was in reality the threatened party. The German Imperial
Chancellor replied at that time with truth that we had never
misused our military strength, and that we should not do so in
the future: "Germany cannot be placed under compulsion, not
even under moral compulsion." (April 30, 1907.)

Under such auspices, the negotiations came to a close in
Petrograd, where, following the death of Count Lamsdorff, Is-
volski had assumed direction of the Foreign Office. The Anglo-
Russian agreement, of August 31, 1907, which applied to Persia,
the Persian Gulf, Thibet and Afghanistan, resembled the agree-
ment of 1904 in that it swept aside, for the sake of a higher object,
the world-political differences between the two Powers ; it did not,
however, represent an adjustment of all questions in dispute,
but rather a truce in the future spheres of influence. Even if the
agreement was not aimed directly at Germany, nevertheless the
decision as to Persia's fate one-sidedly and arbitrarily closed up
a further portion of the world. While the press of the two
countries painted in the darkest colors the dangers of German
imperialism, the countries themselves proceeded on their course
of boundless conquest. This treaty also is undeniably to be
understood as part of England's imperial policy, especially from
the point of view of the military security of India and of the
Indian "glacis." It was also from anxiety as to its own future
that this statesmanship, capable as it is, thanks to its positions
of strength scattered throughout the world, of far more ambi-
tious undertakings than the German Continental Power, deter-
mined to satisfy its much-feared rival, Russia. That such great
sacrifices were made, however, is only to be explained, as in the
occurrences of 1904, by the recent shift in the world policy of
England, which proceeded to act without, and if necessary
against Germany. To this extent, in this agreement also, in
which there is no mention of Germany, the indirect effects which
no doubt had been calculated are more important than its actual
content. In the year 1865 Palmerston had considered a strong
Germany as desirable, in order to act as a check upon France

MODERN GERMANY 473

and Russia; at the present moment Earl Percy, Under-Secretary
of State, interpreted the meaning of the understandings with
France and Russia from the contrary point of view: "To sup-
port these two states against a union of the two Central Powers,
Germany and Austria-Hungary." Soon thereafter a leading
publication openly revealed the ultimate design:

'^he Persian understanding, valuable in itself as it was and
remains, was less important as an achievement than as a basis
for other efforts of constructive diplomacy."

The meaning of this "constructive diplomacy" was self-evi-
dent. After rendering the Russian rival innocuous in the Far
East and after temporarily satisfying him in the Middle East,
the aim was to guide Russian ambition, which had long desired
to wipe out the Japanese disgrace and to divert internal revolu-
tionary forces, back to the Near East, which was the most nat-
ural historical field for the newly revealed tendencies of all of
Russia's political parties. That the increasingly pronounced
world-political differences were transferred to this dangerous
theatre, where the rivalries of the Great Powers had for so
long lain dormant, produced incalculable consequences. As a
result of King Edward's strategic move, the differences between
Austria and Russia in the Balkans, which had slumbered for a
decade, flared up anew; and since they naturally reacted upon
Germany, the Franco-Russian Alliance could not fail to take
on a more offensive character than it had possessed for sixteen
years. Whoever seeks to fathom the causes of the World War
finds himself here at the point where the decisive involution of
the relentless forces of destiny begins.

Russia's new policy became apparent when ^e interpreted as
a political violation of the Miirzsteg programme the purely eco-
nomic project of a Sandjak railway, for which Austria drew her
authority from the Berlin Act, and entered a sharp protest.
This meant the opposing of all economic activity by Austria be-
yond her own boundaries, just as England had undertaken to
thwart Germany's plans throughout the world. In the question
of the Macedonian reforms, which had always represented a field
of conflict for the rival influences of the Great Powers, Austria-
Hungary and Russia found themselves progressively at odds,
while in this connection England sought to institute an extension
of the agreements of 1907. The meeting of King Edward and
the Czar at Reval, in June, 1908, indicated, under the cloak of
a far-reaching programme of Macedonian reforms, in reality the
coming partition of European Turkey. In this case also Eng-
land was inspired by the thought that that which she had not

474 MODERN GERMANY

been able to carry through with Germany she might accomplish
despite her — that is to say, cold-bloodedly to start an era of Euro-
pean struggles for power, which in the language of the Island
Kingdom is styled the maintenance of the European balance of
power. It was seen from the start that there could not fail
to be a reaction on the large and small states of the Balkans, and
although for the time being the Young Turk Revolution re-
sulted in a complete check for the original program, neverthe-
less the stone had been set rolling.

At the same time the effort was made to undermine the DrW-
bund from within. The position of Italy in the Dreibund
had been growing weaker for several years. This was due to a
series of agreements with the different Powers providing mutual
guarantees in regard to the Balkan and Mediterranean questions
— agreements that were in effect "re-insurance" against all pos-
sible contingencies. After the Anglo-German antagonism became
manifest, at the conference of Algeciras, Italy's position suffered
a severe blow; it was apparent that the opening up of all the
Balkan questions for the future might prove a serious menace
to her. And from the English standpoint the hope was perhaps
entertained that under such auspices Austria-Hungary herself
might be won over to the plans of the new Entente, Before a
definite course was finally taken against the Dual Monarchy, the
attempt was made to gain its friendship. And once more it was
King Edward, who personally, at a meeting with Emperor Francis
Joseph in Ischl (August, 1908), endeavored to entice the Haps-
burger away from his German allies. He met with an uncom-
promising refusal. All the more determinedly did England,
since Austria- Hungary would not become her tool, proceed to
carry out against her the scheme of isolation, for which the
foundations had been laid more than a year before.

The Imperial German Government understood thoroughly the
new situation, as the result of which it was at every point forced
onto the defensive and with each counterstroke laid itself open
to the suspicion of taking the offensive. In an illuminating state-
ment addressed to the Federal Governments, the Imperial Chan-
cellor, in June, 1908, drew the following picture of the Euro-
pean situation:

"We must reckon with the fact that if we or Austria-Hun-
gary should become involved with one of the Entente Powers in
a serious conflict of interests, the understandings and agreements
would crystallize into concrete alliances, so that together with
Austria we might find ourselves face to face with a strong coali-
tion. We cannot eliminate the fundamental causes of the politi-

MODERN GERMANY 475

cal dangers that surround us without stultif3ang ourselves. As
far as Germany is concerned, they are due to the continued
growth of her economic strength since the founding of the
Empire. It is the groundless fear of a possible misuse of the
economic, and hence also of the political, power of Germany and
of her closest ally that drives other states to form alliances
against us, and that would perhaps overcome their hesitation to
attack and crush us, if they felt that they were strong enough
to do so."

A period now began which was to test the strength of the
opposing groups of Powers ; a period which was to show whether
the aim of the unprecedented diplomatic preparations, which
were the work of England, was to be war or peace.

IV. THE FIRST TESTS OF STRENGTH OF THE TRIPLE

ALLIANCE

Bosnia, igoS-og. Isolation Through the E forts of Publicists and
Pacificists. Death of King Edward, The Morocco-Congo Treaty
of igji.

After the preparation for the encircling policy in the years
1909 to 19 1 4, there follows its practical application, a series of
strength tests which, arising at first from questions of petty
local importance, are seen to develop each time into a European
crisis leading to the verge of war. These result in some cases
from the after-effects of the Morocco question, while later on
the scene shifts to the East, filled with inflammable material by
the reopening of the Oriental question. These crises seem to
the observer like the breathing of the new Europe created by the
policy of Edward VII. At the start, the manifestations of life
shown by the new group of Powers do not reveal the functioning
of a machine whose parts easily and unfailingly cooperate; but
with the lapse of time, despite, or rather because, of an occasional
failure or dislocation, the unity becomes more marked. As the
complicated machine begins to work harmoniously, its activity
is steadily increased, and the stronger its effects are felt the
stronger becomes the resistance of the threatened states, as the
German Chancellor had predicted. Even when, after a crisis,
a temporary relaxation sets in between individual members of
the two camps, the result is merely a heightening of the accumu-
lated tension at other points. On this account, these episodes,
despite the hopeful reception given their momentary solution
each time, appear in retrospect like the hasty catching of breath
in the midst of a silent and desperate test of strength, each time
leading only to a still fiercer struggle.

476 MODERN GERMANY

The first of these tests — the Bosnian crisis of 1908-09 — came
unexpectedly, and showed by its course that it was as yet too
early to speak of a concerted movement in the policy of isola-
tion.

Immediately after the meeting in Reval, the active imagina-
tion of Minister Isvolsici began to work. In a letter dated June
18, 1908, which he would gladly have repudiated later, he pro-
posed to the leader of Austria-Hungary's policy the annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even of the Sandjak, in return
for which Russia planned to obtain passage through the Darda-
nelles. A generation previously Russia had pointed the way for
the Dual Monarchy into Bosnia, and thereafter repeatedly —
for the last time through Kuropatkin — ^had suggested to Vienna
to change the administration of the provinces entrusted to her by
the Treaty of Berlin into an actual annexation corresponding
to existing conditions. Isvolski was thus only continuing the
course of Russia's policy for the previous thirty years, which,
without the slightest regard for the little Serbian brother, rec-
ognized this territory as within the undisputed sphere of interest
of Austria-Hungary. According to the bitter words of King
Milan, Russia had hitherto "always made use of the Serbian
nation in the nature of convenient small change for the settle-
ment of her indebtedness to Austria." ^ The Russian minister,
even after the outbreak of the Young Turk Revolution, held
fast to his program, and at a meeting with Count Aehrenthal
in Buchlau reached an agreement without difficulty as to the
means for carrying it through.

It is not surprising that Austria, in view of this promised
support, quickly proceeded to act. For the transformation of
Turkey into a constitutional national state could not fail to
endanger the hitherto passable condition of affairs in Bosnia, not
alone on account of the possibility of a nationalistic Turkish
demand for the country's return, but also because of the danger
of Serbian propaganda, which counted on the temporary nature of
the Austro-Hungarian mandate. Further, it was imperative to
take timely precautions at the most vulnerable spot against the
danger of an opening up of the whole Balkan question through
the policy of isolation, which had now become more imminent.
The annexation decree of October, 1908, merely served to
strengthen Vienna in- several directions. This represented in
nowise a policy of conquest in the style of the World Powers,
which were insatiably seeking what they could devour; on the
contrary, it was simply a change in the legal form of a title

^ Die serbUche Prage, Dr. WUdau Georgewitach, p. 6x.

MODERN GERMANY 477

which had long been recognized by Europe. Indeed, so thor*
oughly did Austria renounce any policy of force that she sur-
rendered at the same time to Turkey the garrison rights in the
Sandjak granted to her by treaty, and publicly abandoned the
ambitious plans which no doubt had taken form at times in the
imagination of her statesmen.

The effect of the decree of annexation was most unexpected.
The reason for this was that Isvolski was unable to obtain Lon-
don's agreement to the Russian part of the program — the open-
ing of the Dardanelles. For in England the Reval program
was no longer considered practicable, owing to the Young Turk
Revolution. Following the fall of Abdul Hamid, the hated
protagonist of German influence, the more ambitious hope awoke
in the minds of British statesmen of again becoming the pro-
tector and councillor of a youthful and constitutional Turkey,
and, thanks to this position, which carried with it consequences
so important for England's world policy (Arabia and the
Persian Gulf), the further hope of ifinally making an end of the
German competitor. Thus, as a result of the changed situa-
tion, British statesmen found themselves in the painful posi-
tion, to the astonishment of Isvolski, of being forced to oppose
the opening of the Dardanelles, to which in Reval they had
been favorable. The efiEect of die decree of annexation, there-
fore, was seen not alone in the formally justified protest of
Turkey, the anger of Serbia, who saw her secret hopes demol-
ished, and the disappointment of Isvolski, who found himself
diplomatically out-manoeuvred, but above all in the outburst of
English bitterness, which was quite unexpected in Vienna. The
London Foreign Office received the notice of the annexation
in the most unfriendly manner, and the irresponsible organs of
the press let loose the vials of their wrath against the unpardon-
able wrong inflicted on humanity and international law by this
immoral act — all of this with the moral bathos which is always
in evidence in England when they dare not mention the
real motives. The English Balkan Committee, which had been
in touch with all the national revolutionary elements of the
Balkans, now incited the Turks to a trade boycott and to
demands for compensation; especially did they stir up the Serbs.
It was a cause of astonishment that London was even more
Pan-Slavic than Petrograd itself — had it not been England her-
self, who at the Congress of Berlin made the motion for the
Bosnian mandate to Austria (analogous to her own acquisition of
Cyprus), and had she not a short while previously turned with
ill-concealed horror from the blood-stained dynasty in Bel-

478 MODERN GERMANY

grade? It is known that on the very day of the reception of
die Austrian ultimatum, in July, 19 14, the British representative
in Petrog^rad said: ''Direct British interests in Serbia are nil,
and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned
by British public opinion."

The secret of this violent opposition of England in the autumn
of 1908 was to be sought neither in Serbia nor in any anxiety
for the formalities of international law, but in a system of gen-
eral policy which, seeing defeat for certain of its expectations,
set up with cunning calculation aims that gave even greater
promise for the future.

This was an opportunity to show Austria-Hungary, who a
short while before had refused to be drawn into the British
plans of isolating Germany, what a state faithful to the Drei-
bund would have to expect from across the Channel. It \i^as
an opportunity to pour balm upon the wounds of the new
Russian Entente ally, to whom, contrary to desire, it had been
necessary to refuse the promised compensation, and at the same
time to deflect the anger of this ally (in view of Isvolski's char-
acter this was not diflicult) against Austria-Hungary, who had
been the winner in the game. By offering generous diplomatic
help to Russia, it was possible to prevent the new friend from
entertaining doubts as to the power of the Entente. By making
the proposal for an international conference and by inciting in
the most violent manner the press of the friendly countries, the
British Foreign Office could not fail either to frighten Austria-
Hungary into yielding or at least to prove to Russia the indis-
pensability of the Entente. Finally, by arousing a strong Pan-
Slavic movement from Moscow to Belgrade there was prospect
of confining Russia henceforth to her "proper field of labor,"
a consummation which London had sought for some time. In
this manner it was possible, in any event, for England to turn
Isvolski's unfortunate little game into a remunerative specula-
tion along big lines.

For a moment it appeared as if the action would be a suc-
cess. Soon the whole Slavic world was in flames. For a long
time French publicists had sought to arouse the slumbering
forces in this region, but it was England who provided the
latter with the opportunity for their first political demonstration
before the eyes of the world. The Serbians, to whom King
Edward's ambitious policy suddenly gave a foothold such as
they had never had in all their history, challenged their neigh-
bor in the most provocative manner; they quickly accustomed
themselves to the idea that the historical role of an Eastern

MODERN GERMANY 479

Piedmont was reserved for them, and eagerly took up the catch-
word coined by France that Austria-Hungary must suffer the
fate of an "Eastern Switzerland.'* Indeed, for the first time
the political lines of attack of Austria-Hungary's enemies were
seen to extend into the heart of the Dual Monarchy, where
individual politicians whose stock in trade was "nationality"
stood ready to cooperate. At all points, in the diplomatic strug-
gle of the winter 1908-09, forces were ifor the first time aroused
which in the years preceding the World War constantly grew
more threatening and finally became a factor in its outbreak.

The fact that England's portentous policy at this time failed
of its aim was primarily due to the much greater strength of
the bond between Germany and Austria-Hungary than of that
holding the Entente together. The German Imperial Chan-
cellor after the decree of annexation, the date of which had not
been known to him beforehand, immediately informed Vienna
that it might feel absolute security as to Germany's attitude,
in which connection he said: "This is for us a matter of self-
evident loyalty." Whoever criticizes the unconditional nature
of this approval as being in opposition to the Bismarck tradition
in questions of Austria's Balkan policy, forgets that it was no
longer a matter of the special local interests of an ally which
might be supported or not according to wish, but that vital in-
terests were at stake which, in the new world situation as cre-
ated by- the encircling policy, concerned both parties equally.
In a speech in the Reichstag in March, 1909, Prince Billow
therefore very properly recalled Bismarck's saying: "A state
like Austria-Hungary, if left in the lurch, will be alienated and
wiU feel inclined to offer its hand to the Power which has
been the enemy of its untrustworthy friend." An abandonment
of Austria-Hungary at this moment would merely have played
into the hands of King Edward and completed the isolation of
the German Empire.

The fact that Germany was successful in defeating the action
of England and Russia through her firm support of Austria
was due in part to two considerations. She succeeded tem-
porarily in relieving the Morocco crisis, which had continued
after the Algeciras Conference, and in persuading the French,
who were no doubt fully informed of Russia's lack of military
preparation, to maintain an attitude of more or less reserve in
the Bosnian crisis. The Franco-German Declaration of Feb-
ruary 8, 1909, had as its formal basis the Algeciras agreement
and the renewed French recognition of the independence and
integrity of the Sultanate. France merely promised to place

48o MODERN GERMANY

no obstacle in the way of Germany's commercial and industrial
interests in Morocco, while Germany acknowledged that France,
as Morocco's neighbor, was called upon to uphold peace and
order for the sake of ^)ecial political interests. The inequality
of the respective promises is self-evident. Nevertheless, the at-
tempt was more or less successful in this crisis to bring about a
lessening of the tension with France, without the sacrifice of our
real interests. Russia, as we have said, despite all her brave
words, which were blindly swallowed in Belgrade, was not
ready in a military way. German diplomacy, by the declara-
tion of its unconditional support of Austria-Hungary, made the
retreat easy for Russia; at the same time it discovered the man-
ner in which the Great Powers might formally check the wild
eagerness of Serbia's preparations — for which several of them
were responsible. On March 31, 1909, Serbia, who was forced
to acquiesce in Europe's decision, on the advice of the Great
Powers, pledged herself by a formal declaration to abandon her
unfriendly attitude toward Austria-Hungary and to live once
more on the footing of neighborliness with that state. It was
reserved for the future to show whether the spirits of evil could
be exorcized in this manner.

The first test of strength of the Entente resulted, therefore,
in a defeat, since uniform and coherent diplomatic and military
leadership was lacking. For those who staged the game this
may have served merely as a warning to make good that which
was lacking. In England it was decided to await an oppor-
tunity with an officially smiling face. In a speech on March
30, 1909, Grey laid down the guiding lines for the future.
Two causes for conflict, he said, between England and Germany
must be avoided. One was England's attempt to isolate Ger-
many; this would never be submitted to by a nation of the
strength and power of Germany. The other was the attempt
of any one Power to dictate the policy of the Continent; this
England would never permit. The first of the alternatives
directly admitted the existence of something which the Eng-
lish newspapers had hitherto characterized as a German idee
fixe, and placed a check on the diplomatic measure of isolation.
The second alternative, on which the emphasis was placed, ex-
pressed in cautious form a denunciation of that which it was
customary to style, plainly enough for the ears of Paris and
Petrograd, the danger of a German hegemony. It was a ques-
tion only of selecting a new formula, not a new policy.

In England the conclusion was reached that the Entente
agreements did not furnish a satisfactory weapon of defense,

MODERN GERMANY 481

and the question arose whether England's own military strength
should not be strengthened. There began a period of those
paroxysms of panic which occasionally sweep over the island,
or, rather, which are artificially created for the sake of a polit-
ical purpose. Although the panic outwardly found expression
in ridiculous outbursts of fear of Zeppelins, German spies and
waiters, there was behind it a more serious movement. The
French had constantly called attention to England's lack of mil-
itary preparations. The agitation for universal military serv-
ice,* long carried on by Lord Roberts, now began to find a
stronger response. The spectre of a German invasion was
used to make the unfamiliar idea palatable. The French jingoes
admitted to each other, with tongue in cheek, that the leaders
of the agitation themselves did not believe in the possibility of
such an invasion, and calmed the French nation by the informa-
tion that as a matter of fact something more important was
at stake — ^namely, an expeditionary army, which, in a certain
eventuality, was to fight by the side of the French on the Con-
tinent.^ The British press took up the French argument that
England's military weakness robbed the Entente of its value,
and that in case of war an auxiliary army must be sent to Bel-
^um.* A strong Continental army was already regarded merely
as the logical consequence of England's new Continental policy,
and unhesitatingly on each side of the Channel Belgiiun was
fixed on as the scene of its activity!

At the same time there began an active naval propaganda.
The Cabinet itself went so far as to make the assertion (later
acknowledged to be wrong) that the German fleet, despite offi-
cial German figures, was being more rapidly developed than
was provided for and publicly proclaimed in its program;
if the government indulged in a juggling with figures, the op-
position went to the length of shrieking that the German fleet of
dreadnaughts was on the point of outstripping the British. The
anxiety in England was, to a certain degree, even communicated
to the Americans. After an authority such as Admiral Mahan
g^ave expression, in the summer of 1909, to the fear that some
day the German fleet would disregard the Monroe Doctrine,
numberless British writers encouraged this distrust and saw

* See De la paix de Francfort d la confirence d'AlgSsiras, M^vil, p. 314.

* "Germany and the Entente : A Letter from Berlin, ' by Robert Crozier Long,
Fortnightly Review, October, 1909, p. 747: "The logical complement of our new
Continental policy is a numerous conscript army. That this is no arbitrary
deduction is shown by the remarks of a writer in the Temps some months ago
that England's military weakness deprived the Entente of meaning, and by the
statement lately made by General Hippolyte Langlois that in case of war it
-would be necessary for England to land troops in Belgium to assist France."

482 MODERN GERMANY

with satisfaction that with the beginning of the twentieth
tury in American eyes Germany, not Great Britain, was "the
enemy." They were perfectly well aware that a German men-
ace to the Monroe Doctrine belonged to the same class of friv-
olous inventions as the statement of the British press in Japan
that the Calif ornian land laws (which exclude Japanese from
acquiring land) were due to the intrigues of German-ADoer-
icans !

As far as the influence of the British press extended in the
world, a beginning was now made, with finely organized skill,
to sow the seed which in the summer of 19 14 sprang up to
such a bloody harvest. The more widely spread international
cultural connections of England and France were everywhere
systematically utilized for an unscrupulous campaign against
Germany. It will be one of the future problems of history
to determine the role played by this press, by the group of
newspapers owned by Lord Northcliffe, with its train of de-
pendent organs throughout the provinces and the whole Eng-
lish colonial empire, by the Reuter Bureau and by the Asso-
ciated Press, by the Temps and the Matin, in preparing anti-
German sentiment. In the following years this machine func-
tioned so regularly and unfailingly that it is incorrect to speak of
statesmanship being stampeded by public opinion; rather a de-
liberate political design is obvious which, operating from above
downward, grows with a latent energy of immeasurable effect.
The exaggerations of the German press have been described as
counterbalancing those of the foreign press, and the admission
has been made by us that sins have been committed by both
sides — who can check the political passions of irresponsible per-
sons! In this comparison, however, it must never be forgotten
that the thoroughly decentralized German press, as every one
knows who is familiar with international press conditions, is
not to be likened to the corresponding forces of our enemies;
its lack of territorial, capitalistic and party unity precludes a
like uniformity and cooperation; it does not give the keynote
to the orchestra but represents merely a many-voiced chorus
that accompanies and interprets the events; its anti-English rep-
resentatives up to the time of war were without influence either
on the government or on wide circles of the population. And
finally, one of its pronounced peculiarities is that, thanks to its
structure, it has remained free of those capitalistic influences that
have played a shocking part in the imperialistic propaganda of
other countries.

Even temporary agitation may produce lasting impressions.

MODERN GERMANY 483

The psychological effects of the English panic on the French
mind increased from year to year, and even the agreement with
Germany in 1909 did not serve as a check to this tendency. The
Franco-Russian alliance had formerly perhaps caused greater
outbursts of joy on the occasion of fraternal banquets, but in
the nature of things this had been confined in the main to
the upper stratum of the ruling classes, and had not brought
the two nations into closer touch. Now, however, regardless
of the formally loose bond of the Entente, two civilized peoples
had been drawn close together, and public opinion on both sides
was brought into mutual and intensifying contact. The spirit
of revanche, which for the last ten or fifteen years had played
only a diplomatic role in the Russian alliance, saw now, with
deep satisfaction, on the other side of the Channel an entire
nation the victim of similar elemental feelings of hatred and
of fear.

Furthermore, the military agreements of the two countries,
despite the elastic character of the Entente, in the nature of
things led to a spirit of closer cooperation than was the case
with the Russian alliance: after agreeing in regard to the essen-
tials, the theater and the plan of war, the military representa-
tives drew into constantly closer touch. General French began
his studies on the Belgian terrain as early as 19 10. The secret
English war hand-books of Belgium ^ — which are the most sys-
tematic work of the General Staff of a Great Power regarding
a neighboring neutral country of which we know and which
were printed in the years 191 2-1 91 3 — are the result of his ex-
haustive preparatory studies, of which the Belgian government
could not possibly have remained in ignorance. How far the
cooperation between England and France in working out a
common Belgian plan of campaign had gone was shown shortly
afterward when the press of the two countries most bitterly at-
tacked a Dutch bill (at the beginning of 191 1) for coast de-
fense, proposing the fortification of Flushing. The English took
the position that such a fortification — which was fully within
the right of Dutch sovereignty — ^was entirely unpermissible,
sipce it might hinder the English from efficiently protecting Bel-
gian neutrality against possible German aggression; they would
fain have forbidden the Dutch, in protecting their neutrality,
from making use of those means by which they might keep
foreign armies and fleets away from their territory. The press
heightened the comedy by denouncing German pressure as the

^Belgium, Road and River Reports. _prep&red by the General Staff, Londor,
Vol. I (191a), Vol. II (1913), Vol lir (1914).

484 MODERN GERMANY

cause of this fortification and then denouncing the all^;ed Ger-
man desire to conquer Holland as a danger for the future. So
strong was this indignation that the conclusion was inevitable
tha^ the fortifying of Flushing interfered with the military
plans of the two nations.^ The combinations worked out by the
General Staffs were apt in the end, through mutual incitement,
to become a menace to peace; the military factors, left quite
free of parliamentary control, contrary to all English tradi-
tions, were at liberty to develop, until finally they could not fail
to react with determining force on the plans of the statesmen.

Whoever follows this encircling scheme of diplomacy and
press, accompanied by military and naval preparation, finds him-
self at the moment of the death of King Edward, its spir-
itual originator (May, 1910), face to face with the question:
Does all this not simply mean preparation for the great war,
and was that which the world is to-day experiencing not delib-
erately planned long ago? Despite the temptation to answer
this question affirmatively, it must not be forgotten that at
least the English aim of isolating Germany might have been at-
tained by peaceful methods. According to the opinion of well-
informed men as regards the intentions of the King, it is possi-
ble that he himself would have preferred such a solution. His
object would have been attained if Germany had been crippled
by bloodless means, if her slightest action had been frustrated
and her treaties disrupted or weakened, her chances for the
future ruined, and Germany herself, through constant pressure,
forced to discontinue the increase of her navy and to become
such an unimportant member of the world system of states as
the English calculations demanded. King Edward's aim would
have been reached had the German Empire, at the same time
that the distribution of the world among the giant states went
triumphantly forward, encountered protest and ill-will at every
step beyond its narrowest bounds; had its efforts at self-expres-
sion, which, in view of the increase of its population and of its
sources of energy urged toward outward activity, been consis-
tently denounced as unpermissible or as an inexcusable menace
to the world, while another state that had become innocuous,
with a stationary population, was left free to expand at wilL

^The Bel^an Minister, Baron Greindl, in his report of November 23, 191 1>
says: "The idea of a flanking movement from the North undoubtedly forms part
of the combinations of the Entente cordiale. If that were not the case, the
plan of fortifying Flushing would not have catased such an outcry in Paris
and London. It was not even concealed there why it was desired that the
Scheldt should remain without protection. The purpose was to be able with-
out hindrance to throw an English garrison into Antwerp, that is to say, in
our territory to create a base of operation for an offensive, in which we were
to be compelled to partsdce, in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia."

MODERN GERMANY 485

Such a world-political restriction might attain an apparent suc-
cess, but it carried with it the danger of driving the encircled
state to desperate reaction. For such an event England had
planned as a last resort, if necessary, to visit as a preventive
measure on the German Empire the fate once prepared for the
Spanish, Dutch and French commercial Powers. This method
does not lead to war as the only solution, but it may finally
render it inevitable — especially when the forces of which it
makes use (French revanche and Russian offensive) get out of
hand and blindly pursue their own ends. Such was the fateful
inheritance left behind by King Edward. It cannot be stated
that he desired the World War, but without his interference this
war would never have come about.

The dangers were not to be obviated by relaxation of the
tension at one point. German statesmen, who in February,

1909, had sought an understanding with France, now tried to
foUow up this idea of removing causes of friction throughout
the world, by a similar move towards Russia. They returned
to the policy which in the eighties had avoided a break with
Petrograd, had rendered possible in the nineties a friendly re-
lationship with the Dual Alliance, and had maintained during
the Japanese War a benevolent neutrality. The new Imperial
Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, and the head of the Rus-
sian government, Sassonov, reached an agreement in November,

1 9 10, to the effect ''that neither of the two governments would
enter into an alliance which might be aimed against the other."
Especially did they declare their mutual interest in the main-
tenance of the status quo in the Balkans and in the Near East,
and reached an understanding in regard to the Persian ques-
tion, which had been settled in 1907 only on a one-sided basis.
In return for Germany's recognition of Russia's position in Per-
sia, Russia definitely abandoned her opposition to the Bagdad
Railway, to which, it was agreed, certain connections should be
made.

These events which, from the standpoint of the peace of the
world, might have indicated a desirable alleviation, were re-
garded in the camp of the Triple Entente with mixed feelings.
Although nothing was further from Russia's thoughts than a
"re-insurance agreement," and although an official declaration
to this effect was immediately made, London and Paris felt that
the Entente had been weakened. It may be that all the Rus-
sian statesmen were aiming at was, by concessions on a minor
point, to purchase Germansr's moral support in other cases of
dispute, or merely to gain time temporarily until ready for

486 MODERN GERMANY

war. It may also be that Russia wished to give warning that
another course was open to her, both to her old ally (who in
the previous year had not satisfied all her demands but had made
an independent agreement with Germany) and to her nci^
partner in the Entente, following the re-formation of the Cabi-
net and the demise of King Edward. At all events, the prac-
tical indirect result of the Potsdam Agreement was, both in
England and in France, to create, after the first dissatisfaction^,
a greater desire to advance Russia's policies or to take the lead
themselves wherever possible at other points. Matters had al-
ready gone so far that every diminution in the effort to isolate
Germany at one point resulted in an increased activity at others,
the final effect being an intensifying of the whole situation.
While certain Englishmen began to consider an analogous Anglo-
German agreement, the old advocates of Germany's isolation
were puzzled what to think of Sir Edward Grey, who no longer
had the clever King behind him.^ A well-informed critic such
as Garvin declared that in matters like the Bagdad Railway,
which was a vital question for England more than for any
other Great Power, the Triple Entente had ceased to exist.
Even less did the French hide their disappointment, and they
mourned with even sharper grief the English King; whom they
missed; they were disturbed by the withdrawal of the Russian
troops from the Polish border, and they wondered reproach-
fully whether for the sake of revanche they should not have
placed themselves much more unreservedly at the disposal of
their Russian ally.

Instead of its disorganization, a firmer consolidation of the
Entente was therefore demanded, energetic action abroad in-
stead of restraint — regardless of the danger that the incipient
relaxation of the world situation might again yield to an im-
perilling of peace. "It is high timtf," wrote the Temps in
March, 191 1, "that an end be put to the unsatisfactory con-
dition of the Entente by actual cooperation." At this very time,
after an interregnum of six years, the energetic Delcasse had re-
turned to the Cabinet as Minister of Marine, and before long
he had again imposed his views on the weaker characters in the
ministry. The group formed by the Temps and the Comite
du Maroc began to promulgate a new Morocco program, which
promised a marked diversion towards foreign questions. Eng-

1 Thus H. H. Johnston, in the Nineteenth Century and After, December, 1910,
remarks with regard to what he considers the necessary "adjustment of the
Doliucal rcJations between the British and Carman Empire :, "If such an end
iould be attained without too great a sacrifice of Tittl Bntish mtera^ it »
Se end above aU others which should be unmediately and nnflaggingty pax-
aocd by British stateamen."

MODERN GERMANY 487

lish cooperation was certain from the start, and for the pur-
pose of mutual encouragement, the press again began the popu*
lar game of question and answer in regard to the nature of the
Franco-English agreements, resulting on both sides in unwitting
revelations and in the creation of a spirit of recklessness.

The manner in which England bolstered up France's ex-
pected action in Morocco by an enthusiastic speech of Sir Ed-
ward Grey on March 13, 191 1, on world peace and by an un-
restricted treaty of arbitration with America, will always be a
source of wonder. To be sure, there were reasons of a world-
political and domestic-political nature for this speech, but the
theatric reception which was given to it proved that an un-
mistakable application in the field of foreign politics outweighed
all other considerations. Grey's journalistic confidant. Spender,
felt that he might venture to revive the meaningless saying of
Napoleon in an up-to-date form: "The British Empire is
Peace." Impetuously he stretched both hands toward America,
and quieted the French, who were somewhat disturbed by this
''world peace," by saying that the German military spirit had
in reality received a body blow by this speech and that the life
of the nations was to be governed by a new principle which was
to replace the old "blood-and-iron" policy. The culmination
lay in the question : "Now that England has held out the olive
branch to the nations, is there any justification for an addition
to the present German naval program?" The statesman whom
Spender praised for never having been a sentimentalist thought
thus to solve all problems with a peace speech; even at the last
minute before the World War he once more produced arguments
of this kind, which are probably a peculiarity of his mentality.

The immediate effect of the speech, after the German Im-
perial Chancellor had replied with a manly declaration of our
point of view, was to give the signal for the renewal of the
publicity campaign for the encircling of Germany, in which,
by the cooperation of harmless friends of peace in all countries,
the cannons of pacifism were turned against us. While the
giant states prepared anew for the partition of the world, they
sought to persuade the Germans to adopt, as the English Oppo-
sition sarcastically remarked, a "change in the rules of the
game," and because the state which had been systematically
isolated for seven years did not begin to disarm, it was out-
lawed as the disturber of the peace of the world. It thus be-
came steadily clearer that a threat against Germany was con-
cealed in Grey's confused dreams of peace, and the absolute
dependence of the political and non-political brains in America

488 MODERN GERMANY

on English arguments was revealed, although not for the last
time. Even he who does not regard the policy of the Liberal
Cabinet as pure Machiavellism but takes into consideration its
traditional mode of expression and the restrictions that regard
for others imposes upon it, cannot escape the suspicions that
Grey desired under all circumstances to uphold the action of
France in Morocco against the expected German protest and
to denounce this, when it should come, as a disturbance of the
peace of the world. For precisely during these weeks (April ii,
191 1 ), the British minister secretly gave his consent to the ad-
vance of the French on Fez.

The situation in the Morocco question had long since become
untenable. In the course of the last five years the Algeciras
Act had been more and more nullified, as the result of internal
anarchy and even more through France's "readiness to help.** *
That which was proclaimed as the ''peaceful penetration" of
Morocco proved to be, even in English opinion, a system of
financial strangling, of brutal reprisals, of continuous intrigues
and provocations, which increased until the idlest excuses were
regarded as justifying the French advance on Fez. On the
other hand, the Franco-German negotiations of 1909, which had
at least provided security for Germany's trade interests and an
economic cooperation in Africa, had resulted in failure in De-
cember, 1 910, and had altogether ceased. This was entirely
owing to France, as well-known French writers afterward ad-
mitted.* This failure was due in great part to the frequent
cabinet changes and the alliance of politicians with capitalistic
interests in Paris; a decisive factor, however, was the feeling
of self-confidence, carefully nursed in London, that the French
aims might be realized, if need be, without regard for Germany
and without offering compensation. Since Delcasse's return to
power, there was a determination to risk the march on Fez with
British support; once safely in Fez, the French would see to
it that military necessity and the well-seasoned game of creating
"incidents" should make it impossible for them to leave; a
complete occupation of the capital was, of course, the natural
prelude to the declaration of the protectorate. This was an
attempt to rob the German Empire of the remnant of the com-
pensation agreed upon, through the pressure brought to bear by
the general political situation and by means of a political method
in which one seemingly innocent step necessitated the next.

^Morocco in Diplomccy, Morel (London, 1912), p. 40: "Tom . . . across and
reduced to waste paper.

*£.g., L# coup dAgadir, Albin.

MODERN GERMANY 489

That was the culminating act of the policy begun in April,
1904 — ^a policy which, according to the opinion of an English-
man, aimed to make the state which was in reality threatened
appear in the light of the warlike aggressor, unless it submitted
to humiliating exclusion.^

German diplomats had given warning after warning, with
increasing earnestness, of the results which would follow if the
Algeciras Act were to be nullified in this manner and if the
signatory Powers should again obtain freedom of action. As a
deaf ear continued to be turned to these warnings, Germany de-
cided to speak more plainly. On July i, 191 1, the gunboat
Panther was sent to Agadir, for the protection of German in-
terests in South Morocco, which were threatened by disturb-
ances. According to the intention of Secretary of State von
Kiderlen-Wachter, the measure was for no other purpose than
to show our unwillingness to leave our well-established inter-
ests unprotected; it was, as later characterized by the French-
man, Marcel Sembat, also an indication of the desire "for a
chat," for the purpose of carrying to a conclusion the inter-
rupted negotiations — naturally with but two participants, as
they had been started in the year 1909. Germany's object in
the negotiations, as the French were officially informed by von
Kiderlen at the very start, was not the occupation of South
Morocco, since recognition of the French position had now be-
come unavoidable, but the acquisition of a compensation else-
where. Only in case this was not to be obtained, would it
become necessary in the nature of things to revive Germany's
claims in Morocco.

It is worthy of note that resentment at the demonstration at
Agadir was not so strong in Paris, where they were doubtless
conscious of their own sins of omission, as it was in London.
While Sir Edward Grey had never been willing to admit that
the march on Fez, which he had approved, had created a "new
situation," he now proclaimed, ifilled as he was with distrust
of the German explanations, that a "new situation" had been
created. On July 4, before France had yet spoken, he took a
definite stand, declaring that England would recognize no agree-
ment brought about without her cooperation. Hastily, France's
second sprang between the principals, before the duel had begun,
in order to bring about a result in accordance with her own

^Morocco in Diplomacy, Morel, p. 127: "Had Germany wanted war, her
course was clearly indicated, and it nas been one of the most shameful features
of the persistent misleading of the British public in favor of a diplomacy
immoi^ from its inception, that Germany, the provoked party, has been repre-
■ented, both in the crisis of 1905 and in the crisis ot X911—- crises •— ■-
brought about by that diplomacy — as working for war."

490 MODERN GERMANY

wishes. The point of danger during the succeeding negotia-
tions was from the start neither Berlin nor Paris, but London.

Grey's act became more peremptory at the very moment
when, in the Franco-German negotiations, the question was
taken up as to the extent of compensation in the French Congo.
Begun by an article in The Times of July 20 of unusual im-
portance and from an unusual source, it culminated in the speech
of Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on July 21.
The Times accused Germany of demanding a compensation
such as England had received in Egypt, and went to the length
of saying that no British government could agree to this, even
if a French government should be found ready to accept it.
While the discussion was concerned with the extent of boundary
changes in the French Congo, The Times poured oil on the
flames by making the charge that Germany was making ''a claim
for absolute European predominance." This well-calculated
catchword, which we shall encounter up to the moment of the
outbreak of the war, revealed the fundamental political antag-
onism which had determined all of England's actions for a
decade. In his next measures, however. Grey, according to his
English critic,^ adopted the arguments of The Times in a man-
ner which would have been befitting a French minister. Even
in England curiosity was expressed as to the motive of his
action.

Contrary to the agreement, he was constantly kept informed
from Paris regarding the progress of the negotiations between
the two countries; if he received false information from Paris
(through the underground channels which connected the
French party of action with the British Embassy), this was the
fault of the French; but if he gave more credence to this in-
formation than to the official German declarations, that was his
own fault. Even without this, he was, however, quite clear
as to what he wanted. He desired, even without formal ad-
mission of England to the negotiations, to force Germany's
compensation to be made as small as possible, in the interest
of France, and to bring about such a balance of the scales that
in any event Germany would be worsted. If the Entente was
to issue with greater strength from this jfinal settlement in
regard to Morocco, he would have to stand by its uncompromis-
ing partisans in Paris and prevent at any price the party advo-
cating relaxation of the strain between France and Germany
from gaining political power. This could be brought about

^Morocco in Diplomacy, Morel, p. 170: "He could not surely haye been more
emphatic in defense of a purely French interest, had he been the aenrant of
the French Republic, instead of a servant of the British Empire."

MODERN GERMANY 491

only by provoking Germany and encouraging France — creating
at the same time, it is true, war possibilities which could hardly
have arisen from the Franco-German negotiations alone.

Stripped of all the accretions of diplomatic misunderstandings
and dissensions, this was the significance of the speech which
Grey caused the Radical member of the Cabinet, Lloyd George»
to make on July 22; the Foreign Minister went so far in his
autocratic policy as to inform only the Premier, Asquith, re-
garding the import of this step. The speech was an undis-
guised threat to Germany of English readiness for war, a sound-
ing of the alarm which quickly brought the Franco-German
negotiations to a critical stage. At the same time England
made ready, in the effort further to strengthen France morally,
to take those military and naval measures necessary in emer-
gencies. It is interesting in this connection to see from some
of the existing documents to what point the long-standing plans
for the inclusion of Belgium in the sphere of military action
had been developed. In August the English planned, in case
of the outbreak of war, a landing in the Belgian town of Zee-
briigge, even in the event that Belgium did not previously ask
for help; when the Belgian general, later informed of this plan,
modestly called attention to the necessity of an agreement on
the part of his government, he received the cool reply that in
any case (en tout etat de cause) the English would have entered
the country. Lord Roberts, who spoke from knowledge if any
one was in the position to do so, likewise admitted with mili-
tary frankness that the British expeditionary army was held
ready ''to embark for Flanders to do its share in maintaining
the balance of power in Europe." England was prepared to
march, even without an appeal for her help and without for-
mally taking notice of Belgian neutrality, not for the sake of
protecting the latter or on account of possible international obli<
gations, but solely and alone for the ''European balance of
power." This meant, in the language which she had used for
seven years, that she desired to turn the scale under all condi-
tions in France's favor and against Germany, for the sake of hef
own political aims. She desired thus, from a military stand-
point, to do precisely the same thing for which in the year 191 4,
with her customary moral abhorrence, she publicly blamed the
threatened state which forestalled her.

The result of this sword-rattling policy was that the field
of negotiations was much narrowed and the extent of the Ger-
man compensation greatly limited. The peaceful restraint of
Germany alone made this solution possible.

492 MODERN GERMANY

English interference had a double after-effect, even after the
final settlement on the basis of the Morocco-Congo Agreement
had been reached. From this time on in the French nation the
conviction took root that England's armed support might be
counted upon unconditionally in case of necessity, even beyond
the measure of her obligation. Although persons of independent
thought may have recognized with dismay the fact that for a
decade France had become absolutely subservient to England's
pob'tical ambitions, the revanche instinct had become irresistible
in ever-widening circles of the population. Even the modest
compensation which Germany had enforced caused furious in-
dignation; the legend of the German plans of attack, which had
not even existed against France when isolated after 1871, was
the basis for widespread excitement, and the nation began to
concern itself with the fate of Alsace-Lorraine in ever more
provocative manner. The boasted esprit nouveau, sustained by
a feeling of superiority on account of the possession of the new
weapon, the aeroplane, and excited by constantly occurring inci-
dents, began to speak openly of the "hour" which was at last
approaching. A French writer expressed the "new feeling" by
saying: "The agreement of 191 1 is either the prelude to a
genuine understanding between Germany and France, or the
prelude to a war."

It may have appeared to many at this time that the tension
would relieve itself in an immediate threat of war. The great
lines of historical development, however, are never straight, but
cross and recross each other in unaccountable manner. Thus
the last phase before the World War saw a relaxation of tension
at precisely the most dangerous point. But at the same time
forces which had been loosed by the policy of England as here
exposed, steered independently and brutally toward objects
which were to be attained only by war, and these forces suc-
ceeded in surpressing all the elements working for peace, and
finally in uniting new and old antagonisms to bring on the
World War against the Central Powers.

V. THE LAST PHASE

Anglo'German Attempts at Disarmament, Offensive of Pan^lavitm

and Revanche. igi2'jgi4

Just as an abatement of tension with Russia had followed
the crisis of 1908-09, there now followed on the diplomatic
struggle of the summer and autumn of 191 1, which had caused

MODERN GERMANY 493

an upheaval of the deeps, the attempt or the ''blufF' at an Anglo-
German relaxation. The impulse for the movement came from
England. A doubt had arisen in the minds of the English
as to whether they had not perhaps bent the bow too far in
the last crisis and avoided the danger by the narrowest margin.
An independent politician like Lord Rosebery openly attacked
a political system which, with its ententes, assumed obligations
that, under certain and by no means unlikely conditions, might
compel England to enter upon a gigantic war. Such a system,
he said, was in its uncertainty even more dangerous than one
of open alliances, which possessed the advantage of limiting and
defining. Among publicists and journalists the number of those
increased who attacked the dangerous development which the
agreement of 1904 had undergone and demanded parliamentary
control of its increasingly offensive character.^

It was openly admitted that England had not acted loyally
toward Germany in the Morocco question, and the warning was
given that the continuation of this policy meant lending Eng-
land's support to French revanche.^ There was an increase in
the number of such protestants in the 'Liberal Party, which was
at the helm, and in financial and industrial circles, with their
influential organs, The Manchester Guardian and The Econ-
omist, and among the Radicals, the Irish and workers. Even
the Novoye Vremya on occasion during the following years
spoke with petulance of the majority of the ministerial party,
which, it said, had come under the influence of the pacifists and
the Germano-philes. The Cabinet therefore saw itself com-
pelled to do something in order to satisfy its own followers. It
was all the more ready to do this since, after the settlement of
its Morocco obligations, it possessed a freer hand as to France.
Perhaps in the inner circles of the party the course of events in
the last crisis had shaken faith in the mistaken belief as to Ger-
many's unconditional desire for war.

The government, therefore, sent one of its most noted mem-
bers to negotiate with German statesmen. Lord Haldane, who

^Morocco »H Diplomacy, Morel, p. 198: ''There was unwarrantable, unsanc-
tioned transmutation of a strictly limited agreement with France into an in-
strument of aggression against the Power which challenged France's infringe-
ment both of that Power's interests and rights under its own treatv with
Morocco, and under the Algeciras Act. Parliament should place beyond doubt
or question that this nationally unauthorized transmutation must cease." — The
Daity Nezvs says the Treaty of 1904 had gradually developed into an "agree-
ment hy England in the interest of France to oppose Germany diplomatically
at all times and in all places, and should the event arise, by force 01 arms."

* Morocco in Diplomacy, Morelj p. 196: "We have not treated Germany fairly,
and Germany has a legitimate grievance against us on that score." On page 199
he warns the English against a situation "whereby it might become to-morrow
the agent of sQm« ephemeral French Government or other bent upon war with
Germany for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine."

fj94 MODERN GERMANY

was in Berlin from the 8th to the nth of February, 191 2, was
one of those in the inner cirde who was informed from the
start of the secret obligations toward France. In the last crisis
he had advocated energetic action. But at the same time, less
insular in his outlook, he possessed a sympathetic understanding
for German philosophy and for all that which beyond the Chan-
nel is to-day trodden under foot as German Kultur. Had he
not even, although himself the creator of the unfortunate terri-
torial army, striven to make his compatriots see that Scham-
horst and Clausewitz, Moltke and Roon would not have been
possible without the great thinkers of Germany? His person-
ality was admirably adapted either to mediation or to double-
dealing. He discussed with the leaders of Germany all those
points where the interests of the two countries met, in order
to discover a basis for rapprochement. As the Englishman
made no secret of the fact that his country would not quietly
acquiesce in an attack by Germany on France ( the ancient legend
carefully nourished by the French revanche politicians), the Im-
perial Chancellor gave the most solemn assurance that Germany
would never wage an offensive war against France, but would
draw the sword only under provocation. On the contrary, he
emphasized the fact that a loyal understanding between Germany
and England would in all probability obviate the danger of a
European war. All causes for possible conflict, he said, would
be smothered in the seed by the weight of such a union.

On the English side there had been partial abandonment of
King Edward's position that there were no fnctions, that only
rivalry existed. Certain frictions of this kind were acknowledged,
and England declared herself ready to remove them. With sin-
cerity and genuine desire for peace, the German government
seized the hand held out to it. Time alone could show whether
a relaxation of the tension at one point would produce a general
effect.

That Russia had already taken advantage of the Anglo-Ger-
man tension in order secretly to prepare a new offensive in the
Balkans did not promise well. On February 29, 191 2, soon
after Haldane's visit to Berlin, there was formed, under Rus-
sian auspices, the Balkan League, which had been in the making
since the beginning of the Turco-Italian War and which aimed
at the dismemberment of European Turkey. It undertook to
regard the attempt of any Great Power (Austria-Hungary or
Italy) to interfere, even provisionally, as a casus belli. It has
never been disputed that the League was aimed at Austria-
Hungary from the start. The Pan-Slavic tendencies, which

MODERN GERMANY 495

had been merely an ideologic disguising of Russia's unbridled
policy of force, now took possession of the whole press, of the
intellectuals and the various parties in the Duma, and finally of
the representatives of the official government. Seeking to clear
the way toward Constantinople of all obstacles — the traditional
goal of Russia's ambition — the upholders of these ideas no longer
shrank from accepting the destruction of Austria-Hungary as
the indispensable preliminary to their program.

A policy of offense, however, which aimed at the destruction
of a Great Power, indicated the most fateful overturning of all
genuine political balance, a revolutionizing of the stattis quo
in Europe, compared to which all other peace-destroying aims,
even that of the revanche, were only child's play. And yet
publicists, who had long accustomed themselves to understand by
the "maintenance of the balance of power" the isolation of Ger-
many, do not hesitate to justify this Pan-Slavic ambition in the
name of European balance of power, which would otherwise
have fallen a victim to German hegemony!

If one surveys from these two points of view the ensuing
development of the whole European situation, the impression is
gained of two main currents crossing each other; it seems as
if the tangle of action and reaction could no longer as hitherto
be grouped under a simple exclusive formula. The policy of
the Imperial government was to seek in every manner possible
a relaxation of the tension at the one point where this appeared
possible, and where in the last analysis the decision would come;
on this account it avoided to the degree of self-sacrifice giving
at any point cause for distrust, but it was impossible longer to
remain blind to the fact that the fateful tendencies of the new of-
fensive were spreading faster than those making for an abate-
ment of the tension, and that they threatened our vital interests
with destruction. Germany found herself forced to oppose
Russia's threatening attitude toward Austria-Hungary, unless
she desired to lose her one faithful ally and to see the Dual
Monarchy suffer internal disruption. If she permitted this,
her own isolation would be complete and courage given to all
her enemies for a final crushing blow. In this last stage of the
policy of isolation, in which the German Empire was forced defi-
nitely on the defensive, it was characteristic that the English
statesmen were no longer openly at the helm as previously.
Rather had Russian Pan-Slavism, as the real heir of King Ed-
ward, for the sake of other aims than the world policy of Eng-
land, taken over his activities in the making of world history.
Hence, even if London did not approve of all the methods and

498 MODERN GERMANY

plans of her Entente ally, it could afford to await the development
of affairs with reserve — indeed it could at the same time lend its
support to the experiment of a military abatement. After hav-
ing regulated the clock of the universe anew, there was no
longer cause for concern as to the striking of the hours.

It can cause no astonishment that the German government had
not allowed itself to be caught by the formula of an under-
standing which Grey had conceived and Haldane brought to
Germany, but which had no practical meaning.^ It need not,
however, be assumed that the negotiations which were carried
on in London during the ensuing years were from the start
only a blind to conceal a contrary policy. Events showed that
as regards the future delimitation of the spheres in Central
Africa, as well as in the questions which were bound up with
the continuation of the Bagdad Railway, an understanding was
by no means impossible. Even the more delicate question of a
possible reduction of naval preparations was discussed now with
more success than in 1909. The British public was quieter in
thought than in previous years, and certain perspicacious pub-
licists even recognized the fact that a strong German fleet need
not of necessity possess an offensive character, since the vital
need of maintaining great open markets in the world made the
possession of a corresponding naval power indispensable for the
German Empire.^ Distrust, it is true, was more pronounced in
the official head of the navy; neither the personality nor the
manner of expression of Mr. Churchill was calculated, in view
of his mocking reference to the "German luxury fleet," to ren-
der easy for the Imperial government renunciation of so vital
a sovereign right as the autonomous determination of its neces-
sary armament. Nevertheless, there was a certain gain even
in this field, as on both sides the maintenance of a relative
strength of the two fleets in a ratio of 16 to 10 was declared
to be possible and satisfactory.

If, meanwhile, France had been crowded somewhat into the
background by the two principal opponents of the Central Pow-
ers, it was nevertheless of tremendous importance what form
her obligations toward the two members of the Entente would
take. It was a prelude to the Balkan War pregnant with con-

^The formula reads: "The two Powers being mutually desirous of securing
peace and friend^ip between themselves, England declares that she will neither
make nor join in any unprovoked attack on Germany. Aggression upon Ger-
manv forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which
England now is a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such
an object."

* Morocco in Diplomacy, Morel, p. si 2: "This she can attain only by the
possession of a fleet which will make the strongest Power hesitate either to
attack her or to ignore her."

MODERN GERMANY 499I

sequences that the Premier, Poincare, on the occasion of his
visit to Petrograd in August, 191 2, obligated himself to advo-
cate the renewal of the three-year military service period. The
Russian statesmen had based their demand for this on the like-
lihood of serious complications in the "Austrian question"; the
fact was recalled that at the time of the formation of the
Dual Alliance the three-year period of service had been in effect,
and the final argument was used that otherwise a pro-German
party would gain power and endanger the Alliance. The Pan-
Slavic offensive, clear as to the course which it desired to pur-
sue, imposed upon its ally an almost intolerable increase of
military burdens. Only for the sake of the hopes which had
from the start bound the French revanche to the Dual Alli-
ance, did the French politicians, under the continuous pressure
of diplomatic and military extortion, submit to the inevitable.^
Poincare, who shortly afterward was elected to the presidency
of the Republic, lent his name to this program ; and even if the
French were successful in gaining in return certain military con-
cessions from Russia, nevertheless this system of mutual obli-
gations could not fail in the end ^till further to increase the
tension in the atmosphere in France and Russia. At all events,
it was this obligation of France, undertaken before the Balkan
War, and the outcome of the war itself which forced the Ger-
man government in the spring of 191 3 to draw up an extensive
military program. Such was the causal and chronological se-
quence of events.

At the same time England drew closer the bond with France.
The fact that she had another iron in the fire made it all the
more impossible for her to dispense with her Entente ally, who
followed the negotiations with Germany with unconcealed dis-
trust. In the summer of 1912 Britain sought, at first by harsh
compulsory measures, to prevent Italy from renewing the Drei-
bund in order to render that country subservient to her own
interests in the Mediterranean. As the attempt proved a fail-
ure, the concentration of the entire French fleet in the Med-
iterranean was provided for by a naval convention in Septem-
ber, 191 2, England, for her part, logically undertaking the pro-
tection of the northern coast of France. With justice, a French
senator, Chautemps, remarked in regard to this agreement that
it was based on the principle of the division of labor: "We
surrender to England and to Russia the responsibility for the

^ See the revelations in GU Bias of May 35, 191^, and the confeanon of the
Minister of Finance, Dumont, in the French Chamber. Of this confession the'
Manchester Guardian of May 31, X9i3> said: '*The French Government has
been blackmailed by Russia."

498 MODERN GERMANY

safety of our west coast, as well as the protection of our colo-
nies against an enemy occupation." And although England
resisted the continuous efibrts of the chauvinist press to induce
her also to adopt the system of universal military service, never-
theless with this naval convention she assumed an increased
moral responsibility on land as well as on the sea. It was strictly
logical that, following the outbreak of the Balkan War, the
extent of the general political obligations should, at France's in-
stigation, be finally set down in writing.

This was done in the exchange of letters between Sir Ed-
ward Grey and Ambassador Cambon on November 22, 1912.
These dociunents, which were evidently formulated by Grey,
proceeded on the assumption that the previous ''consultations"
between the naval and military experts of the two countries did
not restrict the freedom of decision of the two governments in
question. But as it might become essential, in certain eventu-
alities, for each government to know whether it could depend
upon the armed assistance of the other, the proper course to be
pursued was formulated by Grey in the following words:

''I agree that in case either Government has grave reason
to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or any move
that threatens the general peace, it shall immediately discuss
with the other whether both Governments are acting together
to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what
measures they are prepared to take in common. If these measures
involve participation in the action, the plans of the General Staffs
should at once be taken into consideration and the Government
is then to decide what effect is to be given to them."

The exchange of notes sounds harmless and without binding
force; it was from the start designed as an ostensible document
for consumption by the British public and by the world in
general. It was an agreement which contained the obligation
for action in certain eventualities, but it was so worded that
Grey could deny in Parliament its binding force, and even at
the last moment declare himself "to be free from engagement."
In this document it was not so much a question of the word-
ing as of the permanence of feeling of its originators, who were
able at will to bring about the eventualities in question, or to
prevent them. As a matter of fact, the government of par-
liamentary England had surrendered the power of decision into
the hands of its foreign minister and of its military and naval
experts in a manner never done in monarchical Germany. It
was from that time just as much bound morally as if it had
signed a formal treaty, for, to quote Grey's words, it had

MODERN GERMANY 499

pledged "England's honor." On July 30, 19 14, the French am-
bassador demanded the redemption of the pledge by recalling this
exchange of letters.

Even in time of peace, the agreement, knowledge of which
had quickly spread beyond the inner circle, could not fail to
have a most encouraging effect on French sentiment; its mere
existence was a menace to peace. The worst feature of all was
that the far-reaching pledge viewed the essentially general con-
dition of an "unprovoked attack." For if Russia were one day
to assume the offensive against Austria-Hungary, thereby giving
effect to Germany's obligations as an ally of the latter country,
France also would be drawn into the war. Russia was thus
placed at the point of control, and was able to set in motion
this whole series of mutually interdependent obligations. Fur-
ther, she was from now on sure of England's moral support,
which was the final factor in the situation ; the moment she saw
fit to press the button, the agreements of the general staffs of
France, England and Belgium came into force.

Thus the Balkan War began at a time when the tendencies
aiming at the isolation of the Central Powers were increasing
in strength, and the course of the struggle served still further to
heighten them. The weakening of European Turkey, the in-
citing of Pan-Slavic greed, the overweening outburst of Serbian
megalomania, and especially the preparation for a future attack
on Austria-Himgary — these were the results of that which the
Triple Entente triumphantly proclaimed as its victory. It was
found, to be sure, that the Russian offensive had not realized all
its ambitions. The mad drive of the Slavs toward the Ad-
riatic had for the last time brought Austria-Hungary and Italy
together in united action in Albania, after the renewal of the
Dreibund during the war. The Czar had set himself. up as
chief advocate of the Slavic cause and spoken to the Slavic
peoples in so commanding, and for Austria-Hungary, with half
her population Slavic, so inadmissible, a manner that Napoleon
himself, as protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, could
not have spoken more authoritatively; but he had been able
neither to prevent the war between the Serbs and Bulgars nor to
force his way to the Adriatic. Although the decision in March,
191 3, in the Winter Palace in Petrograd, was for peace, the
world owed this not to a real desire for peace, but solely to
the realization by those in power in Russia that they were not
yet ready. Therefore the war against Austria-Hungary was
postponed, but most unwillingly and with bitterness. The un-
bridled recrudescence of the Pan-Slavic propaganda was due to

500 MODERN GERMANY

this disappointment, as were also the unheard-of provocations
of Austria-Hungary by the press. It became constantly more
unlikely that the Czar and Sassonov would be able again to
stem so powerful a current.

Louder than had been the case for a generation, came the
echo from France, where the burden of the three-year period of
service, which had been forced on the country by the Russian
ally, was creating an intolerable situation, for which, how-
ever, the wicked German neighbor was made responsible. Every
incident on the border line (as the landing of the Zeppelin in
Luneville and the insults offered to Germans in Nancy) brought
clearly to view that there slumbered in the French national soul
an elementary hatred of all that which, in impotent longing for
revenge, was styled German barbarism. There was now at last
no hesitancy shown in unrestrainedly proclaiming this and in
treating in the more serious newspapers the ''Alsace-Lorraine
question" in a more provocative manner than at any time since

1871.

The primary cause of the encircling policy, however — the an-
tagonism between Germany and France — ^had during the Balkan
War been crowded into the background more than at any time
in a decade. The influence toward compromise exercised by
Germany during this crisis had not remained unnoticed among
the leaders of England; and while they for their part urged
moderation in Petrograd, the world beheld the astonishing spec-
tacle of the two rivals working together in the same field as
guardians of the world peace. British statesmen assured every
one who would listen that they were now convinced of the peace-
ful character of Germany's policy. In the summer of 191 3, the
celebration of the twenty-fifth year of the reign of Emperor
William gave an opportunity to the German nation and to wide
circles throughout the world gratefully to recall the services of
the German Kaiser in preserving the world's peace in more than
one crisis. The commentaries of the British press at that time
were couched in a tone which had nothing in common with the
spiteful utterance of the French and which gave no hint of the
outbreaks of which it proved itself capable a year later. The
colonial negotiations, therefore, from the summer of 191 3 on
followed a course constantly more promising. It must not, how-
ever, on that account be thought that German statesmen shut
their eyes to the unchanging fundamental tendency of British
policies. When at the height of the Balkan crisis the secret
Franco-English agreement of November, 191 2, became known,
it was declared with evident anxiety in an official German re-

MODERN GERMANY 501

port: ^nrhe net is constantly being drawn closer in which
French diplomacy has succeeded in entrapping England/' It was
herein prophetically remarked of the dangerous game played by
the British government that: "The constant encouragement
which it gives directly and indirectly to French chauvinism may
one day lead to a catastrophe, in which British and French sol-
diers will pay with their blood on French battlefields for Eng-
land's policy of isolation. The seed which King Edward sowed
is bearing fruit."

This was made certain by Russia's offensive policy, which
after a short pause was more energetically renewed. Viewed
from the outside, it seemed almost to have crowded into the
background the antagonism between England and Germany, and*
Russian statesmen now turned their attention with equal force
to the two Central Powers, which they recognized as an
inseparable obstacle in their path. The plan for the renewal of
the Balkan League, for which the Russian Ambassador in Bel-
grade was the most ardent worker, was based on the assump-
tion of the annihilation of one Great Power. The Pan-Slavic
press even declared that it was true that the Balkan question was
not yet settled, but that the Austrian question had become more
important: "A catastrophic liquidation of Austria's crimes,
which have piled up for centuries, is imminent." ^

After the fall of European Turkey had been brought about»
attention began to be turned to Asiatic Turkey and to the un-
dermining of German influence there, although it was realized
in Petrograd that this action likewise was bound to lead to
war. The Russian protest against the sweeping powers of Gen-
eral Liman von Sanders in Constantinople jn January, 19 14, was
the crucial point of the final diplomatic test of strength, and
cast illuminating light on the whole European situation. The
fate of Asiatic Turkey, which the German Empire desired to
maintain intact, was die real question at issue. That the Ger-
man commission was not without precedent is proved by the
corresponding British naval commission, whose labors, assum-
ing that they were sincere, were bound to contribute to in-
suring Turkey's possession of Constantinople and of the key
to the Dardanelles. Nevertheless, Russia, urged on by French
influence, attacked only the German commission ; and if she was
partially successful in her effort, this was due to the support
which she unexpectedly received from England. The solution
of the riddle can only be that from the start England considered
the naval commission as a mere blind.

^ Novoyg Vremyo, Febnuury 13, 1914.

502 MODERN GERMANY

I In Petrograd these discussions led to still more violent threats
of war : "Russia desires peace, but is prepared for war," wrote
the Bourse Gazette on March 13, 1914. ''The Russian army,
which has always been victorious, will entirely forget the de-
fensive idea to which it has had to resign itself in the most recent
period of our history." ^

The military and financial cooperation with France had en-
tered since the autumn on a stage more and more inimical to
peace. After Joffre in August, 191 3, had come to the fore as
the future generalissimo, arrangements had been made during the
succeeding months for a new billion-franc loan, the purpose of
which was the building of a network of strategic railways in
Poland that were to render possible a Russian offensive against
Germany. We saw a little while ago how tempting was the pros-
pect for the French money lenders; the assurance was constantly
given that the building of the railroad and the payment by in-
stallment would go hand in hand. The alliance of French czp-
ital and Russian politics for better or for worse which had come
about of recent years, had for a long time been an instrument
in the policy of isolation; it had now become a weapon for an
attack in the immediate future, and every one knew what was
really meant when the Temps revealed the purpose of this
last loan with the mysterious words: "All parties must unite
harmoniously in preparing for ultimate success." It was openly
admitted even in official Russian publications that the country
was preparing against Germany, and although the completion
of the railways was not to be expected under two or three years,
the outbreak of war was destined to show how far the imme-
diate preparations for war had advanced since the beginning of
the year.

In addition, other motives increased more and more the mili-
tary impetus in wider circles of society. The antagonism of
the nations was increased by the economic rivalry, which had
been the basic cause of enmity between Germany and Great
Britain. The belief, which was shared by such men as Prince
Trubetzkoi and Prince Kotchubey, that the Germans had driven
Russia into the war with Japan and then made use of
their neighbor's necessity to extort a favorable commercial treaty
for themselves, had spread gradually throughout the circles of
Russian politicians and economists. When economic writers be-
gan now to urge timely preparation, in view of these experi-
ences, for the renewal of the commercial treaties in 191 7, this

^ Petersburger Boerstnsntunz, March 13. 19x4* The artide is said to have
been inqiirea by the Minister of War, Suchoinlinov.

MODERN GERMANY 503

was understood by leading men to mean that Russia must as-
sume so powerful a military and diplomatic position for this
event (which coincided in point of time with the completion of
the Russian measures of military preparation) that the country
would be able to free itself from the humiliating condition of a
commercial tributary. When Sassonov ventured in the Duma
to make use of this historical and economic argument, it was
clear to the whole world that he had unconditionally capitulated
to the anti-German elements. The commercial argument was
brought into connection with the general tendencies of Russia's
Balkan policy. A man like the historian, P. von MitrofanoflF,
who by no means belonged to the Pan-Slavists, declared openly:

''The impetus toward the South is a historical, political and
economic necessity, and any state which opposes this movement
is by that very fact an enemy. ... It has become clear to
the Russians that if conditions remain as they now are, the
way to Constantinople leads through Berlin. Vienna is in re-
ality a secondary question."

The insatiable desire for expansion of the vast eastern em-
pire created a willingness to sweep aside all of the opposing
Great Powers. Although England's diplomatic game had orig-
inally aimed to turn the thoughts only of Russia's ruling class
into this new channel, the antipathy to the Germans, which is
historically and psychologically explicable and which makes the
Slav more deeply conscious of racial antagonisms than ourselves,
gained uninterruptedly in strength in all strata of the popula-
tion. A nationalistic feeling which was increasing in self-con-
sciousness, a species of new-fashioned Russian patriotism which
shaped its far-reaching plans by antagonism toward Germany,
expressed and sated itself through this antipathy. ''The dislike
of the Germans," remarked the same objective observer, "is in
everybody's mind and on everybody's tongue, and seldom has
public opinion been so uniform." Every competent judge proph-
esied that in case of war Russia would not have to reckon with
the outbreak of a revolution, as at the time of the unpopular
Japanese War, but that a war against Germany would be ex-
ceedingly popular in the army and in the Duma, in society and
among intellectuals — ^indeed, even among the masses of the
people.

If one seeks to apportion responsibility as regards public opin-
ion in these last months before the World War, in which, as
in a final taking of the breath for a coming struggle, there was
an extreme mental tension, one is astonished by the growing
similarity in the threatening language of the leading organs of

504 MODERN GERMANY

the Triple Entente; they had adapted their varied roles to cadi
other for this purpose in a remarkable manner; and they were,
moreover, bound together by invisible golden cords (not to
speak of the lower forms of financial dependence), from The
Times, which received for its Russian edition a disproportion-
ate subvention, down to Le Temps, which another Parisian pa-
per characterized as the "authoritative organ of passive obedi-
ence to all the demands of Monsieur Isvolski." All of the al-
lies now made use of the same language, which each one un-
derstood even though it added its own individual interpreta-
tion. We have seen how for years England concealed her gen-
eral policy aimed throughout the world at Germany under the
formula of "the European balance of power"; when Le Temps
spoke of the necessity of "reestablishing the European equilib-
rium," every one understood that this was a question of Alsace-
Lorraine; for Russia, however, the European balance of power
meant nothing less than liberty to destroy Austria-Hungary and
Asiatic Turkey, and to clear away every important obstacle
which stood in her path. Thus, even before the war, by a sim-
ilar political terminology, it was customary to accuse the inher-
ently powerful German Empire of being destructive of peace;
while waxing strong without war, it had no desire to change the
status quo of the world at any point. The finishing touch in the
hemming in of Gfermany was furnished by the accusation brought
against the state which was encircled and thrown upon the
defensive, of striving for an intolerable hegemony in Europe.

In this situation, which was constantly becoming more por-
tentous, the effort was made in Petrograd and Paris to change
the various ententes into a definite alliance; if only in view of
the possibility of a successful outcome of the Anglo-German ne-
gotiations, a closer and more regular union by treaty was thought
preferable to the previous elastic bond. Following the custom-
ary prelude from irresponsible sources, advantage was taken of
the holiday spirit called forth by the visit of King George in
Paris on April 21, 19 14, to urge the formation of an Anglo-
French alliance. Grey, who for the first time visited the Con-
tinent, resisted the insistent urging of Minister Delcasse and
Ambassador Isvolski. He still remained an advocate of the
"free hand," since by binding his country in this manner he
would have encountered opposition in the Cabinet and especially
in his own party. But he was experienced enough in the art
of arousing hopes to be able to console the disappointed French
with the possibility of a Cabinet change (since the Unionists
were not bound by precedents) and with the suggestion that in

MODERN GERMANY 505

the methodical cooperation of the members of the Entente they
already possessed what was tantamount to a formal alliance.
He promised to develop this cooperation into a kind of organic
institution under his presidency in London.

Grey went even a step further. When the proposition was
made for an Anglo-Russian naval convention, he announced his
approval and obtained the decision of the Cabinet to enter into
the necessary negotiations. More interesting than the custom-
ary technical discussions of the naval staffs, which were to fol-
lov7 the model of the Franco-Russian naval convention, is the
political view, according to which the Russian originators of
the plan demanded that England neutralize as great a portion of
the German fleet as possible in the Baltic. By this means the
overwhelming superiority of the German fleet over the Russian
ivould be nullified, and perhaps a Russian landing in Pomerania
rendered possible. In this field, the British government could
perform an important service by sending, before the commence-
ment of actual war operations, a great number of merchant ships
to the Baltic ports, in order that the lack of Russian transport
ships might be made good. The negotiations, the basis of which
soon became known to the German government, were carried
fonvard so successfully that as early as the end of May the
nations concerned let as much regarding them filter through as
was needed for putting the public into the right state of mind.
The general political importance of these plans cannot be too
highly estimated. They show the logical and deliberate course
of offensive diplomacy in Petrograd, which at this very time
led the press to discuss with ever new variation ''Russia's undis-
puted claim to Asiatic Turkey," as well as the subject of Aus-
tria-Hungary's approaching catastrophe. It seemed nearer than
ever before to its goal of enlisting the naval power of England
in its service against the powerful ally of the Dual Monarchy
and of Turkey.

The negotiations prove further the essentially offensive char-
acter of Grey's policy. He may perhaps still have maintained
a "free hand," as in December, 1905, and not consciously have
pursued a course inevitably leading to war, as was the case with
Russia; but by consistently enlarging the system of "peace guar-
antees"— that is to say of constricting Germany by close con-
nections with states entertaining offensive intentions, with whose
aims he was familiar — he was tying the hands of his own coun-
try ever more tightly. He thus clung to the course which he
had followed since the beginning of his ministry, and his con-
duct in Parliament on June 11, 191 4, continued to be consistent,

5o6 MODERN GERMANY

when he was forced to meet the questionings of his thoroughly
alarmed party colleagues. He referred to a ministerial declara-
tion of the previous year that no secret imderstandings existed
which might restrict or hinder the government and Parliament
in their freedom to decide whether England should take part
in a future war; nor were there, he said, at this time any
negotiations either under way or in prospect which made this
declaration less true. This statement was as true formally as it
was essentially based upon a shameless falsehood. Grey and his
nearest friends in the Cabinet were fully aware of the signifi-
cance of allying the first Naval Power in the world with the un-
controllable desire for war of its political partners.

It was England alone who was now able at will to open or
dose the gates of the Temple of Janus. So well informed an
observer as Theodor Schiemann constantly gave utterance to the
warning in these weeks that as soon as Paris and Petrograd
should have made sure of England's support an early European
war was to be expected as a most probable result. The decision
of Grey and Asquith undoubtedly was due in part to the fact
that their political party, which had long been fundamentally
disrupted, was in the Ulster question driving the country to-
ward the verge of civil war and the army toward mutiny. The
consideration that the Liberal Cabinet was likely soon to be
displaced by that of the much more resolute opposition party
could not fail to act as an encouragement on Grey, who had
long been following the foreign policy of the Conservatives,
much more than that of the Liberals. On the other hand, the
government had become so dependent on the opposition that it
strove to avoid giving it cause to criticize the country's foreign
policy. French internal politics, with their bitterly uncompromis-
ing struggles of cliques, in which no one dared to give voice to the
unexpressed thought of all : "War or peace with Germany ?" had
long since reacted in a fateful manner on the foreign policy; it
became apparent at this time that in England, too, the diffi-
culties resulting from internal differences tended to turn the
scale against peace.

Grey's policy appears in a light all the more ambiguous when,
with the greatest possible increase of the obligations which he had
undertaken against Germany, the probability had become stronger
of an agreement with Germany. As the result of tireless nego-
tiations, the Anglo-German agreement came formally into ex-
istence in the course of the summer. It regulated the com-
mercial future of the Portuguese colonies in East and West
Africa, by dividing them into an English and a German sphere

MODERN GERMANY 507

of interest; at the same time it brought about a settlement sat-
isfactory to both parties, concerning the final configuration of
the Bagdad Railway, and a compromise as to conflicting in-
terests which had hitherto been the cause of estrangement. If
Sir Edward Grey's ultimate aim had really been an under-
standing with Germany, the above agreement would have given
proof that such an agreement was possible if sincerely desired;
but if the agreement was — as soon proved to be the case — only
a make-believe concession to that part of the English public
which desired peace with Germany, it was sure to give way
under a general and heavy strain. At all events, it was the
will of destiny that the British Empire be brought face to face
in its full significance with the question of its future relation
to Germany, undisturbed by local di£Ferences. When the gov-
ernment followed up the naval visit to Kronstadt by that to
Kiel, it apparently continued symbolically to keep both irons in
the fire. In truth, however, Grey proceeded till the end along
the course of those of whom Lady Macbeth says:

''They would not play false, and yet would wrongly win."

At this moment Russia's Balkan policy, which von Hartwig
directed in Belgrade, produced its bloody harvest. On June 28,
191 4, the heir to the crowns of Austria and Hungary was mur-
dered in Sarajevo.

CHAPTER II
THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

PROFESSOR HERMANN ONCKEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OP

HEIDELBERG

ONLY he who is thoroughly familiar with events prelimi-
nary to and leading up to the war is in a position to form
an objective picture of the outbreak of hostilities. Without this
insight into these preliminary events, no one, approadiing the
happenings of the final week, would be able under any circum-
stances to open the door that leads to understanding.

The real questions at the root of this desperate struggle are
not touched upon in the official blue and white books, and the
superficial observer might easily gain the impression that a tech-
nical discussion between a few individual diplomats had led,
in a single week, through misunderstanding, awkwardness and
malevolence, to the greatest war in the world's history. Among
diplomats one now hears ad nauseam such harmless expressions
as "European balance of power," "national honor," "human
civilization" and "anxiety for the peace of the world," with
which we had become familiar enough before the war ; but they
are merely blinds intended to conceal the great motive forces
of history and a movement which had long been consciously
under way.

The blue books, too, though not without value as historical
sources, are at the same time political briefs of the various
governments. The apparently so copious material is, in reality,
very incomplete. Each state has selected those documents which
seem to it useful in sustaining its fecial pleading; hence, a com-
paratively greater unrestraint in making public her papers is
shown by England, who was for a relatively long time not
directly concerned in the questions at issue and who would seem
to have occupied toward them the position of watchful mediator.

The material of the blue books is not alone incomplete as a
whole, but the individual documents are frequently abbreviated,
and at times even demonstrably falsified.^ English history since

^The Eiwlish falsification is easily recognized even by the ordinary reader.
No. 105 of the Blue Book contains a letter written by Sir Edward Grey to
Ambassador Bertie at Paris, dated July 30th. Added are three annexes, the
correspondence between Grey and Cambon of November 22-23, 19 is^ and a
report concerninR military preparations and boundary violations by Germany*
which the French Minister of Foreign Affairs sent to Ambassador Cambon at

508

MODERN GERMANY 509

the time of Lord Palmcrston offers many examples of unscru-
pulous castration and twisting of official despatches. In the
present blue book, also, one falsification can be proved widi ab-
solute certainty, despite later futile efforts to suppress the dam-
aging evidence. An important fact is that this falsification con-
cerns the reasons why England was obliged to, and why even-
tually she did, render assistance — ^precisely in this connection
did Grey have need of supplementary feats of editorial leger-
demain. This forgery led in turn to the futile attempt in the
French yellow book (which at more than one point reveals for
those familiar with previous centuries the well-known sprightly
unreliability of French diplomatic reports^ ) to bring about agree-
ment with the English statements, by means of an equally awk*
ward falsification.^

London. The third annex, which is of importance in this connection, in the
first edition of the Blue Book is dated "July 3'* 19^4-'* ^^ ^^^ second edition
this date, which cannot be reconciled with that of Grey's letter, is omitted I But
that is not alL In the first edition this reoort — in the English translation of
the Blue Book— b«^ns with the words: "The German army had its advance
posts on our frontiers yesterday (Fridav)." But since Fndav was the 31 at
of July, the date of the document ought to have been the first of August.
Consequently the word "Friday," which gave things away, was likewise elimi-
nated in the second edition. If, however, annex three is of July 3i8t, or
even of Au£[ust ist (which would be more consonant with its military con-
tents), it is impossible that it should have been enclosed in a letter of Grey'a
of July 30th. But since the letter refers to annex three ("he gave me a paper
of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the (jerman military Repara-
tions were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than
anything France had yet done"), it must have been falsified either as regards
the date or as regards the contents at least to the extent of the quoted sen-
tence, which was probably interpolated later on. That calls all the eventa
recited in No. 10^ into question, and since we have now become thoroughly
suspicious, we begin to understand why the British Minister should have done
something so unusual in diplomatic routine and at the same time so superfluoua
as to pick out and send by special messenger to his representative m Paris
the correspondence of November, 191a, which was long since known there, and
the military report which he asserted he had Just received from Paris through
Ambassador Cambon. The reason for this falsification is that the government
felt a belated need of presenting somewhere in the Blue Book the obligations
undertaken in November, 19 12, in neat juxtaposition with a military docu-
ment which proved the actuality of the "menaces" which the former docu-
ments had foreseen.

^ The most typical example is ^ a compilation from diplomatic and consular
reports, dated July 30, 1913, which aims to prove that recently sentiment in
Germany had taken a turn opposed to peace justifying France's policy to a
large degree. In this collective report, which can hardly lay claim to being
considered as an authentic source of historical evidence, we find the fol-
lowing sentences: "If it is true that the Emperor is discussed, and that the
Chancellor is unpopular, Mr. von Kiderlen was the most hated man in Ger-
many. But he IS beginning to be less badljr thought of, for he is making
people understand that he is going to have his revenge." Mr. von Kiderlen-
Wachter died December, 19 12! Thus the collective report was compiled, not
on July 30, 19 1 3, but precipitately and with consequent lack of truthfulness
in the autumn of 19 14. Further incongruities in Mr. Cambon's reports have bee«
laid bare in the North German Gaaette of December 21, 19 14.

*The letter addressed to Mr. Cambon by Mr. Viviani, dated July 30th (Yellow
Book No. 106), gives part of the information, contained in annex three,^ of
No. 105, of the Blue Book, and which consequently cannot have come into
being before Tuly ^ist, or rather August xsL It can be proved that this letter,
too, IS a fabrication, made up from various reports dating from different

g:riods. The purpose was to secure credence for annex three. No. 105, of the
ritish Blue Book.

5IO MODERN GERMANY

Finally, it must not be forgotten that in the blue books one
is able to follow from day to day only the visible course of
the negotiations, conferences and e£Forts at mediation, as these
were undertaken, continued and again interrupted. The invisi-
ble impulses in the course of a£Fairs find expression only in iso-
lated instances in this mass of diplomatic documents — a word or
a hint which assures a friend of readiness to help in case of
need, encouraging him to action, which may be far more deci-
sive than any official e£Fort at mediation. The reader must not,
therefore, allow himself to be diverted by occurrences in the
foreground, but must endeavor to penetrate beneath the surface
and to interpret the various events in the spirit of the war's en-
tire preliminary history and of the personages engaged. Only
in that case do the decisive turning-points and the controlling
features of this vast game stand out in clear perspective.

The authors, accomplices and abettors in the murder of the
Arch-Ducal heir apparent intended the deed as a decisive event,
which was to result in the desired disruption of Austria-Hun-
gary and in changing the face of Europe. The date deliber-
ately chosen for the crime was the five hundred and twenty-fifth
anniversary of the Battle of the Amsel Field, following which
a Serbian, Milos Obilicz, had stabbed the victorious Sultan
Murad. It was planned that the new "hereditary enemy"
should receive a mortal wound on this day, which was cele-
brated as the "independence day" of the Serbian nation for the
first time in 19 14, with provocative speeches in favor of the "en-
slaved brothers." The more the strong personality of Franz
Ferdinand appeared to guarantee the future of the Dual Mon-
archy, the more important did it seem to Servian jingoes to re-
move this future obstacle by murderous means. Emplo5niient
of such means is constantly met with in the history of the Ser-
bian nation and crown throughout the nineteenth century. The
outbursts of joy following the deed showed what Serbia believed
to have been accomplished. The criminally exaggerated na-
tionalistic feeling of the Serbs, among the official and military
circles of whom knowledge of and cooperation in the crime was
widespread, is to be held mainly responsible, not the subordinate
tools in its commission. It was the plan of the murderers to
take advantage of the dangerous tension of the political at-
mosphere of the summer of 191 4, intensified as it was by the
clamor regarding Russian preparedness, in order to make sure,
in the general confusion, of reaping the fruits of their deed. The
important question now was as to what lengths in protecting the

MODERN GERMANY 5H

culprits and the Serbian state the Russian abettors, who had
been directly concerned in creating this chauvinistic sentiment,
were ready to go, as well as those European politicians who for
years, through their trifling with the possible dismemberment of
Austria-Hungary, had been indirectly concerned in bringing
about the situation.

The moral guilt of the Serbian government was increased by
its behavior after the deed. No spontaneous effort was made
by it to proceed against the conspirators on Serbian soil by
means of its own agents, although so many signs pointed to-
ward Belgrade; even less did it attempt at the last moment in
Vienna to free itself from connection with the movement which
it had brought about. The solemn obligations undertaken by
it on March 31, 1909, had been entirely forgotten. On the con-
trary, so certain did the government feel of the continuation of
the backing it had hitherto enjoyed that it permitted the press
of the country to discuss day by day the impotence and the dis-
solution of the neighboring Monarchy; the official governmental
publication even went so far as to declare that the internal
conditions in Austria-Hungary had been the sole cause of the
crime. So hopelessly obsessed was Serbia by her delusion of the
disintegration of Austria-Hungary that she either thought that
country incapable of any vigorous action or else saw no reason
for fear in braving it.

It was inevitable that the deeply injured state, which had so
long patiently borne Serbia's threats, should at last be aroused.
To countenance this aggression meant to endanger not alone its
prestige, but its very existence. One needs only to ask how long
Russia would have quietly submitted to a similar agitation in
Sweden or Rumania, looking to the separation of Finland or
Bessarabia; or how long the United States would have suffered
a continued deliberate disturbance of the peace by Mexico.
Would not both of these states, if a similar agitation, backed up
by a third Great Power, had led to an attack on their official
head, have sought satisfaction and security by armed force and
without asking permission of any one? In self-defense, Austria-
Hungary saw herself compelled, now or never, to put a check
upon these forces which were aiming at her destruction, even at
the risk of arousing Russia to bring to bear the full weight of
her offensive strength.

The German Imperial Government, which before the 23rd
of July was informed only in a general way of Austria-Hungary's
views aiid intentions, had expressed its entire agreement. "With
all our heart," says the White Book in this connection, ''we

5ia MODERN GERMANY

were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and
assure him that any action considered necessary to end the move-
ment in Serbia directed against the existence of the A4onaidiy
would meet with our approval." We did not close our eyes to
the fact that the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy, and the
bringing of the whole of Slavdom under the Russian scq>ter,
would render the position of the German race in Middle Europe
untenable, and that in this crisis an isolated and morally weak-
ened Austria would lose for us her full value as an ally. Hence,
Germany left an entirely free hand to her ally in proceeding
against Serbia, without taking part in the preparations or know-
ing beforehand the details of the ultimatum. As had previouslj
been the case more than once, the Central Powers, virhich were
the ones really threatened, saw themselves, in view of the con-
stantly increasing number of their enemies, forced to action,
though it is wrong to represent the steps they took as a diplo-
matic o£Fensive. Only a superficial reader of the Blue Books
will allow himself to be misled by the impression that, as far
as appearances go, it was Austria-Hungary, who in the week
from July 23 to August i, by making demands, took the diplo-
matic offensive, and that the German Empire became her acoom-
plice through its approval of Austria-Hungary's procedure; it
must not be forgotten for a moment that the offensive character
of the Triple Entente and of the Pan-Slavic movement, which
aimed at the destruction of Austria-Hungary, had long since
forced the Central Powers into a defensive position.

The demands which Austria-Hungary made on Serbia on
July 23, with the setting of a time limit, were characterized by
our enemies as excessive, and intolerable for a sovereign state
— especially was the demand that Austrian judges participate in
the investigation of the crime said to be without precedent
As a matter of fact, there is no lack of precedent in modern
history in cases which the nature of the provocation and the
stage of civilization of the offending state made such a step
necessary. No doubt Austria-Hungary intended it as a Ics^
son for Serbia when she sought to enforce the fulfilment oi
the disgracefully disregarded promises which this state had made
in 1909. From the start, however, she gave definite guarantees
to the Great Powers in regard to the scope of her contemplated
action by declaring that she would not violate Serbia's terri-
torial rights, but would recognize the integrity and independ-
ence of the country; there was no question of a "permanent"
impairment of Serbia's sovereignty. Austria-Hungary did not
aim at a shifting of the balance of power in the Balkans, but

MODERN GERMANY 513

claimed merely the right of taking, in her discretion, the neces-
sary preventative measures for the protection of her vital inter-
ests, ivhich were seriously threatened by the undermining ac-
tivity of the Serbian agitators. Accordingly, Germany took
the stand that this purely Austro-Serbian conflict must re-
main localized; following the declaration of the Central Pow-
ers that they were striving for such a localization of the quar-
rel, the French and British governments promised their good
offices in the same effort. As long as the conflict remained lo-
calized, the peace of the world was assured. But as soon as
Russia or any other Power seized on an incident of such char-
acter in order to interfere, there could be no doubt as to what
action "wsls to be expected from the Triple Entente in the im-
mediate future.

Events immediately proved that the leaders of Russian Pan-
Slavism were not to be deterred even by the murder of the
Archduke, but were ready to deny all the monarchic traditions
of their own history rather than to surrender the criminals and
abandon their hopes of Serbia. This state, as the nucleus of
their Balkan policy, was indispensable to their offensive. A
word from Petrograd would have sufiiced to bring the Serbs to
reason before the ultimatum — this word was not spoken by the
state which, in the summer of 191 3, had assumed to be the
arbiter of the Slavic world. The offensive tendencies of a
policy of force, which was not to be turned aside from its aims
by the danger of the most serious complications, continued to
gain in strength. When, a fortnight after the murder in
Sarajevo, further disclosures regarding the Anglo-Russian naval
convention percolated through to the public, a Russian news-
paper cried triumphantly: "We are now able, thanks to the
support of the British fleet and to our now completely prepared
army, to demand that Berlin put an end to that political system
which is in keeping neither with our dignity nor with our in-
ternational position." The word of 1870, "archipret," uttered
at this moment could not fail to act as an incitement to Bel-
grade. Russia was determined from the start to permit the
enforcement of Austria's demands under no circumstances.
The same minister who found nothing to say publicly in con-
demnation of the Serbian crime characterized Austria's de-
mands as "provocative and immoral," and attributed to them,
despite the Monarchy's positive promises, the intention to devour
and crush Serbia; later the Czar also could see nothing but a
"disgraceful" war against a small country. Thus, like Ger-
many's wish to localize the conflict, Russia's determination to

514 MODERN GERMANY

intervene at any price against Austria's punitive procedure was
beyond question. With this intention, Russia continued quietly
her military preparations.

A decisive factor in such a policy was from the start the ques^
tion as to how far Russia could reckon on her Entente asso-
ciates. Only in case of the latter's unreserved support would
there be no further obstacles to overcome. Sassonov would have
preferred inmiediately to mobilize the Triple Entente and to
have had the mutual obligations of the contracting states become
operative at once; he therefore proposed to the French and Brit-
ish Ambassadors a declaration of solidarity, with hypocritical
justification that only a common attitude of firmness could pre-
vent a war. While the French Ambassador unreservedly adopted
the Russian proposal, the British representative showed himself
at first much more reserved, in which position he was later sus-
tained by Grey, and he let it be understood that his country did
not desire war on account of the Serbian question. All the more
emphatically did Sassonov declare that ''the general European
question" was involved in this Serbian question, and that on this
account England could not e£Face herself; he admitted at this
early date (July 24) that Russian mobilization would at any
rate have to be carried out, and that an Imperial Council would
decide the question the following day.^ From this first moment
on, with full realization of her action, Russia used the question
of the European balance of power as a goad, and offered her
military resources in solving it.

Everything depended upon whether England would foUow^
along this path. For, although France had apparently already
taken up her position, it was nevertheless to be expected that she
would make her final decision dependent on England's attitude.
The country in which the policy of isolating Germany had origi-
nated was now to speak the decisive word.

In England's later official statement credit was claimed for the
earnestness of the country's eflForts for peace. It is not to be
denied that Grey undertook a series of efforts at mediation, but
it is not merely a question as to good intentions, but rather as to
what practical value these efforts had and what was their real
aim : the preservation of the world's peace under conditions which
would have been honorable for all concerned, or a one-sided dip-
lomatic success for the Entente, which would have been decisive
for the whole future. His point of departure was shown by the
fact that he characterized the Austrian demands as intolerable
and the German position as to localizing the conflict as a mere

1 British Blue Book No. 6.

MODERN GERMANY 51S

phrase ^ ; by unreservedly refusing to advise moderation in Petro-
grad,^ he betrayed a growing sympathy with all the arguments of
the Russian interpretation. On July 15, Sassonov, disappointed
at England's reserve, telegraphed to London: "In the event of
the situation becoming more critical, possibly leading to concerted
action by the Great Powers, we count upon England's readiness
to place herself unreservedly by the side of Russia and France
for the purpose of upholding the European balance of power,
for the preservation oif which she has always stood and which in
the event of an Austrian triumph would undoubtedly be dis-
turbed." ' By means of this catchword, calculated to appeal to
the English mind, he sought to befog the issue in dispute, which
England found an awkward one. Grey, however, allowed the
Russian appeal concerning the European balance of power to
influence him with increasing weight. The British Ambassador
in Petrograd, who personally did not belong to the extremists,
ventured, without doubt in agreement with his instructions, on
the same day to formulate the views of his government as re-
gards the real nature of its mediation, to the effect that "England
could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better
purpose as a friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disre-
garded, might one day be converted into an ally than if she were
to declare herself Russia's ally at once." ^ These words should
be placed as the motto at the head of aU later efforts at media-
tion by British statesmanship. They show that Grey differed
only as to method from the Russian advocates of extreme action,
but that he did not shrink from the end to be obtained.

His proposal to increase the twenty-four hour time limit of the
ultimatum was of importance only as a demonstration ; in case of
success, Russia, who was ready for intervention, would merely
have gained a further start in her military preparations.

Events moved too fast for the proposal. Serbia's reply on the
afternoon of July 25th indicated only an apparent readiness to
meet Austria half-way: in reality, she rejected all those demands
of Austria the carrying out of which would have meant energetic
action by the government against the intrigues of Serbian sub-
jects aimed at Austria. Hence Austria was compelled to reject
such an answer ^ from a state which, five years before, had vainly
promised to mend its ways, and to break off diplomatic relations,
according to her threat. That Serbia was in no doubt as to the

^ Introduction to Blue Book, p. V.

* Blue Book No. 1 1 ; Orange Book Now 20.

* Orange Book No. 17.
^Blue Book No. 17.

* Italy also diaajiproved of the Serbian note. See Yellow Book No. 7^

5i6 MODERN GERMANY

reception of her reply is shown by the fact that she had started
to mobilize even before sending the note. On the same date
(July 25th) Russia ordered the mobilization of the military dis-
tricts adjoining Austria-Hungary. The conflict thereby entered
on its second stage.

Grey now considered it advisable to formulate a proposal for
mediation. On the evening of July 26th, after receiving Russia's
approval, he suggested to the French, German and Italian gov-
ernments to authorize their ambassadors in London to meet in
conference for the purpose of considering a peaceful solution.
This suggestion was unacceptable to Austria-Hungary for the
reason that it indirectly recognized Russia as a Power interested
in the Serbo-Austrian conflict, and that it would have brought
before the "areopagus of the Powers" this a£Fair of a state whidi
from every point of view had been most severely provoked. Only
he who is familiar with the extent of the mutual obligations of
the Entente Powers and with the thorough-going organization of
their London headquarters in the summer of 191 4 is in a posi-
tion to realize what role would have been played at this confer-
ence by Russia's two confederates — ^not to speak of Italy. Dur-
ing its course Russia might have continued her preparations,
while Germany would have been forced to promise not to mobi-
lize. Finally, no unprejudiced person will claim that the man
who was ready at the favorable moment to metamorphose him-
self into an ally of Russia was the ideal neutral leader of nego-
tiations, conducted under the pressure of Russian mobilization.^
The longer one considers the proposal for mediation, the clearer
does it become that it was calculated to gain at least a diplo-
matic victory for the Entente Powers. It is, therefore, not sur-
prising that the German government, while declaring itself
ready, in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict, to undertake
mediation jointly with the other Great Powers, pronounced it to
be impossible "to call her ally in the latter's dispute with Serbia
before a European tribunal." ^ Instead of this, in order to com-
pose the misunderstanding between Austria- Hungary and Rus-
sia, Germany assumed the initiative by suggesting direct negotia-
tions between these two Powers, as the most hopeful measure for a
peaceful solution, and succeeded in gaining England's adherence
to the idea of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd,
in place of the conference plan.*

The efforts of German diplomacy were directed toward pre-

^ Orange Book No. 22,

* White Book, 3f No. 24; Blue Book No. 46.

■Blue Book No. 67.

MODERN GERMANY 517

venting a tragic outcome through simultaneous warning and
peaceful explanations. On July 26th, Germany had called atten*
tion in Petrograd to the inevitable results of the first step on
the path of mobilization: "Preparatory military measures by
Russia will force us to counter-measures, which must c6nsist in
mobilizing the army. But mobilization means war. As we
know the obligations of France towards Russia, our mobilization
would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot
assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war." ^
Consonant with this, Paris was informed that only the localizing
of the conflict would prevent untold dangers, but at the same
time that Germany's intentions in regard to France were purely
peaceful. Every suggestion, however, for united efforts toward
peace was rejected by Paris with deep distrust. France could
not make up her mind to undertake in Petrograd a step similar
to that of Germany in Vienna; the slightest move in this direc-
tion, it was feared, would prove compromising in the eyes of
Russia, and it was considered necessary by intentionally colorless
newspaper declarations to avoid even the faintest suspicion of a
"solidarity with Germany which might be wrongfully inter-
preted." * Paris preferred, with folded arms and without initia-
tive, to watch the fateful course of events.

Meanwhile, the Russian government strove to convince the
leading British statesmen that the Central Powers' apparent un-
willingness to yield was due only to the widespread delusion in
Germany and Austria that England would remain neutral under
all circumstances. Only by destroying this delusion — that is to
say, by an unmistakable rapprochement with the Dual Alliance
— could England exorcise this danger, it was claimed. The
readiness with which Grey adopted this suggestion is worthy of
notice. While on the one hand, in disregard of the suggestions
of his own ambassador in Petrograd, he made no effort to exer-
cise a moderating influence on Russia and thereby to contribute
to the success of the negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd,
on the other hand he made a series of moves which according
to his belief were, perhaps, calculated to moderate an assumed
desire for war on Germany's part, but the practical significance
of which was a one-sided pressure on Germany and Austria and
which by unmistakable statements regarding England's possible
attitude encouraged both Petrograd and Paris to more energetic
action. Whether his movements were directed by deliberate cal-
culation or were due to mental astigmatism, united with insu-

1 White Book.
■Yellow Book No. 6a.

5i8 MODERN GERMANY

perable prejudices, is a question that will be answered differently
according to one's psychology.

The very first step showed that Russia's suggestion had been
heeded — that England must definitely indicate her position.
Grey declared to the German Ambassador on July 27th that if
Germany assisted Austria, because she could not afford calmly
to see her ally crushed, other issues might bring other Powers in,
and the war would be the greatest ever known.^ This meant
nothing less than that England would oppose the defeat of France
or (as this had never been Germany's object) that she would
conceivably under this pretext enter into a European war. This
comforting information was immediately communicated to the
French.' At the same time military measures were announced.
To Russia's plaint that a false impression existed in the minds
of German statesmen as to England's future attitude. Grey
made answer: "This impression will be dispelled by the orders
we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it
liappens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave." In
this underhanded manner, he wished it to be understood that his
reference must not be taken to mean that anything more than
<liplomatic action was promised,' but he told the Russians clearly
ivhat they wished to know. For, as a matter of fact, this mili-
tary measure was ordered on July 23rd by Churchill, secretly
and on his own initiative ; the new feature was that the Cabinet
decided on the evening of July 27th to publish it. If the desire
ivas thereby to intimidate Germany the inevitable result was still
further to stiffen the resistance of France and Russia. This was
the sense in which the measure was regarded and discussed by
the French. "Great Britain's attitude is becoming firmer," a
French diplomat informs Paris with satisfaction. The Reuter
Bureau was even more frank than Grey desired, when it in-
formed the world that the British decision "greatly encouraged
Russia."

It may be that Grey's step was meant as a bluff, was intended
to create the impression of readiness to strike, but was not an
indication of a real intention to do so. As has been justly re-
marked, there is a dangerous element in such a step ; by the use
of bluff a government may venture too far and then no longer
be able to find a justifiable excuse for retreat. The danger is
greatly increased when this bluffing is carried on by more than
one, and each word of encouragement is eagerly seized upon by

*Blue Book No. 46.

"Yellow Book No. 63.

•Blue Book No. 47; Yellow Book No. 66.

MODERN GERMANY 519

the other party to the game and passed along in exaggerated form*
Therein lay Grey's tremendous responsibility. A method which^
with such measures and with such coadjutors, aimed at a decisive
success for the Entente could not fail, despite all fair-sounding
e£Forts at mediation, to aid in bringing about the war, instead of
preventing it.

On the afternoon of July 29th, after Austria had declared war
on Serbia, Grey once more made use of his method, in a more
emphatic manner. He informed Prince Lichnowsky, the Ger-
man Ambassador, that as long as the crisis was restricted to the
issues at present actually in question, England had no thought
of interfering. But if Germany became involved, and then
France, the conflict might take on such proportions that all
European interests would be at stake. The Ambassador, he said,
must not be misled by the friendly tone of the conversation into
thinking that England, in such an event, would stand aside. In
case British interests required England to intervene, she would
do so at once, and the decision would be speedily taken.^ At first
blush it might be held that even this warning, which was really
tantamount to a threat, was only meant to act as a damper on
Germany's dreaded thirst for war. But a few hours before,
Grey had informed the French Ambassador, Cambon, that he in-
tended to speak thus to Prince Lichnowsky. He had thereby in
advance transformed the peaceful effect of his words in the
minds of the Entente allies into an action tending toward a war-
like solution and increasing the warlike sentiment.

In this notable conversation with Cambon, Grey had empha*
sized the fact that England did not wish to be drawn into an
Austro-Serbian, nor even into an Austro-Russian conflict. Eng-
land did not want to take a hand, he said, in a struggle between
Teutons and Slavs for the supremacy in the Balkans. But if Ger*
many, and in turn France, became involved, they had not yet
made up their minds what they would do. France would then
have been drawn into a quarrel which was not her own, but in
which, in keeping with her alliance, honor and interest obliged her
to engage. England would then be free from engagements, and
would have to decide what action British interests required of
her. Cambon understood the conversation so well that in re»
peating it he summed up the train of thought somewhat more
definitely in this way: should other issues be raised, and Ger-
many and France become involved so that the question came ta
concern the hegemony of Europe, England would then dedde

^ Bine Book No, 86.

520 MODERN GERMANY

ivhat it was necessary for her to do.^ The cue had been uttered
which was understood by the two men who had so often made
use of it. Only apparently was it a question of two separate
contingencies — of one in which England would abstain, and of a
second in which she would intervene. Grey was fully aware tiiat
the first case, as the result of the Austro-German and of the
Franco-Russian treaty obligations, would with automatic swift-
ness bring the second in its train. But he deliberately set in
motion the machinery of the Triple Entente, in order to force
Germany and Austria-Hungary to retreat along the whole line-
He still avoided definitely binding himself, but he foresaw that the
immediate result would be, if Germany did not retreat, to bring
about a situation by means of which he hoped to be able to stam-
pede the whole Cabinet to the most extreme measures.

The die had been cast. The very next day Cambon demanded
that the bill of the provisional agreement contained in the letters
of November, 191 2, be honored; and when certain of English
support, the French government, on the 30th of July, gave Petro-
grad the assurance of unconditional armed assistance, which it
had hitherto withheld. The result was the removal from Russia's
path of the final obstacles in the way of a definite decision for
war.

While England unmistakably drew closer in this manner to
the Dual Alliance, and while the Russian preparations were no
longer limited to mobilization on the Austrian boundary, but
were already extending into the military districts bordering on
Germany, the latter country, despite the more difficult conditions,
was with increased energy pursuing its efforts for peace. Im-
mediately following the return from his northern voyage, the
Emperor threw the whole weight of his personal authority and
of his well-known love of peace into the balance. He recognized,
of course, the difficult position of the Czar, but nevertheless he
appealed to him, in a telegram on the evening of July 28th, in
the name of their common interests and their long-standing
friendship. Above all, however, did he assure the Czar that he
would use his entire influence ''to induce Austria-Hungary to seek
a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia." * Accord-
ingly, the Imperial Chancellor informed the British Ambassador
on the same evening that he was making every e£Fort, both at
Vienna and Petrograd, to persuade the two governments to dis-
cuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way'

^Blue Book No. 87.

« White Boole Exhibit 20.

*Bl\ie Book No. 71.

MODERN GERMANY 521

— that is to say, to bring about a renewal of the direct negotiations
^^hich had been suspended since Austria's declaration of war on
Serbia.

The course was difficult, but not without prospect of success,
Xhe reply of the Czar spoke, it is true, of his indignation at the
declaration of war by Austria and of the improbability of his.
being able to continue to resist the pressure, but he nevertheless,
accepted the o£Fer of the German Emperor: '*At this solemn
moment I beg you earnestly to help me." On the other side,
likewise, the effort to induce the Austrian ally to renew the nego-
tiations was successful.

The measures subsequently taken by the Imperial German
government showed that for the sake of preserving the peace of
the world Berlin was ready to go even beyond the position taken
on July 23rd regarding the Austro-Serbian conflict. In a note
sent to Vienna, on July 29th, it was admitted that Austria-Hun-
gary, in view of her previous experiences, could not be satisfied,
despite a certain readiness on Serbia's part, without receiving
positive guarantees for the fulfilment of her demands; but the
attempt was made to suggest, in the event of war, a limit to
Austria's action, which should have quieted all uneasiness on the
part of Russia. Since Austria, according to her previous decla-
ration, sought no territorial increase in Serbia, the note argued,
presumably the sole aim of the future military operation would
be to obtain such guarantees. If this was correct, Germany ad-
vised Austria to issue a public declaration to this effect, in order
to avoid all misunderstanding. The Imperial Chancellor was
justified in saying to the British Ambassador, Goschen, that the
fact that he had gone so far must be regarded in England as
proof of his earnest desire for peace.^ As he remarked on another
occasion, he was sparing no energy in the effort to urge Vienna
to moderation.^ During the same twenty-four hours, while Grey
was giving uninterrupted and dangerous encouragement to his
allies, the Imperial German government was continuing in Vi-
enna its efforts toward mediation ; in such a manner, indeed, that
the Imperial Chancellor could characterize it in his speech of
August 4th as "going to the limit consonant with our relation
as an ally." *

After Austria-Hungary had decided, on the evening of July
30th, to take Germany's advice, the negotiations between Vienna
and Petrograd were resumed. The possibility of maintaining

^Blae Book, No. 75.

s Blue Book, No. 107.

• Blue Book, No. 103, 104.

522

MODERN GERMANY

peace was thus again opened up at the eleventh hour, through the
intervention of the German Emperor and the compliance of our
ally. We know from these last negotiations that Austria-Hun-
gary declared her readiness to respect the sovereignty of Serbia
and the integrity of her territory, and further that Germany
was prepared to become surety for this pledge. We know, too,
of a renewed suggestion by Grey that Austria-Hungary should
cease her military advance after the occupation of Belgrade and
the surrounding territory, and should accept the mediation of the
four Powers between herself and Russia; this proposal also was
supported in Vienna by the German government.

But all hopes of peace were shattered by Russia with a single
blow. Sassonov, in the negotiations with Austria-Hungary, re-
sumed on the evening of July 30, increased his demands — ^work-
ing hand in hand with England I — in such a manner that it would
have meant the complete surrender of the Monarchy.* Nor was
this all: a few hours later, while Vienna was still considering
her reply, Russia suddenly, with a fateful decision, burned all her
bridges behind her. The certainty gained from a series of actions
on the part of British diplomacy that in case of war the aid of
France and England might be reckoned on, caused Russia to
decide against peace. That this consideration was a decisive fac-
tor in the change of front is shown by the report of the Belgian
Minister in Petrograd, an acceptable witness, even in the eyes
of our enemies; this report, written on July 31, pitilessly exposed
the chain of cause and effect so carefully concealed by Grey. It
acknowledges that ''Germany has striven here, as she has in
Vienna, to find a way to avoid a general conflict." It offers this
revelation : "England let it be understood at first that she would

^ It is remarkable that the tone of the formula originally chosen by SaasonoT
(Oranffe Book No. 60) was, "at the demand of the British Ambassador" (Yellaw
Book No. 113), made considerably sharper, as may be seen here:

YELLOW BOOK

"If Austria agrees to stay the ad-
vance of her troops on Serbian ter-
ritory, and if, recognizing that the
Austro-Serbian dispute has assumed
the character of a question of Etiro-
pean interest, she admits that the
Great Powers shall examine the sat-
isfaction which Serbia mifht giye to
the Austro - Hungarian Government
without affecting her sovereign rights
and indei>endence, Russia undertakes
to maintain her waiting attitude."

This interference on the part of England with the formula is bound to
arouse grave doubts as to tM love of peace of the British policy. Sassonov
had ever;r reason to thank Grey "for the friendly and firm tone" which he has
Jbdopted in the pourparlers with Germany and Austria (Orange Book No. 69).

ORANGE BOOK

''If Austria, recospizing that the
Austro-Serbian Question has assumed
the character of a European question,
declares her willingness to exclude
from l»er ultimatum the points which
threaten the sovereign rights of
Serbia,^ Russia binds herself to cease
her military prq>arationa."

MODERN GERMANY saj

not permit herself to be drawn into a conflict. To-day, however,.
Petrograd is convinced — indeed, assurance has been given — that
England will uphold France. This support is a very strong fac-
tor in the problem, and has served in great measure to help the
war party obtain die upper hand."

The Russian war party, therefore, decreed complete mobiliza-
tion, which was to set the world afire. Without being threat-
ened in a military way, either by Austria-Hungary^ or by the
German Empire,' it took the step the unavoidable consequences
of which on the German side were as clear to the Czar's govern-
ment as they must have been to the other members of the En-
tente,* who claimed to be so greatly concerned for peace. The
insajtiable Asiatic lust for war herewith broke bounds, the lust
which in recent years had been strengthened by the secret and
open encouragement of the Western Powers, and which now,
without asking its promoters, brutally throttled the final efforts
at diplomatic mediation. The responsibility for the plot rests
with more than one state in the camp of our enemies; the re-
sponsibility for the deed must be borne by Russia alone, who,,
in the words of Helfferich, at this moment became the incendiary
in a peaceful world.*

What followed were merely inevitable consequences, which
developed with automatic speed and which at only one point were
subjected to what seemed a voluntary decision.

Through Russia's general mobilization, the moment had come
for Germany when she saw herself forced to meet with the
greatest possible promptness the probability of a war on two
fronts; every hour in which she passively permitted the concen-

^ Russia could not jCNOSsibly have seen a threat in Austria'9 partial mobiliza-
tion against Serbia. The Russian assertion in the communiquS of August 2nd
(Orange Book No. 77), that at the same time (July aist) reports had been
received of a general moUlization by Austria, does not accord with the facta

* That the alleged German preparations, which are said to have necessitated
the Russian mobilization, are contrary to facts, is evident, as that ar^ment
was used only- in relation to other Powers, but was not used by the Czar or
his advisors in their negotiations with the German Emperor or the German
diplomats. In connection with the Russian mobilization, see the German White
Book, and the report of July 31st of Baron De rEscaille, the Belgian Minister
at Petrograd.

* On July 2^th, Secretary of State von Jagow informed the British Ambassador
that "if Russia mobilized onlv in the south, Germany would not mobilize, but
if she mobilized in the north, (jermany would have to do so, too, ana the
Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult
exactly to locate her mobilization" (Blue Book No. 4^). Similarly the French
Ambassador reported that Mr. von Jagow had "pointed out that if Russia
mobilized, (Germany would be obliged to mobilize aa well, that we also would
be forced to do so, and that the struggle would be almost inevitable" (Yellow
Book No. 67).

* It is significant that the introduction to the British Blue Book suppresses
the fact of the Russian general mobilization, and then says in the last para-
graph: "At this moment, on Friday the 31st, (jermany suddenly dispatched an
ultimatum to Russia demanding tliat she should countermand her mobilization
within twelve hours."

S24 MODERN GERMANY

tration of millions of men on her unprotected eastern border
would have been an inexcusable imperilling of the Empire.
Hence, on July 31st, at midnight, the Russian government was
informed that, on account of Russia's general mobilization of her
army and navy, Germany had proclaimed a state of impending
war, which would be followed by mobilization if Russia did not
stop her military measures against Germany and Austria-Hun-
gary within twelve hours and notify Germany to that effect. As
the time limit set in this ultimatum passed without a reply from
Russia, on the afternoon of August ist, at 5 o'clock, the Emperor
ordered mobilization of the entire German army and of the
Imperial fleet; on the same afternoon, before the formal decla-
ration of war had been received in Petrograd, Russian troops
had already passed the border and begun hostilities.

Simultaneously with the ultimatum to Russia, the demand was
made on the French government to declare within eighteen hours
whether it would remain neutraL As we have seen, France from
the very beginning had taken sides in the secret diplomatic game,
but as regards the outside world had hitherto held herself in
reserve. That under all circumstances she would stand by her
Russian ally was known in Berlin, even without the malicious
words attributed to Ambassador Jules Cambon: ''We are not
Italians." And not less clearly had it been made manifest that
all political initiative and decision in Paris was limited to wait-
ing for the cue to be given by Petrograd, and especially by Lon-
don. Hence, the evasive reply from Paris, which meant war
but was so couched as to force the German government to make
the declaration, was not unexpected.

While war was started by Russia on the Continent, it re-
mained stiU a question whether England would immediately take
part The apparent uncertainty could not last long. In this
last diplomatic game Grey's only anxiety was to find a suitable
cause for war which would act so irresistibly on the decision in
the Cabinet and afterward in Parliament and in the public mind
that no protest of the peace elements could make way against it.
On the other hand, it was the task of German diplomacy to de-
prive this enemy set on war of every excuse which might justify
the war before the country; nay, more, it had to make every
effort to render the decision of the Cabinet difficult, if not in-
deed impossible, and if everything else failed, to force the enemy
at least to confess the true reason for the war.

With this thought in mind, the Imperial Chancellor had al-
ready, on July 29^1, before the final crisis, started to sound Eng-
land in the event that Russia's ruthless desire for war should ren-

MODERN GERMANY 525

der a Continental conflict unavoidable. Since he was clearly
aware, from England's policy during recent years and from
Grey's most recent asseverations, that at the root of England's
political calculation was the determination to prevent at any cost
a diminution of France's power, he informed the British Ambas-
sador that Germany was prepared, provided English neutrality
was certain, to give every assurance to the British government
that even in the event of a victory she aimed at no territorial
acquisition at the expense of France.^ Reviewing the negotiations
for disarmament during recent years, he was able to give expres-
sion to the conviction that, as the aim of his policy during his
chancellorship had constantly been the relaxation of tension be-
tween Germany and England, he now had in mind an agreement
of neutrality between the two Powers. To such an extent, then,
was the German Empire ready to tie its hands in the final unde-
sired struggle against French revanche that it renounced in ad-
vance all possible gain from the conflict — the same German
Empire of which the French Prime Minister had declared in
the sitting of the Chamber of December 23, 19 14, that it had
for more than forty years tirelessly pursued the aim of destroy-
ing France in order to subjugate the world. Thus far were we
ready to go in meeting that Power of whose share in the out-
break of the threatening world conflagration we were fully cog-
nizant.

On the next day the o£Fer was rejected unconditionally.
Grey's reply characterized any such stipulation as that proposed
as unacceptable. France, he said, even without loss of territory
in Europe, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great
Power and become subordinate to German policy. The proposal
was evidently so unwelcome to Grey that he characterized such
a ''bargain" with Germany, at the expense of France, as a dis-
grace from which the good name of England would never re-
cover. With justice, HelSerich declares that Grey considered
himself merely as the ally of France whom Germany sought to
seduce. The fact that he expressly reserved freedom to act as
circumstances might require blinded no one ; this was the formula
which, in the case of France and Russia, indicated probable
assistance, but as regards Germany, hostile intervention. It is
with this in mind that the close of his reply is to be interpreted,
if it is to be properly appreciated. He says that if the peace
of Europe could be preserved and the present crisis safely passed,
his own endeavor would be to promote some arrangement by
which Germany could be assured that no aggressive or hostile

^Blue Book No. 85.

526 MODERN GERMANY

policy would be pursued against her by the Triple Entente.
This final verbal arabesque was the ultimate achievement which
the leader for ten years in the policy of isolating Germany was
able to produce in the cause of the world's peace. The fact that
he declared the idea of a general rapprochement as practicable
only after the passing of the crisis — an idea hitherto rejected as
"Utopian'' — showed how vitally important he considered this
crisis to be. Only the diplomatic defeat, as striven for by him,
of the Central Powers, resulting in their permanent disability
for an independent policy, would have represented for him the
crowning of the work and would have opened up for the world
the outlook into a hitherto impossible new era.

Meanwhile, following the start of the Russian mobilization
and the German ultimatum, the current of events swept so
swiftly and irresistibly onward that Grey, in his bewilderment,
was no longer able to check it, even had he desired to lay hold
of the possibility of peace. As soon as German mobilization, the
consequences of which for France he naturally realized, became
imminent, he determined to place the long-deliberated question
before Germany and France: Did they intend to respect the
neutrality of Belgium? The French government had already
become anxious. Grey was forced to admit that the Cabinet
had not yet reached a decision, and that this question of neu-
trality would be, "I could not say a decisive, but an important
factor in determining our attitude." Cambon, however, was
insistent: "Will you help us?" Grey's reply was evasive — ^he
was not yet able publicly to assume a formad obligation. Pa-
thetically Cambon reminded him of 1870: it was not in Eng-
land's interest, he said, that France should be humiliated by
Germany. In that event England, he declared, would be in a
very much weakened position in regard to Germany. In the
year 1870 England had conunitted a sad mistake by permitting
a great increase in Germany's strength — was she going to repeat
this mistake?

The question of Belgian neutrality gave to Grey the long-
sought-for excuse for war which he needed to stampede the
Cabinet, Parliament and public opinion, and which the British
press and that of the world have since then discussed ad infinp-
turn, with appeals to international law and to humanity.

That this excuse for war was only a subterfuge is proved by
several indisputable facts. In anticipation of Grey's designs, on
August 1st, before it had finally declared itself, the German
government demanded of him whether England would obligate
herself to remain neutral in case Germany promised not to vio-

MODERN GERMANY 527

late Belgium's neutrality. Grey, however, refused to give such
a p^romise, by which, if he had really been concerned for Bel-
gium, he might have saved the unhappy country from its fate.^
Grey was thereby prevented beforehand from playing the trump
of Belgian neutrality — he considered it permissible, however, to
keep this inquiry from the knowledge of the Cabinet and Parlia-
ment. Indeed, he even went further. Following Grey's re-
fusal, Prince Lichnowsky urged him at least to formulate the
possible conditions for England's neutrality, the Ambassador
himself increasing the offer of July 29th by proposing a guaran-
tee on the part of Germany of the integrity of France and of
the French colonies. This offer also Grey withheld from the
Cabinet, as all negotiations on this basis would have defeated
his pre-determined action. Such conduct is to be explained only
by a fixed determination for war.

As a matter of fact. Grey had completely bound England's
hands, in the interest of France, even before he was justified in
assuming Belgian neutrality to be threatened. On the after-
noon of the same ist of August he gave the French Ambassador,
who had become anxiously insistent, reason to expect a promise
which he was able formally to make to him the very next morn-
ing. In the Cabinet meeting on the morning of August 2nd —
that in which he withheld the German offers and inquiries!—
he caused a resolution to be passed which authorized him (with
the customary formal reservations) to inform Cambon that if
the German fleet were to come through the North Sea or into
the English Channel, with the purpose of hostile attacks against
the French coast or French shipping, the British fleet would lend
France its full support.' This far-reaching promise was nothing
less than a positive undertaking to go to war against Germany,'
an obligation which was the inevitable result of the spirit of the
Franco-English naval convention. The obligation, however, was
assimied before the inquiry as regards the passage of German
troops had been made in Brussels on the evening (at seven
o'clock) of the 2nd of August. This offers positive proof, in
addition to the negative proof, that the question of Belgium's
neutrality was not the deciding factor — but that, rather, the
British fleet, in the period from the 2nd to the 4th of August,
independently of the question of neutrality and before a decision
regarding it had been reached, would have forcibly prevented a
German attack on the north coast of France, thus beginning the

^Blue Book No. 123.

'Blue Book No. 148; Yellow Book No. 137,

■Yellow Book, No. 143-

528 MODERN GERMANY

war on its own account. In possession of this statement France
gave the above-mentioned evasive reply to the German ulti-
matum, which led to the declaration of war.

The leading imperialistic group of the government, which was
determined on war, needed this Belgian excuse in order to over-
come the opposition of a strong party in the Cabinet opposed to
the war. Nor at the crucial moment did this argimient prove
sufficient for a small minority represented by such men as Lord
Morley, John Burns and Trevelyan. The majority, however,
was determined to disregard an even stronger resistance in their
own party, and in extreme case of need to form a coalition min-
istry for the World War with the Conservative opposition, whose
manner of political thought was based on force alone and who
unconditionally supported the government and urged forward
even more violently. With this means at their disposal, says
Shaw, "Sir Edward Grey and Mr, Asquith let loose the lion."

The real impelling motive of English statesmenship, whose
diplomatic exponent Grey was at this moment, must be sought at
another point — in the basic conception of the whole policy of
isolation. Whoever has followed the significance and the inter-
connection of events in the preliminary history of the war will
not be surprised to see that the systematic preparation and the
tenacious clinging to an idea could have as a final result only the
completed deed. When in the course of the war the burdens
and sacrifices mounted, contrary to England's expectation, to a
point where Belgian neutrality no longer seemed sufficient as a
decisive war motive for a healthy national egoism, the political
heads of the nation held it to be wiser to discard a fictitious mo-
tive which was fundamentally un-English and to call things by
their true names. In a leading article in The Times, of March
9, 191 5, this admission was made with a ruthless frankness which
cannot surprise the initiated : "We do not set up to be interna-
tional Don Quixotes, ready at all times to redress wrongs which
do us no hurt. Even had Germany not invaded Belgium, honor
and interest would have united us with France." Soon there-
after Lord Haldane, the one-time pro-German decoy of the
Cabinet, indulged in this observation: "Belgium touched our
honor, France our sentiment and interest. If we consider the
theory of world conquest underlying the successful German
movement in favor of a war of attack, it seems to me that it
would have been madness to sit still with folded hands while
Germany was sweeping aside the obstacles on the Continent to an
attack on the British Empire." He also implies the fact (of
which Grey's declaration gives documentary proof) that Eng-

MODERN GERMANY 529

land would have detennined to take part in the world war
even without the passage of Germany through Belgium.

It is not, however, the whole truth to say that England en-
tered the war on France's account. By a promise of neutrality,
the English might have gained Germany's assurance that France's
territorial integrity would not be disturbed. It was not a sign
of diplomatic weakness on the part of Germany, but a well-cal-
culated move to force her enemies to disclose their last card,
when, with knowledge of the naval convention and the promise
of August 2nd, she took an additional step and declared herself
ready to guarantee not to disturb the north coast of France,
French shipping and French colonies. Truly the buckler which the
ruler of the seas would have set up before her ally was strong
and high enough to protect her colleague in the Entente against
every danger. But this was not sufficient — there was a greater
interest at stake.

Concealed under the negative purpose of preventing the weak-
ening of France at any price, there existed the positive desire of
causing Germany's enfeeblement throu^ a coalition of Powers
which could never again be reproduced. There was, on the one
hand, the well-weighed belief, which Ambassador de Bunsen in-
cautiously admitted, that Germany and Austria-Hungary would
probably be strong enough to defeat France and Russia, and that
only the decided and immediate intervention of England could
render the opposite result certain. On the other hand, there
existed the not unfounded fear that, if this opportunity were not
seized, the Entente allies would be permanently estranged and
would turn away from England — there would thus be nothing
left for the English state than to be friendly with Germany
and to resign itself to that country's claim to existence. That
was the very situation which England had for years striven to
prevent, and which now at the last moment she would not accept.
This policy had been unconditionally adopted in favor of France,
and although England was aware that she was thereby also
electing in favor of the Russian offensive against the Central
Powers, she had at all times sought so to play the game that at
the moment of a great crisis Germany would have to face all
three Powers.

The leading men of the country which, thanks to its insular
situation, had risen to a dominant position by taking skillful
advantage of the conjuncture of events, could not resist the
temptation at this apparently favorable moment to establish the
supremacy of their own land on the ruins of Germany's world-
embracing efforts. Only by taking full advantage of this oppor-

530 MODERN GERMANY

tunity could they hope to put the dangerous German rival in
trade and industry, on the sea and in the colonies, out of the
running for a long time, or perhaps even forever. That the
instinct of trade rivalry had, unseen, gained in strength, was
proved by the action of British journalism after the outbreak of
the war, when it set out to incite the whole world to an attack
on German markets, and indulged in dreams of leveling every
German foundry to the ground. Thus the basic guiding idea
of the policy of isolation finally came dominantly to the fore,
for the first time since its conception by King Edward. It
lies concealed behind the manner in which Grey, with less
certain hand than usual, in the final week threw the weight of
his state against every serious chance of peace and finally de-
cisively in favor of war.

The self-deception of Grey is the fundamental error of the
policy of isolation. It was not even his most serious mistake
when he made the cold-blooded statement in Parliament that
participation in the war would not cost the English much more
than would neutrality — ^this argumentum ad homtnem, aimed to
render calculation as regards the war plausible to the commercial
mind of his compatriots, shows, at all events, that in this man the
inhibitions which would have led him to prevent the war were
but feebly developed. His fundamental weaknesses lie much
deeper. He was haunted by the unfounded fear of the world
supremacy of Germany, which had so long been denounced as
Napoleonic that the world had come to believe in it. He was
misled by the fatal undervaluation of the strength of Austria-
Hungary and by the mistaken belief in the possibility of eco-
nomically starving and cutting off Germany. Just as he over-
estimated the anti-German arguments in their entirety, as these
were circulated in the camp of the Triple Entente, so he under-
estimated the internal powers of his enemy — the ethical and spir-
itual, the military and technical, the economic and financial
reserve forces of a nation which was able and determined to con-
fmit its upward course without offensive and in peace.

CHAPTER III
BELGIUM'S NEUTRALITY

PROFESSOR WALTHER SCHOENBORN, OF HEIDELBERG

DURING the war, no single charge has been more effective
in arousing public opinion against Germany than that
which has been exploited in hostile as well as neutral countries —
that we committed an arbitrary breach of international law in
violating Belgium's neutrality. A glance at the war literature
published in neutral countries shows that no accusation has had
more lasting success, though those who have raised their voices
the loudest have gradually been driven, through the publication by
the German government of documents found in the Brussels ar-
chives, from the offensive to the defensive, and this defensive
attitude is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.^

An examination of this charge and of the grounds on which it
is based, as well as of the points which serve as a vindication for
Germany, must be confined to an investigation of the legal
aspect of the subject, since the accusation does not concern itself
with the question whether Germany's action was politically wise
or expedient, but whether it was admissible under the law of
nations.

The speech which the German Imperial Chancellor, Dr. von
Bethmann-HoUweg, made before the Reichstag, on August 4,
1914, is generally selected by Germany's opponents as a con-

^For a characteristic example of the type referred to, see La Belgique Ntutre
9i Loyaie, by Professor Emll Waxweiler, L.ausanne, 1915* of which an American
edition, entitled Belgium: Neutral and Loyal, was published in New York, 191 5.
Passages taken at nmdom from the book go to show that Mr. Waxweiler touches
but lightly on the dangerous points of the German j^ublications, meeting them
with fictitious arguments, or passing them over in silence, thus disclosing the
inherent weakness of his position. It is regrettable that his skill in the use
of material already well known is greater than his conscientiousness. He quotes
(p. 91) — from No. 85 of the British Blue Book — the Imperial Chancellor's state-
ment to Sir £. Goshen on July 39th concerning Belgium: "It will depend on
the action of France what operations Germany may be forced to undertake in

guaranteed

would be at the mercy of military operations." Note that the statement of
the Imperial Chancellor said clearly that France's action woixld decide Ger-
many's attitude! Again (d. 154) Mr. Waxweiler states that "one date domi-
nates all these allegations, and sa^s: "It was on July 39th that the Imperial
Chancellor, in his conversation with the British Ambassador at Berlin, an-
nounced for the first time that, in the event of a conflict with France, Get-
many would only respect the integrity of Belgium if she did not resist the
free passage of German troops across her territory." It is sUtements of this
sort that force one to regard with the utmost caution all the new material
adduced by Mr. Waxweiler.

532 MODERN GERMANY

«

venient starting-point for their campaign. It is true that in
connection with the entry into Belgium the Chancellor speaks
of a breach of international law; but before being interpreted
against Germany, as is generally done, the words of the Imperial
Chancellor deserve closer investigation. The pertinent sentences
read as follows:

"Gentlemen, we arc now forced to defend ourselves; and
necessity knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxem-
burg, and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory.
Gentlemen, this is contrary to the principles of international
law. It is true the French government declared in Brussels
its intention to respect Belgilun's neutrality as long as its op-
ponents would do so. We know, however, that France stood
ready to invade the country. France could wait, but we
could not. A French attack on our flank on the Lower Rhine
might have had fatal consequences for us. Consequently we
were forced to disregard the legitimate protests of the Luxem-
burg and Belgian governments. The wrong — I speak quite
candidly — ^which we are now committing we shall endeavor
to make good as soon as we have attained our military goal.
He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for what he holds
most dear, can think only as to how he can hew his way out !"

And further:

"We have assured the British government that as long as
England remains neutral our fleet will not attack the northern
coast of France, and that we shall not encroach upon the
territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. I repeat
this assurance here before the whole world. . . ."

Naturally, these words can be correctly understood and appre-
ciated only if the general situation at the time they were uttered
is taken into consideration. Spoken in an hour in which the
fate of the German Empire hung in the balance, and forming
part of a vital political statement by the government to a politi-
cal gathering, they were not intended as, nor could they be, an
objective and carefully considered theoretical verdict regarding
the legal aspect of Germany's procedure. They represent rather
an integral part of a political action. The object of this action,
and consequently the real meaning of the words so promptly and
eagerly turned against Germany, were subsequently made
clear in another equally important announcement of the Imperial

MODERN GERMANY 533

Chancellor, which must be considered in conjunction with his
initial speech, in order that the latter be clearly understood.
In the second war session of the Reichstag, on December 2,
19 14, the Imperial Chancellor declared:

"The neutrality of Belgium, which England pretended to
protect, is a mask. At 7 o'clock on the evening of the 2nd of
August we informed Brussels that the French plan of cam-
paign, which was known to us, compelled us, for reasons of
self-preservation, to march through Belgium ; but as early as the
afternoon of that very day — the 2nd of August — that is to
say, before anything was known or could be known in London
of our action in Brussels, England had assured France of her
unconditional support, in the event of the German fleet attack-
ing the French coast. Not a word was said of the neutrality
of Belgium. This fact is established by Sir Edward Grey's
statement, made in the House of Commons on the 3rd of
August, but which, owing to the difficulty in telegraphic com-
munication, had not come to my knowledge in extenso on the
4th of August. It is furthermore confirmed by the Blue
Book of the British government itself. How, then, can Eng-
land claim to have drawn her sword because we had violated
Belgiiun's neutrality? And how could the British statesmen,
who were perfectly cognizant of the past, speak about Belgian
neutrality at all ? When, on the 4th of August, I spoke of the
wrong we were committing by marching into Belgium, it was
not yet certain whether the Belgian government would not
in the hour of need decide to save the country and withdraw
to Antwerp under protest. You remember, that at the request
of our military administration, after the capture of Liege, I
made a fresh proposal to the Belgian government to this ef-
fect. For military reasons it was imperative on August 4th
to maintain the possibility of such a development at all costs.
Even at that time there were many indications of the Belgian
government's guilt, though positive written proofs were not
dien at my disposal. But the English statesmen were per-
fectly familiar with these proofs. The documents which were
found in Brussels, and which have been given publicity by
me, establish how and to what extent Belgium had relin-
quished her neutrality to England. Two facts are now made
quite clear to the world: When our troops entered Belgian
territory during the night of the 3rd to the 4th of August,
they were in the confines of a state which had long since rid-
dled its own neutrality. The other fact is that England did

534 MODERN GERMANY

not declare war on us for the sake of Belgium's neutrality,
which she had helped to undermine, but because she believed
she would be able, with the help of two great Continental mill-
• tary powers, to crush us. . . ."

With this, the real meaning of the Imperial Chancellor's dec-
larations of August 4th is clearly explained. The German gov-
ernment at that time still hoped to accomplish the march through
Belgium without meeting serious armed resistance. In order to
make it easy for Belgium to adopt an attitude conforming with
these expectations, the German government did not assume the
position that its troops were entitled to march through by virtue
of a legal right, but admitted that it committed thereby a legal
infringement. The German government might have spoken
differently; but, in the first place, documentary proofs of the
previous breaches of Belgium's neutrality were lacking at the
time, and, in the second place, it was not only France but also
England that was seriously compromised by them. On the
afternoon of August 4, however, England's attitude toward Ger-
many had not been publicly decided on; there was, perhaps, still
hope of preventing her from participating in the war. It was
known that England was- deeply interested in the integrity of
Belgium; or, to express it more precisely, she was apprehensive
of Germany establishing herself permanently on Belgium's North
Sea coast. If now, the Imperial Chancellor, in an open session
of the Reichstag, expressly declared the entry into Belgium as
wrong, the strongest guaranty conceivable was thereby given to
the world that Belgium would later on be completely evacuated.
On the other hand, a public reference made by Germany at this
moment of Belgium's violation of her own neutrality, through
secret agreements with France and England, would have com-
pelled the German government forthwith to declare Belgium an
enemy and opponent, thus leaving no choice to England.

For purposes of this investigation, it follows that the words
of the Imperial Chancellor, spoken on August 4, 191 4, cannot
be taken as an estimate of the question in its relationship to in-
ternational law.

The German entry into Belgium has been characterized as a
breach of international law from two points of view:

I. Germany is claimed to have expressly recognized by treaty
the permanent neutrality of Belgium, and to have violated this
treaty obligation by her invasion.

MODERN GERMANY 535

2. By the mere fact of being a neutral state — that is to say>
by not being a participant in the war — Belgium, it is maintained,
had the right to forbid any belligerent from trespassing on her
territory; indeed, according to objective principles of interna-
tional law, she is not supposed even to have been in a position to
permit a belligerent either to enter or march through her terri-
tory. On the contrary, she is assumed to have been under the
obligation of preventing such action.

Some have combined these two points of view by identifying the
rights and duties of a permanently neutral state in war-time
with those of a state which simply happens to be neutral in a
particular war. This is correct as regards the inadmissibility
of other states encroaching on the territory of the neutral state;
but in other respects the rights and duties of the permanently
neutral, or neutralized state, are more comprehensive, as is com-
monly recognized in theory and practice (see below).

The neutralization and the resulting permanent neutrality of
Belgium was legally based up to the present on the treaties of
April 19, 1839. By virtue of these, at the termination of her
war of independence against Holland, which was incited by
France in order to further her schemes of expansion, Belgium
was formally recognized by Holland. The recognition of Bel-
gium by the Great Powers, viz., France, Austria, England, Prus-
sia and Russia, was expressly renewed, and the provisions of the
Dutch-Belgian Treaty were placed under the guaranty of the
Great Powers. The permanent neutrality of Belgium was ex»
pressed in the following terms (Art. VH, of the main treaty
between Belgium and Holland) :

"LsL Belgique, dans les limites indiquees aux Articles z, 2, et 4, for-
mera un £tat independent et perpetuellement neutre. Elle sera tenue
d'observer cette meme neutralit6 envers tous les autres £tats" (Belgium,
ivithin the limits specified in Articles i, a, and 4, shall form an inde-
pendent and perpetually neutral state. She shall be bound to observe
such neutrality toward all other states).

The guaranty given by the five Great Powers (Holland is not
included here) is expressed in the following words:

"[The ^ve Great Powersj) . . . d^larent que les articles ci-annex^s
et formant la teneur du Trait6 conclu en ce jour entre S. M. le roi des
Beiges et S. M. le roi des Pays Bas, grand-due de Luxembourg, sont
considir^s comme ayant la meme force et valeur que s'ils itaient tex-
tuellement ins6r^ dans le present Acte, et qu'ils se trouvent ainsi
plac^ sous la guarantie de Leurs-dites Majest^s*' ( [The Bve Great
Powers] . . . declare that the Article hereunto annexed and forming
the tenor of the Treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the
King of Belgium and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand

536 MODERN GERMANY

Duke of Luxembourg, are considered as having the same force and va-
lidity as if they were textual ly inserted in the present Act, and that
they are thus placed under the guaranty of their said Majesties). (See
Sec III, 3.)*

The second point — viz,, the inviolability of the territory of
any neutral state — ^is covered by the provisions of the fifth Con-
vention of the Second Hague Peace Conference of OctcAer 18,
1907, concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers and
persons in case of war on land, more particularly by Articles I,
2, 5, par. I, and Article 10 of that Convention. The original
French text of the same reads as follows:

''Article z. Le territoire des Puissances neutres est inviolable.

"Article 2. II est interdit aux bellig^rants de faire passer k tr avers
le territoire d'une Puissance neutre des troupes ou des convois soit de
munitions, soit d'approvisionnements.

''Article 5. (Section i.) Une Puissance neutre ne doit tol6rer sur
son territoire aucun des actes vis^s par les articles 2 k 4.

"Article la Ne peut etre consid^r^ comme un acte hostile le fait,
par une Puissance neutre, de repousser, m^me par la force, les atteintes
k sa neutrality."

["Article i. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

"Article 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of
either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral
Power.

"Article 5. (Par. x.) A neutral Power must not allow any of the
acta referred to in articles 2 and 4 to occur on its territory.

"Article 10. The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force,
attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act"]

The Belgians themselves, as well as the English, have based
their charges mainly on the treaties of 1839, while the stipula-
tions of the Hague Convention have been frequently quoted by
the American friends of Belgium, particularly by Mr. Roosevelt.
In this, Mr. Roosevelt and the other supporters of the same
view labor under a misconception of the legal position. It is
true that in principle the Hague Convention applies to every
Treaty Power, but only in case it is actually neutral in a given

^ Article I of the Treaty concluded by the Fire Great Powers with Belgium.
A corresponding provision is contained in Article II of the Treaty of the Great
Powers with the Netherlands.

> Up to the present time, this convention has not been ratified either by
Great Britain or Serbia. It stipulates in Article XX that "the provisions of
the present Convention do not apply, except as between contracting Powers, and
then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention/' But Germany
would not derive from that fact justification for declaring the Convention as
not binding, if for no other reason than that England — ^unttl the evening of
August 4tfr--waft not yet a participant in the war; and for the further reason
that the quoted stipulations are in effect nothing more than the legal customs
existing, and held to be lawful, before the Hague Conference.

MODERN GERMANY 537

ft

war. The moment such a state itself becomes a participant in
the war it is evident that the Convention ceases to be applicable
to it and that the laws of war come into force instead. Now,
whether or not a state is to remain neutral in a war does not by
any means depend exclusively on its own will ; generally speaking,
a state can wage war against another state at any time, when it
believes that its interests demand such action. The law of na-
tions does not in any way prohibit this, just as there are no
international rules as to when a war is "legally permissible" and
when not.

The Boer Republics had no desire whatsoever for war in
1899; they would certainly have preferred to remain "neutral"
— viz., in this case immune from attacL A state can perhaps
prevent its troops from going to war, and thereby avoid a san-
guinary decision by battle, as was done by Bulgaria as regards
Rumania in the second Balkan War; but in behalf of its own
interests it cannot, in face of the determination of another state
to begin hostilities, prevent the advent of a state of war, with
all its effects as regards international law.^ Public opinion and
general moral sentiment may or may not in a given case approve
of involving in a war a state which wishes to remain officially
neutral, for the time being or altogether. The legal position is
always the same according to international law (with the excep-
tion of one special case). The eminent Swiss professor of inter-
national law. Max Huber, is quite right when he says, in ref-
erence to using neutral territory for warlike operations, to com-
pelling a neutral to participate in a war, or to the abandonment
of his neutrality by the neutral himself:

"The decision as to such an action — ^which regularly results
in involving the neutral state in the war — is always determined
by the compelling interest of the state, or, what amounts to the
same thing, by military necessity. The decision as to whether
such a necessity exists, however, can no more be determined by
law than the necessity as to war or peace. The law connects
certain legal effects — those of the rules of war — with the infrac-
tion of the rules of peace, but these effects are the same whether
such a necessity existed or not." ^

The Hague Convention, concerning neutrality, determines only
the duties of belligerents towards the neutral states, and vice
versa, consequently also the actions on the part of the one or the
other, which constitute a breach of neutrality, and which, as long
as the neutrality continues, are not permissible and under given

1 See Intemationai Law, by Westlake, Vol. II, ad edition, p. a.
« See Zeitschrift fur Volkerrecht, Vol. VII, p. 357 ff.

538 MODERN GERMANY

circumstances not legally compatible with it. On the other hand,
the Convention cannot, nor is it intended that it should, give legal
guarantee against the termination — even though one-sided — of
the neutrality of a state. Such a general guarantee would not
be possible, as international law stands to-day, because it would
amount to a prohibition of war.

Huber, therefore, correctly defines "the question whether neu-
trality is to exist or not/' as one "of a purely strategic and politi-
cal nature," with the single exception of the case "that active
and passive neutrality is from the beginning guaranteed (perma-
nent neutrality and neutralization ).*'

In the ultimatum of August 2, 1914 (Belgian Gray Book
No. 20), the German government in unmistakable manner
threatened Belgium with war in case of resistance to the pas-
sage of the German troops. By the presentation of the ulti-
matum Belgium was already, at least conditionally, "involved
in the war.'* As soon as that condition arose the fifth Hague
Convention automatically ceased to apply to Belgium, and dis-
regard of its provisions did not signify a breach of international
law, provided that "involving Belgium in the war" was in itself
legally permissible. According to the above, however, such an
"involving" is de jure left to the free determination of each bel-
ligerent, provided he is not bound by any special treaty, or, in
other words, provided he has not previously recognized the per-
manent neutrality of the state in question. The legal question
therefore culminates in one point: Was Germany legally
bound by the treaty of neutralization; was she in the present
case under a legal obligation to respect the permanent neutrality
of Belgium, or was she not? If she was not, then the Hague
Convention was no longer a legal obstacle to the German ac-
tion; whereas, in the former case, it would be applicable in
determining the duties of Germany and Belgium.

Only if Germany, in August, 1914, was legally bound to
respect the neutralization treaty, was her action towards Bel-
gium a breach of international law.^ But even in such a case,
diough entitled to take up arms in self-defense, Belgium would

*Sec America and the World War, by Theodore Roosevelt, New York, 191 5f
p. Z12 ft. Mr. Roosevelt's belief that the United Statea» after ascertaining that
the facts were as represented, should intervene against Germany, on account
of the violation of the Hague Convention in regard to Belgium, is therefore
without any legal justification in so far as the fifth Hague Convention is con-
cerned, if only for the reasons given in the text. In common with all the
other signatory Powers^ the United States only "ratified" the Hague Conven-
tions— that is to say, tney recognized the Conventions as binding in their own
relations towards the other signatory Powers, but they did not "guarantee**
the conventions, or bind themselves to enforce their stipulations in the rela-
tions between other signatory Powers. "International law," therefore, does not
support Mr. Roosevelt^ attitude.

MODERN GERMANY 539

have had to observe the rules of international law concerning
the conduct of war. Germany was fully justified in proceeding
with reprisals against the lawless resistance of the Belgian popu-
lation, which had no regard for the precepts of the laws of war.^

II

The German government has always recognized the validity,
in principle, of the neutralization agreements. Serious doubts
have been raised, however, in scientific circles in regard to two
points: First, was Germany even outwardly and formally bound
by the treaties of 1839? A great number of scholars, including
conscientious and impartial neutrals, have expressed doubts on
this point. For, in die first place, it was not the German Em-
pire— ^which has only existed as such since 1871 — nor the North
German Ginfederation, which only came into being in 1867 —
that entered into an obligation in 1839, but Prussia, which was
in fact juridically and historically a totally difiFerent legal en-
tity.

Futhermore, an event that took place in 1870 makes the pre-
vailing opinion at that time as regards the binding force of the
treaties of 1839 seem highly doubtful. After the outbreak of
the Franco-German War, in order to safeguard Belgium's neu-
trality, England concluded with the North German Confeder-
acy and with France identical treaties, which provided for a pos-
sible alliance on the part of England with either one of the bel-
ligerents, for the sole purpose of protecting Belgium's neutrality,
in case the other should violate it. Why, one asks, was such a
special treaty necessary if the binding force of the old treaties
was beyond doubt? Nevertheless, the formal validity of the
latter also for Germany must be acknowledged. It is quite true
that when a federal state is founded, the treaties previously en-
tered into by its individual members do not forthwith, ipso jure,
apply to the federacy itself: A state can, in principle, only be
bound in its international relations by its own free will. But,
as far as is known, the Imperial German government never dis-

^ In this connection Mr. Roosevelt seems to labor under a strange miscon*
ception, according to his statement in The Outlook of September 23, 1914*
p. I75» and further statements in his book, America and the World War, to
which reference has alreadv been made. He either gives a totally wrong
interpretation to the term ''hostile act," as used in Article X of the Fifth
Hague Convention, and to the article itself, which cannot exclude the opening
of hostilities against a State that has remained neutral; or else he fails to
recognize that the German reprisals in Belgium were not directed against the
militarv resistance of Belgium as a State, but merely a^nst the unlawful
methods employed by the Belgian population in their resistance.

540 MODERN GERMANY

puted that the neutralization treaties of 1839 were binding on
Germany; on the contrary, as late as April, 191 3, the German
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, referred to
these treaties in the Budget Commission of the Reichstag as
existing and as valid also for Germany (cf. Belgian Gray Book
No. 12, appendix) ; nor has the German government during the
course of the war ever denied the formal validity of the treaties.
Belgium's history makes the material security which the neu-
tralization of 1839 was able to give to the new state appear
highly questionable, especially in view of France's annexation
schemes (cf. section III, 3) ; and the conclusion by England of
the double treaty of 1870, which was chiefly brought about
through Bismarck's revelations concerning the like intentions of
Napoleon III, certainly does not give proof of confidence on the
part of Great Britain in the binding power and efficacy of the
old treaties. Nevertheless, the double treaty does not in itsi
wording imply an annulment of the old treaties ; on the contrary,
not only is the view perfectly plausible that the treaties of 1870
were only to provide for effectual application of the old treaties
in a fecial case, without being in any way prejudicial to their
future efficacy, with all the resulting consequences, but the cor-
rectness of this view is also clearly proved by the concluding
clause of Art. 3 of the double treaty, which provides that, after
the expiration of the new treaty: ''. • . the independence and
neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting
Parties arc respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore
on the first Article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April,
1839." Although this article attributes to the treaties of 1839
only the same effectiveness which they had previously possessed,
no unbiassed judge can fail to see that we have here an express
acknowledgment of the old treaties, also by the North German
Confederation.

The second point of dispute seems to have more weight. Is
not the neutralization of a state such as Belgium, situated as it
is in the midst of great military Powers, preposterous in itself,
and does not permanent neutrality impose inherently contradic-
tory duties on such a state ? Much can certainly be said in favor
of this point of view. For example, the (armed) neutral state
IS prohibited from waging an offensive war, but it is directly
obliged vigorously to protect its neutrality, even by means of a
defensive war; the distinction, however, between an offensive
and defensive war is in reality sometimes very slight. Truly, it
is in the last analysis absurd to place a state of the second or
third order, which is not protected by geographical conditions,

MODERN GERMANY 541

under the obligation to resist violation of its territory by a Great
Power, if need be by means of war — that is to say, to endanger
its existence as a state; whereas, every other state is legally en-
titled to decide whether or not it will oppose such violation by
force of arms. Guaranty treaties with third states do not o£Eer
any real equivalent for this.

But juridically this argument does not seem convincing. The
permanent neutralization of states has formed part of the recog-
nized principles of international law in the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries; and despite certain discouraging experiences in
other cases, precisely Belgium's permanent neutrality was, until
the present war, regularly regarded both in (official) practice
and in theory as a reality; even in recent years it supplied the
chief arguments in the dispute concerning the admissibility of
fortifying Flushing; the jurist cannot very well ignore this.
Perhaps the present war will change general conceptions as to
the feasibility and practicability of the artificial neutralization of
a state ; but to-day an examination of the legal position from the
standpoint of international law must still take into account the
conceptions which have prevailed until now.

Ill

Through its spokesman, the Imperial Chancellor, as well as
through repeated pronouncements of von Jagow, the Secretary
of State for Foreign AfiFairs, the Imperial German government
characterized at the start the German entry into Belgium as aa
act of urgent necessity. Likewise, the ultimatum to Belgium, q£^
the 2nd of August, 1914, was based on the same conception;
The march through Belgian territory was absolutely imperative
in the interest of self-preservation by the German Empire; only
in this way did it seem possible to resist successfully die efforts
of Germany's enemies to crush her. The government regretted
the necessity of encroaching formally on the rights of a third
state (viz., Belgium) and promised all possible indemnification.

The legal standpoint of the German government can perhaps
be best elucidated by a parallel taken from domestic law: A
forester, who is attacked by a poacher, sees an armed companion
of the latter stealthily approaching under cover of another man's
house, and on the point of entering it for the purpose of obtain-
ing a favorable aim; the forester thereupon bursts open the
door and enters the house himself, in order to take the second
poacher by surprise and overpower him. The action of the for-

542 MODERN GERMANY

ester is permissible, but he must compensate the owner of the
house for the damage he has done.

Two questions arise in this connection: First, was the Ger-
man Empire really in a position of urgent necessity? Second, if
such necessity existed, was Germany thereby justified according
to international law in violating the old neutralization treaties?
Both contentions have been disputed by our enemies, but both
are sound.

For it was Germany that was attacked — the proof of this is
to be found in the history of the events antecedent to the war.
The annihilation of Germany, or at the very least the destruction
of her world-position, was the undisputed object of her opponents
at the time of and after the outbreak of war. This would have
been known to Germany, even if the ludicrous desires and
schemes of her opponents for the partition and mutilation of her
territory had not been so naively disclosed in their official and
private utterances during the first months of the war. Germany
was in a most difficult strategic position from the very begin-
ning: involved in a war on two fronts with two of the most
powerful military Powers of Europe, which had in recent years
made tremendous preparations for war ; deprived of her freedom
of action at sea owing to England's highly threatening attitude
even in the last days of July ; and in the beginning, furthermore,
forced to rely mainly on her own military resources because it
was no longer possible to hope for armed assistance from Italy,
and because her ally, Austria, also immediately involved in a war
on two fronts, could employ only a part of her forces against
Russia, whose army alone was estimated to be numerically equal
to the combined forces of the Central Powers, while the French
troops available at the very beginning of the war were undoubt-
edly not very far inferior in number to the German army. There
was but one advantage on Germany's side to counterbalance all
this: the prospect that the great numerical superiority of her
enemies could be effectively developed only after the lapse of
more or less time, whereas the rapidity of the German mobiliza-
tion was regarded as unparalleled, or at any rate as considerably
superior to that of Russia. It was, indeed, as Mr. von Jagow
said, a question "of life and death" for Germany, to take advan-
tage of this superiority so as to overthrow, perhaps, one opponent
before the other could deal a dangerous blow. A delay of only
a few weeks meant that the danger of being crushed by superior
numbers would become a probability.

There was, in addition, the following decisive consideration:
The Belgian frontier was Germany's Achilles heel, the spot

MODERN GERMANY 543

where she was exposed to a mortal hurt, since there were prac-
tically no obstacles along this front in the way of an army seek-
ing to invade the Rhenish industrial districts, which are the cen-
tre of strength of Germany at war; there was no ring of for-
tresses comparable, for instance, to the northern fortresses of
France, to delay the advance of the enemy. The full significance
of this situation was naturally appreciated by the French mili-
tary authorities, and they were prepared to take advantage of it.
Strong French forces — as the German government was reliably
informed — stood ready to march along the Belgian section of the
Meuse, that is to say, along the Givet-Namur line.* Even with
the best of intentions, the Belgian government could not have
prevented France, with her superior numbers, from using Bel-
gium as the base for her attack on Germany.^ It is true that on
August 1st the French government had assured Belgium that it
would respect the latter's neutrality; but at the same time it ex-
pressly reserved full liberty of action for itself in the event that
Belgium's neutrality should "not be respected" by another
Power.* What, however, do the words, "not be respected," sig-
nify? They amount to reserving the right of asserting at any
time, and of acting on the strength of such assertion, that the
fact that a German patrol had by mistake strayed onto Belgian
soil, or that a German aviator had flown over some projection of
Belgian territory, constituted a breach of Belgium's neutrality by
Germany.

^The correctness of the information which the German government receired
concerning this is confirmed by: i, numerous statements of reliable witnesses^
who testified to the presence of French officers and soldiers on Belgian ter-
ritory before the delivery of the German ultimatum to Belgium (these state-
ments have been published in America, in Richard Grasshoff's The Tragedy of
Belgium, New Yorkj 191 St P* ^3 ff ) ; 2, the seizure of French mobilization maps
of sections of Belgian and Dutch territories, which were tied in packets, and
according to the inscriptions, were to be opened only in the event of mobili-
zation; 3, the fact that the Belgian government was officially advised by
Prance as ear^ as July 31st of the massing of French troops on the Belgian
frontier (see Gray Book, No. p); 4, the fact that on August 3rd, at the very
latest, France officially offered the Belgian government the support of five
French army corps (see Blue Bool^-No. 151).

'According to the report of April 33, 1012, made by the English Military
Attache in Brussels, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, in the crisis of 191 1 England
had intended, with exactly the same justification, to land her troops in Belgium
even without the consent of the Belgian government.

*The text of the declaration of the French Ambassador reads: "In the event
of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French govern-
ment, in order to insure its own defense, mi^ht be led to modify its attitude"
(Gray Book, No. 15). As to the worth of this and a previous English declara-
tion bearing on the same matter, see also **Common Sense About the War,"
by G. Bernard Shaw, in The New Statesman, November 14, 1914, p. a8:
'*The apparent moral superiority of the pledge given by France and England
to respect Belgian neutrality is illusory in face of the facts that France and
England stood to gain enormously, and the (^mans to lose correspondingly,
by confining the attack on France to the heavily fortified Franco-German
frontier, and that as France and England knew they would be invited by the
Belgians to enter Belgium if the Germans invaded it, the neutnlity of Belgium
had, as far as they were concerned, no real cadstence."

544 MODERN GERMANY

If France had really wished to adhere strictly to the neutrality
treaties, she should have said: "We shall re^>ect Belgian neu-
trality, until Belgium calls on us or violates her ov^n neutrality/'
But, as it was worded, the Frendi declaration did not in fact
offer the slightest security either to the Belgian or to the German
government. Nevertheless, it satisfied the Belgian as well as
the British government. The French reply was officially knovirn
to the German government. But the latter knew more; it
knew that on August ist Sir Edward Grey had not only posi-
tively refused to pledge England's neutrality in the impends
ing war on the basis of Germany's far-reaching concessions,
but had also refused for his part to name any definite conditions
on which England might engage to remain neutral. In express
terms he had declared that a German promise not to violate Bel-
gium's neutrality was not sufficient as a condition for England
to remain neutral.^ The fundamental difference is very striking
between this attitude and that of England in 1870, when she
concluded a provisional alliance with each of the belligerents
based on the contingency that one of them violate Belgium's
neutrality. On the present occasion the violation of Belgium's
neutrality was to serve England only as a pretext for war. The
German government had, therefore, to reckon with the proba-
bility of England's intervention in the war on land and sea.'
That this would entail the attempt to break through into north-
west Germany through Belgian territory was practically certain.
The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, was perfectly
right when, in his report to his government, of December 23,
191 1, he wrote concerning the probable development of an An-
glo-Franco-German war: ^'A British army, landed at Calais
and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in
order to reach Germany. It would at once force its way into
our country from the northwest; that would give it the advan-
tage of being able to begin operations immediately. . . ." To
guard against this contingency was of vital importance to Ger-
many. But the strong military force requisite to cover the Ger-
man flank on the lower Rhine would, in the opinion of our op-
ponents, have been condemned at the start to inactivity in a
merely defensive position along the Belgian frontier; whereas
their absence would have at the same time considerably weakened
the German offensive in the west. France and England could,

^Blue Book, No. 123. At the same time this disproves the charge that
Germany "would have entered Belgium in any case."

* The correspondence of November 22 and 23, 191 a, between Sir Edward
Grey and Minister Cambon, which had long been known in Berlin, provided for
a joint operation of the armies baaed on the plans of the General Staffs.

MODERN GERMANY 545

therefore, afford to await the deployment of the tremendous
Russian army, and then execute a decisive thrust through Bel-
gium. To have refrained from taking the o£Eensive and making
use of Belgian territory would in itself in all probability have
been disastrous for Germany; in view of the added necessity of
keeping a large force of troops in readiness on the Belgian fron-
tier to prevent a French and English invasion from that quarter,
such tactics would have been simply suicidal.

After carefully considering all these points, no unbiassed
judge will deny that Germany was in a position of extreme
necessity. But could the violation of the neutralization treaties
be justified by this necessity, according to the principles of inter-
national law ? Most certainly. Agreements can be binding for a
state only so long as their observance does not jeopardize the very
foundations of its existence. International law can never impose
on a state the duty of committing suicide. Such, however, would
have been the consequence here. A further observance of the
neutralization treaties of 1839 was incompatible with the vital
interests of Germany; consequently the treaties ceased to have
any binding force for her. This principle has not only been
acted upon by statesmen of all times and nations — how else
would the breaking of "perpetual" peace treaties by new wars
ever have been legally admissible? — but it has also been recog-
nized by scholars in Germany, as well as by those in foreign
countries which are to-day neutral or hostile.^ It will be neces-
sary to quote only a few examples of the many concurrent opin-
ions. Thus, in a verdict of the Supreme Court of the United
State, Justice Curtis stated in 1908: ". . . while it would be
a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute
a treaty, the power to do so was a prerogative of which no
country could be deprived without deeply affecting its inde-
pendence." And with especial reference to the German action
toward Belgium, even Roosevelt admits in his far from pro-
German article in The Outlook (September 23, 1914, page 172)
that, "When a nation feels that the issue of a contest in which,
from whatever reason, it finds itself engaged will be national
life or death, it is inevitable that it should act so as to save itself
from death and to perpetuate its life." The Swiss professor of
international law. Max Huber, has formulated the guiding prin-
ciple in the clearest terms:

"Just as certain legal obligations cease in common law when

^This recalls Gladstone's famous statement concerning the question of the
binding force of a guarantee treaty, which Sir Edward Grey quoted in his
speech of August z* 1914 (Blue Book» p. 93).

546 MODERN GERMANY

they result in unreasonable restrictions for the contracting party
(as, for instance, in cases of self-defense, of extreme necessity, of
excessive civil obligations from a legal contract), just so must
it be assumed in international law, and in this case with greater
justification because of the peculiar nature of a state, that when
the fulfillment of a duty is incompatible with the latter's existence,
independence, vital interests and moral integrity, this duty becomes
null and void, because it cannot be presumed that a state in-
tended to bind itself for such a contingency when entering the
obligation/' ^ In conclusion, we quote the statement of Lawrence,
the eminent English professor of international law: "Extreme

necessity will justify a temporary violation of neutral terri-
tory." ^

Thus the German entry into Belgium is justified in the forum
of international law. But to justify her action Germany does
not need to have recourse to the plea of extreme necessity, in
recognizing the existence of which subjective factors always play
a certain part; for long before the German ultimatum was is*
sued, the Belgian government had already violated her own neu-
trality obligations most seriously to Germany's disadvantage, and
thereby herself torn down the barriers raised by the treaty and
given Germany the right to defend herself by all means.

IV

It is a recognized fact that the neutralization of a state en-
tails on it important duties. Its actions are much less free than
those of an "accidentally neutral" state — that is to say, a state
which does not wish to participate in a given war. What it may
do, what it is forbidden and what it is obliged to do is disputed
in detail. This much, however, is certain: The permanently
neutralized state is obliged to abstain from all action which
might possibly result in drawing it into a war waged by others*
It may, of course, make war to protect its own neutrality, when
this is directly threatened by a third party, but under no circum-
stances is it at liberty to participate in an offensive campaign car-
ried on by others. Furthermore, it must in times of peace avoid
all actions which might possibly, in the event of war, force such
participation upon it. No one has formulated these obligations
more precisely than the English professor, L. Oppenheim, of
Cambridge, in his book on International Law, I, Sec 95, p. 147 :

"A neutralized state is a state whose independence and integ-

1 Sec Zeitschrift fUr Volkerrecht, Vol. VII, p. 363 ft.

* See Principles of International Law, by Thomas Joseph Lawrence, London^
19x0, p. 609.

MODERN GERMANY 547

rity are for all the future guaranteed by an international con-
vention of the Powers, under the condition that such state binds
itself never to take up arms against any other state except for
defense against attack, and never to enter into such international
obligations as could indirectly drag it into war. The reason why
a state asks or consents to become neutralized is that it is a weak
state and does not want an active part in international politics,
being exclusively devoted to peaceable developments of welfare."

Accordingly, the permanently neutralized state of Belgium
should not have engaged in any autonomous policy {Machtpo-
litik) ; even the acquisition of the large Congo Colony was, from
this point of view, open to question, because it changed the whole
basis of the Belgian state and involved it in difficult political
problems. In any case, it should not have become a party to an
aggressive political combination. In doing so it grossly violated
its special obligations and gave to all the guarantors of its perma-
nent neutrality (including the German Empire) the right to in-
terfere in any manner, even by war, if that should be necessary
in view of their menaced interests.

The Belgian government, nevertheless, did violate these obli-
gations. Numerous discoveries, especially in the Brussels ar-
chives, placed material in the hands of the German government
which furnished documentary proof of an understanding between
the Belgian and British governments, plainly not in conformity
with Belgium's duty to preserve permanent neutrality. The
evidence, it is true — as is easy to understand — is not yet com-
plete. It is clear that those negotiations had to be carried on
with the strictest secrecy, since cognizance of them would have
called forth an immediate protest on the part of Germany.
Therefore, even in its hurried flight from Brussels, the Belgian
government had to find time to destroy the most compromising
documents, or to carry them off. It is also possible that there
was not very much written material in existence; at any rate,
it is in conformity with English methods of recent years, when
putting important political agreements into writing, to do so in
the vaguest possible form. Grey was doubtless quite aware, with-
out the example set by Napoleon III and Cavour, that an attack
against a third state may also be arranged by word of mouth.
In regard to the question of military cooperation, however, a
written agreement could hardly be dispensed with, and in this
respect the material discovered is by far the most voluminous; a
comprehensive examination leaves no room for doubt on any
legally important point.^

^The most important docmnents hare been collected in the publication^

S48 MODERN GERMANY

About the middle of January, 1906, military arrangements
were undertaken (on English initiative!) between the British
Military Attache in Brussels, Lieut.-Colonel Barnardiston, and
the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major-General Ducame,
which regulated in every detail a cooperation of the British and
Belgian forces in case of war. They covered all such matters as
the number of troops to be used by both sides; the transporta-
tion of the British forces oversea; the places of disembarkation
and the provisioning base; the participation of the British army
in the advantages provided in the Belgian regulations concerning
military requisitions in war; arrangements for the providing of
interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, and spe-
cial copies of some of the Belgian army regulations which were
to be translated into English, etc.^ Of special interest was the
fact that the British troops, which were to be landed in Bou-
logne, Calais and Cherbourg — that is to say, on French territory
— ^were to be transported by means of Belgian rolling-stocL The
participation of France was, therefore, provided for from the
very first. A much later document — ^viz., a record of an inter-
view between the British Military Attache, Lieut.-Colonel
Bridges, and the head of the Belgian General StafiF, General
Jungbluth, on April 23, 191 2 * — ^proves the continuation of the
military agreement; the only change made was that the number
of men in the British landing corps had been somewhat in-
creased. In a very extensive report, dated December 23, 191 1,
which also fell into German hands, the Belgian Minister at
Berlin, Baron Greindl, warned his government in vain against
tying itself to one side of the great European combinations of
Powers — ^viz., the Entente cordiale — ^and pointed out that it was
placing itself practically at the mercy of this combination, al-
though a menace to Belgian neutrality and independence was
just as likely to come from that side as from Germany.* He
writes: ''The idea of an enveloping movement from the north

Di# b€igisch€ NeutralUSt, Berlin, 19 14. See alio The Case of Belgium, by Dr.
Bernard Demburg, New York, 1915*

^According to nis own statement. General Ducame "insisted as enq>faaticallT
as possible" on certain demands^ which (lisproves the English claim of the
"academic" character of the conrersations. Certainly Lieutenant-Colonel Bar-
nardiston's statement would seem to prove that the British Ambassador and
General Staff must have been aware 01 the true nature of the "conyer8ation&"
In further proof it is well to recall that the cover of General Ducame's report
bears the inscription, "Conventions anglo-belgesT-
' The correctness of the date has not been disputed by the Belgiana
* That Baron Greindl did not refer here to a tmerelv hypothetical "assump-
tion," as M. Waxweiler apparently would liave one l>elieve {Belgium: Neutr<d
and Loyai, American Edition, pu 191), but .to a.very'<veal danger, is proved by
his reference to the "disclosures of Colonel Barnardiston, which are just as
perfidious as they are naive"; to the Vhue and cry in Paris and London" over
the fortification of Flushing, and to the disclosures of Captain Faber.

MODERN GERMANY 549

(i.e., against Germany) is without doubt one of the combina-
tions of the Entente cordiale** The Belgian government con-
tinued the military understanding with England, without at-
tempting to make any similar overtures to Germany. It had
simply chosen between the two groups of European Powers,
and England took good care that Belgium should not fail her
in the great undertaking she had in view.

The following is of especial importance in this connection:
In the fall of the year 19 14, German troops came into possession
of secret military manuals concerning Belgian roads and rivers
("Belgium Road and River Reports, prepared by the General
Staff, War Office"), which were published by the British General
Staff. There are four volumes, of which Volume I had been
printed as early as 1912, Volume II in 1913, Volume III (in
two parts) and Volume IV in 19 14. These manuals contain the
most minute description of the country based on military inves-
tigations. Matters of military importance are specially indicated.
These volumes contain detailed information concerning the net-
work of roads as regards gradients, bridges, crossings, telephone
and telegraph offices, railway stations (giving the length of plat-
forms, barriers, local railways, petroleum tanks, etc.). In the
description of towns and villages the manuals always state
whether all, or part of the inhabitants, speak French. With the
same accuracy the whole course of the Scheldt is described, with
all its tributaries, depths, breadths, bridges, supply of boats, etc
There is added: I. A survey of billeting facilities arranged ac-
cording to communities and villages, with the number of sol-
diers who can be quartered in each, the means of transportation
on hand, and all the other details useful to the commandant of
a place. II. A collection of important hints for aviators cover-
ing the part of Belgiimi south of the Charleroi-Namur-Liege
line, and also the vicinity of Brussels. No less than 125 "possi-
ble" landing-places are accurately described, and it is significant
that a considerable number of these are in the immediate vicinity
of the Liege forts.^

Remarks at the head of the various chapters show that the
material for the manuals was obtained by means of special in-
vestigations made between 1909 and July, 191 4. Any one who
carefully peruses one of these manuals will concur in the opinion
of the German expert that "without the willing and unreserved
support of the Belgian government and military authorities

^Tbe following is an illustration from the manual, No. 91: "Five miles out
on the east of the Aywaille road, and just north of the Fort d'Embourg, a
Tery good covered landing place on grass could be prepared by the removal
of wire fences. It is completely covered from the south by the Fort."

S50 MODERN GERMANY

such a task could not have been accomplished. . • . The quarter-
ing lists, which treat Belgium as if it were English soil, can only
have been provided by the Belgian government. Without doubt,
official Belgian material was used for this purpose. It was
adapted for English use, or in many instances simply translated
into English." ^ After what is known of the detailed Anglo-Bel-
gian negotiations of 1906, this can scarcely come as a surprise.
These secret English military manuals prove perhaps more strik-
ingly than anything else that in military matters Belgium had
surrendered unconditionally to the Englidi.

Considering how matters stood, it is not surprising that in
the offices of the British headquarters for espionage in Brussels
a whole packet of blank requisition forms was found, on which
the British Embassy in Brussels had certified, with the imprint
of its official seal, diat the English spy. Dale Long, resident in
Belgium, was a member of the British General Staff, and was
authorized to make requisitions in Belgium. Nor was it sur-
prising to find in the possession of Grant-Watson, the British
Secretary of Legation in Brussels, on his arrest, documents dated
191 3 and 1 91 4, containing information of the most intimate
kind concerning the Belgian mobilization, and the defense of
Antwerp, and even a handwritten memorandum on a report of
the Belgian Gendarmery relative to the French mobilization
measures of July 27th.* Of still more peculiar interest was the
news given by an unsuspecting English lady, in a letter dated
July 30, 1914, to a German acquaintance: "My son has left
us to-day in order to join Sir John French's Staff in Belgium"
(cf. Suddeutsche Monatshefte, April, 191 5, p. 96).

In the face of the overwhelming amount of evidence, the exist-
ence of the military arrangements between England and Belgium *

^ M. Waxweiler attempts iBelgmm: Neutral and Loyal, American Edition*
p. 198) to minimize the significance of these embarrassing manuals by tracing
them back to e^ionage. While it would have been possible to obtain many
of the single points of information by successful espionage, the overwhelming
amount of material prepared, collected and elaborated in the manuals unques*
tionably proves the correctness of the German contentions.

'Among these papers were orders, issued in the form of a circular, to the
higher Belgian commanders, with the fac simile signature of the Belgian Min-
ister of War and of the Chief of the Belgian General Staff; and a record of
a meeting of the "Commission for the Provisioning Base of Antwerp/' held
on May zj, 19x3.

"Less detailed information is available at the present time in relation to
the corresponding a^eement between Belgium and France, but that there was
an agreement is evident from the existence of the pact with England which
is contingent on it. Besides the detailed information already given, the fol-
lowing points are worthy of note: i, the inspection of the Belgian fortresses
on the Meuse b^ the French Minister of War, General Picquart, and officers
of the French General Staff in 1913, which was openly mentioned in Belgian
newspapers (see Nelte, Zeitschrifi fur Volkerrecht, Vol. VIII, p. 749); a, the
fact that several French cavalry regiments were instructed to concentrate on
Belgian territory in case of mobilization, which was known to the Belgian
General Staff as late as 19 13 (see Josson, Frankrijk de eeuwenoude vijtmd vam

MODERN GERMANY 551

has been only partly, and then but feebly, disputed by the Eng-
lish and Belgians, some of whom ascribed to them a purely
"academic" character. Others attempt to vindicate them by
asserting that the arrangements were of a purely defensive na-
ture, solely intended for the protection of Belgium against the
anticipated German attack. This plea appears to have made an
impression on many fair-minded people in neutral countries,
especially in Switzerland ; and yet, in face of the above-mentioned
facts, it seems almost grotesque, if the spirit and not merely the
letter of the neutrality treaties is taken into consideration.
Theoretically speaking, it is perfectly correct that a permanently
neutral state also may enter into an alliance for the sole purpose
of its own defense. But in the case under discussion was it in
reality such an alliance? If a small or secondary state, on the
basis of an agreement with a Great Power that stands in allied
relationship to another Great Power (a neighbor of the secondary
state), gives its ally such exact information concerning all its
military forces, resources, places of defense — in short, concern-
ing everything of military importance in its own territory —
then the first Great Power is actually placed in the position of
military dictatorship over the secondary state. The secondary
state is no longer in a position successfully to oppose the Great
Power, and the far stronger Great Power can at any time
threaten it with certain destruction and use it, with or without
its consent, as a base of attack against its own opponents.

The name and purpose officially given to such agreements cease
to be of great consequence. The secondary state has practically
surrendered its liberty of action, and the Great Power is free to
use it for any plans of aggression it may cherish. The smaller
state is an accurately appraised factor to be made use of in the
military calculations of the Great Power ; it is, in fact, no more
than its "vassal." The Great Power may declare over and over
again that only in the event of an "attack" on the smaller ally
will it enter the latter's territory; in war such an attack can
always be claimed to have been made. Besides, English history
teaches us that when British interests are threatened, and espe-
cially in the case of a life-and-death struggle of the country, irk-
some treaties and stipulations of international law are for Eng-
land worth only the paper they are written on — ^her action

Vlaanderen en Wallonie (843-1913)* Breda, 1913, p. 860); 3, the sworn ttate-
sients of French prisoners that strong forces of French troops (among them
the following regiments: the 5th, 21st, aSth and 30th dragoons; the 3rd and
6th cuirassiers; the 3rd and 8tb hussars; and a part of the 40tb Field Artillery
Re^ment) had entered Belgium before the presentation of the Germans
ultimatum and had been hospitably received there (see Graashoff, The Tragedy of
Belgium, p. zz ff.)<

552 MODERN GERMANY

against Malta, Denmark, Egypt and the Boer Republics, as well
as her newest '^egal'' maxims of naval warfare, speak plainly
enough. How England had decided to proceed, especially in
regard to Belgium, is shown by the statements made by the
British Military Attache Bridges to the Belgian General Jung-
bluth, in the above-mentioned interview of April 23, 1912, ac-
cording to which the British government "during recent events"
(the crisis of 191 1) had resolved on landing forces in Belgium,
even if the latter failed to call for assistance; and in reply to
Jungbluth's objection, that to such action Belgium's consent
would have been necessary. Bridges stated that he was aware of
this; but that as Belgium was not in a position to prevent the
Germans from marching through, England would have landed
her troops in Belgium in any event.^ In reply to this, Jungbluth
merely stated that Belgium was perfectly well able to prevent
the passage of the Germans. The Belgian government did not
direct any official question to London concerning this point (at
least not according to Mr. Waxweiler's account) ; but a year
subsequent to this. Sir Edward Grey, apparently half-spon-
taneously, gave a reassuring explanation, which he confirmed in
a letter dated April 7, 1913.^ Asquith and Grey also declared
in Parliament in 19 13 and 1914 that there were, in the event of
the outbreak of a war between European Powers, no unpub-
lished agreements which would tie the hands of or restrict the
government, or Parliament, in their decision whether Great
Britain should participate in the war or not. This declaration
may have pacified all who were ignorant of the correspondence
between Grey and Cambon in November, 191 2, with its refer-
ence to the plans of the General Staff of the two countries.

The conception of a defensive alliance certainly does not re-
quire such military intimacy as the Anglo-Belgian : Austria and
Italy, although united by the defensive alliance of the Dreibund,
had not given one another such extensive military information.
Belgium was, however, according to international law, in duty
bound to observe an attitude of reserve toward the Entente cor-
diale. An ordinary state may, at its own risk, join a Great
Power or group of Great Powers, even in the most intimate

«

^**. . , L'Angleterre aurait d^barqu^ ses troupes en Belgique en tout ^t de
cauae." Whether Lieutenant-Calonel Bridges waa officially authorized to ^ake
these statements ia of no importance; of decisive importance, however, is his
official knowledge of British intentions — intentions which were confirmed by
the disclosures of Captain Faber and of Field Marshal Lord Roberts.

"This letter is printed in M. Waxweiler's book, Belgium: Neutral and Loyal
p. 196 ff. The salient point is Sir Edward Grey's statement: "I said that I
was sure that this government would not be the first to violate the neutrality
of Belgium and I did not believe that any British government would be the
£rst to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it."

MODERN GERMANY 553

manner; but for the permanently neutralized state to do so
would be an abuse of its duties, according to international law.
Would a statesman of Switzerland, which is really neutral,
seriously contend to-day that Belgium had done her duty to-
ward Germany before the war **d! observer cette meme neutralite
envers tons Us autres itatsf" What would England and France
have said to a similar Belgo-German "military intimacy" ?

It is not true that Germany "would have marched through
Belgium in any case/' and that as a result the one-sided and in
its effect practically unconditional adherence to the Entente cor-
diale offered Belgium the only possible means of salvation and
security: the English Blue Book itself proves conclusively that
Germany arrived at a final decision only after Grey had refused
to give an assurance as to England's neutrality in the coming
war, even in the event that Germany should bind herself to
respect Belgium's neutrality.^

It is impossible that the Belgian government should have de-
ceived itself as to the fact that it had joined forces with an ag-
gressive group of Powers; for, through the Entente cordiale,
England was drawn into the sphere of influence of the policy
of revenge, which had never been abandoned by France ; whereas,
on the other hand, Germany was without ambitions in Europe,
and was at the same time in the way of satisfying her require-
ments for future colonial expansion by means of friendly agree-
ments with England.

The attitude (not yet known in all its details) of the Belgian
government before the war, is perhaps politically and psycho-
logically comprehensible, nor is this the place for moral dialec-
tics ; but what cannot be maintained is that Belgium scrupulously
fulfilled all the obligations imposed on her by the law of nations^
and that in the face of this the German invasion was a dis-
graceful breach of international law. Where are the confiden-
tial negotiations and agreements between Belgium and Germany
which correspond to those between Belgium and England ? If this
entire problem, which is preeminently of a political nature, is meas-

^A careful study of the course of the negotiations makes it difficult to avoid
the impression that, from about July jist on, Sir Edward Grey deliberately-
tried to provoke Germany to violate Bel^um's neutrality, in order to have
to present to the world a morally effective pretext for the war. That the
violation of Belgium's neutrality waa not the deciding factor for the leading
men of England is proved: i, by Sir Edward Grey's promise to France on
August 2; 2, by Mr. Bonar Law's open letter of the same date, in which he
demanded that Enriand go to the assistance of France and Russia, and did
not even mention Belgium; 3. by the open statements of the English labor
leader, J. Ramsay MacDonalo. among others^ that if France had similarly
violated Belgium's neutrality, England would never have drawn the sword; 4^
bv the surprisingly frank statements of the London Times and of Lord
Haldane.

554 MODERN GERMANY

ured by the standards of international law, it is dear that it was
Belgium herself, who, from widiin, broke down the protecting
rampart which treaty and international law had erected around
her territory — Cleaving only a "paper" wall standing — and re-
placed it by military agreements with one of the two groups of
the European Great Powers. In this way, Belgium had herself
cleared the way for a policy of selfish interest. Belgium's atti-
tude necessarily strengthened the position of the Entente cor-
diale, both from a military and political point of view ; and Ger-
many, as the enemy of the coalition, could, in the event of war,
regard the matter only from a practical point of view, and
ask herself whether she should leave a sure advantage in the
hands of her enemies to make use of at their discretion, or at-
tempt to wrest Belgium from the hostile combination by pacific
or forcible means.

The question, however, is asked by many: Did Germany, in
the early part of August, 1914, know of the secret agreements
between Belgium and England? From a legal point of view,
this is not the decisive point; juristically, the important consid-
eration is rather the objective state of affairs. The crucial point
is whether Belgium could in truth still claim consistently to have
fulfilled her obligations of neutrality towards Germany. The
German Imperial Chancellor meanwhile replied in the Reichs-
tag on December 2, 1914:

"At that time there were already many indications of the
guilt of the Belgian government. Positive written proofs were
not then at my disposal. . . ."

As the remarks of the Military Attache Bridges had in part
come to the knowledge of a number of people, and as Belgium
was (according to Waxweiler, on p. 200) "the chosen land for
spies of every nationality," it may be taken for granted, even
without the statement of the Imperial Chancellor, that it was out
of the question for the Grerman government to have been in
complete ignorance. The German government knew of an
impending French advance along the Belgian frontier — the Ger-
man ultimatum to Belgium refers to this — and it also knew,
without doubt, that Belgium had not deemed it necessary to
adopt adequate military precautions against such an advance; in-
deed, this has not been seriously contended by the Belgians.
How differently in comparison did Switzerland act after the
outbreak of the warl

But apparently Germany still hoped, by means of speedy ac-
tion, to be able to prevent Belgium from taking an active part in
the war, and did not, therefore, on account of the countrjr's

MODERN GERMANY 555

understanding with the Entente cordide, treat it from the be-
ginning as the ally of the latter ; on the contrary, the efibrt was
first made, by asking merely for free passage of Grerman troops,
in a sense simply to crowd Belgium aside.

Thus the German entry into Belgium is justified from the
point of view of international law, also for the reason that Bel-
gium had previously violated her obligations of neutrality in a
way menacing to Germany and favoring the Entente cordiale.

Least of all are those entitled to inveigh against Germany for
breaking the law of nations whose mischievous plans were
thwarted by the rapidity of Germany's action; to them apply
Hamlet's words:

''For 'tis the sport; to have the engineer
Hoitt with his own petard."

BOOK V

THE SPIRIT OF THE WAR

CHAPTER I
KULTUR POLICY OF POWER AND MILITARISM

PROFESSOR FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

BERLIN

"Nur eine auch nach aussen hin starke Nation bewahrt den
Geist in sich, aus dem auch alle Segnungen im Innern stromen." ^

W. VON Humboldt.

THE Germans are a brave people, a faithful people and a
stupid people, so that they need harsh proofs. ... I am
reminded of what I once heard a genial and humane Irish officer
say concerning a proposal to treat with the leaders of a Zulu
rebellion : ^Kill them all,' he said, 'it's the only thing they un-
derstand.' "

Thus writes an Oxford professor, who bears the memorable
name of Walter Raleigh, in one of the Oxford Pamphlets en-
titled ''Might is Right." That is — so he asserts, and thousands
of his countrymen reecho this assertion all over the world —
the accursed motto of the Grermans, as it was likewise
the principle of the buffaloes in North America, until the hunt-
ers came and shot them down. The Times calls us hostes generis
kumani (enemies of humankind). No pope has ever pronounced
more terrible anathemas against heretics than England, cultured
England, has against us. We ask indignantly why our oppo-
nents are not content to send the huge armies and fleets of four
Great Powers and the levies of almost all races against us and
our allies and to fight out this war of great political and national
interests in the manner of other similar wars in the world's his-
tory? But if England had her way, we should be outlawed by
the whole civilized world, and every German who now helps to
defend his home and country would see the eyes of his fellow
creatures bent upon him in reproof and contempt, because his
nation has committed a crime against mankind. From the depths
of the hatred against us, from the cold cruelty, that, dagger-like,
thrusts at our entrails, we draw the conclusion that our enemies
wish to crush us politically to the utmost conceivable degree.
And from that again do we draw the further conclusion that we

^"Only an outwardly strong nation rctaina that ipirit from wUdi all inner
'-^ — flow."

559

56o MODERN GERMANY

must exert the last remnant of our strength to maintain our
existence as a nation. Our power of resistance will become
stronger — a fact which our enemies seem to overlook — ^not
weaker, at the sight of their hate-distorted faces. But we can
step beifore the judgment-seat of mankind, to which they appeal,
with a clear conscience. While our conscience, at all times,
must be our chief and most severe judge, we know very well that
there is also a verdict of history, before whose tribunal we have
to justify our actions. It will be pronounced when the passions
of this struggle have died away. Only future generations, not
our contemporaries, can pronounce it. Nor do we acknowledge
our neutral contemporaries, to whom this book is addressed, as
our judges in the strict sense of the word, because they also are
swayed by sympathies and antipathies, and have not as yet the
freedom of mind necessary to pass an historical judgment. They
are, however, before all others, fitted to prepare the way for an
impartial verdict. We do not beg, we demand and claim as our
due from them, a fair hearing of our cause, and the will to con-
sider and to understand our reasons.

There is a desire to designate this war as a war of Kultur,
nay, even as a religious war.^ Ideas are to be combated. The
"spirit" of our Kultur, our politics, and our militarism is con-
jured up, and the wildest and strangest invectives are hurled
against it. Not alone our leading statesmen are made responsi^
ble. It is plain that the entire German nation is firm as a rock
in their support, and from this fact the conclusion is drawn that
the poison of a false doctrine, hostile to civilization, has spread
through the veins of our people and infected them. Our entire
modem history is searched for the cause of this, to prove to the
world that amongst all the other highly respectable and innocent
nations there is one which is a criminal and a sinner. Let us
hear these accusations, as far as possible, in the words of the
accusers.

There are, or rather there were, two Grermanies, a good one
and a bad one.^ The good Germany was the Germany of Goethe
and Kant, who was the apostle of eternal peace, and this good
Germany had become great without the protection of might.
The bad Germany, on the other hand, emanated from the con-
queror state of Frederick the Great. Power was his aim, force
and cunning were his aids, and treaties were respected by him
only so long as they served his purposes. (How deplorable was

^See The Prussian Haih Said in His Heart, by Cecil Chesterton, pamphlet,
Londmi, 1915, p. 5.

' See Britain*s Case Against Germany, by Ramsay Moir, Chapter III, "The
Two Germanies."

MODERN GERMANY 561

it, then, must the believer in this theory immediately interpose,
that the England of the elder Pitt made an alliance with Fred-
erick and utilized his victories in order to conquer Canada.)
The chasm between the two Germanies, it is said, had already
begun to be bridged by the Prussia of 181 3, which strove for
nobler ends than mere power. But the reactionary period after
1 815 reopened it. The ideals of intellectual Germany had been
maintained by the cosmopolitan professors, who did not regard
the end and aim of the state as one of power, but as one of right
and liberty. Their cultural standard, it is claimed, was higher than
that of the state of to-day, which aims only at power, and
which has asserted itself, thanks to Bismarck's work and Treit-
schke's teachings.

This present-ray state is ruled by the all-governing doctrine,
that the state is power, that nothing is of such value in life as
the state, that it is therefore justified in using every means to
secure its power, and that war is a moral necessity. These teach-
ings of Treitschke, with their "colossal immorality," ^ had poi-
soned the soul of the German people. The other poisoner of the
nation was Nietzsche, who had, it is true, not preached state-
worship, but the worship of might.* Under the influence of
these two men, the notorious book of General von Bernhardi
was written, which demanded the cynical war of aggression
against England. He and his countrymen were intoxicated with
the idea of establishing a world dominion, and at the same time
of forcing German Kultur upon the rest of mankind by the
sword, as Mohammed had once tried to do. But what was this
German Kultur to-day, and what conception did the Germans
have of civilization at all at present? Almost all Germans be-
lieved that their civilization had reached the highest point ever
attained by mankind, that they had nothing to learn from other
nations, but could teach them everything.* They had in mind
only that exclusive Kultur which had . developed in the limited
sphere of one nation and was maintained by the sword. Kultur
was, however, a matter of intellect; it grew by means of intel-
lect, and was defended by it. Kultur, when associated with
might, ceased to be Kultur, and became might, pure and simple.^
Experience taught, so Bishop Welldon declared at a teachers*
congress in London, that when Germans had employed the word
Kultur during recent years, it did not signify science, education,

1 See Treitschke and the Great War, by Joseph McCabe, p.. 287.
' Beaidea the above-quoted worka» see also Nietssche and Treitschke, by
Ernest Barker, Oxford Pamphlets.
* Britain's Lose Against Germany, by Ramsay Muir, p. 13J.
^ NietMsche and Treitschke, by Barker, Oxford Pamphlets^ p. 27.

'.

562 MODERN GERMANY

art, and literature — or at least only in a secondary sense.^ "Ger-
man Kultur is organized efficienqr on the largest scale." Xhe
immediate result was state-worship, for the state, and the state
alone, was the organ of "national efficiency." The individual
actually sacrificed all he had and all he was worth to the state ;
his highest duty was self-sacrifice for the state. Thus it came
about, strangely enough, that education in Germany was valued
not from the ethical, but from the material and physical point of
view, not as a means of civilization, refinement and sympathy,
but as a means of conquest.

Without doubt, if this picture of modern politics and civiliza-
tion were correct, the whole world ought to rise in flaming in-
dignation, and help the English, French and Russians to quell
the spirit of barbarism that is menacing it. But strange remi-
niscences arise when we contemplate the various colors of this
picture and the palette from which they were taken. "Effi-
ciency" is a favorite word of the English; it is a product of
English soil. The following has not been said by a German, but
by a Swede:

"The profound moral aphorism: 'Nothing succeeds like suc-
cess' ... is held in reverence by the English from the peer
down to the longshoreman. Wealth and social power are the
objects of the success to which it refers. . . . For higher cul-
tural attainments, such as esthetics, science, philosophy, and non-
conventional moral talents, English democracy does not show
the slightest appreciation. Fresh acquisitions in the sphere of
psychic life do not, generally speaking, pertain to the success
which succeeds in the England of to-day." *

And what Bishop Welldon says of the material and physical
character of our education must be met with a smile. "The
simplicity of the English soul," says Steifen, "is equivalent in
far too high a degree to a devotion to coarse, material work,
purely physical activity, athletic feats, and recklessness." • We
are of the opinion that other features of the portrait drawn fit
us less than they fit the English. The narrow-minded and arro-
gant belief in the unsurpassable excellence of their own Kultur,
whose function it is to teach, not to learn, is more prevalent and
longer established amongst the English than with us; we shall
show that an unscrupulous policy of power has existed in Eng-
land for centuries in practice, if not in theory. Some portraits
by subjective painters are really self-portraits, and therefore we

^The London Times of January 5, 19x5.

* England als Weltmacht und KuUurstaat, by G. F. Steffen, xgoa, I, 59*

•Ibid., II, 182.

MODERN GERMANY 563

say also in the words of Goethe of the picture presented of us at
this time: "Thou'rt like the spirit thou comprehendest, not like
mer

We shaU resist the temptation to return like for like. We
cannot, however, refrain from pointing out some unpleasant
traits of English character. They are manifest enough, yet the
task of understanding the entire Kultur of a foreign people cor-
rectly, and of classifying the profusion of forces and tendencies
existing in it, is in itself a most difficult task — almost impossi-
ble while enmity and passion prevail and find expression in a
life-and-death struggle like the one raging at present. But we
have every right to an attentive hearing when we defend our-
selves against the distortions and misrepresentations of our opin-
ions and ideals. We are said to have conceptions as to the rela-
tions of Kultur, state and policy of power which are inhuman.
Let us explain what the true state of a£fairs is with us. We will
cite those opinions held by the best men of our nation and which,
we believe, also enjoy the widest circulation among our educated
classes. Extreme and radical views are no more lacking amongst
us than in other nations. We do not wish to ignore them here,
but we shall put them in their proper place and reduce their
importance to the proper measure.

This must be done first of all with regard to the three men
who are alleged to be the chief teachers and representatives of
the modern German spirit: Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bern-
hardi. Their influence among us is now being exaggerated
abroad to a ludicrous degree. We do, indeed, venerate in
Treitschke the great, pure and powerful man whose personal
integrity even our adversaries dare not doubt, the ardent Ger-
man patriot, the divinely inspired artist, who, with deep love and
in glowing colors, conjures up before our eyes the men and con-
ditions of our past. But we have never been blind to his one-
sidedness and impetuosity. Our modern German historical writ-
ers follow in Ranke's footsteps, not in Treitschke's. . They
share, it is true, Treitschke's strong interest in the historico-
political problems of the recent past, but consciously strive for
Ranke's impartiality and objectivity towards other nations, and
they correct at every step the misrepresentations and exaggerations
in Treitschke's historical pictures. How differently do we, for
instance, regard to-day the Confederation of the Rhine, South
German Liberalism, and Frederick William III of Prussia, whom
Treitschke eulogized. It is just as great a mistake to character-
ise his political doctrines as domineering in essence. G)rrectly

564 MODERN GERMANY

understood, they are not in the least brutal.^ They are, indeed,
often blunt and one-sided. For the rest, they originated in a
period which we have already outgrown. His judgment was
moulded in the experiences attendant upon our achievement of
national union and he sought to discover, above all, what advanced
"^ or hampered this union. Our political judgment of to-day is in
many respects more liberal and milder.

Nietzsche, who did not feel himself to be a German but a
European, has influenced not only Germany, but the whole of
Europe, and has been received here as well as there with both
enthusiastic applause and pronounced opposition. The opponents
of Nietzsche's ethics in Germany are much more numerous and
influential than the adherents. The tree he planted has borne
both good and evil fruit. He has seduced unstable and weak
charact«;rs to megalomania and moral anarchy, but he has also
strengthened the power of moral judgment by his pitiless criti-
cism of all conventional sanctimoniousness. This may render
him worthy of hatred by those modern Englishmen who cul-
tivate the ideal of virtue of the outwardly correct Pharisee.

General von Bernhardi cannot be mentioned in the same
breath with Treitschke and Nietzsche. Neither intellectually nor
in influence does he approach them. He is a distinguished writer
on military matters, who thought it his duty to enlighten the
German nation concerning its position and its task among the
World Powers, and concerning the dangers with which Eng-
land's envy and ill-will threatened it. He has together with this
/ expounded various teachings on war of which we do not ap-
prove, but which need not be taken amiss from a frank and
straightforward soldier. We in Germany were highly aston-
ished when we heard that his book, that is as yet little known
among us, was held abroad to be the classical expression of our
views. Just as little is it permissible to see in it the convictions
of our leading statesmen. He shows his own dissatisfaction with
the latter plainly enough. The tremendous edition of the Eng-
lish translation now in circulation in America is a dishonest
means of exciting animosity against us. We vigorously pro-
test against the attempt to make the German government and
the German people responsible for the opinion of this general.
**There are militarists and jingoes in every country," says Gil-
bert Murray, in one of the Oxford Pamphlets.* "Our own have
often been bad enough." We shall hear of them again.

Let us now investigate the reproaches made against our ideals

^That is shown in the sober essay bgr Arthur T. Hadley on "The Political
Teachings of Treitschke/' in the Yale Review of January, I9i5>
*How Can War Ever Be Right? p. i8.

MODERN GERMANY 565

of Kultur and state. It is said that we overrate the importance
for Kultur of the state, and particularly the importance of the
great and powerful state. We overlook the fact that the civiliza-
tion of Athens and Florence was far superior to that of the more
powerful nations with which they were in touch politically. We do
not overlook this fact by any means. Our science strives eagerly
to illustrate the wonderful intellectual power and the high state
of civilization of these municipalities, and our German travellers
study the beauty of Greek and Florentine art perhaps with more ^
earnestness and devotion than the herds of English tourists who
are driven through the museums by their guides and who disturb
the reverential silence. But can the Kultur of these city-states
be understood at all without the strong political impulses that
animated them ? Did not Athens at the time of Pericles pursue
an imperialistic policy, and is it an accident that Machiavelli was
a Florentine and a contemporary of Leonardo? The heads of
Bramante in the Brera in Milan and of Castagno in Florence
illustrate the ideal of virtu which MachiaveUi set up— the ideal
of political and martial heroism. The various expressions of life
of the cultural and the civic community must not be regarded
separately ; they exist under a perpetual interchange of reciprocal
influence, the full extent of which can be divined by its various
symptoms rather than clearly recognized. It is true that the Ger-
many of the eighteenth century is a remarkable instance of the
development of a high national culture in a nation politically
powerless, rent by strife and on the whole a stranger to state-
craft. That is the example of which we are now con-
tinually reminded by our enemies, to bring home * to us that
we would do better to seek our greatness in intellect rather
than in power. But do they by any chance set us a good ex-
ample? Are they ready to sacrifice even an iota of their power
and unity to serve Kulturf They desire to retain the one just
as much as the other, and we do not think any the worse of them
for it, for they may be justly proud of their national Kultur,
which has blossomed in the storms of mighty struggles. Through
Shakespeare's historical dramas sweeps the wind that dispersed
the Armada, and the century of Louis XIV, which brought such
bitter misery to our people, gave to French intellect its incom-
parable clearness, elegance, and suppleness, and moreover the
sovereign courage to dictate to the world not only the laws of
taste, but also the laws of the state and civic society in the
"declaration of human and civic rights." We have, it is true,
like England, refused to acknowledge the universal validity of
these French laws for civilization and politics, but we are not

566 MODERN GERMANY

blind to the greatness of these national conceptions. And it is
quite clear to us that England, as well as France, by the early
foundation of their national and political union and power, have
created a firm basis for their civilization that has given to them,
and furthered, their aristocratic assurance, steadiness, self-reli-
ance and perfection of form. To-day we are painfully aware of
these advantages of our adversaries, because they are turned as
weapons against us. The hollow phrases, commonplaces, and
half-truths which they hurl against us, have a mundane polish
and style and a sovereign confidence of victory, by which they
make a much stronger impression on the rest of the world than
our more homely arguments.

The defects in our Kultur have their origin in great part in
the fact that we did not attain to political union, power and
self-consciousness until very late. Our people were so long
obliged to live in narrow, straitened, and poor circumstances
that we still feel the effects to-day. But we are proud that the
genius of our nation, relying only on its own strength, has worked
its way up out of this constriction without the aid and support
of a great political life. We cheerfully agree with our adver-
saries that Kultur does not originate only in the state and does
not have to rely exclusively on the alliance with political power.
When Klopstock, Winckelmann, and Lessing began their careers
they followed the innate and powerful impulses of their souls,
without knowing or feeling anything of state and power. It is
inherent in the nature of true Kultur, that it springs spon-
taneously and independently, again and again, from the various
impulses and needs of the human mind, and that art, science and
religion each lay down their own laws for themselves and resent
as tyranny every law imposed by other forces. Yet they are
independent only in what they strive for ; the strength which in-
spires their efforts has its root in the community, and in this
again all the faculties and institutions of the political, social,
economic and intellectual life work together. Any one who is
unable to grasp clearly this co-existence of dependence and inde-
pendence in the various branches of historical life will never un-
derstand the true relationship of Kultur and state to one another.

The aim of genuine Kultur is not to be a single province of
human life; it must permeate life completely, including the state
itself, which it must raise to be a valuable cultural factor.
And, conversely, the true state is aware that its power is, in the
last analysis, founded on a spiritual basis. It cannot regulate
the working of the spirit; it cannot and should not by forcible
means impress Kultur, which it needs for the completion of its

MODERN GERMANY 567

power, into its service. Kultur must help the state voluntarily,
and it can and will do so because its own needs impel it thereto,
and because it will receive valuable gifts in return from the state.
Therefore it is in the long run an unnatural and unhealthy con-
dition, if one great branch of national life flourishes while the
other withers. Of course, we must beware of setting up hard
and fast rules. It is absolutely false to declare that master-
pieces of the mind can be produced only in a great and powerful
national state, or that great military victories and triumphs of a
nation will necessarily promote the progress of intellectual cul-
ture. Where Kultur lacks fertile soil of its own, no sunshine of
political power and greatness will help it. And yet even a little
of such sunshine can be infinitely valuable to it. Nor was it
lacking in the first beginnings of our German literature of the
eighteenth century.

''The first real and higher essence of life," Goethe tells us in
his Dichtung und fVahrheit, "was infused into German poetry
through Frederick the Great and the events of the Seven Years'
War. All national poetry must be shallow, or become so, if it
is not based on the most human of foundations, the deeds of the
nations and of their leaders when both stand united for one
man."

And Ranke, whom Muir contrasts with Treitschke as ''the
apostle of unbiassed history," says the same thing:

"This much, however, is certain, that no other phenomenon
contributed so much to the self-reliance which accompanied this
soaring of our great spirits as the life and fame of Frederick
the Great. A nation must needs feel self-reliant and independent
if it is to develop unhampered, and literature has never flour-
ished without being prepared for by the great events of history."

The unintentional and involuntary service rendered by Fred-
erick the Great's policy of might to German intellectual life was
not requited at the time ; the latter did not place itself at the dis-
posal of state interests, but followed its own paths, which led
toward the highest idealism of mankind. In this cosmopolitan
manner of thought of our great poets, we of to-day do not by
any means see, as foreign nations seem to assume, any aberration
from or infidelity to the nation, but a great historical necessity.
With the aid of that cosmopolitan thought, the German intel-
lect freed itself from the pettiness of the social and political con-
ditions of the time, and gained the strength for a complete and
unconditional solution of certain problems of life. The state
of national disunion brought with it the one advantage, that
jnany centers and seats of culture were formed, and the develop^

J

568 MODERN GERMANY

ment of individual diversity was furthered. Small states, like
great ones, may be beneficial to the promotion of Kultur, but
all such effects are indissolubly connected with time and place
and distinct phases of development. Our adversaries of to-day
play with the idea that it would be a service to German Kultur
if Germany were reduced to her former state of political impo-
tence and harmlessness. They apparently believe that the Ger-
man bird sings best when it is imprisoned in a cage, but they
would open their eyes wide with astonishment if the same method
were to be prescribed for them. The cosmopolitan Kultur of
Goethe and Schiller, Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt was a
glorious but transitory flowering — and the fruit which resulted
from it was the German Kultur of the nineteenth century, with
its national tendency, which has helped to build up the German
Empire. Our adversaries, who play off the good Germany
against the bad, the unpolitical against the military Germany,
have not the faintest idea how closely and intimately these tw^o
Germanics are united nor how necessary was the progress from
one stage to the other. Toward the end of the eighteenth and
the beginning of the nineteenth century was the period when
German Kultur began to turn toward the state for the sake of
it$.-own completion.

The fundamental ideas of German idealism had already led
to a higher evaluation of the state and the nation in which the
individuals were living, and German idealism laid stress on the
worth of the individual as a unique source of human beauty and
strength. A further step was soon taken, and it was recognized
that states and nations were also great historical individualities.
It was seen that one state had this, the other that, character, and
each was found justifiable, because it had grown individually and
according to its own laws of development.^

The Romanticist Novalis was an enthusiastic admirer of the
Prussian military state of his time — and that, be it noted, was
before 1806 1 He called the state the embodiment of all activity,
and he made the daring statement: "All Kultur emanates, to-
gether with the state, from the given conditions." We modern
Germans believe that this goes too far, and exaggerates the
value of the state for Kultur. If we were to make use of this
ingenious sentence of the greatest dreamer among the German
Romanticists, the venerable Bishop Welldon would lift up his
hands in horror at our fanatical admiration of the Moloch which
is called State. We will, however, disclose to him the secret that
the enthusiastic veneration of the state on the part of the German
Romanticists at that time was largely drawn from English

MODERN GERMANY 569

sources. The reflections of Burke, on the French Revolution,
wherein he glorifies the state as the union of all that is beautiful,
good and divine in man, had a deep influence on German national
feeling.

When this began to develop in the first decade of the nine-
teenth century, it was not alone esthetic but also ethical motives
that turned German idealism toward the state. The moral law
of the categorical imperative, which the state set up, demanded
action and work, and devotion to the common weal. Fichte, in
sublime manner,, taught a philosophy of action which was destined
to found a new ideal state. And just at that time misfortune
overtook Germany and the old Prussian state crumbled to dust.
What Germany had to suffer under Napoleon's scourge still vi-
brates in our hearts to-day and strengthens our will to do all in
our power to prevent the return of such misfortune. But more
vivid even than the memory of shame and humiliation in our
minds, is the memory of the truly wonderful alliance of the
German spirit with the Prussian state which was concluded for
the salvation and regeneration of Prussia and Germany. The
Prussian state of 181 3, rejuvenated by liberal and humanitarian
ideals, probably still enjoys the esteem of our adversaries. They
do not know it well, however, if they believe that it was more
modest and unselfish in its policy of power than the Prussia
and Germany of Bismarck. The Prussian statesmen who rep-
resented Prussia at the Congress of Vienna were not more mod-
est than their honorable colleagues in Europe, Metternich, Cas-
tlereagh, and Alexander I, who were so well able to look after
the aggrandizement of their states. Precisely those Prussian
statesmen who were most deeply imbued with the thoughts of
Fichte and Kant demanded most vigorously at this period the
annexation of Saxony by Prussia, and Fichte himself, in 181 3,
wished that the King of Prussia would become the enforcer of
German nationalism (J'Zwingherr zur Deutschheif) .

We must, therefore, establish the fact that the doctrine of
the ''two Cjermanies" which is at present being expounded in
England is not correct. It is incorrect that the "tame" Germany
of 1800 was swallowed up by the "savage" Germany of Bis-
marck. On the contrary, the "tame" Germany very early showed
a most serious inclination toward the "savage" Germany and
entered into a voluntary and happy union with it. Certain rem-
nants of the cosmopolitan idealism of the eighteenth century
remained alive in the Kultur and the political views of the edu-
cated classes in Germany for a long time, until they were swept
away by the work and teachings of Bismarck. Let us r^ard

/

570 ' MODERN GERMANY

these boldly, without shrinking. Not as embittered accusers,
but as calm and just judges, and historians, let us regard more
closely that terrible phantom of the "policy of power" {Macht"
politik) with which Bismarck's name has been coupled. How
can one drag Bismarck to the prisoners' dock without at the
same time subjecting the policy of all the other great modern
Powers to just as severe examination? We seem to be dream-
ing when we hear the English (of all people precisely the Eng-
lish!) now declare that Bismarck and his successors in Germany
pursued an especially relentless and unscrupulous policy of power.
What else have they themselves done for centuries? By force
and lawl^sness, the commercial privileges of the Hansa were
crushed by England during Queen Elizabeth's reign. WiA
brutal force England fell upon Holland in the seventeenth cen-
tury, violated Danish neutrality, and in 1807 captured the de-
fenseless Danish fleet.

"The various countries and peoples of the earth," recently said
the Norwegian, Knut Hamsun, "have not gone to England
and asked to be taken over by her. The connection between
these countries and the mother-country is the result of force*' *
Was the England of the nineteenth century milder and more
moderate? By what right did she keep Egypt? By what right
did Jameson break the peace in South Africa in 1896 and start
on his filibustering raid, to the great satisfaction of the widest
circles of English society? And truly not love of right, but
auri sacra fames, incited the English to suppress the liberty of the
Boers. "No doubt," says Mr. Egerton, "in the making of the
British Empire, as in other human transactions, things have hap-
pened that one may wish might have happened otherwise." * If
he had only honestly and conscientiously disclosed the full extent
of these "things." Others of his Anglo-Saxon countrymen were
more honest prior to the war. No less a person than Lord Rob-
erts said: "How was this Empire of Britain founded? War
founded this Empire — ^war and conquest." And in the book,
"The Day of the Saxon," by the American, Homer Lea, we read :
"The brutality of all national development is apparent, and we
make no excuse for it. To conceal it would be a denial of
fact. ... In just such a manner has the British Empire been
made up from the fragments of four great maritime Powers, the
satrapies of petty potentates and the wilderness of nameless sav-
ages."

^In the newspaper Tidns Tegn, January, igis*

*Is the British Empire the Result of Wholesale Robbery f 19 14 (Oxford
FamphletB).

MODERN GERMANY 571

In this war, in which England poses as the guardian of inter-
national law, she tramples upon it when it suits her interest to
do so and when she hopes to escsLpe with impunity. She oppresses
Egypt and violates the treaties regarding the Suez Canal; con-
trary to the tenets of international law, she sinks a German
auxiliary cruiser in the neutral port of Rio del Oro, on August
29th, for which act the New York World, of January 11, 1915,
takes her to task, saying: "To keep certain supplies out of
Germany England has terrorized innocent neutral commerce. To
use her great sea power against an enemy with the utmost effect,
she has not scrupled even by caprice to bring disaster upon a
friend. When remonstrated with, she pleads necessity, which in
war knows neither friends nor law." The Brazilian paper, Tri- '
buna, of December 4, 191 4, asks: "Are we an English protec-
torate?" and states that a Brazilian ship sailing from one Bra-
zilian port to another was stopped and searched by a British man-«
of-war in Brazilian waters.

Cunning and force the English declare to be the chief features
of the modem German policy of power. The greatest and most
effective cunning that a policy of power can employ is to conceal
its claws and, as Machiavelli says, "appear all pity, all faith, all
humanity, all honesty, all piety." And the worst and most
disgusting form of force that an unscrupulous policy of power
can use is that of violating the truth. In this kind of cunning
and in this kind of force England is simply unmatched. There
are, indeed, as we have seen, honest Englishmen who despise
hypocrisy, but the official British policy and the British people
will not relinquish it. England uses it with more art even than
Machiavelli advises. Machiavelli was still naive enough to
assume that the prince who lies and dissembles in public would
be conscious of his lies in his heart of hearts. The average Eng**
lishman, however, has done away with even this ethical impedi-
ment to his hypocrisy, which now and then might cause incon*
venient stings of conscience. He raises in his soul an air-tight par-
tition between the sphere of his will and the sphere of his
emotions. He believes in his humanity, whilst he acts like a
beast of prey. He is told that this is infamous hypocrisy. He
hears these voices, but either he ignores them totally, because he
firmly believes in his virtue, or he meets the accusation with a
slight concession and thus quickly salves his conscience.

"Sometimes," says Muir, significantly, "England has played
the hypocrite. But hypocrisy is the tribute paid to virtue, and
except when it is the lie in the soul, it is preferable to the kind
of truth which the Great King (Frederick II) cultivated; for at

572 MODERN GERMANY

least it recognizes the claims of a standard of conduct higher
than that of the jungle." ^ These words prove that the lie has
become indeed "the lie in the soul" with the English.

The charge, however, that the Prusso-Gcrman policy of power
of Frederick the Great, Bismarck and Treitschke knows no
higher law than that of the jungle, we reject absolutely. It is a
verdict inspired by hatred, animosity and historical short-sighted-
ness, and not by just, humane and historical understanding. All
three of these were men of high morality; they were grim ene-
mies of base egotism and were animated by the high ideal to
live and die fot their country. But this ideal, we are told, was
false, exaggerated, inhuman, because its consequences and appli-
cation in the policy of power are inhuman. It was not inhuman,
for it emanated from a strict, truthful and courageous concep-
tion of life and its moral duties. Everything now depends on
understanding this point correctly, for the most serious of the
accusations against us revolve about it. The answer which
German statesmen and thinkers of modern times are wont to
give to the question of the relation between politics and morals,
we must make clear and justify.

The laws of morality, charity and of the sacredness of treaties
are eternal and inviolable, but the duty of the statesman to look
after the present and future welfare and safety of the state and
the nation entrusted to his guidance is also sacred and inviolable.
What, then, if a conflict between these duties should arise? Or
are conflicts between moral duties not possible? Only shallow-
minded people, or fanatics estranged from the world, or con-
temptible hypocrites can deny this possibility. Every true trag-
edy teaches us the awful fact that our moral life cannot be regu-
lated like clockwork, that the purest striving after good may
lead to painful issues and terrible conflicts. In the life of na-
tions conflicts between private morality and the interest of the
state are simply unavoidable, and are as old as history itself. His-
torical experience, as well as our own conscience, teaches us with
overwhelming force that the statesman can, in such a case, act
only according to the maxim: Salus populi suprema lex esto.
This was the idea which Bismarck meant to convey in his maxim
that "political egotism is the only sane foundation of a great
state." The British statesmen, who have created the great
British World Empire by force and cunning, may also refer to
this principle in justifying their stand. We are very well able,
with our historical understanding, to put ourselves in their place
and sympathize with the weight of obligations to their people

^BrUain's Case Against Germany, Ramsay Muir, p. 76.

MODERN GERMANY 573

under which they acted. One glance into our historical litera-
ture on England, from Ranke's masterpieces to the works of
Marcks, Michael, Stahlin and others, shows that we are able
and willing to write the history of the formation of the British
Empire without hate and malice, with calm understanding, even
with admiration. We by no means maintain that the British
Empire is solely the "result of wholesale robbery," although a
good deal of robbery has taken place. But there are bounds to
the policy of power and state egotism which must not be over-
stepped, and where the justification of an unavoidable conflict of
duties ceases to hold good.

These bounds consist in this: that a state must not seek to
acquire more power than is necessary for its absolute security
and the free development of its national energies. It is clear
that these bounds do not form a mathematical line, that the
judgment of the actors and that of posterity may vary as to
whether they are being overstepped in a particular case or not.
But there are brutal and obvious transgressions as to which no
doubt ought to exist in historical judgment. We take it to be a
particularly brutal transgression, for instance, that the English
put an end to the liberty of the Boer states, which presented no
danger to them, for the sake of acquiring gold fields which were
to increase England's vast wealth still more. And the sacro
egotsmo of the Italians became blasphemy at that moment when,
without urgent cause, they fell upon their allies, in order to rob
and strangle them. Bismarck's history may be searched in vain
for similar outrages of the policy of power. He wanted to put
an end to the unbearable misery of the Bundestag under which
Prussia and Germany were suffering, and to found a strong
national state secure in its existence — ^no more and no less.
There can be no goal more sacred and just for a great and cul-
tured nation to strive for. If hypocrites abroad reproach him
for having relentlessly used force and cunning to attain this goal,
we demand of them to investigate with equal severity the actions
of the liberal statesman Cavour, who had to accomplish the
same task for his people. It will be found that Cavour was
just as high-handed and cunning, and in some measures even
more relentless and revolutionary than Bismarck. After his ob-
ject was achieved, Bismarck declared Germany to be "satiated,"
and warned himself and his successors against every "abuse of
the acquired power." He warned especially against the ways
"in which the first and second French Empires, in a continuous
policy of war and prestige-seeking, had brought about their own

574 MODERIS GERMANY

downfall." ^ He differentiated noost carefully between a sound
policy of interest and an aggressive policy of prestige, and this
differentiation we Germans have thoroughly assimilated. Macht-
politik, in the German sense, has nothing in common with a
policy of prestige, lusting for war. It wishes to be sensible and
measured in its aims, but if it cannot be done otherwise, will
strive for these aims with all possible energy, and will stake the
full strength of the nation on their accomplishment.

One of these aims for which we are now fighting, Bismarck
bequeathed to us. It is of a thoroughly defensive nature. It is
the maintenance of Austria-Hungary as an independent Great
Power. For this aim, as he says, in his Gedanken und Erinnerun-
gen, a German statesman may, if need be, draw the sword with
a quiet conscience. We iiave acted accordingly, and so would
any other state have acted in our place. It is one of the worst
perversions of the truth of which our adversaries are guilty, to
have misrepresented Austria's self-defense, when she was in bitter
extremity, against the subterraneous intrigues of Pan-Slavism and
of the Greater-Serbia agitators, as a war of wanton aggression
against a small nation. This small nation was in truth as dan-
gerous to Austria as a submarine is to a battleship— and Russia
hastened to its aid, not to protect a small nation, but to cut her
way to Constantinople with the sword. Whoever cannot appre-
ciate the position of relentless and pressing extremity in which
Austria and Germany were placed, is unable to judge historical
events objectively and scientifically.

The contention will be maintained abroad that Serbia and
Russia had natural and justifiable interests to defend. Although
we are of the opinion that they violently exaggerated these in-
terests and overstepped the bounds of a sound policy of power^
we at once admit that this question is open to discussion and
that a Russian or Serbian may judge of it differently than we do.
We could also imagine that a disinterested foreigner might be of
the opinion that this was an unavoidable (:ollision arising from
the depths of the imperative national state-interests of the two
parties concerned. Similar judgments have already been passed
on many of the great wars in history, but even in such a case
the question must always be asked whether a greater desire for
expansion did not exist on the one side than on the other. We
do not doubt that the judgment of posterity will be that Russia
and Serbia wished to weaken, if not to ruin, Austria; and that
Austria and Germany were forced to defend themselves.

Perhaps future ages will say that the collision between Ger-

, ^Gedanken und Erinngrungen, Chap. 26,

MODERN GERMANY 575

many and England was also absolutely unavoidable, because on
both sides ambitions were fostered which could be decided only
by the sword. Treitschke believed in a future settlement of
accounts between England and Germany, not because he wished
to replace the British world-empire with a German world-empire,
but because he foresaw that England would oppose her superior
power to Germany's just and moderate claims.^ He was quite
right in his opinion that England, swayed by her instincts of
world monarchy would not like to see any Power rise, even if it
represented no more than a potential danger to her at some
future time. Had France and not Germany been victorious in
1870-71, France would have become, or rather have remained,
England's arch-enemy.

As early as 1877 Salisbury declared Germany to be England's
most dangerous future enemy,^ and a whole school of English
publicists have endeavored since the nineties to plant this idea
in the heart of the British people. We mention Boulger, who
has now with triumphant satisfaction collected his anti-German
articles written since 1898 in the book entitled England's Arch-
Enemy. We refer the reader to the statements of the English
jingoes and militarists which the honest pacifist Norman Angell
presents in an instructive chapter of his book, Prussianism and
Its Destruction (Chapter HI, The Prussian Within Our
Midst). We recall Professor Cramb's lectures on Germany and
England, delivered in 191 3, in which he seeks, not without in-
genuity, and at the same time with determined energy, to pre-
pare the British people for the struggle against Germany. More
bluntly than he, Emil Reich states in his book, Germany's Swelled
Head, first published in 1907, that the antagonism between Ger-
many and England was of exactly the same kind as that between
Athens and Sparta, Rome and Carthage and England and France
in former times. "The Germans," he says, "are bound to strive
for more expansion, for imperialism. They are simply bound to
do so." From that he draws the conclusion: "If Germany
wants to attack England, England ought to attack her long be^
Sore'' He openly and unhesitatingly advocated the most ruth-
less preventive war against Germany.

What else has the much-reviled Bernhardi done than to main-
tain the right of the statesman, "under certain circumstances to
begin at an opportune moment a war which is deemed neces-

^ "The unreaaonableness which lies in every attempt at world dominion finds
its reven^ in the fact that the imperishable idea of nationality is manifested
in the various states with a certain degree of one-sidedness" (Treitschke,
Pol^ik. Vol. II, p. 537).

^England's Arch-Enemy, D. C. Boulger, London, 19 14, p. 10.

576 MODERN GERMANY

sary" ? It does not meet with our approval that the general has
laid down this doctrine. If it is embodied in the political cate-
chism of a government and of a nation, it can easily lead to a
weakening of the feeling of serious moral resp<Misibility and to a
frivolous breach of peace. Of course situations may arise in
which the danger of war is so indubitable and manifest that one
may feel forced to strike the first blow so as not to be over-
powered. But whoever advocates preventive war in theory,
induces in practice an abuse of the ultima ratio. The case is
similar to that of the right of revolution. When the French
National Assembly of 1789 included the right of resistance a
Voppression in the general and civil rights of man, the great
Irishman, Burke, proved with overwhelming arguments that it
thereby destroyed the innermost foundation of political life.
And yet he recognized at the same time that chaotic upheavals
and elemental hurricanes might occur in the life of a state, when
it was imperative to do what the welfare of the whole state, and
not what formal right, demanded.

Bismarck flatly repudiated the doctrine of a preventive war,
and our present Imperial Chancellor has emphatically expressed
the same opinion. The aim of our policy with respect to Eng-
land was to avoid war with her, if this could possibly be done
with honor. Why should the Anglo-Grerman antagonism not
have subsided in time, in the same way as the Anglo-Russian
antagonism, which twenty to thirty years ago often hovered on
the verge of war and yet invariably calmed down again ? Nego-
tiations were being carried on between us and England shortly
before the war, concerning an adjustment of our trans-maritime
spheres of interest, which were near a settlement entirely satis-
factory to us, and which awoke in us the pleasant hope that Eng-
land no longer intended to suppress with brutal force the natural
and legitimate growth of our industries, our coounerce, our
colonial requirements and our fleet. The wish of our govern-
ment was also the wish of our people. This fact, indeed, is now
recognized here and there in England:

"Such is the German national ambition — to become a world-
power, by peaceful methods, if possible, but to become a world-
power! That the bulk of the German people prefers peaceful
methods is the most obvious truism ever stated." ^

But — so this author continues — it is not the masses who de-
cide, but the militarists, whose exponent is General von Bern-
hardi. This opinion is refuted by the history of events leading

^ The Nations of the War. Ed. by L. G. Redmond-Howard. London, 1914*
Vol. Ill, "Germany and the German People," p. 107 ff.

MODERN GERMANY 577

up to the war and by the unanimous instinctive conviction of the
whole nation that this war has been forced upon us, that it is a
defensive war in the highest sense. Only with such a conviction
was it possible for our pacifist Social Democrats to rally round
the colors to a man. We do not deny that it is part of our policy
of power to carry on with the greatest energy possible a war
that has been forced upon us. Ought we to have waited pa-
tiently till the English and French entered Belgium, took posses-
sion of our unprotected Rhenish provinces and our arms factories
in Westphalia, and attacked our main armies in the flank? We
were firmly convinced, and we have been confirmed in that con-
viction by the documents found later, that this danger actually
threatened us.

It is mere pharisaism to reproach us for our march into Bel-
gium. One needs only to put one's self in our place in order
fully to realize what adversaries were about to attack us, what
terrible dangers were menacing our very existence and our fu-
ture; it will be easy to understand that we preferred to violate
a European treaty which, as was discovered later on, had already
been violated by the Belgian government and by England and
France. It is vile calumny to ascribe to us the brutal maxim
that Might is Right. If we fostered it and lived up to it, we
should act not only brutally, but also foolishly and short-sight-
edly, for without respect for the sacredness of treaties no nation
can prosper.^ But there is also a sacred right of self-defense, in
the execution of which that unavoidable conflict of duties arises
when one must act according to the principle of salus populi su-
prema lex.

That is the spirit of German policy of power and of our con-
ception of it. We do not think nor act more harshly or more
arbitrarily than others — ^but we do think more straightfor-
wardly and more truthfully than the others. Here is a differ-
ence between our way of thinking and theirs which should long
since have been apparent to any student of the historical and
political literature of Germany and of other countries. It was
Ranke who taught us to honor truth and to regard states as
living personalities, animated by vital impulses and desire for
power ; they are all proud, covetous of honor, and egotistical, but
no one of them is like the other. They are individualities, each
resting on "special principles of existence," which develop in the
course of centuries, as the result of all the political and cultural,

* "A state which would on principle hold loyalty and faith in contempt would
be constantly menaced by enemies and would, therefore, not be able to at;aia
its object of becoming a physical power" (H. von Treit<rhke, Folitik, 11, p. 544)*

•y

578 MODERN GERMANY

material and intellectual forces and characteristics of the particu-
lar nation. It is unavoidable, he teaches us furthermore, that
these individualities of exuberant strength should, when they move
and stretch, come into conflict with each other, now in peaceful
competition, now in trials of strength by war. That is the judg-
ment of historical realism which accepts the policies of states as
they are, not as they might be according to humanitarian ideals.
This truth-loving, sober realism of ours has often been taken
much amiss in other countries; the Englishman especially, who
is accustomed to hide his ruthless policy of power behind the
deceptive mask of humanitarian ideals, is indignant when we
show him the true face of things. ^ The British do not direct their
attacks against Ranke, but against Treitschke; they overlook the
fact that Treitschke expressed only with more passion and pathos
what Ranke had previously said. Ranke added another thought
that has perhaps borne more fruit on German soil than on that
of other countries. He taught us to comprehend the meaning
and logic of a great Machtpolitik. He said :

'The history of the world is not that chaotic working at cross-
purposes, pell-mell strife and haphazard succession of nations
which it seems to be at first sight. . . AWhat we see in process
of development are forces, spiritual, life-giving, creative forces,,
individual lives themselves, moral units of energy. • . . They
blossom forth, fill the world, manifest themselves in the most
multifarious forms, war with one another, restrict and over-
power one another. In their mutual influence upon each other,
in their sequence, in their existence, their disappearance, in their
resuscitation to a continually increasing potency, higher signifi-
cance and greater extent, lies the secret of the history of the
world."

Regarded from this lofty point of view the egotism of states
and nations takes on a different significance. It becomes the
means for the development of all the latent forces in mankind.
The history of the world is the development of state individuali-
ties, and the moral energies inherent in them decide whether they
flourish or perish."^ The present war exhibits tremendous moral
energies on both sides. On both sides one ought to regard this
spectacle of utmost exertion of power from that high viewpoint,
which, setting aside hatred and animosity, strives to understand
the value and result of this universal energy. This energy gives
us the assurance that none of the adversaries will entirely crush
the other, and that the wealth of individuality in which the
world of to-day abounds will not be diminished. It is the most
stupid of all the calumnies directed against us to say that we

MODERN GERMANY 579

intended to found a world-dominion like that of the Romans,
and to force our Kultur on the conquered nations. Our histori-
cal convictions and our cultural ideals are based on the concep-
tion of a multifarious co-existence of free, strong states, nations
and systems of Kultur. We fully agree with that sentence in
the declaration of the French universities which runs as follows :
"The French Universities continue to believe that civilization is
not the work of one single people, but of all the peoples, that
the intellectual and moral riches of mankind are created by the
natural variety and the necessary independence of the qualities
and gifts of all the nations." Not the French mind, but the
German mind, has been the first to grasp this great truth. It
originated in the days of Herder, Fichte and the German Roman-
ticists. **Only as each nation," says Fichte, addressing the Ger-
man nation, ''when left to itself develops and moulds itself ac-
cording to its individual traits, does the deity appear in the
national mirror."

Into this mirror we of to-day look with the same faith and
the same emotion as the Germans of a hundred years ago. The
great artists and poets of other countries know quite well that
nowhere outside their native countries are they received more
joyously and more gratefully than in Germany, and that espe-
cially the Kultur of the smaller nations, whose suppression we
are said to plan, excites our deep interest, as our reception of the
works of Ibsen and Maeterlinck, not to mention others, amply
proves. We have occasionally gone even somewhat too far in
our preference for foreign literature, and this has now and again
caused a reaction of national sentiment which has not always ex-
pressed itself with great taste. Every great people nowadays has
its nationalistic extravagances; arrogant and exclusive admira-
tion of their own Kultur is not wanting either in England or in
France. Every nation possesses the natural and justifiable wish
to assert the worth and the ideals of its own Kultur and to dif-
fuse them in the world, because only free competition and the
influence of all varieties of national Kultur upon one another can
produce that all-embracing feeling for world and humanity,
which must lie like gossamer over the atmosphere of our struggles.

We want to receive and give at the same time; we also want
to think and act at the same time, and enrich the one process
by the other, without violating any one's right of property. KuU
tur is certainly a servant of the state, and the state is a servant
of Kultur, but both Kultur and the state have also an inner life
of their own, which is not absorbed by the service of the other.
We do not think for a moment of selling our independent cul-

58o MODERN GERMANY

tural needs and the inner freedom of our mind to the state,
when we freely devote our service to it. Our ideals embrace
both personal liberty and devotion to the whole. This combina-
tion is one which our enemies cannot and will not understand.
And yet, only he who really endeavors to understand it can form
a just opinion of what is called our ''militarism," almost the
worst charge raised against us.

The historical origin of our army is far too little known in
other countries. It is a far too one-sided view to trace it back
to the old Prussian army of Frederick William I and Frederick
the Great, with its iron discipline and the aristocratic esprit de
corps of its officers. The character of the Prussian army was
greatly changed during the period of reform after 1807- by
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Boyen, the disciples of German
idealism and Kantian ethics. They made laws that breathed the
spirit of respect for human dignity, and which were to make
service in the army a moral duty for all and an act of the highest
patriotism. They introduced compulsory military service in or-
der to make Prussia — at that time the smallest and most exposed
of all the Great Powers — strong by means of the spirit and the
utmost exertion of all the moral energies of the nation. This
idea has retained its full vigor and vitality up to the present
hour. "Kant was quite right," a soldier wrote us from the
front; "and in every private of our glorious popular army there
is, unconsciously to himself, a good deal of Kantian ethics to be
found." Since these ethics, which have emanated from our in-
tellectual Kultur, have become an inner link in our national
army, our militarism has become part and parcel of our Kultur.

It is comprehensible that this spirit of devoted national ideal-
ism and personal enthusiasm of the individual stands out more
clearly, more brilliantly, more splendidly in time of war than in
time of peace. The barracks and drill grounds in time of peace
give but a one-sided picture of our army. This schooling in
peace is severe, monotonous and dry, nor can it be otherwise
because its purpose is to bring discipline and technical training
to the highest degree of perfection. It is also harsh at times,
and it were better if many a word used on the barrack-ground
had been left unsaid. Cases of maltreatment occur which we
deplore. They are perhaps just as frequent in other armies, but
the foreign press, inspired by information from England and
France, has for years been in the habit of exaggerating every
case of maltreatment that occurs in our country, and of sys-
tematically depicting our army system as contemptible. We are
working hard in our country to put a stop to such isolated cases

MODERN GERMANY 581

of maltreatment, and our most intelligent oiEcers have the mat-
ter at heart. When General von Moltke recently read the letter
of a Greek physician, in which the latter referred to cases of
maltreatment in the German army in time of peace, he wrote:
"Unfortunately it is not to be denied that deplorable excesses
committed by some brutal individuals have occurred. I hope it
will be one of the salutary consequences of the war that the Ger-
mans will have learnt to respect the human being in every
one whether equal or subordinate, and that such deplorable acts
will entirely disappear from the army."

The tendency of modern development will undoubtedly do
away with this remnant of past ages. There is no better testi-
mony of the spirit that animates our army, even in time of peace,
than the love for and pride in his old regiment which lives in
every soldier who has served. He cherishes the memory of it
during his whole life. A vast number of veterans' societies, in
which the former soldiers meet on a friendly social footing, are
scattered throughout Germany. If a regiment which is garri-
soned in a small town celebrates a jubilee, it is a popular festival
for all the inhabitants as well.

The popular nature of our army is by no means inconsistent
with the peculiar esprit de corps of our officers. Some harsh
traits may cling to the latter body which might be dispensed with
as a remnant of by-gone times, but in its inmost nature it is sound
and indispensable. It provides the army with leaders of uni-
form moral views, strict integrity, unselfish devotion to king and
country, and a chivalrous conception of life. It is one of those
corporate counterpoises to the too great individualisation and
"atomfsation" of modern Kultur. It is desirable and necessary,
not only in the army, and has often had to be created elsewhere,
with great difficulty, by the cooperative association of men be-
longing to the same profession. In the army it is the immediate
result of natural and vital development. The strict line of de-
marcation between officers and men is adhered to for reasons of
military expediency, not of arrogance. It is the mildest of tha con-
ceivable and possible means of maintaining the discipline and sub-
ordination absolutely necessary in an army. In armies where such
a line of demarcation is wanting, punishments are more frequent
and more severe than with us. Our soldier knows that it separates
him from his superior only outwardly, not inwardly. On the
battlefield and in the trenches one spirit of devotion, of mutual
hearty confidence, and of heroism, animates leader and soldier
in peril and death. Any one who has seen the relations be-
tween officers and men at the front will cease to regard our

^

582 MODERN GERMANY

militarism as a mechanical drill of obedient menials. He will
find warm human feeling, human faith, and human greatness at
every step.

Foreigners will perhaps reply to this: What you describe as
the spirit of your militarism is the expression of certain national
peculiarities, not all of which are congenial to us, but which we
must not begrudge you, as you will not part with them. But
your militarism has become an international danger because it
has encroached on civil life, because it has militarized all your
people outwardly and inwardly to such a degree that they must
seek an outlet in foreign conquest. This view is that of enemies
who realize they have to deal with a dangerous and strong ad-
versary, who is not to be beaten by a levy of troops from all parts
of the world. But were we not obliged to be prepared for such
a levy, since England had begun to regard with hostile envy our
growing economic prosperity and our fleet created for the pro-
tection of this prosperity ? Were we not in former times always
in an unusually dangerous and cramped position between the
great military Powers, France and Russia? * Can we forget what
we have suffered through our former defenselessness since the
days of the Thirty Years' War? It is nothing else but stern
necessity that forces us to develop a maximum of military power.
It is the only safe guarantee of our independence.

Why is the accusation not directed against France, who exacts
still more from her population than we, who was the first to
begin and to cause the competition in armaments between the
great European states by the increase of her army in 1886, and
who has always kept it alive by her policy of revenge? Why is
not Russia, who has created a vast army for the purposes of her
notorious thirst for conquest, also accused? And why is Eng-
land forgotten, England that has developed the most extreme
form of militarism at sea, and who has, against the wish of all
other nations, successfully stood for the maintenance of its most
inhuman theory, viz., the right of capture at sea? Compared to
the right of capture at sea, all the little harshnesses of Prussian
militarism are insignificant. England is now reaping what she
has sown. Our submarines, sinking her merchant vessels, are
forced to act on the principle : A corsaire, corsaire et demi.

We have a right to be deeply embittered by the malevolent
calumnies of our adversaries, but we will not close this chapter,

^This fact is now recognized by impartial foreigners. The former Dutch
Prime Minister, Van Houten, says: "Germany has until the present day been
the victim of French militarism in that until 1870 France's efforts were
alwavs directed with success at {preventing Germany from attaining complete
development of power through unity. France was always supported in these
cfforu by Russia^' {Das Grossere Deutschland, Dresden, February, 191 5).

t^

SSV1S3

\)i\

MODERN GERMANY 583

which IS to assist neutral nations to understand our motives and
opinions, with words of hatred and bitterness. Great civilized

^her, dishonor themselves

oi hate, and
roots of
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all.

CHAPTER II
THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

PROFESSOR ERNST ZITELMANN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

BONN

■

TO speak of the war and international law involves three
questions: What has been the aim of international law
in this war? How far has it stood the test? What is going to
become of it? Its past, its present, its future — this we shall deal
with briefly from the German point of view.*

International law, especially the law of war, which concerns
us here, is the fruit of centuries of labor. Particularly during
the last decade has its development been pronounced and prom-
ising. All civilized nations, Germany as well as her present
opponents, have helped to build it up. Czar Nicholas II, in
his peace manifesto, suggested the First Hague Peace Confer-
ence, and the terms "Declaration of Paris" and "Declaration
of London" preserve and honor the memory of the services ren-
dered by France and England. We were proud of what had
been accomplished. Statesmen and scholars spoke of interna-
tional law as of one of the highest achievements of modem civ-
ilization; we felt justified in regarding as a blessing to mankind
the fact that the mutual relations of states were no longer to
be determined by the arbitrary dictates of force, but by fixed
rights and duties. We found, therefore, in the attitude of an
individual state towards international law, in the manner in
which it respected and observed the law's commands, an im-
portant criterion of its civilization, of its worth as a civilized
state. Indeed, we only regarded that state as civilized which
adapted itself to the rules of international law.

Herewith is by no means implied, however, that this is the
final and most important standard by which to judge the con-
duct of a state in its relation to the outside world. Legal pre-
cepts are not the highest laws governing human life; they estab-
lish merely a minimum of obligations, and within the limit thus
drawn, other forces, above all moral forces, should be active.
Just as an individual in his private life may keep within the

^ The following essay was finished early in March, 191 5, and makes use
of such facts only as had by that time become known. The fundamental view
has remained uncnanged.

MODERN GERMANY 58s

bounds of the law and may yet act basely and contemptibly, so
likewise may the state. In the life of states, too, there are moral
obligations, obligations of honor and decency. To be lacking
in gratitude, to break faith, even where no written alliance
exists, to desert a friend in die hour of need or to betray him,
to attack the defenseless in a treacherous manner, to sacrifice
high possessions of mankind to petty personal gains: all this
may not be a violation of international law, but it is much
worse — it brands the state before the highest tribunal, the tribunal
of moral conscience. The view is sometimes encountered, it is
true, and it is not a novel one, that for the state there are no
moral obligations; that besides the legal tenets, a state is bound
only by the law which its own advantage prescribes; indeed,
the opposite view is almost scornfully derided as being out of
touch with the world of reality. This standpoint is justified
only if the binding force of moral norms is denied also for
the individual; but if it is recognized for the individual, the
logical conclusion is inevitable that moral norms exist equally
for the state. We need not decide here whether, and to what
extent, the moral laws governing a state differ from those which
concern the individual. The reproach of being out of touch
with the world applies, in reality, to this negative doctrine. It
is blind to the palpable existence of a public conscience. One
example is sufficient. The question whether or not a state may
go to war is not a question of international law. A state does
not act against international law by going to war, even without
the shadow of a reason, unless bound by special treaties not
to do so. Yet perhaps nothing at the outbreak of a war occu-
pies public opinion so much as the question which state is re-
sponsible for the war. This question lies exclusively in the
sphere of morals; it is asked whether a state was morally jus-
tified in declaring war, or whether its motives were base and
reprehensible. How heavily the weight of this moral judgment
is felt is proved in every war by the fact that each party to
the conflict does his utmost to prove his own innocence and the
enemy's guilt; it is moral condemnation which the state shuns,
even though it may not have violated any tenet of law.

A state, therefore, has by no means reached the highest point
when it can say only that it is observing the provisions of in-
ternational law. Yet even this we used to look upon as some-
thing of an achievement. We thought our possession in inter-
national law important, and we hoped to attain much through
its medium — it was to contribute towards the realization of

S86 MODERN GERMANY

high ideals of humanity. But finer distinctions must be made
at this point.

Everywhere in international law it is a question only of the
duties and rights of states in their relations to each other. These
duties and rights are of twofold origin. On the one hand, they
are laid down in abstract legal rules, based on the development
of legal custom and treaties. Even though only a number of
states — not all of them — may have taken part in the creation of
these rules, they may yet be termed "general international law,"
for they arise from general considerations, applying equally to
all individual states, and should, therefore, be universally bind-
ing. Or else the rights and duties of states rest on a special
regulation of interests by treaty between certain states. These
two kinds of law are of unequal value« The special regulation
is the result of a concrete situation relative to the power and
interests of these particular states ; the obligations into which the
individual state enters in this relation are to the interest of the
other state only, and not to the interest of all states in general.
Hence such treaty agreements may change, they may cease, new
ones may originate, without affecting the interests of the world
or universal law. Only those stipulations are within the range
of general law, which refer, in the first place, to the genesis of
such agreements — that is to say, to the prerequisites of their valid-
ity; in the second, to their binding force as long as they hold
good ; and finally, to the manner in which they may terminate.

The general provisions of international law, however, with
which alone we are here concerned, do not aim to serve the
particular interest of individual states. They serve hi^er pur-
poses, viz., the interests of all states, and therefore the interests
of all mankind. The state is the legal form in which a nation
seeks to realize its ideals of life, it is not an end in itself but
a means to this end. The individual state, however, is not
alone in the world, there are others beside it. And the ideals
which every individual state has to realize, harmonize fortu-
nately to a great extent with those of other states: there are
common state interests, on the one hand, and there are interests
of mankind, on the other. To serve these is the aim and pur-
pose of general international law.

This international law is based primarily on the fundamental
idea of "equality** : the individual states, without regard to their
size, their position and their resources, are supposed to be equal
before international law, to enjoy equal rights. International
law thus aims to be a protection for the weaker states; might is
not to be greater than right. On this basis, international law

MODERN GERMANY 587

aims at assisting the states in peace time to attain peaceful ends
common to them all, which, however, the individual state acting
for itself could not attain at all, or only imperfectly. Inter-
national law furnishes the rules governing the collaboration of
the several states for the purpose of attaining these ends, it
creates in this respect a "union of interests" (Ztveciverband)
of states.

On war, too, international law strives to exert a regulating
influence, though war in itself would seem to break all legal
rules. Everlasting peace was not to be hoped for. This dream
of noble minds was bound to be shattered by stern reality. The
task of international law was, as far as possible, to prevent war,
but if it should break out, to humanize it. The object of every
war is the overthrow of tfie adversary; but without prejudice to
this object, it can still be restricted in the interest of humanity.
The laws of war are througliout a compromise between what is
necessary for attaining the object of the war and what himianity
demands.

The first aim is to prevent an unnecessary extension of the
war beyond the circle of the Powers directly engaged in it.
Accordingly, rules concerning the rights and duties of neu-
trals have been laid down. Similarly, the so-called Congo Act
was conceived as a means of excluding a large part of the Afri-
can colonial possessions of the belligerent states from the theater
of war, since it could not fail to be evident to every state that
to carry war into the colonies would be detrimental to the com-
mon interest of the dominant white race, without in any way
affecting the issue of the war. The limitation imposed by the
Congo Act would have benefited all European states alike.
Germany was ready to adhere to it; but England, disregarding
the obligation she had entered into, precipitated hostilities in
Africa.

Furthermore, international law aims at limiting the war in
regard to the persons engaged. It is the supreme idea of the
laws of war that the conflict should be waged solely between the
states, through their. armies and navies, not by and against indi-
vidual citizens. Two principles result from this. One is, that
individual citizens may not fight against the hostile state unless
they belong to the army or navy. A state which tolerates or
even encourages the mischief of the "hedge war" {franctireur
war) grossly offends against this fundamental principle of inter-
national law, and necessarily brings immeasurable harm down
upon the population. No one can have any doubt whatever that
the participation of private individuals in hostilities against a

588 MODERN GERMANY

modem army is without influence on the outcome of the war.
The losses that can be inflicted on the enemy are too small to
be of consequence, considering the huge size of modem armies;
but their inevitable result is that they call forth frightful retri-
bution. For the resulting sufferings and horrors no one can be
held legally responsible save the state that tolerates or encour-
ages the participation of its citizens.

The second conclusion is that the state may wage war only
against the foreign state itself — that is to say, against the army
and navy, not against peaceful individuals. Through the labor
of centuries this principle has ripened more and more into the
noblest fruit of international law. It has already been realized
by the regulations relative to war on land, which provide that
life, freedom, honor and property of non-participant citizens must
be unconditionally protected, as far as military exigencies per-
mit; plundering is forbidden, and the individual must be indem-
nified for what is taken from him for military purposes. We
were justified in praising this principle as one of the noblest
victories of humane sentiment. In naval warfare, it is true,
the inviolability of private property, even if it is not to serve for
military purposes, has not yet been recognized. At the Hague
Conference, Germany, with other great states, declared her readi-
ness to recognize this principle; owing to England's opposition,
it came to naught; and thus to the present day right of capture
at sea is tolerated by international law. It is the last remnant
of a barbarous viewpoint which we had hoped to be able to
abolish in a not too-distant future.

On war as it is carried on between the armies and navies
international law has sought to impose restrictions. The ob-
ject of war can be attained even if the cruelties formerly
practised are avoided. Proceeding from this idea, the Geneva
Convention was concluded, which purposed to ease the lot of
the wounded and sick of the armies in the field; this was ex-
tended to include naval warfare. Regulations were drawn up
for the treatment of prisoners of war which were prompted by
the clear and humane consideration that war captivity is not
penal custody; the prisoner in serving his state has only done
his duty, he has done what 'the enemy state expects its own
citizens to do. The ends of war are sufficiently served if, by
being kept in custody, the prisoner is prevented from aiding his
country; more than this is not called for.

Finally, international law has endeavored, by a number of
separate provisions, to restrict the means of warfare. There are
warlike actions which are doubtless injurious to the enemy,

MODERN GERMANY 589

but the advantages of which are out of all proportion to their
cruelty; they arc therefore forbidden. Included in this category
is the prohibition of using bullets which cause unnecessarily cruel
wounds (the so-called dum-dum bullets).

This is the substance of the ideas of international law, roughly
sketched and considered more with regard to broad outlines
than to detailed provisions, which are as yet imperfect and but
slowly developing. If merely that which has so far been
built up as international law were really observed, war would
still be terrible enough; nevertheless, without prejudice to the
political purposes involved, it would be more humane, and an
infinite amount of suffering would be prevented which has no
influence on the issue of the war.

Naturally, however, there was no overlooking the fact that
the realization of this hope was uncertain. International law
of all existing law is the weakest. Its weakness, to begin with,
lies in the nature of its origin. The substance of international
law as above described is only slowly developing and growing,
the elaboration in detail of the principles is often uncertain and
controversial; only in parts has the law as yet assumed definite
form. This will be discussed more fully later on. Secondly, its
weakness lies in the means of its realization. International law
purports to regulate the relations of independent, sovereign
states. There is no organized power to enforce its observance,
there can be none. Even if an impartial court existed, competent
to decide what is right or vva*ong in a dispute touching interna-
tional law, and even if the individual states had pledged them-
selves to appear before this court and to submit to its verdict, there
would yet be no means of compelling them to do so. If a bellig-
erent state does not keep within the bounds of international law,
if it infringes the law, the injured state has no other means of
coercion than such as it can itself enforce. This is what is
called reprisals : in international law the principle is unchallenged
that a breach of the law may be returned by a breach of the
law, that wrong may be answered by wrong. On this point,
too, we shall have more to say later on. Nowhere else in the
legal sphere does this principle exist. It is explained by the
fact that there is no coercion possible against a state.

There are people, not only in Germany, but also abroad, who
from this have drawn the conclusion that international law is
no true law. This is a mistake. More and more modern science
recognizes that compulsion by a superior power is no inherent
characteristic of a legal precept. Here is not the place to en-
large on this; it may even be regarded as superfluous, for after

590 MODERN GERMANY

all the question is merely theoretical. In reality no one denies
that international law — ^whether it be true law, or whether it
be unworthy of the name — ^has nevertheless binding force. And
because we admit this binding force, we feel in conscience and
honor bound to respect it. At the same time adherence to its
precepts is a demand of practical wisdom, provided a state is not
thinking merely of the advantage of the moment, but is pursuing
a far-sighted policy looking towards the future. International law
does not aim at the advantage of an individual state, but at that
of all states ; what it gives to one, it also gives to the other ; what
it takes from a state in limiting its free scope, it returns in the
form of increased protection. The more keenly the moral duty of
observing this legal order is felt and the more clearly its bene-
fits are realized, the more secure is international law as a living
force.

This, however, implies at the same time a restriction of the
validity of international law. Though it is a moral duty to
observe international law, that duty may yet cease to exist:
all law of nations breaks down in the case of necessity, a neces-
sity from which there is no escape within the bounds of the law.
International law is not an end in itself, its aim is to coordinate
the existence of the states. The moment the very life of a state
is threatened and its existence cannot be saved except by a breach
of the law, the inhibitions of the law cease. To adhere to
the law in the greatest of danger and not to seize upon the last
means of salvation because of an obstruction of international
law, would be to commit suicide. The law cannot demand
suicide. The question becomes a purely moral one, transcend-
ing all legal points of view. No state has ever regarded and
treated, or will ever regard and treat, the matter otherwise.
This refers in particular, but by no means alone, to treaty obli-
gations which one state has entered into with other states. Such
was the position of Germany in relation to Belgium at the out-
break of the war. As is well known, Germany undertook
scrupulously to respect the integrity of Belgium, as well as of
the French territory on the Continent, and to spare the north
coast of France, provided England would undertake to remain
neutral Not only did England reject this proposal, but Sir
Edward Grey, in reply to the urgent request of the German
ambassador, as to whether he could not give the terms (Hi which
England would remain neutral, replied he must definitely de-
cline to make any promise of neutrality, England must keep
her hands free. From this moment Germany could no longer
doubt that, besides Russia and France, she would have to face

MODERN GERMANY 591

England in the impending war. Thus arose the emergenqr in
which deliverance could be found only in the violation of Bel-
gium's neutrality. The action of Germany, who only demanded
free passage through Belgium, was therefore justified, even if
we leave out of consideration the fact that Belgium herself had
already renounced her privilege as a neutral by grossly violating
the duties of her position as such. Concerning this, however, it
is unnecessary to say more. The matter is cited only by way of
example, not for excuse or apology.

In admitting the plea of necessity, it is true, great care must
be exercised. A case of necessity can be pleaded only when
the state has really no other means of helping itself than by
the breach. If there are other means at hand, a plea of neces-
sity cannot be put forward. That is obvious, and it is equally
obvious that needless cruelties, needless fury, needless destruc-
tion can never be justified by necessity. Necessity is an excuse
only for an action which is required in order to save oneself
from danger; the action must be necessary for the purpose of
self-preservation.

This effect of necessity is not peculiar to international law;
it exists in all law. It exists in civil law, as well as in criminal
law, it exists even in the law that regulates the constitutional
life of a nation — it expresses the limitation of validity inherent
in all law. But it is of particular importance in international
law. In the clash of interests in private life there is still the
state, standing above the individual Its duty is to watch over
the general interest; it can therefore, in the case of necessity,
weigh the conflicting interests and, having weighed them, deny
the individual the right of necessity in certain circumstances, just
as it can demand the life of the individual — e. g., the life of the
soldier in war — realizing that life is not the highest of posses-
sions. But with states it is otherwise. Whether in this case
the supreme and most important interests of the state are at
stake, whether therefore the state is justified in breaking the
law — this the state concerned must decide for itself, since there
is no superior court, no superior power. Here the law of neces-
sity fully asserts itself with all its primitive force. The well-
known "clause of honor" of the arbitration treaties (under which
all disputes involving the vital interests, the honor or the inde-
pendence of the state are excepted from arbitration) rests on
the same idea, which is the source of the law of necessity.

Such discussions border on the ultimate problems of thought.
The validity of international law, in the last resort, is rooted in

592 MODERN GERMANY

values of a higher order, whence it derives its strength and, at
the same time, its limitation.

Despite all these restrictions, despite the uncertainty of its
sources, despite the weakness of its realization, international law
has yet one advantage over all other law. It takes precedence
of all laws on account of its immense and unique range, ad-
dressing, as it does, all states, that is to say the whole of man-
kind, and striving to reconcile the most stupendous conflicts of
interests. Further, it is entitled to precedence on account of
the moral elevation, the pure humaneness of the aims which it
pursues.

How often has all this been announced at international con-
gresses! With what enthusiasm has it been acclaimed! Par-
ticularly in Germany the appreciation of the value of interna-
tional law was steadily growing, as was only natural in view
of the German character, which is fond of cultivating inter-
national relations. Just as the Germans endeavor to appropri-
ate the masterpieces of all literatures by translations, just as
they have a liking for the study of foreign languages, and
as they are perhaps the most travelled of all the peoples of
the world, so they have always, often beyond the immediate
need, expounded the idea that above the individual states there
is a higher community, a community of civilization. The era
of peace maintained by us for more than forty-three years, often
with difficulty and at the sacrifice of our pride, has witnessed in
Germany an enormous increase in the work of promoting inter-
national relations in all spheres of life — economy, sociology^
science, art, religion — and in particular of law, in the province
of which, as history shows, a large part of the intellectual en-
ergy of Germany for centuries has been occupied. The en-
deavors to consolidate private law, to create a "world law,"
have been the subject in Germany of theoretical research and
practical advancement; the great attempts to find by scientific
methods uniform principles of international private law for all
nations of the earth, have in the last century emanated chiefly
from Germany; and Germany has joyfully assisted in the
Hague discussions concerning a consolidation by treaty of this
department of law, hand in hand with the other great civilized
nations, whose merits we have gladly recognized. Above all,
has the law of nations in a growing measure received loving care
in Germany, as an almost endless literature on the subject shows.

At each of the numerous universities in the German Empire
there are one, or in some cases, several chairs of international
law. Again and again, particularly in the last decades, the Fed-

MODERN GERMANY 593

cral governments have insisted that special attention be devoted
to the study of international law. Nobody in Germany can
be a member of the legal profession or enter the administration
of the state without having passed an examination in this sub-
ject. And not only with statesmen and scholars has interna-
tional law found this consideration, but even in the minds of
the people at large the consciousness of its value has increased.
It is only natural that the masses are not so keenly interested
in this branch as in other parts of the law. The greatest and
most immediate interest is always claimed by relations of private
law, which daily obtrude themselves on the attention; interest
is further aroused by penal law in the repression of crime, and by
public law through the development of the internal affairs of the
state; comparatively seldom does the importance of international
law, as affecting the personal relations of individuals, make itself
felt in peace time. But unremitting informative work in this
regard, too, has gradually awakened and strengthened the recog-
nition by the masses of the importance of international law.
This is of the highest value, for law is a live factor only when
supported by the consciousness of the whole nation: the activity
of statesmen can, in the long run, be only the expression of that
which the nation desires.

Such was the condition of international law up to the summer
of last year. What a picture do we now behold in the World
War! Is it really more than a heap of ruins that we have
before us? A disastrous confusion seems to have taken root
abroad in the heads of otherwise high-minded men ; one is tempted
to feel that in certain circles the moral value of international
law has not been grasped at all. Breaches of the most estab-
lished principles of international law have been advocated quite
openly in foreign newspapers and speeches. A man like Wells
has publicly preached the " franctireur war" against Germany in
its most appalling form; Clemenceau has demanded a treat-
ment of the wounded Germans in France which would be a
violation of all international law. However, words are not
deeds. Let us dismiss these overheated outbursts, and look
only at the facts. There also a sad picture of devastation is
revealed. It is not our task here to enumerate in detail all the
offences against the rules of international law committed by our
enemies, still less to defend Germany against the charges made
against her by the foreign press, and even by foreign govern-
ments. There would be nothing gained in doing so, unless com-
plete evidence in support of and against the charges were given,

594 MODERN GERMANY

and that is not possible here; besides, it has already been suffi-
ciently done in other works (see especially Der Weltkrieg und
das Vblkerrecht, by Miillcr, Berlin, 1915). We shall here
try only to find certain leading principles by which matters
can be judged, and we shall make use of specific cases only by
way of example.

AH violations of international law are divisible into two great
groups: either a rule of international law is broken by action, or
its very validity is denied.

To begin with actual infringements of the law, in cases
where the validity of the law is nevertheless recognized. The
infringement of a legal norm by no means implies in itself a
denial of the rule's validity; it proves only that the conception
of the binding force of the norm is not strong enough to triumph
over the motives that prompt to its infringement. When a
thief steals, he thereby breaks the law respecting property, but
he does not deny its validity, he breaks it although he recog-
nizes its validity.

In judging the significance of actual breaches of international
law, a distinction must be made, as to whether they are com-
mitted by individuals or whether they emanate from the state
itself. By breaches of international law by individuals are to
be understood acts contrary to international law which are com-
mitted by individual soldiers or subordinate officers, or by offi-
cials not in a commanding position. In accepting this definition
theoretical hair-splitting must be discarded. For, strictly speak-
ing, there is no such thing as a violation of international law
by an individual, for the rules make the state, not the individual,
directly responsible for legal duties. But the state issues to its
soldiers and officials injunctions and prohibitions in accordance
with international law, and if the individual disobeys these in-
junctions and prohibitions, he indirectly acts contrary to inter-
national law. Breaches of the law by individuals happen every-
where in private and public life; it is easy to understand that
the laws of peace have a better chance of being observed than
the laws of war. In war there are many circumstances condu-
cive to infringements of the law. The soldier must act
promptly, he is often given no time for thought, the circumstances
are frequently obscure, and errors are possible. Adding thereto
the power of temptation, the heat of passions unchained by war,
and the difficulty of drawing the line between what is justified
by the necessity of war and what is contrary to law, one will
find it easy to understand why transgressions occur. Nor should
too great weight be given to an individual act, considering the

MODERN GERMANY 395

enormous number of men employed in war — ^up to this time
mankind had had no experience whatever of the consequences
which arise when armies of millions take the field. All these
are reasons which permit of attaching minor importance to
breaches of international law by individuals, however deplor-
able and sometimes even atrocious they may be.

That international law is nevertheless recognized as valid,
despite its breach by individuals, is shown especially by the fact
that the state to which the perpetrator belongs almost always
endeavors to deny the breach of the law. It either denies that
the alleged infringement happened at all — as, for instance, dis-
claiming that the Red Cross was fired upon, that the flag of
truce was abused, that houses were plundered, non-participant
citizens wounded, ill treated, dragged into prison, or killed —
or it is claimed that conditions prevailed which divested the
deed of an unlawful character — ^as, again, that an open town
which was fired on had been defended, that a truce bearer who
was made prisoner had by espionage forfeited protection. The
controversy thus shifts into the sphere of facts. There is no
impartial tribunal above the states concerned that could ascer-
tain the truth in strict justice, and passions make bad judges.
Our government has gone out of its way to ascertain the truth
of accusations against our enemies by taking evidence on oath,
with absolute calmness and impartiality, in the same manner as
crimes committed within the state are investigated, and the re-
sult is bad enough. I refer only to the atrocious deeds perpetrated
at Orchics, which have been proved and the proofs of which have
been published by our Foreign Office.^ Nor has our govern-
ment shirked trouble in investigating alleged breaches of law
by Germans, whenever the allegations were not, as they usually
were, merely sweeping condemnations, but statements of spe-
cific single acts, with date and locality clearly indicated.

Following the legal maxim ''W incumbit probatio qui dicit,
nott qui negaf (proof is incumbent upon the accuser, not the
defendant), Germany might have waited till the other side had

^ This refers to atrocities conunitted by French franctireurs at Orchies, in
the Department du Nord, described in an official war telegram as follows:
"In the village twenty Germans who had been wounded in the engagement of
the previous day were found mutilated in a ghastly manner. Their ears and
noses had been cut off and their mouths and the <tt>ening8 left after the
removal of their noses, stuffed with sawdust. They had then been left to
die from suffocation." The correctness of the report was confirmed by two
French clergymen over their signatures; and as further substantiation there
exists a report made to the German Emperor by the chief of the field hos-
nital work, Sergeant-General von Schjcrning. A punitive expedition was sent
by the German forces to Orchies, which was razed to the ground. The case
was presented in a very different light in the allied press, which said that
the GermanSj without provocation, had destroyed the village in a barbarotis
manner. This took place in the latter part of September, 19x4.

596 MODERN GERMANY

disclosed its proof — the French government has not up till now
seen fit to publish proofs of the serious charges brought by it —
but the German government in the interest of the good repu-
tation of our army has not rested its case there. Unquestion-
ably on the German side, also, regrettable occurrences have
taken place. Despite the severe discipline which has always
prevailed in the German army and is traditional with the German
soldier, it is impossible that among the millions of Germans in
the field there should not be some who commit brutal acts.
But what our soldiers have been accused of by the enemy has
on closer investigation nearly always been found to be pure in-
vention, and the inquiry on our part has been carried through
by means of evidence on oath with every assurance of impar-
tiality. Often enough the depositions of the enemy subjects
themselves have shown the alleged facts to be pure fabrication.
Sometimes they were creations of a fancy heated by war, an
imagination grown hysterical; at other times exaggerations of
insignificant little incidents passed from mouth to mouth, and
sometimes — unfortunately very frequently — intentional malicious
calumnies.

For the rest, not a few of the accusations raised in the press
against the German army collapse from the legal point of view.
It is quite astonishing with what audacity alleged breaches of
international law by the German army are judged by people
who have not the least notion of international law. Absolutely
unquestioned principles are flatly ignored. I shall give just one
example, which is, however, a very weighty one. It is rec-
ognized by law that an attack on private persons and private prop-
erty by the troops is justified when committed after an unlawful
attack from the opposing side, and when it is made in self-de-
fense, by way of retribution, as punishment, or when impera-
tively demanded in the interest of the safety of the military
movements. In Belgium, German soldiers have been treacher-
ously fired on by persons not in the army, and other treachery
has been perpetrated. Thereupon the houses where this took
place were burnt down, the inhabitants killed or removed. This
has been done and held lawful by all nations in all previous
wars. Likewise, it is not unlawful to kill wounded enemies
who shoot at the advancing troops from behind. But to speak
of such things is to waste one's breath. Amongst those who are
at all familiar with international law, with the ideas laid down
by it and with the manner in which it has been handled in
previous wars, there can be no dispute concerning all these
things. Against bad will no explanation, no proof is of avail.

MODERN GERMANY 597

The breaches of law so far mentioned are prima facie acts
of individuals only. In this connection the Hague Convention
respecting war on land expressly stipulates in article 3 that a
state is responsible for all acts committed by persons forming
part of its armed forces. But this responsibility can be taken
only to mean that the state is liable for them, and is in particular
liable to pay compensation (as the article referred to explicitly
lays down) for all such acts. It cannot be construed as mean-
ing that the state itself can be charged with every act committed
by the individual. It is simply liability of the state for the
fault of a third party, not for any fault of its own. Quidquid
delirant Achivi, plectuntur reges. The more numerous such
acts are, and the higher the position of the perpetrators, the more
must they be regarded as evidence of the low level of the general
moral and legal standard in the army, or the civil service, and
consequently in the whole nation. It is proof of a lack of cul-
tural breeding. And in so far as the state has the duty of at-
tending to the necessary education and instruction of the people
— since in this respect the state and the people are inseparable —
the reproach of an inferior civilization comes home to the state
itself.

But there are cases where the state can be regarded as the
guilty party, from a legal point of view, in the event of such acts
by individuals. What is meant when we speak of the wrong
of the state itself as against the wrong of individuals? Acts
committed by the state are only acts committed by individuals.
But we consider the state itself guilty, whenever the final deci-
sion rests with the persons who conduct the state, the highest
leaders of its policies and its army, in short, when its masters
in the field and in the office, in their position as such, commit
the breach of law. For they are the "organs" of the state, their
official action is the action of the state itself. Charges made
against them, therefore, aflect the state directly. And this
charge is a serious one. For the grounds of excuse which in
the case of the misdeeds of individuals allow of a milder verdict,
fail when the wrong is done by the state itself; we are not faced
by deeds committed under the impulse of the moment, but by
acts coolly preconceived and planned in cold blood. Therefore,
they weigh much heavier than deeds of individuals.

A state can become personally guilty in various ways. First,
by itself ordering the breach of the law, either in a specific
case or by a general order. The individual soldiers or subor-
dinate officials who act in observance of such command can, in
this event, be considered only as tools, while the state itself is

598 MODERN GERMANY

the really guilty one. A great number of such commands is-
sued by our adversaries have come to our knowledge; of many
of them, which they would certainly have wished might remain
secret, the original documents have fallen into our hands. The
order of the Chief in Command of the loth Russian Army,
dated December 5, 19 14, may serve as an example:

"The Commander in Chief has enjoined strict observance of the com-
mand of Headquarters that in the attack all able-bodied male inhal>itants
of the age of ten years and upwards are to be driven in front of the
troops! I"

Oftener, indirect responsibility of the organs of the state
must be assumed: the more frequent the excesses on the part of
individuals, the more they cease to be mere exceptions; the
longer the state hesitates to punish them, the more justified is
the inference that these transgressions are due to orders from
those higher in authority. When a large number of Russians
taken prisoners were found in possession of material for set-
ting fire to houses, the inference could not fail to be that instruc-
tions had been given from higher quarters. So, too, when dur-
ing the retreat of the Russian army from the Mazurian dis-
trict and Bukowina, a number of villages which did not lie in
the war zone proper were devastated, and when trains were
laden with stolen property. Such a train was found when
the Russian army was surrounded in the Mazurian winter battle.

The state is also guilty when it fails to prevent future recur-
rence of unlawful acts of individuals — soldiers or others — ^by
taking appropriate measures; when, in other words, it tolerates
their continuance. Granting that the administration in France,
England and Russia were taken by surprise and were therefore
powerless against the first outbreaks of the people's passion
against Germans abroad, it is certain that when these hideous
outrages continued they did not prevent them but let events
take their course, standing by with folded arms.

Further, the state makes itself an accohiplice if, instead of pro-
ceeding against outrages committed, it neglects to punish the of-
fenders according to criminal law. As far as we can judge
from Germany, our enemies have been sadly remiss in this re-
spect. In London and in Russia, for instance, members of the
mobs which at the outbreak of the war committed the most hor-
rible outrages against the lives and property of Germans, if
they were brought to trial at all were nearly alwa3rs acquitted
in court. Wherever breaches of international law abroad were
punished, public opinion has been openly opposed to it; as, ior

MODERN GERMANY 599

instance, the recent mild sentence passed on a mayor in the east
of France, who, although a civilian, had fired at a German
aviator. Germany may point with pride to the strict justice
meted out by her courts. Misdeeds of individual soldiers in the
field against subjects of the enemy state have been punished as
unrelentingly as if they had been committed against Germans,
and German public opinion entirely approves thereof. The
proofs of all this lie open to every one.

Finally, complicity of the state must be recognized when it
employs troops which it must have known beforehand would
not respect the laws and customs of war existing between civil-
ized nations. Out of every corner of the earth our enemies
have brought auxiliary troops to the European seat of war;
Germany has had to sacrifice her best blood in fighting semi-
savages, according to whose standard of civilization every atrocity
in war seems natural. It stands to reason that such troops
have no conception of or respect for international law, and that
they will behave differently from our popular armies in which
the flower of the nation is fighting, and where there is hardly
a single man who has not had a regular school training. Yet
our enemies dare to assert that we are the barbarians! It would
be a laughing matter, if it were not so serious.

Still, in all these cases we have only actual breaches of the
law on the part of the state, whereas the rule of the law itself
remains recognized, its validity is not disputed. This is made
evident by the attempt to dispute the facts alleged as constitut-
ing the breach of law. Such attempts, in the absence of an
impartial court, may be continued, at least for a certain period,
with a chance of success, till the facts speak too loudly. In
Longwy, close to the Franco-German frontier, a large supply
of "dum-dum" bullets, together with other war material, was
found. The fact could not be disputed. France, however, de-
nies that these bullets were intended for use in the war, con-
tending that they were intended for manoeuvring purposes only.
This excuse shows that the prohibition of the use of "dum-
dum" bullets itself is recognized as valid. It is difficult, how-
ever, to regard this as more than a subterfuge. That England
intended "dum-dum" bullets to be used in the war is proved
by the sworn statements of two captured British officers on
whom such bullets were found.

In other instances the action of the state is admitted, but
at the same time the appearance of right is maintained, by ad-
vancing legal pretexts which are quite obviously such, and noth-
ing more. The fact that Germans who happened to be abroad

6oo MODERN GERMANY

at the outbreak of war were imprisoned in large numbers and
kept in concentration camps was against all international law.
In order to cloak this, the pretext that these Germans had car-
ried on espionage was made without any grounds for suspicion.
Such cases are particularly revolting when judicial procedure is
abused in order to lend a semblance of right to a measure con-
trary to international law. We had such an experience with
the French. German army surgeons were convicted of plun-
dering on the most futile pretexts. Fortunately, a technical
error in procedure led to a second hearing, which resulted in
the acquittal of the accused. Still, the first verdict remains
inexcusable. The shooting of distinguished Germans in Mo-
rocco amounts to a judicial murder of the worst kind; it is a
stain on the honor of French law courts. No sensible person
could doubt the unreliability of the native witnesses for the
prosecution.

Finally, many quite obvious breaches of law have taken place
without any attempt being made to disguise the facts, while the
validity of the legal rule which was broken has not been denied
at all. Under this classification fall such deeds as the English
destruction of the German auxiliary cruiser Kaiser tVilhelm der
Grosse, in neutral waters, the British seizure of the hospital
ship Ophelia, the theft and destruction of mail bound for, and
leaving, Germany. These instances could be multiplied indefi-
nitely, as one breach of the law has followed hard upon the
other. But enough. We sought only to give examples.

What is of far greater moment is the fact that in this war
many breaches of law have occurred under the plea that the
rules ofiEended against had no force in international law — rules
whose recognition up to that time had been looked upon as ab-
solutely established. It is not a case of denying the facts, but of
denying the binding force of the rule contravened. The dis^
pute is confined to the legal sphere, and is therefore more dan-
gerous. It is a greater threat to the future. For while one may
always trust that a particular violation of law will not occur
again, the denial of the validity of the legal rule itself amounts
to an announcement that a similar course will be taken in the
future. The fact that a denial of legal norms on so broad a
scale is possible at all is due to the nature of the sources of
international law.

For centuries the general law of nations has, in substance,
been developed by practical usage without conscious law-making
— ^that is, as unwritten law. In the last decades, especially in

MODERN GERMANY 6oi

the sphere of the law of war, conscious law-making through in-
ternational agreements has steadily gained ground. In this con-
nection may be mentioned the numerous agreements of the two
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the new Geneva
Convention of 1906 and the Declaration of London of 1909.
The formulation of international law in these conventions has
been hailed with great satisfaction and often^ enthusiastically
praised. But it has entailed an evil consequence — ^an inclina-
tion to overestimate the conventions. There is a temptation to
consider the convention as the sole source of international law
and the conventional law as the only existing international law.
Both of these assumptions would be erroneous.

Above all, it must never be forgotten that the embodiment
of international law in state treaties is not identical with a codi-
fication, such as civil law has undergone in France in the Code
Civil, and in Germany in the Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, The
state treaties do not comprise the whole sphere of the law of
war; some important matters are not even touched upon. And
even where a matter is regulated, it is in no way a complete
and exclusive codification of the recognized law. On the con-
trary, in both respects, the unwritten law, unless modified by
treaty, continues in force by the side of it. This is stated in
clear terms in several of the conventions. The Hague con-
vention with respect to war on land in its preamble explicitly
states:

"It has not, however, been found possible at present to
agree in regard to regulations covering all the circumstances
which arise in practice. On the other hand, the high con-
tracting parties do not intend that unforeseen cases should,
in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the arbi-
trary judgment of military commanders. Until a more com-
plete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high con-
tracting parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases
not included in the regulations adopted by them, the inhab-
itants and the belligerents remain under the protection and
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience."

To the same effect, only more briefly and therefore more dis-
tinctly, in the convention relative to restrictions with regard to
the exercise of the right of capture in naval war, the desire is
expressed to frame a certain number of rules, "without afiEecting

6oa MODERN GERMANY

the common law now in force in respect to those matters which
that law has left unsettled'*; and in the convention concerning
the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war, it is
similarly stated : ''seeing that even if it is not possible at present
to concert measures applicable to all cases which may in prac-
tice occur and which are not covered by the present convention
— it is, nevertheless, expedient to take into consideration the
general principles of the law of nations."

Therefore, all other international law, i. e., law not laid
down in the conventions, continues to coexist along with the
conventional law. The first leading principle, therefore, is that
the fact that a rule is not mentioned in the conventions does not
permit the conclusion that it is not valid law. Or, in other
words, if specific duties are imposed on a state by a conven-
tion, that fact is not proof that such duties are the only ones
it must observe. Are we to think, c. g., that a neutral state
really satisfies the demands of international law, if it merely
complies with the duties mentioned by the two Hague Con-
ventions respecting neutrality? What a paltry thing neutrality
would be if its meaning were limited to those few meagre stip-
ulations I The law established by agreement must needs be com-
plemented by the law not so established.

However, to be able to recognize this unestablished law is not
always easy. It originates from actual practice, which is the
expression on the part of the states of that which they hold to
be right. This common opinion of what is right, as evidenced
in actual practice, is binding on the individual state, because the
latter is a member of the community of states. General inter-
national law is common law, rooted in a community of states
of equal rank ; it is not autonomous law resulting from the sway
of a dominant state. Precedents in international law are fre-
quently scarce and contradictory ; interpretation may be doubtful,
since it happens that the law as established by practice is often
in dispute. There may even be points on which actual precedents
are altogether lacking. Numberless questions of law which the
present war has raised have not been settled either by written
sources or by previous practice. In such cases we are faced by
a gap in the law; but that does not mean that there is a lawless
vacuum. The gap must be filled up, and that causes many new
uncertainties and possibilities of dispute.

The preamble referred to in the convention respecting the
laws and customs of a war on land states very significantly:
''The high contracting parties have not had in mind that un-
foreseen cases should be left to the arbitrary judgment of the

MODERN GERMANY 603

military commanders." That must be amplified to mean that
they are not left at all to the will of the individual states,
nor to its legislation. When England now attempts to justify
the order of her Admiralty to British merchant vessels to fly
neutral flags, on the ground that according to British law such
misuse of flags is allowed, nothing at all is proved in reference
to the question of international law. England cannot by means
of a British statute acquire rights against other states. Rather
must the gap be filled in the manner customary in the sphere
of law, by analogy, and ultimately by falling back on broad
legal ideas — in this case on the ultimate basic principles of in-
ternational law, as they have gradually taken shape in common
opinion. Only from these broad principles can the decision in
the individual case be derived.

This, too, has found expression in the preamble referred to
in the convention concerning war on land. With a view to
supplementing the written law, it refers, first, to the established
customs, and in the second instance, when such established custom
is lacking, to the "principles of the law of nations, as they result
from . . • the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public
conscience." The expression is perhaps not above criticism, but
in substance it amounts to what we have said. For instance,
the necessary supplement of stipulations concerning the duties of
neutrals must be sought in the essential meaning of neutrality
itself. To be neutral means to remain impartial, not to favor
any of the belligerents. The neutral state is, therefore, in duty
bound, in eventualities not expressly mentioned in the conven-
tions, to refrain from doing anything which would amount to
taking sides with one of the parties to the war, and not to tol-
erate anything on the part of the population that would favor
the one or the other war-party. Nothing short of this is true
neutrality. It is instructive to observe in this war to what vary-
ing extent the various neutral states recognize and adhere to
these unwritten duties as neutrals.

The unwritten international law has, however, an even
greater import. Considered formally, the validity of the written
sources of the law can be disputed in the present war. A treaty
binds a state only when "ratified" by it. England has not rati-
fied either the London Declaration or the Hague Conventions
numbers 5 and 13, which concern the duties of neutrals in naval
war or in war on land, nor convention number 10 concerning
the adaptation to naval war of the Geneva Convention; while
Russia has not ratified convention number 8 relative to con-
tact mines nor number 1 1 relative to restrictions with regard to

604 MODERN GERMANY

the exercise of the right of capture in naval war. Serbia, Mon-
tenegro and Turkey have not ratified any of the conventions
of the Second Hague Conference, and Montenegro has even re-
fused to recognize the new Geneva Convention. Formally, there-
fore, all these conventions are not binding on the state that has
not ratified them. Indeed, this non-validity extends even fur-
ther. All the conventions just cited contain a clause that might
be termed the "general participation clause" and which provides
that these conventions shall bind the states that have ratified
them only in case all belligerent Powers have ratified them. The
participation in the war of one state that is not a party to the
conventions excludes their binding force as regards all the Pow-
ers. Only when a convention is nothing but a new formulation
of a former one (as, for instance, the convention of 1907 con-
cerning war on land compared to that of 1899, and the new
Geneva Convention compared to the old one), is the new conven-
tion to be valid, at least between those Powers which have rati-
fied it, even though there may be a Power participating in the
war which has only ratified the old and not the new conven-
tion. In respect to such a Power, the old convention remains
in force. Apart from this important exception, there is no bind-
ing force, formally speaking, for any of the belligerents, in any
of the above-mentioned conventions, in consequence of the par-
ticipation in the war by Serbia, Montenegro and Turkey. But
in so far as the conventions are to be considered as not valid, the
unwritten international law retains its force; it is applicable in-
stead of the written law.

In determining this unwritten law, however, the written
sources play a prominent part. In fact their formal non-validity
is scarcely of importance. For, in large measure, it was not in-
tended by the conventions to make new law, but rather to
formulate the existing law, deciding at the same time ques-
tions in dispute and adding improvements and completions. This,
too, is directly expressed in the preamble to various conventions
(The Hague Convention numbers 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, the new
Geneva Convention, the Declaration of London). The formal
non-validity of a convention is, therefore, no proof that its con-
tents are not valid law, just the same; we may, therefore, add to
our first principle this second one: A rule is not to be con-
sidered invalid because it is formulated in a convention which
itself is not formally recognized as in force.

Conversely, it may be said, the various conventions, notwith-
standing their formal non-validity, when cautiously employed,
lend themselves as sources for determining the law that had ex-

MODERN GERMANY 605

istcd apart from tfaem. More than this. The laying down of
certain principles of law in the conventions has, even though it
may not have imparted formal, binding force, nevertheless gained
a dedtsiive influence on, and confirmed public opinion regarding the
legal points involved. The written word, even when formally
invalid, is' nevertheless not without force. The form which has
been given in the conventions to legal principles has become part
and parcel of the public's legal views and given shape to them.
This is evident from the fact that some belligerents have, at
least partly, acknowledged the binding force of the conventions.
Typical in this respect is the reply of the German government
in answer to the protests by the British government concerning
alleged breaches by Germany of the convention concerning
mines. The reply, while acknowledging that since Rus-
sia had not ratified the convention, it was not valid, owing to
the "general participation clause," even as between Germany and
England, goes on to say: "Nevertheless, the German govern-
ment of its own free will considers itself as bound by it." In
like manner, Germany has observed all the conventions; in par-
ticular has she recognized the Declaration of London concern-
ing the laws of naval war as binding through her incorpora-
tion of its stipulations in the German "Prize Regulations"
(Prisenordnung) .

In lamentable contrast to this attitude of Germany is that of
England, particularly in regard to the Declaration of London,
which she has practically demolished. This has been forcibly
and clearly set forth in the memorandum of February 4, 191 5,
which the German government issued, together with her decla-
ration of British waters as a war zone. England announced her
readiness to recognize the Declaration of London as a whole, but
subsequently, by a number of additional orders, modified the
Declaration to such an extent in all essential details that hardly
anything of it has been left. Let us now read the "Introduc-
tory Stipulation" with which this convention, signed though not
ratified by England, opens. It is as follows: "The Signatory
Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following
chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized
principles of international law." England has herself thereby
acknowledged that the law contained in the convention was valid
before the war. Moreover: England herself has previously
claimed (in her favor) as valid law a number of the principles
laid down in the Declaration of London — that is to say, she has
actually applied them as law. For her now to disclaim them is
sheer arbitrariness. There have always been disputes as to the

6o6 MODERN GERMANY

meaning of the term contraband, but the broad interpretation
which England gives to it, the elimination of the long recognized
distinction between relative and absolute contraband, and the
disavowal of the principles concerning blockade by the closing
of the North Sea, are, all of them, breaches of law which can-
not be excused on the plea of the formal non-validity of the Dec-
laration of London. These are measures undertaken solely with
the desire to ruin Germany economically, without considering
whether the methods adopted are in harmony with international
law or not. That such harmony does not exist, there cannot
really be the slightest doubt from a legal point of view.

Finally, even within the law written and recognized as valid,
it is indispensable to fall back on general legal principles. The
written word, after all, never can be more than a guide toward
a correct decision in legal questions. Its bearing must first be
ascertained by scientific method, a task which has to be solved in
international law in the same manner as in all other branches.

In the first place, the words have to be interpreted, their mean-
ing has to be ascertained. Interpretation of law is governed
by settled principles recognized by the jurisprudence of all na-
tions. The letter of the law may not be slavishly adhered to, but
at the same time it may not be brushed aside in an arbitrary
manner — as is, unfortunately, too often done. If every state
were at liberty to read white where black is set down, the writ-
ten law would be altogether' divested of meaning. Its signifi-
cance would cease. An interpretation that lends another mean-
ing to a clause than the .only one which its phraseology renders
possible, must be justified by the law in question itself, other-
wise it is merely arbitrary. Under the Hague conventions, the
bombarding of undefended towns is forbidden. Now, German
war vessels have bombarded the town of Libau. Libau is a
fortified port. Projectiles which were thrown did not fall within
the fortifications, but hit the commercial quarter of the city.
In Russia it was said that the rule forbidding the bombardment
of undefended towns was thereby violated. Obviously the phrase
''undefended town'* in this case is given a sense no one had
previously contemplated, or could have contemplated. The for-
tified part and the commercial quarter together constitute the
"town," and a town is defended if any part of it is defended.

A particularly remarkable example of the high-handed man-
ner in which England, with France and Russia in her wake,
circumvents obvious law by tricks of interpretation, is oflEered by
her treatment of Article 23 (h) of the regulations concerning
war on land. Here it is expressly stated that it is forbidden "to

MODERN GERMANY 607

Hledare abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law
ttc rights and actions of the hostile party." The text is abso-
lutely clear. Nevertheless, England at the outbreak of war
issued an order forbidding payments to be made to Germany
or Austria-Hungary, and France — ^here, too, England's docile
pupil — has made this prohibition of payment even more strin-
gent. On September 27th, she declared that all contracts con-
cluded since die outbreak of war with a subject of her enemies
should ipso facto become null and void, and that all contracts
previously entered into might, on application by the French
debtor, be declared void, provided they had not yet gone into
effect. England's action was no surprise. In fact, the prohibi-
tion of payment conforms with the provisions of English pri-
vate law, which has not been able to rid itself of the antiquated
idea that the individual citizen of the enemy state is in himself
an "alien enemy."

Sir Edward Grey, in 191 1, in agreement with the majority of
English legal writers, declared, that in the opinion of the British
government this rule of the English law had not been elimi-
nated by the stipulation referred to regarding the regulations
of war on land; that Article 23 (h) simply provided that the
military commanders of occupied enemy territory might not sus-
pend or declare inadmissible in court rights and claims of the
inhabitants of that territory. This interpretation is materially
incorrect, if for no other reason than because it is not until we
come to the third section (Article 42 et seg.) that the regulations
concerning war on land discuss the rights and duties of the
military authorities in occupied enemy territory, while in the
second section, in which Article 23 is found, the general aim in
view is to bring about a restriction of "the means of injuring
the enemy." What fully settles the point is the fact that at
the Hague negotiations the German delegates expressly pointed
out the broader meaning which they gave to Article 23 (h)
(which had been proposed by them), and that no opposition was
raised from any quarter. This is recorded in the minutes of
the meeting. It was the very purpose of the proposed Article 23
(h) to counteract the existing English law; its aim was to se-
cure respect for an important consequence resulting from the
great principle of the law of war, viz., the inviolability of pri-
vate property. If England held a different view, she should
have brought it forward at that time. She should not have agreed
to the article and — three years later — ^have ratified it, with the
mental reservation to interpret it in a manner different to that
in which it was meant by the other Powers. It is unnecessary

6o8 MODERN GERMANY

to state how such behavior would be characterized if occurring in
other domains of law.^

France's proceeding is even worse. That she understood Ar-
ticle 23 (h) in the same manner as Germany, there cannot be
the least doubt; practically the whole of her legal literature
supports the correct interpretation. Since the war, however, she
has simply disavowed her previous legal opinion, and, as the
docile pupil of England, adopted English measures — nay, out-
done the British themselves. A vassal's loyalty evidently gets
the better of legal conscience. The less said about Russian ac-
complishment the better ; it seems that for Russia the bounds of
international law have ceased to exist altogether.

On the other hand, the search for what is law must not stop
at the ascertainment of the meaning of the written word. Con-
siderations based on the general principles lead to results which
should take precedence of the words of the written law. The
law-maker — and the state that by conventions creates regulations
of international law is on a level with him — by his abstract rules
always intends to regulate the real conditions as these are known
to him. He is never in a position to foresee the entire manifold
variety of cases that may occur in real life. Thus it may easily
happen that he lays down a rule that is too general; a case of
a peculiar character may arise which falls under the general
rule, yet the conclusion may be justified that the law-maker, had
he contemplated this case in advance, would have restricted his
general rule. The idea which gave rise to that general rule docs
not apply in this case. And even if the rule at the time it was
framed was really applicable in all cases then possible, it may
be that after its creation conditions have changed, new facts
have arisen and new cases have become possible, which at the
time of framing the rule could not have been foreseen, and for
which it is now no longer suitable. If in such a case the old rule
were to be applied then, in the words of Mephistopheles, reason
would become a sham, beneficence a vexation.

In the jurisprudence of all nations it is recognised that in
. such cases the administration of the law must be at liberty to
deviate from the letter; the legal rule remains inapplicable be-
cause the supposition for which alone it is intended does not
apply. The German commercial code formerly contained special
legal rules for the conclusion of contracts between absent parties.
Then the telephone "was invented. Without hesitation, juris-
prudence dealing with the conclusion of contracts by telephone

^ In this connection see Strupp's treatise in Zeitschrift fur internationales Recht,
1913. Vol. XXIII, Sec. 2, p. 118 fiF.

MODERN GERMANY 609

has treated as inapplicable the principles regulating the con-
clusion of contract between absent parties, although these prin-
ciples applied according to the letter. In this sense the old legal
maxim holds good: "Cessante ratione legis cessat lex ipsa''
New actual conditions may call for new legal regulations; we
then assume that the law has a gap, and we fill it in the same
manner as we fill any other gap.

This general maxim of jurisprudential procedure is particu-
larly important in the case of the law of war. Technical science
and politics may o£Eer surprises which of necessity destroy the
framework of the old rules of international law. Who at the
time of the framing of the rules on naval warfare thought of
the possibilities of submarine warfare as witnessed to-day ? Had
they been anticipated, special rules would have been made. The
old principles of naval warfare cannot in this case be applied
without modification, new rules are required. In this connec-
tion, the principles of neutrality ofiEer still another example in
point: Although in the conventions concerning neutrality it is
declared that a neutral power is not called upon to prevent the
export of arms and ammunition for the benefit of one or the
other of the belligerents, circumstances may be such that this
stipulation, despite its general application, can no longer take
efiEect. It is devoid of meaning, unless under existing condi-
tions the delivery of munitions is possible to both parties, for the
ultimate essence of neutrality is that the neutral state must not
actually favor any party, it must treat both with impartiality.
This general principle of impartiality in treatment has there-
fore found expression in both of the Hague Conventions here in
question (Convention No. 5, Article 9; Convention No. 13, Ar-
ticle 9, and Introduction, fifth paragraph).

In the present war Germany and Austria-Hungary arc sur-
rounded on almost all sides by belligerent enemies. The geo-
graphical position is such that a delivery of munitions from the
United States to Germany and Austria-Hungary is actually out
of the question. In such a case it is the duty, the legal duty,
despite the stipulations quoted from the Hague Conventions, to
prevent the delivery to our enemies of war-material. That alone
conforms with the legal nature of neutrality, and therefore with
international law rightly conceived. A contrary procedure is
opposed to it. Laws must be interpreted in this true spirit, not
by mere verbal arguments — this truth is as old as jurisprudence
itself : "Scire leges non hoc est verba earum tenere, sed vim ac
potestatem/' says old Celsus.

6io MODERN GERMANY

And what will now happen? With sorrow wc watch this
whole spectacle, international law broken and shattered, a lofty
possession of human civilization trodden in the dust. We can
no longer close our eyes to the fact that international law has
not stood the test in this war. If the law relating to war on
land, though actually often broken, has to some extent at least
remained recognized, the law relating to naval warfare has been
almost completely rejected, leaving us face to face with a verit-
able chaos. This is very significant. The whole international
law is a community law; it depends, as was said in the be-
ginning, on the recognition of the fact that the states are co»
ordinated. This conception had become established on the Con-
tinent, between the Continental Powers now at war, as can be
seen from the manner in which war is being conducted on land.
It is different, however, at sea. England has never actually rec-
ognized the other states as standing on a footing of equality
with her on the water. If the aim of her policy has always
been to let no other naval Power arise, if she has consistently
endeavored to be the strongest naval Power, the question in-
volved was here one of actual strength. But in addition she
has always regarded herself as the ruling sea Power in the sense
that in questions of maritime law she considered her will as de-
cisive for all other European Powers.

One is justified in the assumption that the conception has not
yet found unreserved acceptance in England, even in theory, that
the law relating to naval warfare is the law of a community of
states of equal rank, to which every state whether great or small
must submit in like manner. Many of her breaches of mari-
time law may, perhaps, be accounted for by this theoretic back-
wardness: England does not regard them as breaches of law, be-
cause she still innocently adheres to the opinion that international
law in maritime matters is, in fact, English law. As a matter
of fact her behavior in questions of naval warfare is altogether
based on the principle, "Law at sea is only what I recognize as
law, no matter what has been before, no matter what my previ-
ous practice may have been, and I recognize only that as law
which suits my purpose." AH disputes concerning international
law would, indeed, speedily cease, if all states had but the good
sense to recognize this one maxim as absolute: Law at sea is
what England decides to be law.

What will now happen? 5ince international law is exter-
nally powerless, in that there is no tribunal which can compel
the observance of the law, only one remedy remains to the of-
fended state: it must help itself. It has been previously men-

MODERN GERMANY 6ii

tioned that everywhere the right of retribution, the right of re-
prisal, is recognized. Every state that has su£Eered injury in
respect to international law, acts lawfully when it returns one
breach of international law by another. But the nature of the
reprisals is altogether difiEerent in the two groups of breaches of
the law which we have distinguished. Where the international
law, though broken, is still recognized as valid, a reprisal means
only that the injured state returns the injury by a similar in-
jury, or if need be, by a breach of another kind. The state
thereby breaks the law itself, but breaks it legally; the act is
a permissible one. The state breaks the law because it recog-
nizes the validity of the law which the opponent has violated
and because it wishes to assert it. The reprisal is a breach of
the law for the sake of protecting the law. Nevertheless, it is
to be applied with great caution. It is useful in so far as the
hope is justified that by applying the reprisal the enemy will be
induced in the future to forbear from further breaches of in-
ternational law. But it is liable to fail only too easily in its
object and to conjure up even worse evil.

According to the principles of international law, a reprisal,
because it is a lawful action, does not by any means warrant
counter-reprisals. In reality, the danger that a retaliative meas-
ure will be reciprocated by a further retaliative measure is ob-
vious; and thus, instead of compelling the opponent to respect
international law, the reprisal may bring about an increase in
breaches of it. Only in rare instances has Germany resorted to
reprisals. When the news concerning the imprisonment of non-
combatant German subjects in France proved to be true, the
German government by way of retaliation imprisoned the
French citizens who happened to be in Germany ; she retaliated
against the unpardonable confinement by England of German
subjects in concentration camps, by imprisoning British sub-
jects in Germany. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the
confinement of the French and British subjects in Germany is
very lenient; they are deprived of their liberty, but for the rest
every hardship is spared them, in striking contradistinction to
what — according to unimpeachable reports — ^was, and still is, the
lot of at least some of the unfortunate Germans abroad. It is
difficult to restrain one's feeling in thinking of the treatment
of German women and children by the English in E^t Asia,
or in remembering how a civilized state like France has dragged
off Germans to unhealthy parts of tropical Africa, not to speak
of that which is taking place in Russia. On the other hand,
Germany has refrained from rendering like for like. On no

6i2 MODERN GERMANY

occasion has the violation of the Red Cross been reciprocated
by any sort of retaliatory measure. The judicial murder of
Casablanca could easily have been avenged, since we have a large
portion of France in our possession. It has not been done. The
respect for international law, the sense of duty which civiliza-
tion imposes, was powerful enough to drown the call for retali-
ation.

Things are, however, different when legal rules are repudi-
ated. All law of nations, according to its nature, is mutual,
because it aims to regulate the relations of states to one another.
As soon, therefore, as one state in its relation to its enemy refuses
to acknowledge any longer the validity of a rule of law, such
provision ceases to be binding on the enemy, also. That is, in-
deed, the gist of the "general participation clause," which is con-
tained in nearly all conventions: No belligerent state shall in
regard to international law be more favorably situated than its
opponent; a rule which is not binding for the one is not bind-
ing for the other. All legal rules, therefore, which one party
refuses to accept as binding lose their binding force for the op-
ponent also, and if one party puts forward a new legal rule the
enemy may do likewise. It must be admitted that international
law is a law of weak vitality, in that an individual war-party, if
evilly inclined, can render .it invalid. Through the English and
French prohibition against payments to us, the above-mentioned
article of the regulations of war on land ceased to bind Ger-
many: we were then at liberty to reply to this prohibition of
payment by an identical one in respect to those states, and we
did so — although in a very moderate manner. In Germany the
foreign claims are merely suspended, not abolished, and foreign
private property, though placed under supervision and admin-
istration, has in no instance been illegally confiscated.

England has from the start rendered invalid in its most im-
portant provisions the Declaration of London, which according
to its own wording must be treated as a whole and cannot be
separated. Accordingly, its binding force automatically ceased
to exist for Germany, who had at first recognized it. A legal
norm cannot bind the one if it does not bind the other. There-
fore, Germany was absolutely right when, in imitation of Eng-
land's methods of carrying on naval warfare, she declared the
English coastal waters a war zone. The rights of neutrals were
not thereby prejudiced. If a subject of a neutral Power during
a war on land ventures upon the battle-field, a bullet may hit him ;
the belligerent is under no obligation to silence his rifles and ar-
tillery because they may strike the subject of a neutral Power.

MODERN GERMANY 613

Nor is Gennany responsible if, in the naval war which, after her
own manner and with the means at her disposal, she is waging
against England, a neutral ship that ventures into the war zone
comes to grief. If in a duel a non-participant places himself so
that one of the parties has to choose between not fighting or hurt-
ing the onlooker, and if this onlooker insists that he must not be
hurt, he prevents this duellist from defending himself and thereby
actually favors the other party. Is this really to be called neu-
trality? England not only wishes to damage Germany by her
methods of procedure, she sdso abuses the rights of neutrals in the
most barefaced manner. She represents her treatment of Ger-
many as a retributive measure — ^wrongly so, for Germany had
fully observed the Declaration of London, as well as all odier
maritime laws of war, until their breach by England. But even
if she were entitled to retaliate upon Germany — she is not so
entitled, as has been said — this would never excuse her viola-
tion of the ri^ts of neutrals. She is now going even furdier:
in her latest measures she does not hesitate to discard the old-
established rules of the Declaration of Paris, which have enjoyed
undisputed validity from the formal point of view. The whole
maritime law of war seems to collapse before our eyes.

The procedure of our opponents, which runs counter to inter-
national law, entails the danger that through resorting to re-
prisals and counter-reprisals die evils of the war will grow
more and more extensive, that the methods governing it will
grow more and more merciless, bloody and ghastly. And even
beyond this application of reprisals, there is the further danger
that, on account of so many infractions, the rulers of states,
armies and navies, and the nations generally, will in the end cease
to believe in the sacredness of international law. It must be
observed with sorrow that the consciousness of the nations regard-
ing international law as a binding force, a consciousness which
was happily growing, is now on the wane. For this reason it
is to be feared that each individual state which suffers from the
breaches of the law committed by its enemies will, in the end,
cease to regard itself as bound by anything, and will consult
only its own momentary advantage, with the sword as the sole
arbiter. If this once comes to be the case, war will finally turn
into a struggle for complete annihilation among the civilized
nations.

The loss which this war has caused and is apparently still
going to cause to international law is immense. Nevertheless,
we do not despair of the future of international law — at least
not if, as we hope, Germany be victorious. It will be one of our

6i4 MODERN GERMANY

chief solicitudes then to see that a new international law is built
up on broader and more liberal principles. All international law
is founded on the conception of equal rights for all nations.
Germany has never aspired to world-dominion, nor will she ever
do so in the future; history has taught us, only too clearly, that
world-supremacy is a delusive blessing. Germany wants light
and air for herself, but she also wants every nation to live and
prosper in its own individual way. We are convinced that there
is room for all in the world, and that the happiness and well-
being of one nation does not stand in the way of another's hap-
piness, but that, on the contrary, it increases it. England,
however, cannot free herself of the idea that at sea she is su-
preme, that there her will alone is paramount Too long have
the peoples of the earth submitted to this. The hour is near, we
trust, when they need do so no longer. We are waging this
struggle not only for ourselves, for our maintenance as a state,
for our existence as a nation, for our share in the culture of hu-
mankind, but we are in the last resort fighting it in the interest
of all nations. This may not be realized to-day, but the time
will come when the war will be looked upon from this point
of view. The word of the great Dutchman, that the sea is free,
has not up to this time been a truth. It shall become a truth,
and this will be due to Germany.

CHAPTER III
THE MEANING OF THE WAR

PROFESSOR OTTO HINTZE, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERUN

THE English are fond of comparing the war which they and
their allies are waging against us to that waged against
Napoleon I. They accuse us of purposing to subjugate the Conti«>
nent to our domination in order to crush and rob England. The re»
quirements of warfare, it is true, make it imperative that we
diould gain to a certain point the ascendancy over our Conti-
nental enemies, in order to grapple with England, and force
her to make peace. But that our poUcy has been guided by this
intention for years cannot be accepted by any impartial student
of contemporary history. If this had been our purpose, we
would have taken advantage of England's dilemma in the Boer
War and of that of Russia in the Japanese War to render one or
the other of our present adversaries innocuous. We made no
attempt to do so. Rather has our policy been to keep peace as
long as this was compatible with the honor and vital interests
of our people. Our chances for further progress were vastly
greater through the development of our forces in peaceful com-
petition with other nations than by a world war, in which all
the other Powers except ourselves had a clear and fixed aim in
view as the prize of victory. The resemblance of the present
war to the Napoleonic conflict consists only in the fact that Eng-
land has again set her Continental allies against that Power
which she at present regards as the chief opponent to her su-
premacy at sea and in international trade.

It is absurd — in view of the political history of the past
twenty years — to speak of Germany's ambition for world domin-
ion as like that of Napoleon I. From our point of view the
present crisis resembles rather that which the Prussia of Fred-
erick the Great endured in the Seven Years* War. To-day the
German Empire is fighting for its existence as a Great Power
just as the Prussian State did at that time. The question for us
is whether we shall be able to maintain our position in the
ranks of the World Powers, or whether our opponents will suc-
ceed in ousting us from that position. Allied with us, Austria-
Hungary, too, is defending her existence as a Great Power. The

615

6i6 MODERN GERMANY

two Central European Powers are in danger of being crushed by
the border countries of our continent. These border countries,
favored by greater possibilites of expanding beyond the boun-
daries of Europe, and united by a community of interests — ^which
is probably only temporary — are endeavoring to cut off the Cen-
tral Powers from the outside world, and to reduce their strength
to such an extent that they would be harmless as competitors in
world politics.

We must frustrate this attempt and prevent, if possible, a
repetition of similar dangerous crises. Our chief and imme- \
diate goal is to overthrow the plans of our enemies, to teach them ^
the necessary respect for our arms on land and sea, to break the
iron ring which has paralyzed our world politics for so long with
its concentric pressure, and to gain and secure the possibility for
free development of our forces and for undisturbed pursuit of
our vital interests in the world. We want to maintain our
place in the sun. Nor shall we allow ourselves to be ousted
from the ranks of World Powers, in spite of our confined posi-
tion on the Continent We must endeavor to strengthen our
position in such a manner that the dangers now threatening us \
will be reduced as much as possible. But we are far from en-
tertaining plans of world domination such as are pursued by
England and perhaps Russia. The public, it is true, has a
rather hazy conception of the meaning of the phrase "World
Power." Certain minor German publicists think that a World
Power must be boundless in its demands and its ambition for
power. That is not the real significance of this term. Such is
certainly not the goal of practical German politics. We do not
understand by a World Power one which dominates and dic-
tates to the world, nor a new Rome that does not suffer any
other Power besides itself to enjoy equal rights. We take the
term as meaning a Great Power within the bounds of the new
world system of states, a Power of that type which is at once
a result and a requirement of the enlarged circumstances of the
world. We wish to stand as a World Power next to other
World Powers in the future community of states, just as we
have stood as a Great Power next to Great Powers in the
hitherto existing European state system. It would be contrary i ^
to the spirit in which we wage this war were we to lay claim
to a supremacy such as England possesses or desires, which threat-
ens the independence of other nations. This British supremacy
must be ended, but it must not be transferred from one Power
to another. Moreover, there is much to indicate that the world
supremacy of one Power would be much more unbearable in the

MODERN GERMANY 617

new world system of states than it has been so far in the European
state system.

The idea on which our policy is based is, therefore, not that
of world domination, but rather that of the balance of power.
In this connection we must enter a protest against the way in
which this conceptioQ has for centuries been falsified by England.
That which is understood in England by the European balance
of power is nothing more nor less than the principle that the Con-
tinental Powers must fight, balance and neutralize one another,
so that Britain can establish her maritime and commercial domi-
nance without let or hindrance. Things are no different to-day in
this respect than two hundred years ago. This system of the bal-
ance of power is, according to England's idea, to be limited to
Europe. As a World Power, England does not form an integral
part of this system. She lays claim only to control and regulate it.
In the future world system of states there is to be, according
to England's conception, no balance of power, because this
would be incompatible with England's supremacy at sea and in
commerce. European balance of power is for England only a
catchword, a deceptive formula which cloaks her plans of world
domination. The real balance of power in the world system of
states for which we are striving would be based on the premise
that England renounce her claims to absolute supremacy at sea.

This will be difficult to accomplish. The economic structure
of modern England is so dependent on her supremacy at sea
that its abolition might have the most disastrous results. Eng- ^
land has become a purely industrial state and has allowed her |
agriculture to decay; she needs imperatively a regular overseas 1
influx of provisions and raw materials to feed her population i
and keep her factories going. The safeguarding of these im-
ports is the vital question for the United Kingdom; if in a
war they were cut off for more than six weeks, or even seriously
interrupted, England would be forced by starvation and unem-
ployment to make peace. Absolute supremacy at sea, therefore,
is regarded in England as a condition necessary to the existence
of the British state. If you ask what divine or human law
apportioned supremacy at sea to the Britons for all times, the
Englishman will draw your attention to the conditions just
analyzed, with that naivete with which he confounds his na-
tional interests with those of the universe.

Lust for world-dominion has always had a disintegrating ef-
fect upon the national structure of states which have yielded to
it. The British dependence on sea traffic is a weakness which
has been produced by the lust for maritime and conunercial

6i8 MODERN GERMANY

supremacy in the world. Is this weakness of England suiEcient
reason for the other Powers to tolerate forever her domination
at sea? To a certain extent this seemed a passable excuse so
long as England's requirements for existence did not come into
irreconcilable conflict with those of other great nations. As
matters stand in this war, however, England's supremacy at
sea is meant not only to safeguard her own national existence,
but to starve the German people, nearly seventy million souls.
England is carrying on this war primarily not against our army
and our fleet, but against our women and children. For us,
therefore, the necessity is just as urgent that this British tyranny
be abolished. The world may be sure that we are determined
to resort to all possible means to defend our life in this war,
which has been forced upon us by England. The relentlessness
with which we are compelled to carry on the war is solely the
fault of England. The solution of the underlying differences
would have been very easy. England need only have agreed
to what all nations demanded, that the right of capture at sea
should be abolished, at least for provisions and raw material.
Then the appeal to starvation as an ally in this war would have
been impossible. England thought that in this she possessed a
powerful weapon which she did not wish to surrender. Per-
haps she will learn by experience that this weapon is two-edged
and that its use is fraught with dangers which make it appear
advisable to relinquish it.

Though the English may cling to the idea which permeates
all their political life that to them as God's chosen people is
due an especially favored place in the world, they cannot expect
us to agree to this conception and bow to its consequences.
We hope, too, that the other nations on whom the yoke of
British naval supremacy weighs heavily will pull themselves to-
gether and cast it off. The British fleet is not only a means
of safeguarding British vital interests, but is also a very dan-
gerous weapon which .menaces all coasts and is able to subject
all non-British shipping to a paralyzing control. England has
at all times unscrupulously and arbitrarily twisted and manipu-
lated the laws of naval warfare in the interest of her sole
supremacy. She has always infringed on the rights of neutrals
in naval warfare in order to damage as much as possible all her
competitors — not alone her enemies — in trade and shipping. In
the present war the timid protests, made not only by the small
naval powers, but even by the United States — ^protests against
the damage to their shipping and against misuse of their flag
by England, the mistress of the seas--die timidly away. Has it

MODERN GERMANY 619

really come to such a pass that the world cannot make a stand I *
against England's naval tyranny, and that the old call for free-
dom of the seas has become only an empty word? We cannot
and will not believe this. We have taken up arms against
England's domination of the sea and of the world at large, be-
cause she is menacing our vital interests by a murderous naval
warfare contrary to international law. In answer to England's
acts, we are carrying on the war with extreme measures and
ruthlessness, not because superior power, but because the
knavery and deceit of our enemies and our own consequent
necessity force us to do so. But we are far removed from
wishing to substitute a German tyranny for that of Eng-
land. We are fighting for the freedom of the seas and the
humane laws of naval warfare formulated in the Declaration
of London of 1909, which are in accordance with the concep-
tions of the rights and laws of all nations, but not with the
special interests of England, who prevented the adoption of
these laws. We want to supplement the balance of power on
land with the balance of power at sea, to create the only perma-
nent and sound foundation for a world system of states.

In this struggle against British supremacy at sea and world
dominion we are fighting for the interests of the world's traffic
and trade and for an economic and political prerequisite to the
state system of the future. If we do not fight this war to the
end now, then later on other nations will take it up again.

Even before the war, England had to relinquish the exercise
to its full extent of her maritime supremacy; she had to with-
draw a great part of the garrisons from her foreign naval
stations, concentrating her forces in home waters. That was
the effect of German naval armament. It had already visibly
benefited other maritime nations. The pressure which Eng-
land had hitherto exercised in foreign continents was decreas-
ing perceptibly.

The great Dominions — ^whose demonstrations of sympathy
and active aid to the motherland are, after all, of only small
politico-military value — are, more and more, tending to complete
autonomy. The era of 'colonial rule in Asia and on the north
coast of Africa will, it seems likely, soon come to an end, as
that in America and Australia has already done. The former
dream of the rule of the world by the white race has been de-
stroyed by the rise of Japan, and who knows how short a time
it may be before the slogan, "Asia for the Asiatics," is realized.
The rise of Islam must inevitably be a powerful factor in this
change of conditions in the world. Only in Central Africa,

620 MODERN GERMANY

among the uncivilized negro peoples, does there seem still to be
a great future for colonial activity. That activity must, how-
ever, limit itself to promoting welfare and morality rather than
engaging in the ruthless exploitation of natural treasures and hu-
man forces, with an eye to large and immediate profits, as is the
practice, for example, in the Belgian Congo.

The irresistible progress of the littoral countries of the Pa-
cific, which makes them the chief problem of trade and politics
of the world, is also fateful for British maritime and world
dominion. The present war is speeding this development by
giving Japan a valuable opportunity, which will perhaps never
recur, to make use of her military superiority over China. Will
the United Stat^ look on quietly at this dangerous proceeding?
Is the profit accruing to a few business men for the delivery of
munitions of war to our enemies blinding the United States to
the fact that this trade is prolonging the war and increasing
Japan's opportunity to strengthen her power? Arc American
sympathies for England greater than American interests?

But perhaps none of the neutral states has a greater interest in
destroying England's naval supremacy than Italy.^ Nature has
predestined Italy to the position of supreme Power in the Medi-
terranean, but political development has brought it about that
to-day the long coast-line of the Apennine peninsula is more a
factor of weakness than of strength. England controls, by virtue
of her possession of Gibraltar, the western basin of the Mediter-
ranean, by her possession of Malta the eastern, and by that of
Egypt the Suez CanaL Once Italy had in the all-powerful Brit-
ish navy a protector against France, who had come threateningly
near to her after the occupation of Tunis. The position of Italy
was not ideal, but Great Britain offered her a moderate amount
of security. Now England has allied herself with France and
entrusted her, within certain limits, with the protection of the
Mediterranean. What role could Italy play by the side of a
victorious England and France? Of what use would even
Trieste be to her, with a growing Slavonic popidation all around
and a hostile hinterland in the rear? Trieste is indispensable to
Austria; in Italy's hands it would become a waste place. It is
useless now to recall the Dreibund, within the bounds of which
Italy satisfactorily promoted her economic and political inter-
ests for more than thirty years. We do not know the exact
obligations which the Dreibund imposed — especially after the
renewal in 1912. If, in declaring her neutrality, Italy denied

^ It is well to recall that this was written earty in the year 19151 before
Italy had decided to embrace the cause of the Allies. — ^TkAWSLATOi'a xotb.

MODERN GERMANY 621

the defensive character of the war, she based her declaration on
an interpretation which we naturally refuse to share. But be-
hind this explanation are, of course, other reasons to the justice
of which we do not, by any means, wish to turn a deaf ear.
If, on the other hand, there is now a strong current of public
opinion urging her to abandon neutrality and side with the
Triple Entente, it is more a mixture of Latin race sentimentality,
Irredentist hate of Austria and democratic-republican sympathies
that is stirring the national soul, than the sound instinct of po-
litical interests. Italy's political interests clearly require a weak-
ening of France and England, her superior rivals in the Medi-
terranean, and they also require a strengthening of Central
Europe. Even in the event of victory, Italy's connection with
Republican France would in a country of democratic unrest shake
the last remnant of monarchical audiority, thereby endangering
the course of prudent politics and the very position of power of
the country.^

Just as Italy is menaced by England and France, so too are
the eastern Balkan states— especially Rumania — ^menaced by
Russia. The candid declarations of the Russian ministers and
party leaders in the last Duma session (February 9, 191 5) leave
no room for doubt that Russia not only aims at the opening of
the Dardanelles, but at their outright possession, together with
Constantinople and the shores of the Black Sea in Asia Minor.
But if the Black Sea thus becomes a Russian sea, how could
Rumania escape the danger of complete dependence on her dom-
ineering neighbor? In what a situation would she be placed
economically, since she has no other access to the ocean except
by way of the Dardanelles, through which 95 per cent, of her
exports pass? Although the numerous influences which are at
work in the country to induce Rumania to join the Triple
Entente direct the nationalistic desires of the population towards
Transylvanian territory, Rumania's real interests point beyond
the Pruth; they demand that she join the Central European
"block," with its front turned against Russia, whose victory

^ While tUs book wu going to press Italy's secession from the Triplo
Alliance to the side of our enemies took place. It is not possible to discuss
this fact here and the literature it has produced, because the motives of the
Italian government are not easy to determine. Italy's dependence on Engluid
evidently has played as important a part in this situation as the sympathies
of the radical Irredentists and Free Masons for France. Article VII of the
Triple Alliance treaty does* not in any way justify Italy's action, nor had
it been interpreted in this sense in August. It is even more diificuU to
reconcile Italy's stand with Article IV. which bound Italy to mainUin a
benevolent neutrality in case she should not think it advisable to join her
allies in the war. We feel justified, therefore, in using such terms as breach
of faith.

622 MODERN GERMANY

would make Serbia great, but would subject all odier Balkan
peoples to an insupportable pressure.

The two great imperialistic currents — the British and the
Russian — which have joined in this war against the Central
European Powers, are au fond inimical to each other. If Russia
holds the Dardanelles, then England's sovereignty in the Medi-
terranean, Egypt and the Suez Canal is menaced. It remains to
be seen whether England will really permit such a change when
it becomes imminent. Her hitherto compliant attitude is prob-
ably designed to leave to other Poweis the odium of opposition
to this plan and to gain Russia's sword by prospects which will
not be realized for a long time to come. It is certain, however,
that Russia and England would soon be at cross-purposes in
Asia. Russian expansion in Asia — ^which Prince Uchtomski, in
his great work on the Oriental journey of the then heir to the
throne, written in the early nineties, described as the historical
mission of Czardom ^ — involves a natural hostility towards the
colonizing island people, who in the Far East are scoring signal
successes in bringing the influence of west European culture to
bear against the Russians, who feel themselves intellectually akin
to the Asiatics. The common victory of the two chief exponents
of imperialism would at first spell a sort of partition of the
world between them, but the final struggle for world dominion
would inevitably and speedily follow.

We are unable to see therein salvation for humanity. We are
not only fighting for our own power and independence by trying
to stave this off, but for the freedom of all nations. The earth
is to be neither Anglo-Saxon nor Muscovite. We do not want
world domination by one single nation, but that vigorous co-
existence of free nations and states that has hitherto been the
foundation of modem Kultur. The Kultur of the newer na-
tions would be strangled in the octopus coils of a world-dominat-
ing England or Russia, as was once the ancient world in the
embrace of world-dominating Rome. British imperialism en-
deavors, as Professor Cramb has put it, to give the dominated
races an English soul.^ That is characteristic of a nation that
has never sought to comprehend and adapt itself to the peculiari-
ties of foreign races and nations. The British colonial ofiicial is,
it is true, able to govern the inhabitants of India, but he does
not understand their psychology. English education may be
able to impart certain exterior habits of life, but it is not able

^ Oi^ientrtise S. M. des Kaisers von Russland Nikolaus II als GrossfUrst^
Thronfolger, Prince E. Uchtomski, Leipzig, 1809, VoL II, p. 388 ff.
* Germany and England, by J. A. Cramb, London, 19 14, p. las.

MODERN GERMANY • 623

to dominate and form Oriental thinking and feeling. The Rus-
sians seems to understand the soul of the Orient better, but only
in so far as the dull uneducated masses are concerned, the masses
who need to be ruled along patriarchal-despotic lines. Russians
are essentially foreign to the cultural ideals of the Occident and do
not understand them. Even to-day Russian imperialism pro-
claims the principle: One God, one Czar, one Empire. With
what religious and nationalistic intolerance and with what bar-
baric methods this principle is carried out is shown by the treat-
ment of the Ruthenians in East Galicia, whom Russia is trying
by violent measures to rob of their nationality and of their old
allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church.

These methods are foreign to the German. We have always
had a profounder understanding and higher regard for foreign
peculiarities. What we regard as the future ideal is a system of
World Powers who mutually recognize and respect one an-
other's independence and equality, as was formerly the case with
the Great Powers in the European conmiunity of states. And by
the side of these World Powers we want also the smaller or
less powerful and less developed states to be safeguarded in their
independent existence, provided they do not, if they are our neigh-
bors, secretly conspire with our enemies against us. We do not
share Lord Salisbury's opinion that the big states must grow
greater and ever greater and the small states smaller and fewer.
If the necessities of world economics and world politics require
a unification of greater political areas, we conceive it as a com-
munity of interests of free, independent states, not as the estab-
lishment of a world empire according to the British or Russian
pattern. And we know that, in forming such a community,
much care, tact and patience will be needed.

We do not stand for any sort of world domination, but for the
principle of freedom and equal rights for all the nations of the
earth, in so far as they have attained to the necessary stage of civ-
ilization. This is in accordance with German nature. It is in
this sense that we desire to interpret the much-quoted prophetic
words of Emanuel Geibel, one of our noblest poets: "Am
deutschen Wesen soil die Welt genesen" ^ That is the object of
German tVeltpolitik; that is aJso the object of the war. We
are not waging it as the aggressor in order to put an end to
an untenable position. We are waging it in defense against a
long prepared attack of our neighbors, the object of which is to
strike us off the list of the World Powers. We are carrying
on the war in order to maintain our position in the rank of

* "The spirit of the German race shall heal the sickness of the world."

\

624 MODERN GERMANY

World Powers, in order to break the yoke of England's sea and
world dominion, but not to succeed to England's position as the
ruler of the world.

We want to found a new balance of power in the world
system of states. That is quite a different thing from what the
English understand by European balance of power. The false,
European balance of power of the English is a deceptive phan-
tasm. It is merely a means to England's world domination.
Real balance of power amongst the World Powers excludes ab-
solute domination at sea of any one single Power, and re-estab-
lishes the old principle of the freedom of the seas. That it is
also of higher ethical value than the English idea of world
domination must be clear to every one who perceives a higher
ideal in the possibility of free competition of all nations than in
the gratification of the national egoism of a single nation, which
regards its own welfare as the be-all and the end-all of the his-
tory of the world*

THE MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK

Professor Otto Hintze ("Germany and the World Powers"
and **The Meaning of the War") is Professor of History at
the University of Berlin. He is Secretary of the Society for
the History of Mark Brandenburg. He is the author of
Nationalism and Constitutionalism ( 1901 ) ; Civil Service
(1911) ; and British Plans of World Conquest and the Pres^
ent War (1915).

Professor Ernst Trobltsch, Ph. D., LL. D., ("The Spirit
of German Kultur'') is Professor of Theology at the Univer-
sity of Berlin. He was formerly Professor of Theology at the
University of Bonn. He is the author of Political Ethics and
Christianity ( 1 904) ; Separation of Church and State (1907) ;
and Protestantism and Origins of Modern Civilization
(1912).

Professor Hermann Schumacher, LL. D., Hon. LL. D.,
("Germany's International Economic Position") is Professor
of Social and Political Science at the University of Bonn.
From 1896 to 1901 he was an assistant in the Prussian Min-
istry of Public Works. He was Principal of the Commercial
Q)llege at Cologne and later Professor of Sociology in the
University of Kiel. In 1906 he was Exchange Professor at
Columbia University. He was sent by the German govern-
ment to the United States to study the system of handling
the grain trade, and he made an exhaustive report. He is
the author of Treaty Ports in China (1898); Railroads in
China (1900) ; and Industrial Insurance (1907). He is the
editor of Teubner's "Handbook of Trade and Industry."

Dr. Wilhelm Sojlf ("Germany's Colonial Policy*') is Secre-
tary of State for the Colonies, and an Upper Privy Councillor.
He was the representative of the Foreign Office at Calcutta.
He entered the Colonial Service, and was finally appointed
Governor of Samoa, where he established and put into practice
the German colonial policy. He is the editor of a number of
Sanskrit texts.

625

626 THE MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK

Professor Hans Dblbruck, Ph. D., ("The German Military
System") is Professor of History at the University of Berlin,
and a member of the Privy Council. He was a soldier in the
Franco-Prussian War. In 1882 he was made a member of
the House of Deputies, and in 1884 a member of the Reichs-
tag. He is the author of The Strategy of Pericles and Fred-
erick the Great (1890); Frederick, Napoleon, Moltke: An'
dent and Modern Strategy (1892); The Polish Question
(1893); History of Military Science (1900-1906). He is
the editor of the "Preussische Jahrbucher."

Professor Gustav von Schmoller ("The Origin and Nature
of German Institutions") is Professor of Political Economy at
the University of Berlin. He has held the same post at the
Universities of Halle and Strassburg. In 1887 he was made
Historiographer of the History of Brandenburg. Since 1899
he has been the Representative of the University of Berlin in
the Prussian Upper House. He is an Upper Privy Councillor
and a member of the Academy of Science. He is the author
of a number of bo6ks on questions of political economy and
administrative and constitutional history. He is the editor of
"Constitutional and Sociological Research" and "Annals of
Legislation, Administration and Political Economy of the Ger-
man Empire."

Doctor Hans Luther ("The Spirit of Self-government in
Germany") is City Councillor of Berlin. He was formerly
City Councillor of Magdeburg, and from there he was called
to Berlin and made Executive Commissioner of the "Diet of
Cities," which is a union of Prussian cities for the purpose of
study and improvement in communal and municipal adminis-
tration. He is the author of numerous essays on financial and
administrative questions.

Profesgor Friedrich Tezner, LL. D., ("The Inner Structure
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy") is Professor of Law
at the University of Vienna. He is a member of the Royal
Court Council. He is the author of a number of legal works
and books on the history of law.

Professor Ottocar Weber, Ph. D., ("Austria-Hungary's For-
eign Policy") is Director of the Historical Seminary of the
German University at Prague. He is the author of The Peace
of Utrecht (1891) ; From Luther to Bismarck (1906) ; Ger-
man History: From 1684 to 1806 (1913).

THE MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK 627

Professor Carl Becker ("Turkey") is Professor of Oriental
History and Languages, and Director of the Oriental Sem-
inary, at the University of Bonn. He was formerly Instruc-
tor in Semitic Philology in the University of Heidelberg,
and Professor of Oriental History and Civilization at the
Colonial Institute of Hamburg. He is the author of a number
of books about Mohammedan races, history and customs. He
is the editor of "Islam."

Professor Erich Marcks, Ph. D., ("England's Policy of
Force") is Professor of Modem History at the University of
Munich. He was formerly Professor of Modern History at
the Universities of Freiburg, Leipzig and Heidelberg. He is
a member of the Privy Council. He is the author of Queen
Elizabeth and Her Times (1897); Germany and England
(1900) ; Present-day Imperialism (1903).

Professor Paul Darmstadter ("France's Policy of Force")
is Professor of Economics and Colonial History at the Univer-
sity of Gottingen. He is the author of The Abolition of Serf-
dom in Savoy, Switzerland and Lorraine (1897) > ^^^ United
States of America: Its Political, Economic and Social Devel-
opment (1909) ; The History of the Partition and Coloniza-
tion of Africa Since the Period of Discoveries (Vol. I, 1913).

Professor Karl Hampb, Ph. D., ("Belgiiun and the Great
Powers") is Professor of Medieval History at the University
of Heidelberg. He formerly held the same chair at the Uni«
versity of Bonn. He is the author of Emperor Frederick II
(1899) > History of German Emperors (1909).

Professor Hans Uebbrsberger, Ph. D., ("Russia and Pan-
Slavism" and "Serbia's Role") is Professor of the History of
Eastern Europe at the University of Vienna. He is the author
of Austria and Russia Since the End of the iSth Century (Vol.
I, 1906) ; Russia's Oriental Policy in the Last Two Centu-
ries (Vol. I, 1913). He is associate editor of the "Magazine
of East-European History."

Professor Ottq Franke, Ph. D., ("The Great Powers in
East Asia") is Professor of the History and Languages of East
Asia at the Colonial Institute of Hamburg. He was for many
years in the German consular service in China and later in
the Chinese diplomatic service. He is the author of numerous

628 THE MEN WHO WROTE THIS BOOK

essays on the subjects of Chinese history, literature, philosophy,
politics and language.

Professor Hermann Oncken, Ph. D., ("Events Leading Up
to the World War'' and "The Outbreak of the War") is Pro-
fessor of Modern History at the University of Heidelberg;.
He was Professor of Modern History at the University of
Chicago in 1905, and later at the University of Giessen. He
is the author of America and the Great Powers (19 10) ; The
World War and the German Americans (1914).

Professor Walther Schoenborn, Ph. D., ("Belgium's Neu-
trality") is Professor of Public Law at the University of
Heidelberg. He is the author of The Occupation of Vera
Cruz, With an Appendix: Documents Concerning the Policy
of President Wilson Towards Mexico (1914), and a number
of books on law.

Professor Friedrich Meinecke, Ph. D., {"Kultur, Policy
of Power and Militarism") is Professor of History at the
University of Berlin. He has held the same chair in the Uni-
versities of Strassburg and Freiburg. He was formerly in
the Prussian Archive Service. He is a member of the Privy
Council. He is the author of From Stein to Bismarck (1908) ;
Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism (1911). He is the editor
of "The Historical Review."

Professor Ernst Zitelmann, LL. D., ("The War and Inter-
national Law") is Professor of Law at the University of Bonn
and Honorary Professor of Law at the University of Czerno-
witz. He was formerly Professor of Law at the Universities
of Leipzig, Gottingen and Halle. He is a Privy Councillor
of Justice. He is the author of a number of legal works and
books on the history of law.

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